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SUI.ILARY
This thesis is a historical and intellectual study
of a political movement in Germany known as revolutionary-
-nationalism. The movement had its origins in the First
World War, gathered strength during the early twenties, but
finally disintegrated in 1933 after the National Socialist
seizure of power. Attention is focussed initially on the
pre-war background to the development of the movement and
in particular to the Prussian tradition. Then there is
an analysis, using memoirs and other revolutionary-nationalist
literature, of the formative influence of the war-experience
on the movement. An account of post-war German nationalism
starting with the Freikorps and continuing with the rise
of the Nazi party provides the setting for the study of
an emergent ideology of revolutionary-nationalism. The
chief intellectual figures of the movement are the subject
of close textual analysis. These include Ernst Juenger, the
most important figure, Carl Schmitt, Hans Zahrer, Franz
Schauweoker, Frederic Hielscher, Tferner Best, Ernst Niekiseh
and Ernst von Salomon.
Their writings are related to general currents in German
social thought and German philosophy, including the sociology
of knowledge and Nietzsche's philosophy of the will-to-power.
Special emphasis is laid upon Hans Zehrer's political sociology
and Ernst Juenger's theory of technology. The relations
between the revolutionary-nationalists and the Nazi party
are discussed, and in particular their respective attitudes
towards political mobilisation. The thesis concludes with
a study of the impact of revolutionary-nationalist thought
in the post-war world upon the controversy over the nature
of modern technology.
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The other face of fascism in Germany from 1914 to 1933 was
revolutionary nationalism. It was a minority movement of ex-front
soldiers and intellectuals which stood in close proximity to the Nazi
movement. Its ambivalent and often confused relationship to the
Nazis has been seized upon by some critics as evidence that its idea
of a conservative revolution placed it as a firm opponent of Nazism."5"
The fact that one segment of the movement called itself national-
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bdLshevist has prompted others to see it as totally anti-fascist.
Even in the invaluable political history of the movement by Otto
Ernst Schueddekopfthere is a distinct exaggeration of its
ideological affinity with German communism and the left in general,
but its ideology was both anti-democratic and anti-Marxist.
Although it did stand between the Nazi and Communist parties, it was
to the former rather than the latter, that it generally gravitated.
For this rason the label of fascism is a very apt one. It is even
more apt when we realise two important things. European fascism was
at no time a homogeneous phenomenon. Political movements adopting
• fascist1 labels differed considerably both in their goals and their
organisation. The societies in which fascist regimes in the
inter-war years came to power differed considerably with regard both
their economies and their social structure.German national-sooiali3m
was no more the prototype of 'fascism' than Mussolini's Italian
fascism. The second crucial factor is this. The dimension of
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totalitarianism cuts across the distinction between fascism and
5
communism. In addition if there is a case, as James Gregor has
g
suggested, for regarding Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia and
Mussolini's Italy as developmental dictatorships, not only does the
homogeneous image of fascism become faintly absurd, the distinction
between fascism and communism itself becomes highly blurred. In
fact the proponents of German revolutionary-nationalism themselves
exploited the insecure and potentially dissoluble nature of these
conceptual boundaries by claiming to see virtue in all three
movements. At the same time they saw them as being initially
separate and autonomous. If it was possible to see similarities
between Italian fascism and German Nazism, it was also possible to
see connections between the former and Russian Bolshevism,
Without ever claiming allegiance to any of three movements,
revolutionary-nationalism, at different times and in different contexts
showed favour towards all of them. It was a movement of fascist
intellectuals whose own ideology testifies to the pitfalls and the
inadequacies of the indiscriminate use of the 'fascist' label.
This having been said, it is a movement which was by its historical
nature a component of German fascism. The intellectuals who dominated
the movement were the articulate exponents, not only of an attack
upon humanitarianism and the idea of progress, but of a doctrine of
the radical evil of human nature. Implicit in their view of man
and society was the presupposition of the inability or failure of
modern man to improve either his own or his social condition. At
its most extreme, as in the work of its central figure, Ernst
Juenger, it became an apology for contempt, despair and slavery.
The social basis of its value-attitudes resided, in a very clear
and singular manner, in the war experience of a whole generation of
junior German officers. This was the so-called front generation
which survived the Great ar. Trained in a severely authoritarian
and militaristic Prussian tradition, many acquired in combat a
gruesome appetite for murder and violence which outlived the
teraiination of the war itself. In the brutal exploits of the
Freikorps, the post-war volunteers, and later the private armies
of Nazism, Germany was to reap the harvest of this unquenchable
appetite. The clearest insight into the psychology of a mass
violence later to sweep through Europe in a devastating fashion, is
to be found in the writings of the revolutionary-nationalists.
For the latter, composed of many veterans of the front, claimed to
embody the spirit of the war-experience in their own writings and
activities. Their political goals which often differed from the
Nazis far doctrinal reasons were derived from attitudes which had
an identical root - the capitulation to the attractions of mass
slaughter and anoral brutality.
The central intellectual figure in the revolutionary-nationalist
movement is Ernst Juenger, war-hero and holder of the coveted
pour-le-merite. Juenger presented that rare example of
man-of-action turned thinker, of fighter turned dialectician.
Despite differences in historical and political circumstances, he can
on this particular count be compared to such diverse figures as
T. E, Lawrence, Andre Malraux or Che Guevera. His politics were
moulded by the nature of the war in which he was involved.
His war-diaries, published in Germany throughout the twenties, became best-
selling literature. Unlike many of his less literate front-
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contemporaries he was a master of literary style and something of an
unofficial spokesman for their soldierly life-style. Juenger was
at the centre of a fairly loose and amorphous intellectual circle
which included his brother and poet, Friedrich Goorg Juenger;
Carl Schmitt, the brilliant young political theorist renowned for his
attacks on the Weimar constitution end the parliament ry system;
Ernst Niekisch, one-time minister in the Bavarian Soviet Republic,
who was the leading national-bolshevist in Germany; and many others
including Franz Schauwecker, a fellow-front writer, and younger
disciples of the post-war era including Frederic Hielscher, irnst von
Salomon and Werner Best. In close proximity to Juenger's circle
stood the editorial board of the magazine die Tat, whose editor and
leading v/riter Hans Zehrer provided an important intellectual forum
for young nationalists. although revolutionary-nationalism as a
whole was much wider and more fragment fury in its organisation and
nature these were the men who gave it its predominantly intellectual
eiqphasis.
Despite the importance of Germany's fascist intellectuals to the
unde- standing of fascism, it would be true to say that nowhere else in
Europe was there as great a scepticism to the mass fascist movement
by intellectuals of similar political persuasion as in Germaxy.
There was no German equivalent of ary stature to Giovanni Gentile's
"Manifesto of fascist intellectuals" at Bologna in 1924# part from
Gottfried Benn, there were no Nazi supporters with the literary
credentials of French fascists such as Henri de Montherlant,
Drieu la Rochelle, Louis Ferdinand Celine or Robert Brasillach.
Mussolini could attract personal allegiance from men such as Gabriele
D'Anxvunzio and F.T. Marinetti and the leader of Action Francaise,
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Charles Maurras was a man with an outstanding intellectual reputation.
Hitler on the otter hand was scarcely able to captivate the German
intellectuals at all. In fact he alienated from Nazism many who might
otherwise have joined. The reasons for this, as we shall see, remain
central to the explanation of the political ineffectiveness and
isolation of revolutionary-nationalism as an independent movement.
One important source of the divergence between the minority
nationalist factions and the mass Nazi movement was the question of the
Prussian state. iVhile the Nazis admired the achievements of the
Prussian state, the basis of their racialist attitudes ~re to be
sought elsewhere. For the revolutionary-nationalists on the other
hand, the core of their nationalism lay in their allegiance to Prussia
- in a fundamental value attitude wi ich we sh 21 come to call
Prussianism. Not only did this trenchant Prussian attitude mean
separation from the Nazis, it also meant ultimately separation from
other European fascist movements with similar nationalist attitudes,
Mussolini's movement in particular which possessed many similar
characteristics to revolutionary-nationalism, was often rejected by
the "Prussians'1 as being too southern European, and infected by Romish
catholic sentiments. But there is something even more fundamental than
this cross-national incompatibility. Prussianism bore witness to
the essentially conservative origins of revolutionary-nationalism
and to that curious contradiotio in adjecto - the idea of a conservative
revolution.
How are we to understand this phenomenon? In its orthodox
sense conservatism as a political doctrine is pledged to the
conservation of what it considers are the stable and often 'natural'
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characteristics of existing society. In the nineteenth century,
German conservatism survived the attacks of an enlightened
humanitarianism and the belief in progress to remain a doctrine
commited to autocracy, tradition and order. As Klaus Epstein has
remarked, none of the early forms of German conservatism could ever
7
have envisaged revolution as being anything else than a deadly enemy.
The alternative conservative strategies typical of the nineteenth
century in general are on the one hand an attempt to repress all forms
of opposition by reactionary methods including fbrce and on the other
the creation of reformist policies aimed at preserving the status quo.
Revolution was invariably the main threat, the source of aggression
and subversion, the destroyer of all traditional forms of life,
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Moreover, as Karl Mannheim has noted, the political consciousness
of German conservatism in the late sixteenth century arose out of the
urgent need to discredit the revolutionary attack on its credentials.
Its alternative strategies, reaction or reform, only make sense as
strategies of a doctrine already under attack. On the face of it
Bismarck's policies in the Second Reich, substantially opposed to the
reformist parliamentarianism of Disraeli in Britain, seemed to validate
the policy of a reactionary and occasionally benevolent autocracy in
a period of industrialisation and widescale social change.
The First World »;ar however changed all that. It marked the
watershed of modern German history. An autocratic regime had seemed
to successfully endure the transition to a mass industrial age. But
Germary*s war-exhaustion and defeat put an end to such illusions.
A regime, an era and a way of life had collapsed overnight. The
apparent triumph of a traditional conservatism turned out to be a
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terrible illusion. To the young nationalist generation who fought
at the front the inability of a conservative and autocratic Germany
to defend itself against the 1918 revolution was an unforgivable form
of original sin. But once accomplished it was irreversible. In
the writings of Oswald Spengler and Arthur Moeller van der Bruck
who were the elder statesmen of the conservative revolution, there is
expressed again and again the sentiment which fired the hearts of many
young middle-class Germans. If conservatism had led to defend
itself against the revolutionary left and if the revolutionary left had
failed to seize power in turn, than a new conservatism could emerge
from the debacle w ich itself was revolutionary. If the fortress
of traditional conservatism had collapsed simultaneously Tilth the
collapse of its deadliest attackers, the onl, alternative was for
its former defenders to take on the mantle of destruction. The
Freikorps, the quasi-legal volunteer army which defended the newly
formed Republic against its leftish enemies, did so with a brutality and
a contempt for legality which gave a new and more sinister meaning to
Marx1 s caustic statement in the 18th Brumaire about the disrespect of
counter-revolutionary armies for the sacrosanct bourgeois values
which they are supposed to be defending. For many ex-front soldiers
the Freikorps were an excuse for the renewal of irrational sacrifice
and destruction. Under such conditions conservatism in its traditional
sense seemed to have lost all meaning. By 1930 one young nationalist
could write "to be consezvative is to affirm necessity, destirvy,
life-and-death; to believe in circumstances is utopian-rationalist.
The inability of a conservative and autocratic Germany to defend
itself in 1918 was in the eyes of many young nationalists an unpardonable
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Original sin. Once committed it was adjudged irreversible.
Revolution became fbr the German nationalists a weapon to be
expropiated from the would-be ineffectual leftist and Marxist
destroyers of conservative rule. For Hitler, the revolutionary
Marxist tactics of bringing the masses out onto the streets, was
something to be admired copied and finally bettered by national-
socialism. For the fascist intellectuals on the other hand the main
plagiarism from the Marxist left was the theoretical concept of
revolution itself. In both cases fascism sought political revenge
against the enemy whose methods it had adopted. But if orthodox
conservatism was already a shattered remanent of a bygone era, what
could their nationalism entail other tiian nostalgia and bitterness?
The answer of the revolutionary-nationalists was that it entailed the
perfection of statist rule to avenge the imperfect ons and humiliations
of history. Here the idea of revolution was more than a mere
concession to the climate of the modern age. It was a way of
formulating the dynamic and ruthless process by which a new type of
statist despotism relevant to the industrial societies of the twentieth
century was to be inaugurated. In the writings of Juenger and his
associates the worship of violence and revolution is both an exorcism
of conservative vulnerability and a spur to revenge against those who
have destroyed the autocratic order on w ich it was founded. The
inpetus to modernity is based on a deeply-felt resentment at the loss
of tradition. It is to the historical basis of this tradition that
we must now turn.
CHAPTER I
Part 2
The key to the revolutionary nature of German nationalism in
post-war Germany lies in the contradictory nature and historical
development of Germany as a nation in the nineteenth century.
Unlike France and Britain, Germany came into beirg as a nation-state only
after Bismarck's wars of unification and the founding of the Second
Reich in 1871. National sentiment had however preceded it by more
than half a century. The war of liberation against France in 1813
marked the beginnings of the widespread call for the development
of German national identity and unity. Even this however, had been
preceded by an almost unique historical development in the history of
European states - the fact was that Germany wa3 preceded by one
particular territorial area with its own administrative and statist
traditions which went back for centuries; - the nucleus and the source
of the creation of the German nation was Prussia. The stereotype of
German nationalism as a monolithic and militaristic display of
chauvinism which came to be adopted by the western democratic countries
during the First World War was not as unproblematic as it seemed. The
historical development of Germany was plagued by a double identity -
the cultural and ethnic identity of a "Germanic people" and the
historical fact of the particularistic and historically expanding state
in the north-east of Germany - the state of Prussia,
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century the iaeal of nation¬
hood propounded by thinkers such as Herder, Novalis or Wilhelm von
Humboldt was a cultural or spiritual one. They decreed that the
nation should embody vital cultural or spiritual values necessary
to the life of its people.1 Their writings carried in them the
flowering of cosmopolitan and humanistic ideals which had een
nurtured in the generation of Goethe Schiller and Kant. But this
universalism underlying such ideals of a national culture was over¬
shadowed by the historical reality of Prussia. For many, Prussia
alone possessed the statist attributes necessary for the creation of
the new political territory of the nation. Prussia was the state within
the nation which had existed before the nation itself. Its origins,
traceable back to the colonisation of Old Prussia by the Teutonic
Knights in the thirteenth and fourteenth cent iries, presented a mine of
mythical precedents for establishing it as the product of the ruthless
and systematic application of a disciplined statecraft in medieval and
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modem Europe. ' In the transition to the modern state in .urope, it
had in the rule of Frederick the Great an example of the process of
bureaucratic centralisation and benevolent despotism which, it was
claimed, rivalled the growth of modernity in France and Britain. The
main difference was that, unlike Britain, which maue territorial
acquisitions abroad, and France, which administered over a fairly
fixed and stable territorial area, the process of the modernisation of
the state in Prussia was complemented by the gradual territorial
expansion of Prussia within Germany and Eastern Europe. The
absorption of German principalities or Austrian provinces went hand in
hand with the creat on of a centralised bureaucracy, a standing army
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and a general code of Prussian law.^ The setback to absolutism
caused by the French Revolution and the humiliating defeat by
Napoleon severely checked the advance of Prussia, But the retreat
of Napoleon and the War of Liberation marked the beginnings of
national sentiment which provided the historical foundations for
the Second Reich, and the creation of an empire in which the
tradition of Prussia was itself crucial. The emergence of Bismarck's
Reich marked the new German state with the stamp of Prussianism,
Despite its special position within the constitution of the Reich,
Prussia lost a substantial amount of its previous political autonomy.
At the precise time when its practical political importance was
somewhat diminished, its mythical importance increased. For many
German nationalists it came to represent the true spirit of German
nationalism. In doing so it substituted the nationalism of the poeple,
the nationalism of popular sovereignity prevalent in Europe after the
French Revolution, with the nationalism of the state, Teutonic
colonisation, the growth of the landlord class - the Junkers, east
of the Elbe with political and military responsibilities; the ruthless
political leadership of Frederick the Great and Bismarck, were to be
seen by the revolutionary-nationalists as the historically most enduring
features of Prussianism, They were also regarded as the historical
basis of Germany1s strength in Europe, They were after all crucial
moments in the history of Germany V7here Prussian rule had prevailed
against the liberalising influence of German society. Unlike Louis
XIV in France, the Prussian monnrchs, especially Frederick William
enlisted the Prussian nobility into the service of the state either
as administrators or as members of the officer corps of the armies.
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The Junkers became the ruling class of Prussia while on the other
hand the autonomy of the Estates was destroyed.**" As a result no
political counter-balancing force remained to the absolutist state
either in the form of an estates-general as in Prance or in a
parliament as in England. Later in the nineteenth century, when a
revolutionary parliamentary assembly was formed during the 1846
revolution, it was not at Berlin in Prussia but in Frankfurt,
The ability of the irussian monarch Frederick William IV with the
aid of the Junkers to withstand its liberal demands for the
absorption of Prussia into a democratic Germany meant that the
embryonic growth of a politically independent middle-class was stifled,
at birth. The unification of Germany under Bismarck effectively
emasculated German liberalism. Both the national-liberals and
conservatives alike concurred in the process which was looked upon
as a form of statist "revolutionary transformation". In return for
Bismarck1s great achievement, they were both prepared to accept the
creation of a constitutional Reohtstaat. which while being designed
to prevent both absolutism and popular rule, did little to strengthen
the parliamentary power of the Reichstag to curb the power of Bismarck
and his cabinet. The imperial Realpolitik of one man and the
subsequent reliance of a whole generation of German politicians upon
it, destroyed, according to Max Weber, the political capability and
self-reliance of German politicians in either the conservative or
middle-class parties.
The challenge of the middie-class to the state and its ruling-class
supporters which had been the predominant feature of bourgeois
revolutions in Britain and France never really materialised in Germany.
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Moreover the contradictory dual nationalism of Germany and Prussia
seemed to perpetuate a geopolitical division between state and
society. During the period of industrialisation in the Second Reich
when a new class of large-scale industrialists came into being, the
norm of the political subordination of capitalism remained. Moreover,
in contrast to the classic laissez-faire situation which characterized
the development of industrial capitalism in England during its initial
phases, the state in Germany itself became the largest single capitalist.
Unlike England there was no middle-class radicalism which attached
itself to a laissez-faire ideology aimed aga nst the excessive power
of the state on the one hand or a demand for direct political power
on the other. The German state acted in economic collusion with
industrialists as their political superior. According to Ralph
Dahrendorf "Apart from giant banks and near monopolies in production,
we soon find powerful economic combinations in forms of syndicates,trusts,
cartels, all of which were not only tolerated but in fact furthered by
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the state in Germany", In Prussia, in particul.jr this involved
control of railroads, banks, coalmines and agricultural developments,
Bismarck's welfare statist policies of regulating working hours, and
creating pensions and insurance for workers while passing anti-
socialist, anti-trade union legislation completed the process of
paternalistic state intervention in industrial life. The ability of
the state to minimise class-conflict in this period of rapid
industrialisation by tying the hands of both the industrialists and
the working-class led the young and exceedingly nationalistic Max
Weber to conclude that the ruthless political leadership necessary to
the struggles of an imperialistic Germany were not to be found in the
new social classes of an industrial society.
•,','hile no tradition like Anglo-Saxon middle-class reformism and
political independence was ever established, a radical working-class
party was established in Germany before it was in Britain. The growth
of the German social-democrats during the Second Reich, despite
harassment from Bismarck, was remarkable not only in terms of
recruitment but also in terms of centralised organisat on and
discipline. Under the leadership of Ferdinand Lassalle and later of
August Bebel, the party became disciplined and relatively self-
contained. Bismarck's policy of attempting to politically isolate
the Social Democrats complemented the ideologically separatist
mentality of their leaders and the doctrinaire Marxist ideology
propounded by Karl Kautsky which was officially adopted by the party
in its Erfurt programme of 1891. Its ideolc gical extremism made it
the subject of distrust and fear among conservative circles of the
ruling-classes. It had no connections or even dialogue with
potentially liberal sectors of the middle-class. In academic circles,
in particular, entrenched opposition eventually produced the notorious
"Lex rons" forbidding membership to academics of the Social-Democratic
party. Among its most notable victims was the political sociologist
Robert Michels. Bui while the extreme ideological position of the
Social-Democrats provided fruitful ammunition for railing circles,
its wholesale abstention from the types of widespread social agitation
and unrest which were beginning to convulse the societies of Europe
prior to 1914, meant that the exceptional domestic calm of Germany
was maintained until the outbreak of war. The party remained, as
Guenther Roth has suggested, radical in theory and moderate in practice.
Any class-conflict in which it indulged was for the most part class-
conflict from above, as it attempted to fend off the persecution of the
Second Reich,
The political subordination of the Reichstag and its middle-
class parties and the political isolation of the social-democrats
seemed to suggest that even with some form of parliamentarianism
and political suffrage, albeit in Prussia a three-tier suffrage,
the state as an autonomous and traditional instrument of politics
could continue to dominate German society. But this meant not
merely the domination of state over society, it meant the apparent
domination of the at ice over German society as a whole. Its practical
achievments meant that it did not need the extrinsic aid of conservative
doctrine to legitimate its position. According to Weber, Bismarck's
legacy was to destroy the power of conservative intellectuals to
formulate political ideals. The legacy of sterility was reaped during
the nilhelmian era. German conservatism had ground to a halt and was
bereft of ideals. "At no time in the last fifteen years," he wrote
during the war, "has the Prussian conservative politioal character
shown itself in the service of political ideals as Stahl or Gerlach or
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the old Christian-Socialists had in their own way". The main loss
was the ideal of the nation as something independent of the machinations
of the Prussian-centred Reich. Where an ideal of the nation did show
itself, however, was outside conservative and ruling circles. It grew
up in the Voelkisch ideal of an ethnically pure German race. The
intellectual origins of Voelkisch racism, to be found in writers as
diverse as Count Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Julius
Langbehn and Heinrich Class, became an inspiration to a new generation
of middle-class teachers and students, to members of the newly formed
German Youth Movement, the Pan-German League and Georg Schonerer's
pan-German movement centred in Vienna. Like Voelkisch thought,
Prussianism benefited from the amorphous territoriality of German
16,
nationhood. The historical absen,pe of fixed and agreed "borders for
Germany meant that German nationality while being subordinated to
Prussian statist claims on the other hand, could be subordinated to
ethnic Germanic claims on the other. Both were amorphous and
fluid. Neither presupposed fixed and agreed territorial claims,
and neither identified nationality with popular sovereignity in the
liberal-democratic sense.
The similar but often conflicting nature of the Prussian and
voelkisch claims on German nationality provides the origin of the
post-war distinction between revolutionary-nationalism and national-
socialism. The Nazi idea of a racially pure German people was
inherited from pre-war racist thinking and was a continuation at a
lower intellectual level of anti-semitic and anti-urban sentiment.
Several early core members of the party were members of the secret
Thule Society in Munich which remained an incubator for voelkisch
ideals during the traumatic period of socialist revolution and the
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Munich soviet republics. In its notorious slogan of "Blood and
Soil" Nazism combined rural and racial mysticism. The urban Jew
was the stereotype of all the decadent features of urban life -
effeminate cosmopolitan, unscrupulous financier and degenerate
proletarian. The people as an indivisible unit were independent of
the state but also independent of urban?-industrial society. The
voekisch and Nazi distrust of modernity was in distinct contrast
to the conservatism of the revolutionary-nationalists. Nazism approved
of the mass following of the people behind the slogan of Blut und Boden.
It was modern in that it was populist but conservative in that it was
anti-industrial. Prussianism on the other hand was elitist with
regard to mass politics and hence conservative in the political
17.
sense, but modern with Regard to its acceptance of the centralisation
of tfie modern state and the growth of industrialism. The elitist
control of radical and centralist industidalisation eventually led
Ernst Juenger and other revolutionary-nationalists to national-
bolshevism, but under terms consistent with their worship of the
mythical praxis of the Prussian state which retained their ideological
allegiance.
Both voelkisch and Prussian nationalism sabotaged in their
different ways the conservative nationalism of ruling circles and the
academic mandarinate during the Second Reich. But it was the war
itself which provided both the euphoria and the finale to the patriotic
jingoism of the German upperclasses as it burst out into a dazzling
series of utopian fantasies which the course of the war almost immediately
destroyed, A general professorial silence on political issues of
national importance was widespread up to the outbreak of the war. As
late as 1913, in meetings held to celebrate the anniversary of the War
of Liberation, many German professors gave warnings that the strident
nationalism of the Pan-German League under the leadership of Heinrich
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Class was detrimental to authentic patriotism. The duty of the
academic remained that of obeying the state rather than advocating the
policy it should adopt. But the outbreak of the war itself transformed
the conservative docility of the large mjority of the Gelehrtenstand
or professorial class into a new militant movement for annexationism.
The aims of the Pan-German League became widespread in academic and
intellectual circles of the political right. Planked by the support
of many leading German industrialists, pan-German influence reached its
height in the academic community in the summer of 1913 with the so-called
Petition of the Intellectuals signed by 1,3k7 notable people from the
intellectual professions# Of these 352 were academic professors.
According to Heinrich Clans the petition registered complete agreement
with the aims of the Pan-German League for the annexation of Belgium
end the border territories of ^astern France, the conquest of p_rt of
the northern French channel coast, land for the settlement cf German
farmers in eastern Europe, and the creation of a chain of German naval
settlements around Europe to break the English n;.val monopoly and
establish "the freedom of the seas".10
The supporters of annexationism were not merely pragmatic
advocates of a ruthless expansionism. They saw themselves as fighting
a war of ideals. "Every war is a war of beliefs" states Werner
Sombart at the beginning of his polemical tract Traders . nd Heroes
(Handler und Helden). The beliefs manufactured by the nationalist
intellectuals to legitimate the war were known as "The Ideas of 1914"
a phrase coined by Johann Plenge, a sociologist at Munster University.
The war acted as a devastating trigger-mechanism to an outpouring of
political utopianism which only a few years previously would not have
seemed possible. For many the war provided a conclusive end to the
professional and intellectual constraints of pure science and the
standards of academic objectivity. Edouard Meyer, the historian
wrote "It is no longer possible to think of scientific matters. We
merely vegetate. All our previous activity has come to a standstill
and the world in which we used to live has sunk into the distance
behind us."11 For others the war represented a coming triumph of
German Kultur against estern civilisation. Reinhold Seeberg, a
Berlin professor of history and one of the leading annexationists wrote
" bove the stream of blood float the blissful thinkers dancing on air
and singing the powerful melodies of world-historical progress, of
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Germany the great and strong." Adolf Harnack urged his Berlin
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students to prepare for a war of self-sacrifice in which individualism
would have no meaning. Sombart, Max Scholar, Alois Riehl and 7/llhelm
.Vundt took the opportunity to wage a war of polemics against the
Anglo-Saxon intellectual tradition. While Riehl and Wundt attacked
the shallowness of English ethics and epistemology since Locke, Jcheler
attacked the "cant" of British capitalist hypocrisy and bourgeois
asceticism and Sombart fought a running battle against the legacy of
Spencer, claiming that Germany was the prime historical example of
a society which was both militant and industrial.^ One, in fact,
in which Anglish traders had been replaced by German heroes.
As propaganda, the "Ideas of 1914" were generally ineffective.
Their appeal to the superiority of German Kultur could not compete
with Allied propaganda about German militarism and the warlike mentality
of the barbarous "Hun". They were more important historically speaking
as a testament to the sense of religious crusade by which a previously
docile group of conservative intellectuals had been stricken and to
their illusions of military conquest as a vindication of superior
cultural standing. The tragedy of pre-war Germany, which had
experienced neither a successful bourgeois revolution nor the growth
of an independent middle-class, was that the Prussian militaristic
tradition had managed to co-exist with developments in German academic
scholarship which were unparalleled anywhere else in nurope. Yet both
the military offioers corps and the professorial class were status
enclaves loyal to ruling conservative circles and isolated from the
middle-classes. Militarism and the pursuit of Kultur were both
privileged though separate life-3tyles in the same society. After the
outbreak of war, however, many conservative intellectuals thought in
terms of a much closer and more positive union. German military
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invincibility and the "ideas of 1914" were regarded : s the twin
spearheads of German expansionism. The prospect of an expansionist
German empire called forth a multitude of euphoric and Utopian schemes
for social and political reorganisation. Sod® opposition to this
expansionist frenzy came from left-wing intellectuals and the Social-
lemoerats, although the latter supported the war too on their own terms.
But within professional and intellectual circles generally opposition
was slight. Some of it came rom the exclusive Deutsche Gesellschaf't
1914 a small group of more moderate academics centred on Berlin, who
included among their members the historians Zrnst Troeltsch and
Priedrich Meinecke. Although nationalistic in support of the war,
they opposed the extremism of the pan-German annexationist claims.
Yet hardly- anywhere was there mounted a frontal attack on the whole
ethos of "the ideas of 1914".
The major exception, in academic circles, was to be found in the
wartime political writings of Max Weber, himself a member of the
Deutsche Gesellschaft. eber, in a very significant attack on
the utopianism of the "ideas of 1914", presented an augury for the
future emergence of revolut i onary-nationalism. He was in fact almost
alone in attacking the German war professors from the point of view
which can be regarded as conservative and sociological, Klaus Schwabe
has recently said that the war-ideas of the conservative intellectuals
offered no rational or empirical grounds for the justification of the
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German war-effort. They tended to see it as irrational and
voluntaristie, and in many c ses were prepared to accept the
abandonment of the ideal of an international science and a
cosmopolitan learning in their partisan commitment to the superiority
of German culture. It was precisely this type of chauvinism and
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conscious partisanship which eber attacked in Science as a Vocation
as denigrating ti e objective pursuit of knowledge. But is criticism
was more far-reaching than this. He claimed that the superficial
utopianism of the ideas of 1914 offered no defence against a universal
process which was penetrating to the core of all modern industrial
powers - the process of irreversible bureaucratisation.
"This sober fact of universal bureaucratisation (he wrote)
in reality conceals itself behind the so-called "G-erman ideas of
1914", behind what the literati euphemistically call the "socialism
of the future", behind the slogans of organising"co-operative
economy" and all other contemporary slogans of a similar nature.
Even when they have the opposite intention they invariably
promote the creation of bureaucracy," 1A
The illusion of the German literati that the war was a liberating
force which had let loose the possibility for a vast series of Utopian
aspirations for a future Germany was countered by Weber specifically
through the assertion that highly rational organisational processes
emerging without exception within all the industrial societies of the
west would become the predominant features of those societies,
tftopianiam even though it intended the opposite could only become grist
to the mill of universal bureaucracy. The intellectual illusion of
importance was a last convulsion before an oncoming impotence of the
spirit in general.
At its most extreme, Weber's argument exhibited an incurable
fatalism at the prospect of the domination of man by the objects of
his own scientific and technological creation in the machine age.
The outcome of the war, he prophesied, would not be the world-
historical triumph of German Kultur but "the creation of an "iron cage
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of bondage" reducing men to a state of servitude before their own
organisational creations. In a famous passage in his essay
"Parliament and government in a reconstructed German" he wrote
"A lifeless machine is a congealed spirit. Only this
gives it the power to coerce men into its service and
to dominate their everyday work as completely as in
the factory.... But this congealed spirit is also that
living machine represented by bureaucratic organisation
with its specialisation of skills, its differentiated
spheres of competence, its regulations and hierachical
authority-relations. Together with the lifeless
machine, it is at work erecting the iron cage of bondage
to which one day men will perhaps be forced to submit
like the fellahs of ancient Egypt. This might happen
if a technically superior form of rational bureaucratic
administration and welfare were to be the ultimate and
exclusive value in the execution of its affairs....
An "organic" social stratification of an oriental
iigyptian type would arise. But in contrast to the
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latter, it would be as ruthlessly rational as a machine."
While his critique of professorial utopianism was conservative,
his critique of his opponent's conservativism was sociological.
Their futuristio designs had made no allowance for the fundamental
processes of rationalisation in modern life. Their optimism was
consequently dismissed as wishful thinking. Instead Weber
entertained the possibility of universal servitude to a system
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designed as a rational means of organising the productive life of
man. eber's pessimism foreshadowed the cultural despair that was
to have its hour after Germany's defeat and humiliation. It was
ominously prophetic not only of Germany's impending defeat in war
but of the coming popularity of Germany's then unknown but
subsequently notorious prophet of decline, Oswald Spengler. Before
the war had ended eber had announced what amounted to the death of
the conservative nationalism whic: has grown up under Bismarck as a
doctrine without ideals and ended up in the war as a wish-dream devoid
of reality.
The subsequent question could only be "What direction can now
be taken?" For Weber that direction was political democracy. He
was interested in the possibility of genuine parliamentary conflict
as a means of offsetting the growth of organisational bureaucracy
and the 'Prussian' dominance of the civil service in the politics of
the Second Reich. His emphasis on the importance of charisma however
was due to the fact that he envisaged the ascendancy of politics over
bureaucracy as taking place only through decisive and popular
political leaders. Finally, attacking Nietzsche's aristocratic
rejection of the democratic masses, he saw democracy as freeing the
road for the development of genuine and cultured values within the
social structure of bourgeois society.Yet this commitment to
democracy, which at the end of his life farced "Weber out of his
Prussian mould towards something approaching the Anglo Saxon Tory
democrat, lacked a certain element of personal conviction. For
Weber, all roads, including socialism, at times appeared to lead to
bureaucracy. Parliamentary democracy seemed like some foim of
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standing arrangement to deter the worst effects of servitude to the
rational "bureaucratic machine, Moreover there is a fundamental failure
by eber to accord to human values themselves the power of influencing
the future. His severe and Prussian rejection of "an ethic of
ultimate values" (G-esinnungsethik) in favour of "an ethic of
responsibility" (Verantwortungsethik) echoes Nietzsche's devaluation
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of the Christian values of pity or altruism. But more than this
it releases entirely the idea of progress in its affirmative
evaluative sense from the process of rationalisation in the modern
world. Unlike many conservatives Weber affirmed the application of
reason to the modern world. But unlike many liberals he refused
to see this as the progressive-aanifestation of Values beneficial
to humanity.
Weber's decision to fight for democracy was not therefore a
commitment to fight for the idea of human progress. It was a
commitment to fight for individual freedom of action in the face of
overwhelming odds. One consequence of this was his controversial
demand for a "leadership-democracy" in Weimar Germany in which a
charismatic leader could emerge with presidential powers enabling him
to control than be controlled by the bureaucratic machine. At the
same time however he also hoped for a revitalised parliamentary
politics in which all parties would actively fight genuine political
conflicts unconstrained by civil service expertise or bureaucratic
mediocrity. He in fact wanted the parliamentary parties of the future
to assert their active will-to-power against the atrophying process
of rationalisation. Charismatic leadership and parliamentary struggle
were both heroic but constitutional expressions of the resistance to the
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rationalisation that was everywhere the fete of modern man. It
was a telling response to the disintegration of conservative
nationalism. But for other nationalists who had equally turned
their backs on the disasters of wartime nationalism it also had its
point. While democracy and individual freedom were Western
impositions which constituted an insult to Germany, the war-experience
could be interpreted as Weber had suggested, namely as an accelerator
in the growth of modern rationalisation. The war-experience of the
front-generation from which the doctrine of revolut onary-nationalism
emerged in fact came face to face with a certain aspect of this new
and terrifying rationality. Weber's metaphor of the iron cage of
bondage is a near-perfect transcription of the picture painted by
Ernst Juenger of the modern soldier's enslavement to the requirements
and destructive capacity of technological armaments in the stalemate
of trench warfare. In a word, as we shall see, the hattlefront is
Juenger*s iron cage. It was to give a totally different meaning to the
suggestion by Weber that individual freedom of action was action within
the iron cage. The iron cage of total war offered no opportunity
far action that was individualistic, creative, or rational. It was
collectivistic, irrational, and destructive. Instead of the lifeless-
ness and the habitual routinization of modern bureaucracies however,
it offered adventure, danger and sacrifice. While Weber had included
the bureaucratisation of the modern mass army in his concept of
rationalisation, he had omitted to say anything of the variation of
psychological motives it produced. Juenger on the other hand was to
produce an apologia for war which relied on the inevitability of its
technological enslavement of the individual sol&ier« ln the cliched
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language of the twentieth century war was hell, but a hell which had
its own satanic attractions.
A rather different attack by Weber on the conservatism of the
Second Reich was also crucially important to the development of
revolutionary-nationalism. In pre-war Germany, the Junker landlords,
the officer corps and the Prussian civil service were occupational
status groups at the apex of German society, distinct and superior
in social and cultural convention to the newly-emerging middle-classes
but equally important objects of bourgeois aspiration. Weber claimed,
however, that class differences did not necessarily involve a fundamental
difference in life-styles. "Germany's he said, "is a nation of
plebians". The Juenkers he regarded as plebian agricultural
landowners engaged in routine managerial work. They lacked the
cosmopolitan breeding of their anglo-saxon counterpart - the country
gentleman. Unlike England, therefore, there was no aristocracy in
Germany, The educational competition among bourgeois youth to gain
positions in the civil service and the officer corps revealed not the
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breeding of an aristocracy but the "physiognomy of the parvenu".
Student duellin fraternities in German universities were seen by
Weber as too chauvinistic to he a breeding-ground for aristocrats.
Although Germany was Prussian, authoritarian and hierachical in its
social stratification, it was not an aristocratic society. Looking
forward to the future, therefore, Weber claimed that nothing of
aristocratic value would be lost. "If democratisation has the effect
of eliminating the social prestige of the academically qualified man....
then no politically valuable forms of social life would be abolished
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here". This, in retrospect, offered the revolutionary-nationalists
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the comforting rationalisation that the destruction of the Second
Reich and the creation of a republican democracy had not destroyed
anything of intrinsic value to Prussianism, but merely represented
the disintegration of a Staendestaat w, ich had been unable to hold in
check the emergence of a parvenu bourgeois society and consequently
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perished through its own efi'eteness. In this context Germany could
be seen in retrospect as a capitalist nation-state not possessing a true
aristocracy, not embodying any fundamentally di ferent cultural values
to those of the west, and not containing, despite the heroic and
solitary Realpolitik of Bismarck, apy statist solution to the
inexorable growth of bourgeois society. The apparent domination of
the German state over bourgeois society which claimed the loyalty
and quiescence of the conservative nationalists was now revealed as an
illusion. Germany in the Second Reich, according to Ernst Juenger,
was an "age of pseudo-rule" in wi.ich authentic Prussian foims of
domination had already ceased to function. The trappings of
militarism, culture and hierachy were now merely factors fatally
retarding the development of Germany into a bourgeois nation capable
of holding its own with the west. The destruction of conservative
nationalism was therefore no great loss, because it was not part of an
authentic Prussianism.
Prussianism came therefore to signify much more of a life-style
and a myth to be viewed independently of historical circumstances,
It was the yardstick of a conservative allegiance which Juenger
maintained even when reality seemed to desert it. In a letter to
his brother just after the war Juenger wrote:
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"Perhaps I have done what the Prussians expected of me, and
I sometimes ask nyself if they too have done what I expected of them.
In spite of that, what has survived of Prussianism is still more dear*
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to me than what the idealists offer us."
The revolutionaries are "emaciated rats" with "overrefined
doctrines" who revolt and nauseate him. He clings instead to the
lifeline of a promise which has all hut passed into history.
Juenger's continuing loyalty to Prussianism after the destruction of
the Second Reich, was the loyalty to a myth extrapolated from a network
of complex historical circumstances. To many younger nationalists
who felt the attraction of this myth, the publication of Oswald
Spengler*s Prussianism and Socialism was to give them unquestionable
support. For it attenipted to take out of the hands of the 1918
revolutionaries the emotive concept of socialism central to their whole
existence. Juenger meanwhile had seen in the myth of Prussianism as
the core of German national identity the enduring antidote to the
idealism which he despised. He was also able to give its most
important circumstantial evidence - the front-experience which
constituted his own iron cage of bondage and gave him a metaphysical
contentment in the midst of dangerous servitude. While Prus3ianism
provided the legacy of continuity in German nationalism, its
conservative legality, its privileged social hieracnies and its
•compromise' with political democracy and bourgeois society all came
to be viewed with contempt. In place of the pseudo-aristocracy of the
Second Reich, Juenger envisaged a new Nietzschean master-aristocracy,
a ruling race freed from the legal and cultural constraints of the age
of pseudo-rule. Reside Bismarck he placed Nietzsche the distraught
philospher of the Uebermensch who had called I'isrnarck a "fraternity
student" and the state "the cold monster". Revolutionary-nationalism
became characterised by both Prussian and Nietzschean tendencies and
attempted to resolve the tension that Nietzsche himself found between
tin spiritless order of the Machtstaat and his own destructive
intellect. But had not Nietzsche himself written in The Twilight of
the Idols
"'Deutschland Deutschland, ueber alles: I'm afraid that was
the end of German philosophy.,., ire there German philosophers,
Are there German poets? ire there good German books? Thse are the
questions foreigners ask me, I blush but with the boldness characteristic
of me in desperate straits, I reply "Yes. Bismarckl"
With the aid of Bismarck, Nietzsche produced his obituary of the
German spirit. His own philosophy was to remain the essential clue to
its afterlife. Revolutionary-nationalism was the hybrid of an
intellectual current nurtured in the works of the great philosopher
which ceased to concern itself with Geist and devoted its obsessions
to M cht. German idealism dissolved before the new fetishisms of
violence and power. The will-to-power triumphed among Nietzsche's
philistine disciples thriving under the illusion that ti ey were made
demonic by war. 7hat same illusion was the prelude to the destruction
of German culture itself.
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CHAPTER n
IN THE HY; CP THii HURRICAMK.
The Greet Tar resulted in the decimation of a whole generation
of German youth. The German enqy left behind it on the battlefield
more than two million dead. Among those who suffered at the hands
of the immense slaughter were those same sections of middle-class
German youth whose enthusiasm for the Fatherland was so great on the
outbreak of war. At Langemarck thousands of young Germans singing
"Deutschland ueber alles" cind various andervoegel songs were massacred
as they advanced into battle. The type of warfare, the number of
casualties, the importance of machinery were things of which few
people in 1914- had dreamed. How did German youth react to its
immersion in mass slaughter? Ai\y answer to such a question would
inevitably be an inadequate paraphrase. Yet there is strong evidence
to be found that the credibility of the war as a war of patriotic
ideals was drastically undermined.
This is especially the case if one considers the correspondence
of young German students who were later to be killed in the war."*"
Most of them invariably contrasted their initial euphoria with their
first experience of the realities of war. For mar$r of them there is
an obvious sense of desperation in their attempts to convince their
parents and their families in Germany that the war is something which
neither they nor, for that matter, history had ever before experienced.
Many letters plaintively begin with words like the following: "You
at home can't have the faintest idea what it means to us when it simply
says in the newspaper in a bland tone 'In Flanders today only
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artillery activity'" or, again, from another student "You can
form absolutely no idea of our incredible privations."^ Yet another,
a medical 3tuuent, trying to convey the slaughter which confronts
him in his first battle, writes "It is impossible to describe it,
and even now when it is a day behind us, I myself can hardly believe
that such bestial barbarity and unspealcable suffering are possible.
Every foot of ground contested, every hundred yards another trench;
everywhere bodies - rows of theml"^" Others saw the heroism which they
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believe was offered them as nothing more then hideous brutality.
Others, more articulate, realised the cheapness of death in the face
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of technological war.
.Although some letters contain eulogies of landscape or expressions
of devotion to the Fatherland, by and large, there emerges as the dates
of the letters-headings go on, a cumulative sense of disenchantment.
The people back home, the collective sentiment seems to say, don't
know what things are like and don't do what we h ve to do. The
inescapable fact of the soldier's uniqueness, his solitude begins
to emerge. Some hold to the thin thread of patriotism end the idea
of sacrificing themselves to their country's future greatness, but
uncertainty about the course of the war overshadows their conviction.
Others write that their life as soldiers has involved a fundamental
transformation of their experience. A Marburg theology student writes
"we are alienated from all the people and things connected with our
former life".'' In his next letter he tries to convey the basis of
this sense of alienation and of the distance which has grown up between
his former identity and his soldier's self-image; he tries to convey
the effect that the routinization of violence has upon him:
"The 3rd. end 4th companies were wiped out - one patrol only fought
its way through. They were surrounded nd attempts on the part of the
233d and 3rd Battalions to rescue them failed, the third being blown up,
while the fourth.... held out for six deys.... until they fixed their
last cartridge.
"One of the platoon commanders was killed.... and his elder
brother wounded. .Jy Fahrich comrade H.H. is said by an eye-witness
to have been killed. Only three regular officers of the old regiment
are left.
"These are bald statements of events, but what terrible memories
do they not hold for the human souli .11 the books in the world could
not contain them. It is enough to haunt a man for the rest of his
life to have seen one murder; the soldier is doomed to appear
hard, insensitive and brutal. /nd during an attack? you ask.
•Then a man is no longer a man*, as once said a Jaeger officer who had
been in the Argonne since September and taken part in storm after
storm, including the last. dach of these experiences stands alone,
incomprehensible, inexplicable, irrational.
".'.!aiy a fine poem, enthusiastically composed in a snug sitting-
room, about the hero's end and the glory of such a death will now be
re d with a bitter smile." °
The extract is revealing in two ways. Firstly, it poses the
question of the effect experiencing and being part of mass slaughter
has upon the ordinary soldier, and secondly, it gropes its way,
through the irosy at the end, to an implicit assertion that the
experience of storm-fighting cuts off the combat soldier from all
those around him, even those who want to sympathise with him or
eulogize his name in poetry. It presents the storm-fighter as
different, unique, beset by irrational and inhuman instincts.
The crucial phrase "Then a man is no longer a man" refers to the
transformation of identity which the personality undergoes under
the stress of heavy combat and the first-hand experience of mass
violence. It attempts to articulate the idea that the soldier had
become a law unto himself.
The extract contains in embryonic form moiy of the sentiments
that pervaded the war-writings of what was to be called the 'new
nationalism''. Bearing this in mind, it is significant that in the
type of correspondence analysed above, the disenchantment with
idealistic patriotism did not seem to lead many students to actually
go on and condemn the very idea of war. One finds little evidence
of pacifist sentiment. Towards the end of the war, however, there
was a very strong challenge from within German intellectual circles
to the idea expressed in the words of Wilfred Owen's ironic poem
"Dulce et decorum est, pre patria mori". There grew up as the
slaughter and the stalemate of the war on the estern Front increased,
a universal condemnation of war itself. It came less from within
the echelons of those who had fought in the war than from bohemian
and intellectual circles within Germany itself. In particular,
they were grouped around the Expressionist movement which had emerged
as a formidable cultural force in the pre-war years. In many
expressionist manifestoes and dramas war was condemned as an instrument
for the destruction of the brotherhood of mankind. Pacifist circles
formed in particular around Rene Schickele's magazine, Die Eeissen
Blatter and also around Die ktion. an influential periodical
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produced by the Activists of Kurt Miller. Among those few
Expressionists whose disillusionment with war came from their
actual participation in it were Ernst Toller, the famous dramatist,
and Fritz von Unruh, en ox—Prussian officer. Unruh in his book,
The ay of Sacrifice."*'0 condemns the bloodshed of the 1916 Verdun
offensive in unequivocal terms and finis the only value to be had
within the battlefield the actual sense of community which existed
between soldiers similarly situated in the face of adversity. His
former patriotism had dissolved in disillusionment. The political
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consequences of pacifism were to be felt at the end of the ar in the
.expressionists' support for the November revolution of 1918. The
revolution was interpreted in many Jixpressionist writings as the
apocalyptic event designed to end all wars. The link between pacifism
and socialism was seen on a much wider scale in the support the
revolutionary s, and especially the Spartacists, gained from war-weary
soldiers and sailors who had either mutinied or returned from the front.
The disenchantment of many people, both workers and intellectuals,
helped to bring about the collapse of the political system responsible
for the war.
With only a few exceptions, however, and Unruh was perhaps the
outstanding one, there is little evidence that young middle-class
Germans who had attained some sort of officer status in the war,
turned pacifist or supported the November revolution. Of the many
who died on the battlefield, a question-mark must be suspended over
them. The overwhelming majority of the junior officer class in the
German arny which took sides in the post-war events joined up with the
Freikorps, volunteer counter-revolutionary units who banded together
to destroy the revolutionary forces in a systematically destructive
manner. It is within the junior officer class that one finds the
seeds of the new nationalism - an equal hatred of idealistic
patriotism and socialist pecifism. s an alternative to both
patriotism and pacifism, there is substituted in 'new nationalism'
a 'soldierly' (soldatisch) ethos of destructive violence. To
understand the origins of the sentiments underlying tnis ethos, the
development of the war, especially on the Western Front, becomes very
important.
By 1916 the stalemate of trench warfare was beginning to make
significant demands upon the German Army which were to {affect both
the morale and the organisation of its troops. The transition from
mobile to static warfare created an extraordinary bureaucratisation
of military structure. Rosinski states:
"As the necessity for quick decisions decreased and the
amount of administrative work increased in trench warfare, the
commander's function decreased, and that of his staff officers
increased. This led to the hypertrophy of the general staff
system which already enjoyed a position of extraordinary prestige
and threatened to reduce the corps commanders to mere figureheads."
In general, the reliance on front-line -troops to such a vast
extent exposed them to extraordinary dangers and tasks. In comparison
with the Allies the German shock troops were numerically inferior,
and given much less support end relief by inferior artillery. In
addition, many artillery experts claimed tint, owing to the lack
of explosives in German shells, they had a far less effective material
and psychological effect than did those of the Allies on the German
front line."'-2
On the Western Front storm-troops were devised as elite
formations of mobile troops to storm the eneny lines and make
breakthroughs for the regular infantry. Their initial effectiveness
at the Homme inspired the creation of them throughout the German
arny,^ One of the most outstanding commanders of one of these
storm units was a young officer from a Hanoverian regiment named
Ernst Juenger. Before the w< r, Juenger, the son of a chemist, had
run away from school and tried to enlist in the French Foreign Legion,
and he and his brother had been ardent members of the Wandervogel.
The war gave Juenger the opportunity to find the adventure which
civilian life lacked. His quick promotion to lieutenant was typical
of the recruitment of vast numbers of middle-class students, many of them
no raore than school leaving age, into the junior officer stratum of
the arcy. The elite Prussian officer corps, unprepared for mass
technological war in 1934, had been virtually decimated in the first
few months of the campaign, when most of its officers took unnecessary
risk and showed unnecessary bravery. With the development of the war
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vast repl cements and extensions of the officer class was necessitated.
Since promotion froia the non-commissioned ranks was strictly limited,
vast numbers of the replenishment force were middle-class student
volunteers. The heritage of 'new nationalism' and the leaders of
the post-war Freikorps were both in large part derived from that section
of junior officers in command of storm battalions.
Juenger was a typical commander of this group. He saw quite
clearly the importance of the storm battalions. ".Above all", he
writes, "I devoted ny efforts to the training of a shock troop, as it
had become more and more clear to me that in the course of the war
all success springs from individual action, while the mass of the
15
troops give impetus and weight of fire." He envisaged the storm
troops as the new elite of the German army. He called them
'the princes of the trenches'. He was not typical of the military
stratum to which he belonged, however, in that he wrote in the after¬
math of the war, the most rem; rkable account of the type of warfare
in which he was engaged that has perhaps ever been made. Throughout
the early twenties, first as an officer in the Reichswehr and then as
a zoology student at Leipzig University, he wrote a series of remarkable
war-memoirs - Storm of Steel in 1921, Conflict as an Inner Wgperience
in 1922, Wood 125 in 1925 end Fire ; nd Blood in 1926.^ His description
of war ranges from the extremely subjective to the extremely
objective. At one moment he brings forth the emotions of the
soldier advancing into battle, the next he gives a poetic and
panoramic description of a battlefield which encompasses whole armies.
crystalline analysis of the process of war is linked with the total
recall of his own feelings as he fought in it.
.More important than this, from a sociological point of view,
is that Juenger was perhaps the first writer to give a detailed
subjective account of the process of socialisation in w r. It
17
is a graphic portrayal of the total environment of war. The
rising awareness which we noted above in the Marburg theology student
of the alienation-effect that war has upon permanent combat-soldiers,
becomes in Juenger a thorough and worked-out description of the
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process of alternation. He catalogues the transform- tions that
occur both in the personality and the self-image of the front-fighter
of the storm battalions. It is a description of a total change of
identity and a revelation of man's basic instinct for destruction.
"When war tears the European community apart", he writes, "when we
confront each other from behind banners and symbols at which many
had laughed so sceptically, (destruction) reveals itself as a
primeval judgement. The true man identifies himself in the smoke-filled
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orgy of war which for so long had been neglected by all."
The image of the 'rage for blood* as the revelation of man's
basic instincts runs throughout all Juenger's writings. In the
moment of advance "The turooil of our feelin s was c; lied forth by
rage, alcohol and the thirst for blood.... The tremendous force of
destruction that bent over the field of battle w s concentr; ted in
our brains. So may the men of the Renaissance have been locked
in their passions, rid so may a Cellini have raged or werewolves
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hunted through the night on the track of blood"* Or, again, he ssys
ecstatically, "The overpowering desire to kill gave me wings* Rage
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squeezed bitter tears from my eyes"*
.After the complacency of civilised bourgeois society, the war
has revealed man to be a truly destructive being. The front-fighter,
the permanent destroyer, is a man who has 'switched worlds'* He is
"saturated in experience and blood"* But this, Juenger says, was
not the reason his own generation went to war. Their initial
enthusiasm was engendered by a wave of idealism inconsonant with the
realities of war. Both this disenchantment and revelation of
destructive instinct are incorporated in his statement "I have not
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become old, but I have become soneone else. If the experience
of war reveals man subjectively as he is, it also reveals to him
objectively society as it is. There is a dialectic in the movement
of Juenger's writings between Juenger's description of the alternation
process and his description of the total environment and finally back
towards the environment-modified man. The environment of war is a
massified and objectivated reality confronting the front-fighter.
^ /
It is the revelatory shock of materiel (Das Materiel). For the
first war in human history the fate of individual men was decided by
the machinery of armaments. The soldier's environment, the battlefield
that stretches for miles around him, is the environment of technological
weaponry, and the technology of war is the outcome of the increased
intensity and competitiveness of industrial production in civil society.
The First World War for Juenger is the inevitable heritage of industrial
society and on the battlefield the reliance on technological weaponry
symbolizes the conquest of man by man-made machines.
"The domination of machine over man, of the servant
over the master, is obvious and a more profound change which
was already beginning to violently shake the roots of the social
and economic order in peacetime, has now crystallized into
human butchery" 23
For Juenger, therefore, war is not a setting in which man struggles
against man, but one in which man more fundamentally struggles against
his environment. Rage and brutality, the primordial emotions, are
autonomous instincts, independent of any personal enmity. One fights
the enemy because they are on the other side of the front line, and they
too in fighting back are struggling against the technological
pervasiveness of the environment. For man to retain his hatred and
his courage - his will to fight - is not to defy the eneny, but to
defy 'materiel'. The mass-machine slaughter of the war reveals the
machine as the enemy of man and also a more primordial distinction
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between man and matter. German youth, bereft of all its enthusiasm,
vows not to fall as victims to the machine. "Hardened by experience
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they remain sober in a pitiless world". There is a lengthy passage
in Storm of Steel where Juenger captures the essence of the front-
fighters' confrontation of the massified and objectivated reality of
technology. It shows not only the sense of helplessness at being
projected into a pre-existent world which is external to him and
independent of his own action. It also tries to show how he must
'reclaim1 that world by responding to it and imposing himself upon
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it. Not only is he socialised into an objectivated reality which
he then internalises, but the process of internalisstion is a dialectic
movement back towards the environment of which he is a product and upon
which he in turn must impose himself, by dramatic action. Juenger's
description is of a battle-ravaged landscape at Guillemont:-
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"In this neighbourhood of villages, woods and fields there
was literally not a bush or a blade of grass to be seen*
livery hands-breadth of grass had been churned up again and
agadn; trees had been uprooted and smashed and ground to
touchwood, the houses blown to bits and turned to dust;
hills had been levelled and the arable land made into a
desert.
"And yet the strangest thing of all was not the landscape
in itself, but the fact that scenes such as these, which
the world had never known before, were fashioned by men
who intended them to be a decisive end to the war.
Thus all the frightfulneas that man could devise was brought
onto the battlefield; and where there had been an idyllic
picture of rural peace, there was now a faithful picture of
the soul of scientific war. In earlier wars, certainly,
towns and villages had been burned, but what was this
compared with this sea of craters dug out by machines?
For even in this fantastic desert there was the sameness
of the machine-made article. A shell-hole strewn with
bully tins, broken weapons, fragments of uniforms and dud
shells with one or two bodies on its edge....this was the
never-changing scene that surrounded each one of those
thousands of men. .And it seemed that man, on the land¬
scape he himself created, became more different, more
callous, more hardy and more mysterious than in ary
previous battle. After that battle the German soldier
first wore the steel helmet and his features were
chiselled with the lines of an energy stretched to its
utmost pitch, lines that future generations will find as
fascinating and imposing as the heads of Renaissance
times," 27
On the landscape of destructive technology, the soldier becomes
"more different, more callous, more hardy and more mysterious" in
order to merge with the setting around him. He carves his image
out of the circumstances into whioh he has been propelled and the
image - the steel helmet and the chiselled features remain indelibly
printed upon his personality. At last he has made himself the equal
of the destructiveness of technological wax. The process of alternation
is complete. Out of purgatory of front-line fighting a 'new type* has
been bom - the front-fighter, the warrior. Unlike the Germain academic
professors waging war with their pens, the warrior does not fight
ideological wars in the name of culture against civilisation. He does
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not acknowledge national stereotypes. Juenger says at one point he
hears no personal animosity towards the British soldier. He even
finds it possible to admire his courage. For what truly counts is
nothing more than the actual qualities of fighting itself. "The
essential thing is not why we fight", Juenger writes at one point,
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"but how we fight." Yet Juenger realises that there is a purpose
which can be deduced in the fighting of the front-fighter. By fighting
the eneny he is also fighting technology, the legacy of the previous
generation. In Fire and Blood in which he develops his attack on
technology much further than in his ea-rller wnr-books, he claims
that the warrior is engaged in a generational struggle against the
Wilhelminian generation who developed 'materiel*, that is to say, all
the destructive technological capacities of the war. He does not
regard the pre-war generation in terms of conservative nationalism,
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which he was later to regard as an ideological artifice, but in terms
of the politicians and industrialists who pushed forward economic
development much to their own liking and independently of the opinions
of the academic class.
This generational struggle is the struggle against the
conditioning environment. The warrior defies technology by
making human combat significant. The storm-troop elite, so crucial to
to strategic advances, defies the technological leviathan. In doing
so it attacks the heritage of its former generation. '.'/hen Juenger
spoke of "man on the landscape which he himself had created", he
meant the landscape made possible by the materialism of the previous
generation. Juenger's dialectic fulfills itself when man transformed
by the landscape aide possible by the previous generation, himself
launches out as a transformer of landscapes, of other settings distant
from the warrior's world. Socialised into a reality beyond his control,
he emerges as a product of that reality, poised to ensure that other
realities will be controlled by him. The method of his control is
the destructive powers that war has taught him. The Juenger this
dialectic process of objectivation, internalisation and externalization
is condensed into a poetic image of the nature of warj
"War, the father of all things, is also our father;
it has hammered, chiselled and hardened us into
what we are, .And as long as the wheel of life
circles around us, the war will be the axis round
which it revolves. It has pulled us into the
fight and fighters we will remain a3 long as we
live,,,, but not only is war our father, it is also
our son,,,, we have been hammered and chiselled but
we are also men who swing hammers and wield chisels,
blacksmiths of sparkling steel, martyrs of our deeds,
made forceful by force,"30
The warrior internalizes the reality of war and becomes the
embodiment of it. With the deeds of the Freikorps already before
him as he was writing, Juenger envisaged the elite storm troops of
the Western Front continuing after the war's end to scourge and
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destroy the cities of mid-Europe, Their activities in the future
were not to be contained by official declarations of war. In Wood 125
he has an embryonic vision of a German empire of a hundred million
to be fought for by the storm elites without considerations of space
or time, and whose eventual emergence would justify all the death
32and destruction necessary to its creation. For the most part the
vision remains unpolitical, Ihe destructive warrior is law unto
himself. He is the last hope against the massified technological
reality handed down by past generations.
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At a crucial point in his writing, however, Juenger deflects
his portrait of the emergent warrior from the struggle against
environment to suggest in fact that the veiy environment which
oppresses him is necessary to his self-fulfillment. This occurs
in his elaboration of the concept of * adventure*« /bout Juenger's
warrior there is a fundamental stoicism. Oppressed by the hurricane
of destruction unleashed by 'materiel' he does not seek to evade it,
nor to reconstitute the world as a world without hurricanes, but rather
he advocates a form of ultimate self-fulfillment in the eye of the
hurricane itself. Though he fights against technology, the warrior
cannot do more in purely objective military terms than to defy, to
seek not to let it diminish human braveiy . He cannot destroy it.
It will always be there, even if there are modifications in its nature.
Hence, he must ultimately seek fulfillment in the midst of the very
world which enslaves him, knowing that while its boundaries alter in
shape and sise, its boundaries will always remain. The enslavement
of duty, the oppressiveness of military tasks are, according to
Juenger, the necessary sign-posts on the road to the magic quality
he calls •adventure*. He writes:
"Every age has its tasks, its duties and its
pleasures, and it also has its adventurers. And
every age has a younger generation, which has its
hour and loves adventure, in which the play of
children assumes significance on account of its
adult seriousness. Therein lies the real meaning
of life•.•.
"Certainly it (war) is serious. But the adventure
is the whole which lies over and above danger. The
task is life but the adventure is poetry. Duty
makes work difficult but the desire for danger makes
it easy. Hence, we are never ashamed of being
adventurers•"33
Nothing is further from adventure than the rationality of
the goal-directed act. It is enough that war should exist, that
there will always be battles to be fought and battles to be won.
The permanence of the enslaving environment which man seeks to defy.
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ensures the permanence of the defiance which leads to the magic of
adventure. The warrior's destructiveness becomes meaningful only
in the sense that "the play of children assumes significance on account
of its adult seriousness." It is enough to know that it makes an
impact without knowing why. Justified neither in terms of its
reasons or its consequences, the adventure of war is justified in
terms of the magic of its eschatological immediacy. The lot of the
soldier, according to Juenger, is never to reason wfcy - as long as he
reasons why.
Juneger's ethic is an ethic of anarchistic nihilism. The purpose
of the soldier is to destroy - and destroy and destroy. In the midst
of the inferno, the significance of human action boils itself down to
sheer physical impact. Although the nihilism of adventure is
anarchistic, it is not according to Juenger, individualistic. The
warrior, the storm-fighter, is a collective type. The column of
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soldiers marching into battle is "One will - one movement". It is
above all because the storm-troops have been fused "into a hermetic
unity" that they are able to seek out danger. Their capacity for
adventure is reflected in the sheer volume of their undifferentiated
number. They experience adventure as a collective mass. The suicidal
advance into combat shows the interplay between the mundane uniformity
of the setting and the excitement at the prospect of collective
destruction:
"everything is monochrome, uniform and grey. Everything
is utilitarian and purposeful, like the process of a
machine in motion. But everything is exoiting, like
the sight of the machine is for those who have lived
life at its fullest and moat violent. Here in our
truest guise we draw closer to the slaughter to
imprint our new and binding seal into the flowing
wax of the world.
"Ve wheel round to be annihilated in the most profoundest
of senses and the greatest of unities#"35
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The warrior as a collective type satisfies his desire for
adventure in the act of destruction bordering on suicide. In the
elusive moment of victory, he feels himself to be part of a world-
historical power. "There", writes Juenger, "history is experienced
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at its burning-point.
The process of alternation has thus come full circle. The warrior
forged out of the total environment of war, must remain perpetually
enslaved by that which he permanently defies. The setting of war
alters, but wherever he fights the environment of ♦material* will
follow him. The distinction between war and peace, Juenger
prophesied, would ultimately vanish, but the warrior would remain,
indestructible amidst destruction - in permanent opposition to the
permanent environment of permanent war. Above all, exultant that
the source of his oppression is without end, he extracts the poetxy
of adventure out of the eye of the hurricane.
II
A significant variation on the theme of alternation in the war-
writings of the new nationalists is provided by another storm-fighter
who had experience cf both the Russian and the Western Fronts -
Franz Schauwecker. Like Juenger, Schauwecker had written his first
book of war-memoirs, In the Jaws of Death, very soon after the end of
the war. Towards the end of the twenties, with the great influx of
war-literature which was prompted by the outcry following the
publication of Srich Maria Remarque's All Quiet on the 'Western Front,
he wrote two novels,both of them more impressive than his first work
and also with the unmistakable imprint of Juenger's example upon them.
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The first of these was called The Fiery ay. and in it Schauwecker
documents the transition experienced by a student into a fully-fledged
front-line officer. Much less complex than Juenger, and with less
of an intricate concern for sociological analysis, nonetheless there
are important thematic similarities. Unlike Juenger, Schauwecker
traces the course of his semi-autobiographical hero from school into
the any and finally to the front. Essentially, however, he is
concerned with the same process of transformation - of the entry
into a unique and radically new world.
The central figure of the piece is a student volunteer. He
enlists in that glow of euphoria and patriotism that swept the
younger middle-class generation of Germany in 1914, But his
illusions are soon dispelled when he has his first encounter with
military training, "Drill has begun", he writes, "and the free life
of the individual is swept aside," Training for war is for
Schauwecker an electrifying process. Beneath the artificial pomp
and glory of military ceremony, discipline makes the individual
dissolve into the collective mass under the hand of an iron discipline.
The experience of coercion is eulogised in poetic images of events,
recalled in tremendous detail and intensity:
"The amy tosses us, pounds us, kneads us, with fists
like the fists of blacksmiths. It thrusts at us
cold, stem, horribly inexorable, and we face it
stiffly, head high, chin firm on chinstrap, neck
up, arms to the side, stomach in, chest out,knees
straight, shoulders back, mouth shut, eye3 to the
front, and face immovable as iron,"39
The experience of relentless discipline is an electrifying
transformation fbr the typical student of the gymnasium or the
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university. It replaces academic discipline with a discipline
which is at once more horrifying, more challenging, and more
necessary to man's survival. In comparison, the intellectual
pursuits of the student are "grotesque, pedantic and appallingly
empty." The so-called scholar vegetates in the no-man's land of
sterile theory and loses all trace of his real existence. In the
lecture hall, Schauwecker writes, "dust flew out of the books and
covered the earth. The lecturer's desks creaked with dryness.
iixamination was a monster with a sackful of dried facts on its
back," The outbreak of war is a form of liberation, as the
students of 1914 thought it was. But with historical hindsight,
Schauwecker attempts to cast this liberation in a more specific light.
It is a liberation from the intellect and from the fragmented emptiness
of civil life into historical destiny. The commonplace speeches
at patriotic meetings, the perennial cheers for the iaperor are as
pedantic as the ocadeny. The isolated fragments of adventure for
the typical student - drunkenness, duels, love affairs, are poor
compensation for a life without meaning. The real meaning of life
is experienced on the battlefield, in the front line, for the first
time in the student's hitherto vacuous life:
"Until now we have only learnt about the world
and about life as elements in a theory, grey things
which stared at us morosely, collected together by
a lot of bloodless old men.
"But now we ore soldiers and the world is aflame,
and we stand in the furnace of experience. The pale
plants of abstraction nurtured in darkness are shrinking,
and palpable 3hapes are thrusting upwards. We are
shown the State, the Nation, the Body, Death, not as
models on a teacher's desk, but as things we move and . ,
breathe amongst out here in the sunlight and the hail."
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The transformational experience, the alternation from student
to front-fighter, is portrayed as part of the philosophical quest
for meaning and for authenticity. But yet again it is not philosophical,
for it involves a total negation of intellect. The switching of worlds
is an attempt to nihilate abstract thought itself. At one particular
moment on the Russian Front, the narrator describes his feelings
after he has been tied to a tree for three hours in a sub-zero
temperature as being wrongly accused of eating iron rations. His
sense of injustice dissolves before the novelty of the physical
experience of his suffering, where thought becomes wordless, and
finally nothing at all. "Here I stand", he proclaims, "I don't
think in words which is anaemic theorising. These are thoughts
without words. I think in sensations, so to speak, I experience
thought."4"2 Later, too, his sense of injustice at being roughly
handled by proletarian soldiers for being a student volunteer is
finally resolved when he physically attacks a soldier stealing his
food to gain respect all round. He has proved himself as a soldier
by proving himself to be exclusively physical, and eliminating all
traces of bis intellectual background.
The qualities of the front-fighter which Schauweoker extols -
loyalty, heroism, courage and saorifice, are also in conflict with
intellect. Bredow, the student hero of the narrator's regiment,
philosophises endlessly on the uselessness of philosophy before the
greater force of Fate, Of the soldier's qualities, he remarks:
"And these things don't come from the intellect.
They reveal themselves in hate and surrender,on
night-watches and in death, in laughter and in
blood.,.. It (war) is all necessary and ineluctable,
a great and sacred discipline,"43
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The "sacred discipline", the compulsion to pre-ordained action,
the fulfillment of the necessary task, are to Bredow the ultimate
consolation which frees him from thoughts of the consequence of his
actions, of the infinite number of possibilities which might arise
out of the war. "Mustn't new men arise?", he speculates, "new
worid-ideas?... This inarticulateness of great forces takes on in ay
eyes at times the expression of something threatening,... There's
only one solution: to be occupied. Into how many dangers have I
gone, that I might find freedom from ny presentiments of the future.
The freedom of which Bredow speaks is the negative freedom of
casting into oblivion the wider significance of the war into which
he hes been thrust. He thinks about it endlessly, but is never forced
to look for conclusions to his questions because the very nature of
his environment is such that it continually deflects him from thinking
about what it is. One is always "occupied" in physical tasks which
ward off the horror of thinking about what they involve. Warfare
becomes the final solution to the problem of intellect. The mind
is compressed into the narrow region of functionality accorded to
it by the exigencies of permanent struggle. For the narrator, any
meaning that there is is a metaphysical winding-sheet which covers
the battlefield. With intense images of elemental physical motions
in the trenches, he tries to demonstrate his metaphysical quest to
track it down. But, finally, it reveals itself as nothing but the
revelation that the individual has ceased to exist in himself. He
has graduated to the status of a collective type and become dissolved
in the 'hole. "I do not count", he writes, "nor does the sum of
individual lives count: it is only the organic whole that counts,
for in it alone lies the Meaning of war.
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Schauwecker's warrior, the student volunteer transformed into
a hardened soldier, is like Juenger's warrior, a collective type.
He dissolves his own personality and sacrifices it to the "organic
whole". The process of alternation revealed as a transformation
of personality is also the transformation of diverse personalities
into a holistic type, mass-produced by the exigencies of war.
In Schauwecker's work also, the soldier is seen to be struggling
against the technological leviathan. At one point in the narration,
where his platoon is engaged in attack, he expresses a sense of
elation at having found his way through a roaring crescendo of cannon
and howitzer explosions to engage in hand-to-hand combat. The
ability of the storm fighter to escape death by 'materiel' in order
to confront it in the form of a human and visible enemy is one of
the great and exhilarating achievements of combat in a technological
war. Hand-to-hand combat is seen perversely and paradoxically as
a humanizing force, for the highest degree cf personal brutality
and violence is nothing compared to the destruction wreaked by
relentless artillery. Being the lesser of the two evils, it is
no longer an evil at all, but is the warrior's capacity for human
redemption, a violent destructive but humanizing force.
ni
The alternation experience propounded by Juenger and
Schauwecker is projected as the typical experience of the front-
fighter in war. It takes no cognizance of multiple realities.
There is no doubt that the experience of the First World !ar at first
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hand prompted many writers and intellectuals to unequivocal
condemnation. In England the writers like Robert Graves and the
war-poets, Wilfred Owen, Seigfried Sassoon and Isaac Roseriburg,
and in Germany Ernst Toller, Fritz von Unruh and, later, Ludwig
Renn and Erich Maria Remarque, all offered on the basis of authentic
experience a moral condemnation of what they had seen and suffered
and a hope, too, that the experience they underwent would not again
be repeated in human history. Equally, there remained within
sections of the German arny a diehard patriotism and a nostalgia
for the Second Reich which was very distant from Juengerian
nihilism. Both pacifism and patriotism, sentiments which
were anathema to the new nationalist front-fighter, were attitudes
that remained. In addition, many who were proud of their
war-experiences found no difficulty in squaring it with the
membership of the various political parties in the eim;u* Republic,
all of which had veterans' organisations. The war-experience produced
little homogeneity of cultural or political attitudes in Germany.
There was even an organised group of Jewish ex-front-fight ex-s. The vast
diversity of cultural and political affiliations in Weimar democracy
was evidence that, in general, the war-experience had little effect
in limiting the growth of a heterogenous political universe.
The new nationalist depiction of reality was a one-sided creation.
It was totally partisan. It spoke for a section of junior officers,
many of them student volunteers in their late teens and early twenties,
who bore the full brunt of front-line combat. Its presentation by
Juenger and Schauwecker confers upon it the status of a myth in the
Sorelian sense of the vrord,^ There is no attempt to give the role
of the front-fighter in the war a historical or scientific validity.
The front-fighter is to be a model of inspiration for the younger
generation who never fought the war. Their conceptions of a future
Germany are to be guided by his actions. Their self-image is to
be moulded with reference to the heroic qualities of the front-
fighter which they are motivated to emulate. No nyth, however,
originates in a vacuum. Its originators mu3t be close to the
reality it mythologises. In nyths which relate to war or revolution,
there must be some initial focal point of authenticity, where the
originators have participated in and contributed to the reality
»«7
which they interpreted in a particular way. Juenger as a war-
hero, a front-fighter who was wounded on twenty separate occasions
at the front and received eight decorations, including the highest
award in the German amy for an infantiy soldier, the Pour Le M^rite,
legitimated his account of the meaning of the war by his irrefutable
personal involvement. The other new nationalists had similar
though less spectacular biographies. The future of German
nationalism in post-war Germary depended then on the nyth of what
happened to it in the Great War. Out of the complexity of political
manoeuvring and military strategy, out of the diversity of amy
personnel which consisted of bureaucratised staff officers,
proletarian ranks, the aristocratic officer corps, and student
volunteers, out of the conflict of opinion about the nature and
desirability of war, the image of th« front-fighter, the new-type
emerges unscathed with a war-experience so definitive that
it possesses an aura of virgin purity. As Sorel said, "It is
the myth in its entirety which is alone important." It encompasses
the true area of authentic experience. According to the new
nationalists, the 'war-experience1 is the experience of the German
soldier in the Great 7ar.
For the new-nationalists the war-experience is also a totality.
Its partisan theoretical typification of the front-fighter possesses
within it the typifications by the front-fighter of his world. The
boundaries of his world encompass the ravaged landscape like the one
Juenger described at Guilleaont, the recurrent distinction
between the storm battalions and the mass of troops who give weight
and fire; the further distinction between what Schauwecker called the
"Front and the Rear", that is the soldiers who risk their life in
battle and the ossified bureaucratic structure of the staff system
out of contact with events in the field. It includes the permanent
confrontation with 'materiel' as an experience in which, according to
Juenger, man experiences himself as fundamentally incompatible with
and alienated from all forms of physical matter. It contains the
constant feeling of what Schauwecker called "the natural affinity of
life and death, where death destroys apparently without choice or
justice",^"0 and the primordial sensation of the rage "which
squeezed bitter tears from (his) eyes." Above all, war is typified
as a permanent feature of human activity, not as a historical
aberration which erupts periodically in civilised society. All these
typifications are necessary. The 'authentic uyth' must seek out
fundamental forms of typification which remain durable and inspirational
throughout the passage of history when the source of the myth is
distanced further and further from contemporary realities. Sorel
wrote, "Experience shows that the framing of the future, in some
indeterminate time, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very
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effective."^ The essence of the war-experience is to be transmitted
from generation to generation. The experience of Germany on the
battlefield is seen as having superseded Germany's defeat and made
its humiliation temporary. For Juenger and Schauwecker, moreover,
the war-experience is a myth of collective and not individual heroism
and hence identification with the front-fighter is not an act of
individual fantasy, but also an attempt to recreate the same sense
of community at an indeterminate future date as that which comes out
of the incredible and unforgettable human density of trench warfare,
and the elating experience of marching into battle as an undifferent¬
iated mass."*0
In its focus on alternation, the nyth implies too that a return
to the past is impossible. The war is a historical turning-point.
It contains within it the seeds of an experience inaccessible to the
previous generation, besides which their idealism and their patriotism
pales into insignificance. Another new nationalist novelist, Erich
.dwin Dwinger, summarises all these notions when he writes:
"We began as an amy behind barbed wire, and experienced
there the feeling of community. It gripped our souls
so unforgettably, that our yearning will not be
satisfied until we experience this feeling again;
to lead such a life as a whole people without the
constraining slush of Wilhelmianism which even in
those days restricted us agonizinglyj"51
Hie rejection of the past, the sense of community necessary to
the efficacy of the Sorelian myth, the unequivocal anarchistic nihilism,
make the vision of the new Germany one that is incompatible with the
idealist!i. said 'staatlich' conceptions of the conservative nationalists
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and also with post-war restorationism. Historical periodisation
as utilised by the new nationalists demands that 1914 becomes the
end of one era and the beginning of another.
There remains, however, an additional dimension which is
crucial to the growth and continuity of the myth. In any
alternation process, the mere experience responsible for the change
cannot persist in itself through a changed environment. The
majority of soldiers of the German army with experience of front¬
line combat returned home with the desire to lead an orderly and
peaceful civilian life. The iqyth was confronted with the task of
perpetuating itself. If it had been confined alone to the early
writings of Juenger and Schauwecker, it would have almost certainly
died out. But their writings gained both sustenance and credence
from the fact that maiy of the junior officers of the German amy
brought the war back with them to Germany. The volunteer units
of the FreUeorps, set up to counter revolutionary activity in Berlin
and also to defend Germany's eastern frontier's against the Poles
and the Red Army, provided further fuel for the new nationalist
argument. It concretized Juenger's writing above all. As the
initiator and prime exponent of new nationalism in its first very
sparse and solitary phase, the Freikorps, though never explicitly,
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became his focal point of reference. Juenger's writing, in turn,
became the inspirational point of reference for the 'Freikorps'
writers of the late twenties. He was a model and an example.
"here in practice, Juenger as an officer in the Reichswehr and
then as a science student was remote from the activities of the
Freikorps, his writing acted as a source of legitimacy for their
anti-bourgeois and counter-revolutionary terror. They became
incorporated into the nyth of the war-experience and those writers
who followed Juenger applied the ideological technique to their
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own Freikorpa experience. Within this violent and activiatic
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In the immediate years following the war, two writers issued
fundamental challenges to the conception of nationalism and the
conception of the German state which they claimed was responsible for
the German catastrophe of 1918. They were Oswald Spengler and
Moeller van der Bruck. Spengler, an anonymous high-school teacher
before the war, was suddenly to become a figure of renown in Europe
after the publication of his massive two-volume work, The Decline of
the West. He wrote the first volume just before the outbreak of war
and subsequently revised it. When it was finally published, it became
a best-selling work throughout Germany, running into three editions and
then going out of print. The reason for the success of Spengler*s
massive morphological interpretation of civilisations lay almost
exclusively in what he had to say with regard to Western European
culture. Utilising the distinction between culture and civilisation
originating from Nietzsche, Spengler stated that every society went
through a traceable pattern of growth and decline. The period of growth,
the •creative* period, was the spring, summer and autumn of a society,
the period of decline was the winter, the final stage in the cycle,
when society became civilisational and was characterised by a breakdown
of art and creativity and the upsurge of material comfort and rational
intellect."1' According to Spengler, Western European culture had
entered the winter of its decline in the nineteenth century. Although
society would continue in its civilisational form long after its
creativity had been spent, nonetheless the process of decline was irreversible.
The implications of this assertion for the German middle-class
were self-evident. Spengler offered an electrifying version of the
"Decline of the West" at a time when Germany had been defeated by
West-European powers and was becoming rapidly cosmopolitanised.
Beneath the terrifying spectre of Western European domination,
Germans, bewildered by the collapse of the second Reich and the
disintegration of the war-effort, could latch onto something which
proclaimed the fundamental decadence of the victors and of their
culture. Now that German culture had been swept aside, its vacuum
could be filled by gloom and foreboding and by the denunciation of the
West. If the West appeared victorious, according to Spengler, this was
merely a superficial form of mastery which could do nothing to alter its
long-term disintegration. The particular forms of inner disintegration
(Zersetzung) which Spengler saw in Western culture were the political
institutions of parliamentary democracy, the growth in technology, the
emergence of the gigantic metropolis, and the growth of the popular press
Many German academics belonging to the pre-war ethos of conservative
nationalism seized upon this notion of Zersetzung as evidence of the
widespread civilisational decay which had contaminated the fallen Germany
Georg von Below, Edouard Meyer, Friedrich Meineeke and Karl Alexander von
Muller all went some way to accepting the doctrinal lead of the solitary,
non-academic figure of Spengler in rationalising the failure of all the
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pre-war ideals they had stood for.
The pessimism surrounding Spengler*s prophecy of long-term decline,
for which he was criticised on all sides, was something which he felt
necessary to specifically disavow."* He still felt obliged to establish
a blueprint for some sort of political action which might immediately
reverse Germany*s passage towards misfortune. In 1919, in fact, in
66.
between the publication of the first and second volumes of his
Magnum Opus, he wrote a polemical essay in which he tried to show his
commitment to a political solution which would destroy both the
imported vestiges of Western democracy and parliamentarianisra and also
unite the major forms of opposition to the post-war republic - namely,
conservatism and socialism. This essay, called Prussdanism and
Socialism. aro3e out of a conversation with his secretary, August Albers,
who following on the assassination of Kurt Eisner and the collapse of the
Munich Soviet Republic had asked Spengler his opinions on the nature of
socialism.^ To a wider public, the complimentary use of the term
'socialism* and the radical implications of much of his theorising were
not nearly so gratifying as the message of his larger book. For the
development of the radical right in German politics, however, the book
was crucial. For it did two things. Firstly, it presented an
alternative socialism to the orthodox international socialism
predominant on the political left, and, secondly, it tried to show that
this socialism was indeed compatible with a nationalism traditionally
associated with the political right.
Indeed, the essay was to become circulated and discussed quite
widely among the younger German nationalists of the post-war period.
Otto Strasser has said that it was more readable, more incisive, and
more immediate in its political implications than his larger work, and
in nationalist circles and in the right-wing Buende, it circulated quite
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rapidly, causing great excitement. It was a seminal influence within
an activistic minority. It tried to show above all that socialism was
not an exclusive possession of the Left and that, consequently, there
was the possibility of a theoretical radicalism on the Right.
According to Spengler, socialism was a catchword with which everyone
tried to characterise their beliefs. Its strongest contemporary
manifestation was Marxism. Spongier, therefore, saw it as his basic
task "to liberate German socialism from Marxism".
His criticism of Marx and of Marxism is fundamentally on
anti-intellectual criticism. It is based upon the condemnation of the
very notion of ideology and of doctrine. Socialism, for Spengler, is
a form of feeling, and not a means of argument. "We late human beings
of the West have become sceptics", he writes, "Ideological systems no
longer make our heads whirl. Programmes belong to the previous
g
century." Against the doctrinal dogmas of what he considered to be
the main form of Marxism, Spengler juxtaposed what he called
"the wordless consciousness of a socialism of the blood.He feels it
necessary, however, to back this approach with a substantive historical
critique of what he considered to be the deficiencies of Marxism in
analysing nineteenth and twentieth century societies. He claims that
Marx1s main fault was to form his class-model of society on the basis
purely of what was happening in England in the nineteenth century.
He bases his idea of socialism on the proletariat, "the stratum of
society which grows up in the world-city," According to Spengler, the
industrial worker is not an eneny, but a symbol of capitalist society.
"If there are other slaves of the technological age", he writes,
"then he (the industrial worker) too is a slave, just as much a3 the
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engineer or the entrepreneur." Marx has mistakenly regarded him as a
source of liberation by claiming for his mere factual existence the 3tatus
of an idea where nothing more exists than a mere social category into
which all workers fall.
The elevation of the worker to the level of an idea about the
emancipation of man is fundamentally a religious conception, according
68.
to Spengler, and follows upon the nineteenth century secularisation of
the apocalyptic CI istian tradition. Ke writes
"The words capitalism and socialism signify the good
and evil of an irreligious religion. The bourgeois is
the devil, the worker the angel of the new mythology,
and one only needs to go a little deeper into the vulgar
pathos of the Communist manifesto to recognise an
autonomous Chistianity behind the mask."9
The struggle between good and evil in Marxian terms is a struggle
which takes place in a stateless society. Only by basing his class
model purely upon a market economy and ignoring the state can Marx
create his secular eschatology. In addition, his idea of the
dispensability of the state is based upon his idea of man as a good and
rational being. But, for the pessimistic Spengler, man is
"a zoological animal", "a beast of prey", and on this basis alone the
idea of a stateless society as a human paradise cannot be justified.
To rescue the state for socialism, Spengler challenges the notion of
class-struggle by relegating it to a secondary place within the purely
English structure of the market capitalistic economy. In Germany,
on the other hand, he sees the perfect example of socialism in a
national context. In contrast to the class-divided society,
German, or what he calls "Prussian socialism", is founded on a
structurally based national solidarity where all types of occupation
form, under the auspices of the state, a condition of complementarity.
Ho writes, "Socialism is, purely technically speaking, the principle of
officialdom (Be&atenprinzip). Every worker and every entrepreneur
exhibits, in the last analysis, the character of an official.""''0
State socialism of this kind represents a co-ordination of all
economic and political goals in the national interest. The duty of
the official is to cany out that interest in the context of his
specific occupation. The primacy of the national interest, according
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to Spengler, makes the occupational structure, whatever its internal
complexities, culturally homogeneous. Moreover, the reality of the
state as a constraining and iniating factor in the promotion of the
national solidarity which Spongier considers socialistic, links back
to his philosophy of history, where he opposes the conventional notion
of historical causality with an elusive and indefinable notion of
destiny. In this sen s, reality for Sjjengler pertains to destiny,
whereas the idealism of ideologies such as Marxism dissolve
themselves in the superficial rationalism of cause and effect.
So it is that he writes;
"In the twentieth century we no longer believe in
the power of reason over life. Knowledge of Man is
more important than abstract or universal ideals;
from being optimists we have become pessimists: not
what ought to be, but what will be concerns us: and
to become masters of reality is more important to us
than to remain slaves to ideals. The logic of
historical development, the linking of cause and effect,
appear to us as superficial; only the logic of
organic growth, of fate, of instincts felt by everyone
exhibits the profundity of evolution. Marxism is an
ideology. In its historical scheme are the
characteristics which the materialist retains from
Christianity after the power of belief has been
extinguished.
The state as the pre-existent instrument of socialism is the
arbiter of a readily available reality which eschews the need for
ideals about any future earthly paradise, any secularised utopia
which finds its justification in the idea of historical progression.
For Spengler, it is quite useless to try and prove that such a thing
exists. Quite simply, he says, "life has no purpose. Humanity
has no purpose." In addition, reality is particularistic. In
true socialism there is no humanistic universality. "We are
human beings", he writes, "of a particular century, nation,
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location and type." The state ultimately is living proof of the
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E-Eter of reality. It is the framework of constraint within which
can as a soolcgicJL animal finds sustenance and self-expression for
the "socialism of the blood".
On Spengler's analysis, it i3 evident that in any conventional
and intelligible sense he has severed the connection between socialism
and revolution. For, if socialism already exists, then revolutions
are not needed to institute it. On this account he attacks the
leftist notion of socialist revolution and, in particular, the
events of 1918, which he sees as those of a sham revolution. It was
the result, he claimed, of the military ascendancy of the Allies at
the end of the war. The revolutionaries cashed in on the successful
struggle of "capitalist" England against "socialist" Germany. The
revolution was, therefore, a contradiction of the principles of
socialism - a parasitical act which depended upon the prior
destruction of Germany by its national enemy. The historical frame
of reference in which Spengler operated, that is, by looking back in
conservative fashion to the age of Bismarck as the age of true
socialism, had its repercussions in his analysis of the socialist
movement. At the time when the movement exhibited all those
disciplinary features characteristic of the Prussian state under
"the iron hand of Be! el", it was truly socialistic.Yot, in this
sense, its socialism was derivative - a function of its proximity to
the state rather than of any autonomous doctrine. In this way,
Spengler can criticise the more ideologised revolutionary socialism
of the Spartacists and the intellectuals as being a manifestation of the
disintegration of the socialist movement.
Spengler's characterisation of "Prussian socialism" as the
cultural homogeneity induced by disciplined service to the state
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provided an utterly fascinating reversal of the sociological critique
of bureaucraoy which had been started by Max 'tfeber and Robert Michels.
Spengler does not deny the growth of bureaucracy in politics. But
neither does he condemn it. In fact, he regards genuine socialism
as being bureaucratic in its very nature. Bureaucracy is the genuine
socialist alternative to ideology! Socialism bureaucratised becomes
Prussian socialism, whereas socialism ideologised is Marxism, minority
activism and internationalism. All the latter manifestations are
disintegrative and ephemeral. The events of 1918 showed them all well
to the fore. Spengler castigates the anarchism and the bohemian
predispositions of the leftist intelligentsia, whom he holds
responsible for the revolution. Indeed he regards the history of
revolutions largely in terms of a minority seizure of power by a group
of disaffected intellectuals. While this might be valid for other
European countries, it is not valid for Germany. A minority cannot ever
become a majority in Germany, as the Jacobins did in France or the
Bolsheviks in Russia. In addition, Spengler regards the leftist
revolutionary elites as lacking any pride in themselves. He says that
their ruthlessness lay essentially in a devaluation of their own
importance. "The Jacobins were ready to sacrifice everything else",
he writes, "because they were ready to sacrifice themselves".^4"
For Spengler, true revolution is a phenomenon which must involve
the mobilisation of a whole people, not a minority-inspired eruption.
"A true revolution", he writes, "is nothing less than a whole people, an
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outcry, a brazen thrust, a purpose and a rage." In Germany this
occurred not in 1918 but in 1914, on the outbreak of war. The moment
of national unification created by the mobilisation for war was the true
moment of socialist solidarity. Socialism, of the Prussian kind, is
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inseparable f!roin war. Its zenith is attained in those moments of
German history where the reality of war draws the German people
together. Carried away by his vision of revolution as war, Spengler
denies that German socialists are revolutionaries. "No, we are not
revolutionaries", he writes, "No emergency, no press, no party can call
forth a disorderly uprising which possesses the sheer strength as that
of 1813, 1870 and 1914." Yet, at the same time, there is no doubt
that for Spengler the declaration of war is the true revolutionary act
of the nation. War between nations is a permanent state of mankind,
and the real history of nations is not su! ject to historical progression.
The idea of international socialism therefore, states Spengler, is
totally vacuous. The only possible end to conflict is not the
Marxist paradise of a classless society, but the death of men and the
death of nations themselves. Anyone who denies the omnipotence of
death is indulging in self-delusory fantasies. That is the true
reality of a national socialism. "Man does not express ideas", he
writes, "The artist may imagine, the thinker may feel, but the
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statesman and the soldier project themselves into reality."
After the failure of the 1918 revolution, the only real historical
possibility, according to Spengler, is that of Prussian socialism.
Marxist proletarianism has proved itself to be a limiting historical
case. Its hour has passed. Instead, the future lies with the
nationalist youth of Germany. It is to them that Spengler makes his
final dramatic appeal. Havings dismissed leftist revolution as the
work of self-sacrificial intellectual minorities, Spengler outlines his
own socialistic elite prepared at a moment's notice to dig the grave of
intellect:
73.
"I turn to youth. I call upon all those who
have marrow in their bones and blood in their veins.
Educate yourselves! Become men! We don't want any
more ideologists, no more talk about culture and
world-citizenship and the spiritual mission of the
Germans, We need hardness, a bold scepticism.
We need a class of socialist supermen.
The call for education is synonymous with the dismissal of
ideologies, of culture and generally of all traditional forms of
learning. Awareness, in the Spenglerian sense, is much akin to
the Juengerian delineation of the front-fighter's awareness in
war - A world where first-hand experience invalidates the significance
of ideas. The elite of socialist supermen, advocated by a man who,
pages before, had professed his disgust for all revolutionary elites,
is linked to the warrior-type which Juenger was to construct in his
war-memoirs. Spengler, in fact, saw as the prize example of the
"socialism of the blood" the gemeinschaft experience of the front-fighter
in the war, and there is no doubt that he saw this wordless affectivity
as the basis of the fate of Germany in the years to come.
II
While Spengler, despite the popularity of his main work, tended to
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be a somewhat isolated and remote figure in the early twenties;
Arthur Moeller van der Bruck was the leader of a somewhat exclusive
intellectual circle in post-war Eerlin known as the Juni-Klub. It
derived its name from the month of the signing of the Versailles Treaty
in June 1919. The meetings of the club were attended by such people as
Hans Grimm, the novelist of Volk Ohne Raum, Martin Spahn, the historian,
Hans Blueher, the Youth movement leader, and Otto Strasser, one of the
early national-socialist leaders in North Germany. The group
published a periodical called Gewissen. in which many of Moeller van
der Brack* s writings were first published. Its intent was both
serious and theoretical. It wished, in the words of its programme
note, to pledge itself to struggle "against the lack of conscience
20which is the most conspicuous feature of our age,"
Moeller*s most famous work was The Third Reich. First published
in 1923, its continuous influence throughout the years of the Republic
can be gauged by the acclaim accorded to the third edition brought out
in 1931 by the H^seatische Verlag at Hamburg. This extended to most
right-wing circles including the national-socialists. Goebbels, in
fact, was prompted to acclaim it in no uncertain terms. What
enraptured right-wing radicals most of all was the visionary and
Utopian nature of the book. In contrast to the ambiguities of
Spenglerian pessimism, Moeller struck a firm note of inspiration 'when
he cast his book in the light of a vision of Germain's future greatness.
This is made immediately clear in a prefactory letter to Heinrich von
Gleichen. Moeller states here that it was his clear intention to offer
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"instead of government by party,...the ideal of the Third Empire."
The Third Empire claimed, quite naturally, its historical lineage in
the First and Second German empires of Otto and of Bismarck, The
notion was conservative, but at the same time futuristic. Moeller*s
ideal was the starting point of a conservative revolution - a demand for
the revolutionary transformation of society into a new form in which
Germany could reclaim its national-historical heritage. The ideal was
initially philosophical, but Moeller claimed that, like all true
philosophies, it had to be translated into reality, and this would have
to be done by political means. In the confused post-war period in
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which ha was writing, he claimed "It will be an mnpire of
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organisation in the midst of European chaos."
Like bpengler, Moeller's starting-point is essentially an
intellectual reaction to the 1918 revolution. He states q ite
categorically that a revolution never took place. .hat occurred was
an 'insurrection* conducted by a boheiaian minority. The mass of the
people weren't involved, G-ermary had lost its chance. There is a
difference, according to Moeller, between war and revolution. A war
may be temporarily lost, but the peace is never final, whereas
"a revolution occurs once only", Moeller lays the blame for the lost
opportunity of the German revolution, not on the masses, but on their
Leftist leaders, "those revolutionary literati with their cultural
politics (who) have no thought beyond such trivia as the suffrages and
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ballot-boxes." The leader's became corrupted bj liberalism and by
the flirtation with .Vestern Parliamentarianism. Instead of mobilising
the nation, they opted for the degenerate politics of the party machine,
Moeller's bete noire, liberalism, is seen as the conspiratorial seed
behind every left-wing movement. It is none the less hateful to him
for the vague and amorphous light in which he casts it. Rationalism is
a philosophical legacy of both Marxism and liberalism, Marx is a 'homeless
rationalist'. Both ideologies appeal to rootless Jewish intellectuals.
At one point, liberalism refers to the pragmatism of party politics
which he abhors; at another, to the very principle of political democracy
which he dislikes just as much. Most of all, liberalism is a universal
creed directed to the whole of mankind. In this sense, says Moeller,
"liberalism is the death of n tions", Rootlessness, universality,
pragmatism, materialism, are intermixed into the soup's cauldron of
..uropean literal-Marxism. It one point, the whole horror of it all is
/» •
attributed, in a totally paranoid way, to a conspiracy of Freemasons
throughout Europe.
Moeller then rejected Left revolution, because he claimed that
it could not fail to be contaminated by liberalism and international
humanitarianism. His critique of the Left was much more ineffectual
and much less incisive than Spengler*s. His hatred and paranoia seem
to have had a convulsive effect upon his thinking. In his attack on
reactionary patriotism, however, he is,given the esoteric frame of reference
in which he was working, much more incisive. He stated quite
categorically what Spengler had omitted to say - that, for the post-war
German nationalist, there could be no return to pre-war conservative
nationalism. One of the first things he does is to take to task the
post-war restorationists for their inability to extend their nationalistic
resentment at the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty to a critique of
post-war German society as a whole. "The conservative counter-movement",
he says, "seems haphazard and aimless. It has no definite tendencies,
except the general one of trying to escape from the bonds imposed by the
Treaty of Versailles, of trying to find an exit from the wartime prison
2),
into which our enemies have pinned us." Hence, Moeller distinguishes
conservatism from those sources and sentiments with which it is
traditionally associated - namely, the upper middle-class patriotic and
monarchist circles in German politics which gave backing to the German
Nationalist Party. The true conservative cannot be suffused with
nostalgia for an age which led Germany into disaster. Moeller writes:
"Restorations are futile things, valued only by emigres
who have freed themselves from the responsibility of patriotism
but are willing to return to their own arm-chairs....a conviction
is growing, a conviction which is one of the few held in common
by our disintegrated nation, that we have turned our backs for
ever on everything connecteu with the age of William II,"25
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Moeller thus combines criticism of reaction with that of
putschist activism. For him, the Kapp Putsch and the assassination
of Rathenau, acts which were to be revered by new nationalists such as
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Ernst von Salomon as embryonic revolutionary events, were symptomatic
of the post-war nationalist drift into unsystematic and unprogrammatic
resentment against national humiliation.
His estimation of all conservative counter-movements in Europe,
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including fascism, as reactionary, leads him on to a point where he
contenplates some sort of socialistic alliance between the extreme left
and the extreme right. The notion of this new socialism is, however,
fraught with ambiguities, and seems to depend very arbitrarily on the
direction in which he levels his criticisms. Having taken on the task
of criticising Marxism, liberalism and reaction, Moeller occasionally
finds himself slipping into the habit of compromising with one of these
standpoints in order to more successfully attack another. Thus, when
he speaks of Marxism, he describes the proletarist as "a community of
misery", a vast degraded pool of humanity into which "every third man
may any day sink." But the younger generation find it intolerable that
Germany might turn into a proletarian nation. "These men of the
younger generation", he writes, "who will not be proletarians, are
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Germans out of self-respect," "J Like Spengler before him and Sombart
after him, Moeller utilises this distinction between "German" and
"proletarian" socialism.2^ The term "proletarian", in fact, became an
epithet of degradation and for right-radical thinkers a special and
limiting esoteric usage of Marxism. It appealed to the bourgeois and
petit-bourgeois fear of proletarianisation which became so widespread
during the years after the war, and again during the Great Depression.
In drawing up his stereotype of the "reactionary", however, Moeller
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reverses his argument completely and sings the praises of the
proletarist. In referring to his vision of a conservative revolution,
Moeller makes it clear that it is the proletarian and not the
reactionary who participates in this war of liberation! The
reactionary, in despising the proletarist, hinders the alliance of the
political extremes:
"The reactionary fails to see that the war of
liberation led by the oppressed sector of an
oppressed nation will be a war of world ideals,
•a peoples* war*, directed not against ourselves but
against the world-bourgeoisie - to whom we are being
sacrificed. If we win the final war, we shall
thereby win back the Empire for ourselves, not the
Empire of the reactionary's dreams, but the
EMPIRE OF Ua ALL. "30
Moeller*s ambivalent aristocratic hatred and mistrust of the
proletariat dissolves when he confronts the reactionary whom he regards
as his greater enemy. In fact, he sets an important precedent for
right-radical ideology when he states as his two main enemies,
liberalism and reaction, against which nationalism and socialism are
seen as the two antitheses. Under the wing of the nation, the
proletariat, distrusted as an autonomous category and even more as a
theoretical concept, now comes to find its rightful place. In
addition, nationalism and socialism, now freed of their reactionary and
Marxist connotations respectively, are regarded by Moeller as
subordinate components of the doctrine of conservativism. The
conservative, the final stereotype in i'oeilor's book of stereotypes, is
ultimately superior to both the reactionary, with whom he holds in
common a commitment to Germany, and the revolutionary, with whom he holds
in common a commitment to radical social change. Both in opposite ways,
are mundanely political, whereas the conservative revolution is, for
Moeller, fundamentally spiritual. "Our revolution", he states, "begins
with a resurrection in men's souls." It seeks out in them a renewal of
/2.
all that is good in the history of Germany, and in "the mighty river
of German history which ever seeks to regain its bed." It taps the
eternal residue of unspecified and, by implication, unspecifiable
qualities which are uniquely German.
On the face of it, Moeller's conservatism seems, superficially,
to be circumscribed by that same woolly and muddle-headed idealism of
the patriotic professors of 1914, most of whom, no doubt, he would have
regarded as reactionary. In a sense, however, the whole momentum of
his characterisation of conservatism has its deeper roots in Nietzsche's
conception of ^eternal recurrence*. (Ewiges Wiederkehr). Moeller
conceived of history as cyclical, in which distant historical events
will always intrude upon the present as indications of the future that
lies ahead. Life is a continual process of resurgence and renewal.
Values are eternal. By their very nature they come back into history
at the very moment when their distance and remoteness from it seem
irrevocable. "Stable values", he writes, "spring from tradition.
We may be victims of catastrophes which overtake us, of revolutions we
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cannot prevent, but tradition always re-emerges.'" There is a
historical "law" of movement which ensures that values, after a long
period of hibernation, re-emerge to renew the quality of life in society.
It is the conservative who is the true beneficiary of this process.
Revolution, for the conservative, is the process of reclaiming eternity.
Moeller writes "Conservativism has eternity for it. The cosmos itself,
spinning on the axis of law, is no revolution but one of conservative
statics. Nature is conservative... .If we were to suppose for one moment
the revolutionary were to succeed in annihilating all traces of the
previous social order, on that same day the conservative law of movement
would reassert itself."
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It is very clear that Moeller is not merely advocating an
anti-revolutionary revolution in which the conservative is the
antithesis of the revolutionary, but is utilising the type of insight
made by Tocqueville in his writings on the French Revolution, namely
that the revolutionary regime carries out many of the features - in
Tocqueville's case, political and administrative centralisation -
which were policies of the old order. For Moeller it is the
conservative who capitalises on the process of revolution because, in
the attempt to reassert stability after a period of disorder, appeals
have to be made to the historical legacy of the nation. In this way,
he can look upon Lenin, despite his ideological commitment to Marxism,
as a genuine conservative revolutionary, and revolution, in its
Thermidorean context, as a process of stabilisation and renewal,
Moeller's conservative revolution differs from left-socialist revolution
by worshipping precisely those forms of Thermidorean revanche which the
Left has often regarded as the betrayal of revolution. Moeller
recognised that the post-revolutionary process of political stabilisation
was one which played into the conservatives' hands with a vengeance, and
mistakenly thought in addition that it would be one in which ideology
itself would be relegated to a role of minor importance.
In the same way that Moeller*s notion of conservatism is based upon
a neo-Nietzschean conception of eternal recurrence, Moeller's vision of
the Third Reich is a variant of the Nietzschean conception of the
will-to-power, and the two become interlinked. He writes:
"All great men have been conservative and felt,
like Nietzsche, 'I want to be right, not for today and
not for tomorrow, but for centuries to come,'
Conservative thought does not believe in progress; it
rather holds that 'history' has her great moments which
appear and vanish, and that the most man can do is try
to give permanence to them when they come.
"The reactionary creates nothing. The revolutionary
only destroys....The conservative creates by giving to
phenomena a form in which they can endure."\
The will to power is to attempt to give "to phenomena a form in
which they can endure" - namely, by the creation of the Third Reich.
The Third Reich is created by a "third" party of conservatives.
"The third party", says Moeller, "wills the Third Reich."
The Third Reich is the German Empire which benefits ultimately from the
mobilisation of revolutionary forces whose momentum takes them beyond
the control of the revolutionaries. In the immediate context of
German history, this meant for Moeller that the 1918 "insurrection"
had unleashed the forces of disaffection which had outlasted it both
on the extreme right and the extreme left, and under the wing of the
"conservative", their joint aspirations of nationalism and socialism
would provide the foundation for the creation of the T .ird Reich.
Their role as harnessed revolutionary forces was to usher in, by
socially dynamic means, the enduring forms of social stabilisation and
order. The basis of the German nationalism which he saw as the
political movement of the future was that whioh willed the Third Reich
into existence. "German nationalism", he writes "fights for the
possible Reich".Moeller's dream of imperial domination and his
justification of it as a legitimate form of nationalism was the
cornerstone of post-war German nationalism. The Utopian vision of the
Third Reich emerged from the dark shadows of pessimism which engulfed
German thought and even Moeller himself.
In essence the writings of Spengler and Moeller were a counter-
• response to the destruction of the Second Reich and the 1918 revolution.
Embedded in them is that *re-active' feeling^Zf resentment which
Nietzsche describes in The Genealogy of Morals. But this was not
&k».
Judeo-Christian resentment against the barbarian, the aristocratic
and the strong. It was the resentment of the superficially strong
against those progressive and revolutionary forces which Nietzsche had
himself attacked as symptoms of Judeo-Christian decadence. Nietzsche's
disciples displayed the very malaise he attributed to his (and their)
opponents. They resented the revolutionary threat to order. It was
a case of the strong resenting the weak rather than the weak resenting
the strong. But here the s.trong had to expropriate the weapons of the
weak and the decadent in order to ensure their very survival. German
autocracy had been shaken to the roots and had to borrow from the
enemies it resented to renew the illusion of its aristocratic strength,
Moeller had written "Movement begets counter-movement. When Marxism
was swamped in democratic chaos, Nietzsche with his concept of
aristocracy came to the fore."'' He hoped that with the idea of the
Third Reich, history would repeat itself and the 'resentful' strong
finally triumph.
Both Spengler and Moeller were to be sources of inspiration in the
twenties for the small but volatile Nazi party. Spengler*s essay
"The Reconstruction of the German Reich" was to have a substantial
impact on Gregor Strasser who wrote to Spengler to tell him that it was
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"a mine of highly constructive and realistic practical politics".
When Spengler expressed his scepticism about the possibilities of easily
translating his ideas in practical politics, Strasser pressed on
regardless with plans for a social revolution along Spenglerian lines,
Moeller too was popular with the early Nazis. Goebbels acclaimed
The Third Reich with the words "Why isn't he one of us?"^C But
Moeller*s invitation to Hitler to speak to the Juniklub shortly before
his tragic death was disastrous. The former's reservations about
Hitler's beer-hall oratory was a precedent for the later objections to
the Nazi leaders demagoguery among the revolutionary-nationalists.
83,
As it was, with Moeller*s suicide, the vexed question of how he
might have fared in the following years which saw the rise of Nazism
was never to be answered, Spengler who lived on never became an
active force in politics or intellectual life. He remained something
of a recluse and while cautiously supporting the national-socialists
regarded the euporic mass enthusiasm of the movement as escapist and
Utopian, His later works such as Man and Technics never enabled him
to recapture his earlier influence, and when the Nazis came to power
in 1933, he was scarcely thought an intellectual force to be reckoned
with. His "socialism of the blood" already had its protagonists and
despite his pessimism, German nationalists could see in their own
brutal and barbaric life-style the makings of a "race of socialist
supermen". One thing was certain. Both Spengler and Moeller had
laid the foundations for the resurrection of conservatism in an
unrecognisable form. For they both laid claim to a statement which in
pre-war Germany would almost have been impossible:- the revolution of
left must occur in order for the conservative revolution to triumph.
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After the armistice of 1918, Germany was torn apart for the
next four years by endless civil strife. After the November
Revolution there emerged in Berlin a workers' Soviet Republic, in
which the Spartacists, under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl
Liebknecht, played a dominant role. In Munich, a similar Soviet
Republic was set up by Kurt Eisner. In addition, after full-scale
demobilisation, Spartacists seized power from the Republicans in various
cities where there was no Republican army. In the early months of
1919, the Spartacists took over Bremen, Kuhlheim and Halle. Gustav
Noske, the Reich Minister of Defence, was forced to use groups of
demobilised volunteer soldiers to crush these leftist seizures of power.
These military bands were known as the Freikorps. They went on to
fight campaigns in the Baltic and on Germany's eastern frontiers
against the Poles and the Red Array. In March 1920, one of the most
famous of the Freikorps, the brigade of Captain Hermann Ehrhardt, was
the instrument of the Kapp-Luettwitz putsch in Berlin, Later, when
the putsch collapsed and the Freikorps were officially dissolved, many
of Ehrhardt's brigade became part of his terrorist organisation,
Organisation Consul, which was responsible for the assassination of
Matbias Erzbuerger and Walter Rathenau.
The Freikorps, in terms of sociological composition, were
generally confined to the particular age and social stratum which
constituted the front-line junior officers of the war. The one-year
volunteers (Einjaehrigen), who had left school at the age of sixteen
and above all gained commissions in the army as the war expanded,
found little opportunity for a career in the peacetime Eeichswehr
so drastically diminished in sise. In the Freikorps, however,
they were able to continue their wSturm" activities in a different
setting. While officers of the rank of major and above, as well
as staff officers, were hardly to be seen in the Freikorps, an
abundance of former Einjaehrige captains and lieutenants filled the
brigades,1
In this respect they were similar to the squadristi of Mussolini's
Fascist Party in Italy, Their sense of outrage at national humiliation
and left-wing revolution mobilised them to participate in extensive
counter-revolutionary terror. Whereas Italian Fascism developed within
the framework of an organised political opposition movement, the
Freikorps terrorist campaigns against the revolutionary socialists was
officially sanctioned by the new Social-democrat Republic. The
vicious satirical drawings of George Gross show quite clearly how much
the extreme Left regarded the Freikorps as mindless and sadistic
lackeys of reaction for this very reason. The brutal terrorist
methods they used in destroying the socialist basis of power in
many German cities made them widely feared by the majority of the
population, detested by the working-class, and regarded in a
favourable light only by the conservative nationalists of the middle
and upper middle class, who saw them as the last line of defence
against the red terror. Yet, their political role was clearly at
odds with their nihilistic and "soldatisch" sentiments. About
their real nature there remained in the eyes of many bourgeois Germans
a certain ambivalence which finally crystallised by 1922 into fear
and distrust of the unprograramatic terrorist campaigns and
assassinations of the O.C.
Initially, however, they gained much sympathy from young
nationalist admirers - one might almost term them their junior
schoolfellows - who had felt robbed of a chance to fight in the war.
As with the Italian Fascists, large numbers of university students
flocked to join theia. In the Baltic campaign, two of the Freikorps
were integrally composed of students, one of them from the Marburg
Students Corps and a second composed of students from Tuebingen,
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Stuttgart and Hohenheim. Captain Von Epp's brigade, which
destroyed the Soviet Republic in Munich, had large numbers of students
firom Erlangen and Tuebingen. At Erlangen university, in fact, a
thousand out of twelve hundred undergraduates sought to close the
university and force the entire student population to join the
Freikorps,^ The nyth of the war-eaperience itself was perpetuated
within university nationalist circles by the many thousands of
demobilised officers who enrolled for university courses in the years
following the armistice. The fact of Freikorps leaders in their
cities parading their 'heroic' virtues gave wei^it to a cult of
student hero-worship for leading officers like Ehrhardt, who were
A
usually no more than the age of their elder brothers.
In the Youth Movement, too, the influence of the Freikorps was
felt. The movement in general had been fragmented by the overwhelming
politioisation of social life in the first years of the Republic, and
the small Duende had to compete with the newly constituted youth
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movements of the mass political parties. The non-partisan youth
groups were greatly influenced by the "Kampfbuende" formed by brigades
in the Freikorps which had for military purposes been dissolved.
Thus, Ehrhardt founded the "Viking" Bund; the Bund Oberland was
formed under the leadership of Beppo Rohmer and "Werewolf" under the
leadership of Fritz Kloppe.^ In such an atmosphere, anti-bourgeois
traits in the pre-war Youth Movement altered quite radically from a
predominently romanticist and arcadian desire for refuge from the
bourgeois confinements of urban life to a more trenchant commitment
to political action. But it became divided between left and right,
and generally apeakin.-, fragmented. Moreover, civil war, the
campaigns in the East, and political terrorism offered more direct
and more immediate forms of anti-bourgeois existence.
The legacy of violence left by the war was accepted vezy widely
among middle-class youth. When Thomas Mann, after abandoning the
orthodox nationalism of his Reflections of an unpolitical man, gave a
lecture at the Beethovensaal in Berlin in defence of the Republic,
the student section of his audience became hostile at his condemnation
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of the war and the brutality it had caused. They remained impervious
to his exhortation to support the Republic as the true heritage of a
new Germany. In some universities anti-war remarks caused great
outrage among nationalist professors and student corporations. At
Heidelburg, Emil G-umbel was sub ject to intense academic harassment
for claiming that German soldiers in the war had lost their lives
in a dreadful way. For a similar type of remark, Theodor Leasing
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was forced to leave the Teohnical Institute at Hanover. The
pacifist and communist slogan, "no more ware" (Nicht mehr Kriege),
was anathema to those who desperately sought legitimacy for the war
they were too young to fight.
Under such circumstances, it was easy to see in the Freikorps
the legacy of the German soldier in war, continuing, like true
patriots, to defend the Fatherland. It is to be doubted, if we are
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to take the first-hand evidence of the Freikorps fighters, just how
far it was any such thing. Of those whose testimonies are crucial
to understanding the nature of the radicalisation of Freikorps
nationalism, two writers in particular, both members of Ehrhardt's
brigade, are of major significance. These were Friedrich filhelm
Heinz and Ernst von Salomon, Salomons novel, The Outlaws, published
in 1929, and his essay for the 1930 Juenger symposium on war, are,
culturally and politically, the most perceptive documents of the
nature of the Freikorps ethos, and its striving for a radically
new conception of nationalism, not so ouch as a basis for its
activities, but as a means of post-hoc rationalisation of its role
and significance in post-war Germany. The type of writing used by
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the new nationalists, or national-revolutionaries, revealed much
about the nature and the purpose of their writing. Their style,
expressing itself through a variety of forms - notebooks, diaries,
autobiographies, novels and reminiscences, was what one might call
documentaiy. It followed in the footsteps of the earlier writings
of Juenger and Schauwecker. In essence, what was involved was an
attempt to recall factual events in a highly dramatised and often
poetically descriptive form. The literary master of this technique
was, of course, Juenger himself, but it was a feature the new
nationalists came to use, at varying levels of effectiveness. This
documentary style naturally tended to blur the edges between fact
and fiction. In writing of events that have occurred several years
before, it is difficult to disentangle the degree of post-hoc
rationalisation or interpretation that the author has placed into
the mouths of the individuals or characters concerned. Nonetheless,
the documentary style depended above all on the claim to first-hand
authenticity - a personal experience ©f the events involved. This
was the essence of Juenger*s work,and the essence of the work of those
who were influenced by him. This is true of the more important
writers - Salomon, Heine, Werner Beumelberg and Erich Dwinger, and
also of the less literate Freikorps leaders who attempted, sometimes
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rather painfully, to write their memoirs.
The basic starting point of the account given by Salomon and
Heine of the Freikorps ethos is that of conflict as an end in itself}
of conflict as a way of life. Equally, they took up in the context
of their own experiences Juenger1s assertion that war knows no
boundaries, no frontiers. What social psychologists have sometimes
referred to a3 "the functional autonomy of motivesw^ is a recurrent
motif in their work. The main feature of the Freikorps was that the
search for enemies in the interests of the continuation of conflict
had outlasted the war. Heinz writes:
"People told us the war was over. That made us laugh,
e ourselves are the war..,. We marched onto the post-war
battle-fields just as we had gone into battle on the
Western Front.*2
In his 63say for the Juenger symposium, Salmon re-echoes this
sentiment. "The war came to an end", he writes, "but the warriors
continued to march on.,.. The war had its own laws. .hat was good
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enough for the war was good enough for the period after the war."
Certainly, in the writings of both of them, the same images of
slaughter and brutality persist as in Juenger*s evocation of the
slaughter at the front. Dead men fall down at Salomon's side
like flies, but do not distract from his rage to kill. Unlike the
war at the front, however, the enemy was more varied. In The Outlaws,
the Freikorps hatred was against all enemies, whether Poles or
Cpartacists ©r unarmed citizens, with equal intensity. The atrocity
was totally indiscriminate. 11 enemies, civilians or soldiers, armed
or defenceless, fell victim to the rage for blood. The war had
returned to civil society with a vengeance. The destructivesss
which had been nurtured on the battlefields of the front returned to
ravage the nation which had ultimately failed its most destructive
fighters.
The fundamental difference, however, was that the Freikorps was
no longer part of the German arty. The Reichswehr, diminished so
drastically in size and confined, by and large, in its officer stratum
to the aristocratic, upper middle-class circles and to families with
an army tradition, was an alien institution. For the Freikorps, the
army had lost its legitimacy, its claim to be the true military arm
of Germany, Its class privilege and its ineffectually were a source
of both resentment and contempt respectively. The changing of
environment, the switching of worlds, which Jueager had proclaimed
30 ecstatically, meant that the "warrior", the front-fighter, had
lost his political daim to legitimacy. He was no longer part
of the German army and, as we shall see, the German army was not
part of the front-fighter* s vision of Germany. The front-fighter
experience forged in the service for the Second Reich perpetuated
itself in the Freikorps after the Second Reich had collapsed in
ignominy. The institutional context of violence had been destroyed
and the legitimacy of the army as an institution severely shaken.
The junior officer stratum upon which the army had been so dependent
now looked upon the arny with contempt.
Although the state nominally commanded the allegiance of the
Freikorps, the allegiance was fragile and periodically destroyed.
As the Freikorps campaigns switched dizzily from German cities to the
Eastern Front and then back again to the Kapp putsch in Eerlin and the
h
•liberation* of the Ruhr, the loyalty of the Freikorps became whittled
down to nothing more than a faith in their own leaders, and a
commitment to fight irrespective of the legality of the battle that was
offered them. It was the Freikorps, in fact, which provided the
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basis for Juenger* s vision of a "storm elite" of mid- urope, prepared
at a moment's notice to change the direction of its agression in
search of even newer enemies. They were, in Hie title of Salomon*s
novel, genuine "outlaws". They were bereft of legitimacy, finding
in all sections of the nation an unsoldierly and bourgeois attitude
to life which contradicted their own brutal and destructive life-style,
iTuenger's vision of the new warrior, the new type who emerged from the
Front, was undoubtedly a Freikorps man. Their actions were
destructive. They held most human values in contempt. Their
activism was nihilistic. They had few positive or constructive ideas
about the future of Germany. If, in the military sense they shewed
exceptional courage and discipline, this merely indicated that their
anarchic tendencies were collective in nature rather than individualistic.
Their action echoed Juenger•s words, "Not why we fight, but how we
fight is the essential thing." In the last analysis, their destructive
capacity was for the asking of almost anybody who wanted to use it.
Salomon recalled the practical implications of this policy, or
lack of policy, with regret. For Juenger*s philosophy of adventure
found its reality in an adventurism which was politically aimless,
of infinite plasticity, and lacking in any sense of ultimate achievement.
9^
Historically, according to Salomon, this meant that the movement was
prone to incredible self-contradictions. He laments:
"We who were fighting under the old colours, had saved
the country from chaos, God forgive us. We had sinned
against the spirit. We thought we were saving the country,
and w© were only saving the bourgeoisie."^
For some, too, the desirability of a putsch was justified in
revolutionary terms, while for others it was counter-revolutionary.
As in the case of the Kapp putsch, carried out militarily speaking,
with great ease, there was little co-ordination between the leaders of
the brigades involved, no conception of an alternative political regime,
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and little attempt to proselytise to the population at large. If
the front-fighter could be portrayed as the archetypal German at war,
the Freikorp man could hardly be seen as the archetypal German of
peacetime. As adventurers prey to the requirements of political
stability, revolutionaries fulfilling the role of counter-revolution,
the self-contradictions of their actions was not only a result of
political naivity, but also of the growing pluralism and heterogeneity
of political forces in post-war Germany. War in civil society, by
definition, lacks the homogeneity of national mobilisation. The
nation as a reality had become a number of fragmented and conflicting
forces with the Freikorps as, almost literally, the potential friend or
enemy of all of them.
To the new nationalists it soon became evident that, if the nation
was no longer a reality of which they approved, then it would have to
become a myth. It would have to be totally distant and remote from
the reality of post-war Germany. It would have to become an ideal
inconsonant with the present political state, only to be achieved by
revolutionary action. The theme of the sudden revelation of the "idea"
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of the nation runs through the new nationalist writings. In Arnolt
Bronnen's novel, 0.S.. Bergerhoff, a Freikorps fighter in Upper Silesia,
says of the predicament of his fellow-soldiers there:
"There we were...,just a handful of us, scattered,
isolated, as husy as could be, and all at once we were
mastered by this idea of a nation which fell upon us
like a sickness. We became the mysterious and happy
instruments of the nation; the destiny and life of our
people still inspire us. But monsters stir in our
hearts. How can we understand that the government of
our own nation should have betrayed us, their destiny,
their instrument! We were fighting for Germany and
Germany has destroyed us in the very moment of our
triumph."1"
To the authentic myth of the front-fighter is added the •authentic
myth of the nation'. The Freikorps fighter experiences his 'loss' of
the nation in the betrayal of his cause by the masters he serves.
Xrenek, the hero of Bronnen•s novel, proclaims "I'm not running around
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here for the state. I'm running around here for Germany." The
nation emerges throughout all the contingent circumstances which
contradict its essential being as the vision providing the impetus for
the activistic impulses of the Freikorps fighter. As the front-fighter,
now Freikorps fighter, has switched worlds from legitimate total war to
quasi-legal guerilla warfare, and from the battlefront to civil society,
so Germany, the vision that inspires him, must also become something
else. It is no longer a reality which legitimates his actions, but
a distant vision which compels him into action.
In Salomon's work, the myth of the nation and the process of
transformation underlying it is given its clearest expression. The
theoretical centrepiece of Salomon's novel is a discussion between the
author and Erwin Kern, a section leader in Organisation Consul, and, if
we are to credit Salomon's account, its informal leading theoretician.
It was Kern who was primarily responsible for the assassination of
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Rathenau, in its planning, its rationale and its execution. Here,
in the discussion preceding and accompanying the planning of the
assassination, emerges the fact that Rathenau's murder is inseparable
from an understanding of Kern's vision of Germany, G-enerally, the
motive for the assassination has been attributed to anti-semitism,
and certainly this was a predominant factor in the operations of many
right-wing terrorist organisations, including O.C. This is certainly
a very strong motive, which Salomon, writing in retrospect, obviously
"JQ
wished to whitewash entirely. Nonetheless, there is little reason
to suppose that this invalidates the account of the conversations which
took place. On Salomon's reading, Kern emerges as one of the most
sophisticated and perverse of the new nationalists, and also one of the
most nihilistic. In the book, his heroic stature is more than a token
of Salomon's obvious admiration for him. It is also an attempt to
portray him as a bodily extension of the authentic u$rth of the nation
he contrives to formulate, a national-revolutionary hero who died in
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his attempt to resurrect the nation.
In Salomon's version of the prologue to the assassination, Kern
was not anti-semitic, but nihilistic. Both men read the work of the
Jewish statesman avidly and were deeply impressed, especially by his
warning of the spread of materialism in a technological age.2u In
addition, they both went to hear him address a mass meeting, and
realised that their proposed victim was a man of exceptional qualities.
Kern called him, in fact, "the finest and ripest fruit of his age."
But it is for reasons of his excellence and greatness that Kern wishes
to kill him. He resents his claim to greatness in an age by which he,
Kern, feels personally betrayed. He says;
"I could not bear it if someone great should emerge from
the chaotic and insane age in which we live. Let him pursue
what fools call a policy of fulfillment. That's no business
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of ours. But I could not tolerate it if this man
should once again inspire this nation with a faith:
that he should raise it up to a purposefulness and
give to it a national consciousness, For these
things belong to an age which was destroyed in the
war, that is dead, as dead as mutton," 21
Kern's nationalism is a negation of the possibility of faith
in the existing nation. It is precisely because Rathenau seems able
to achieve what Kern has defined as defunct that his existence and
achievement is intolerable. The act of assassination is to be a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Rathenau*s death will ensure that what
Kern holds to be impossible will never come true. The nation will
retain its purity as a nyth, and not be dragged into the amorphous web
of reality by any politician interested in national reconstruction.
According to Kern, it is only the outlaws themselves who remain in
contact with the nation as it really is. It lias no other referent
in living reality. All other imperfect manifestations of it must be
destroyed before they are allowed to take root. For Kern, the nation
no longer exists. It can only be reclaimed by those who have rejected
the pre-war epoch responsible for its humiliation, and who by the
process of war have been changed utterly. It can only be claimed by
destruction and revolutionary terror, without consciousness or faith.
The war, for Kern, signified the death of the nation and all those who
fought for it, both living and dead:
"I asked Kern: 'How is it that you, as an imperial
officer, managed to survive the ninth of November, 1918?'
Kern replied: 'I did not survive it. As honour demanded,
on November ninth, 1918, I blew my brains out. I am dead.
TAhat survives is another thing. Since that day, I have lost
cyself. But I won't be any different from die two millions
that died. I died for the nation, and all that survives
in me lives only for the nation. Were it otherwise, I
could not bear it.'"22
In declaring a moratorium on the nation, Kern declares war on all
those who try and inspire it with a living faith. For such an effort
stands as a theoretical affront to his diagnosis of death. Such a
faith contradiots his experience as a front-officer transformed into
a nihilist by his sense of self-decimation. For how can the nation
continue to exist when all its heroes have already died? The
Freikorps terrorist becomes, through Kern*s words, the humiliated
front-fighter seeking revenge for his own death. Ke 3eeks to
recognise the nation only by making its resurrection synonymous with
his own resurrection. There can be nothing else. Schauwecker goes
even further, by suggesting that the very process of losing the war was
necessary to this ultimate victory of the new nationalism. He makes
Allbrecht, the hero of his novel Awakening of the Nation, say, in the
very last speech in the book:
"Now we can begin to set free what is buried but
what still lives, yes, and that which has the will to
live ut which is not yet born....We had to lose the
war to win the nation,"23
In their desire to radicalise the struggle for national resurrection,
the new nationalists come to look upon the Freikorps campaigns as the
origins of the national revolution. The assassination of Rathenau,
in Salomon's version, is conceived of as a revolutionary act. But
its essence is destructive. It is symbolic of the permanent negation
of the present implicit in the anarchic nihilism of the Freikorps - a
will-to-destroy unaccompanied by a will-to-power. In Kern's vision,
the nation is no longer a politioal concept, but a justification for
nihilism, a pretext for revenge against the complacency of a bourgeois
society. After the assassination, there was no next step. The
killing was greeted by a nation-wide horror and indignation. Kern and
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Hermann Fischer, the assassins, had in fact made plans to flee the
country after the event. Trapped by police in an isolated castle-tower
in the Thurlngian mountains, Kern was killed by a bullet, perhaps from
Ol
his own gun, and Fischer certainly shot himself.
The process of transformation from mass-slaughter at the front
to civil brutality at home and, finally, to secret terror, had a perverse
historical logic all of its own. Kern's death was like a voluntary
self-execution based on the premise of his existing death. It seemed
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to typify the death-wish of a movement turning in upon itself.
Salomon himself insisted that each political assassination severely shook
the structure of the new democracy. Assassination, as a political
technique, is, however, highly limited unless it is accompanied by
other forms of political programme, and these the O.C. certainly did not
have. After Rathenau's assassination, the movement began to disintegrate.
At an early stage in a century of extensive political and
revolutionary terrorism, the nature and consequence of its activities
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were not lost on its leading members. It was characterised by
anonymity, ubiquity, and the effective use of unpredictable terror.
Like most organisations based on suspicion and the creation of fear, it
spent half its time searching out spies and enemies in its own midst with
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a sadistic and petty-minded brutality. Terrorism stood at the
end-process of a period in which a younger generation of German
nationalists had established themselves as ruthless practitioners of
civil genocide - perhaps on a scale unequalled before the emergence in
the thirties of the Stalinist and national-socialist terrors, which had
the advantage, so crucial to politicised and systematic efficiency, of
total power.
The specific background of the Freikorps is crucial to the
understanding of the «yth of the nation as the basis for their nihilism.
No other doctrine or ideology could capture the sense of compulsion
which they felt to act in a brutal or destructive manner, nor
indicate the authentic origin which they felt to underlie this
compulsion. No other revolutionary niyth could dictate to them the
necessity of driving the final nails into the coffin of the Imperial
Germany, for which, only years before, they had fought, and for which
their fallen comrades had died. The nation as a geo-political unit,
a territory subjected to a state, had ceased to exist. It existed in
the writings of the new nationalists as an external metaphysical force
which controlled their actions. In many instances this compulsion is
portrayed as a species of psychobiological reductionism. In this vein,
Heinz, for example, writes "The extreme opposite of nationalism is
fatalism. The nationalist, knowing nothing in his experience but a
sense of overwhelming powers, obeys only the demonic energy of his own
blood, and believes that the process of change is the product of actions
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committed at exactly the right moment." Activism in this sense is not
a manifestation of free-will, but of biological and psychological
compulsion. The nationalist is the activist compelled into activity by
external forces which overwhelm him. The 'nation* is a myth which
engenders the psychological need to act out of desperation. In the
process of radicalisation, the act becomes conceived of as revolutionary,
as a prelude to undefined but cataclysmic change in the social order.
Kern stresses the deterministic and metaphysical nature of this
compulsion when he tells Salomon that they are an elect chosen to submit
to it in the natural course of struggling for the resurrection of the
nation:
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"If we are chosen, we are chosen in our hearts to
preserve what has come down to us through hundreds of
years, what has heen preserved through every contingent
event, what first made us worthy of "being a nation.
No nation striving for its fullest development refuses
to rule as far as its faculties permit. I recognise
no submission save to this power....Nothing else is
open to me but to act as the whole force of my will
orders me to act.
^ This force is destructive.
Hence, I destroy,"29
The nature of this activism, is in the Durkheimian sense, that of
a force external to man which controls his action. It is not, however,
social, but metaphysical. It does not produce normative constraints,
but instead unleashes action in violation of normative constraints.
It is action whioh knows no submission to socialisation outside the
sacred arena of war. Kern thus formulates the embryo of what seems a
contradiction in terms, a nihilist metaphysic, which perpetrates itself
in the "north1 of the nation. Amidst the seemingly arbitrary and random
destruction of anarchic nihilism lies the source of compulsion which
legitimates it. Whereas the myth of the front-fighter is authenticated
by the lived experience of the front, the north of the nation is so vast,
so unapproachable, so remote from reality that it ends up with no
empirical referent at all. Yet this, without doubt, is the core value
of new nationalism. In his sociological essay for the Juenger symposium,
Salomon writes:
"The spiritual essence of the Freikorps formed itself
in a fluctuating and variable manner around an absolute and
recognisable nucleus, around the nation as a central value,
as a metaphysical compulsion, whose laws had to dictate
their every action."30
The nation, bereft of reality, dictates the actions which are
supremely real. Destruction is the supreme reality. For the new
nationalists it was a way, to use Juenger*s words onoe again, "to stamp
their burning seal in the flowing wax of the world." In a certain sense,
such a nationalism must become religious or even divine to compensate
for the grotesquely mundane atrocities which are committed in its
name. Schauwecker ultimately claims that the nation is God.
"If the nation is without beginning and without end," he writes,
"if it is one in origin and in purpose, then the nation is God and God
is the nation. Then Germanness is a religion. Then the German
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is ultimately a believer." It is the be-all and the end-all of
action, and action is, in Kern*s words, destructive. The nation is
a God of war, a reality transformed into a metapnysic in the interests
of maintaining through anarchic nihilism a fundamental contact with
a reality it has lost. The contradictions this creates at a theoretical
level are the ones which Juenger attempts to resolve in his essay on
"Total Mobilisation", in which he sets up his blueprint for the
systematisation of nihilism. As it was, the "myth of the nation"
initially embellished Juenger* s north of the front-fighter, and his
sociological model of nihilistic, unpolitical man.
The fact that the memoirs of the Freikorps campaigns, as with the
memoirs of the war-experience, came to be published at the beginning of
the thirties, re-emphasises the importance of historical retrospection.
The precedent for the national-socialist terror had already been created,
anarchic and unsystematic as it was. What was more important was the
upsurge of intellectual activity which came to demonstrate that such
horror and atrocity was not unamenable to intellectual rationalisation.
The brutality of the Freikorps, the outlaws which Salomon characterised
as being, in all cutural and sociological senses, as freischwebend.
free of all normative constraints in civil society, are portrayed as
the logico-historical consequence of the suffering and betrayal of
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the fl-ont-fighter in the Great War, This judgment was historical. '
103.
The source of its legitimation lay in the fact that those who
retrospectively made the judgment were also those at the centre of
the events on which they passed judgment. A justification of human
brutality had been given the seal of authentic myth.
The radicalisation of German nationalism centred around the
emergent conception of the nation as a myth. It was a form of what
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Charles Maurras, the leader of Action Francaise, had called
"integral nationalism", a total and unconditional commitment to the
nation as an interest above all other interests. The specific
mythology, in addition, ensured the solidarity of the committed group.
The nation was the externalised metaphysical compulsion which governed
all actions. According to the new nationalists, the historical
circumstances of post-war Germany demanded that these actions should
3L
be destructive in content. The religion of nationalism, with its
nation-God, dictated the necessity of destroying all existing forms of
social and political order. Yet destruction was a necessary form of
resurrection. Schauwecker had proclaimed "we had to lose the war to
win the nation". Juenger, in his book The Adventurous Heart, went a
stage further and regarded a certain form of destructiveness as
necessary to the process of historical renewal. He called this form
"Prussian anarchy". The paradox in the phrase is the one we have
already discussed, the contrast between brutal anarchy and military
discipline, the two faces of the f*ont-fighter and the Freikorps
ethos. Nihilism was the mode of destroying the old order to usher
in the new, by the use of militaiy means. Juenger conceived of action
attuned to this transformation in terms of his conception of adventure.
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He speaks of "the most strange and sublime appearance of the Prussian
anarchist which only becomes possible in an age when all order has
come to grief. He alone is equipped, and accountable through the
categorical imperative of his own heart, for passing on through the
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chaos of violence to the foundation of a new order,"
In the writings of the new nationalists, the source of this
"categorical imperative" of the adventurous heart is the nation itself.
The fact, however, that such action implied widespread social and
historical consequences involved, at least for Juenger, a much wider
appraisal of human behaviour than such a narrow concept of nationalism
could give. The role of Spengler and Moeller van der Bruck was to
provide crucial theoretical guide-lines for the histroical significance
of post-war nationalist action, in which nationalism could be seen to
have a wider sociological context. The first major breakthrough
they had created was in their condemnation of the 1918 revolution
as an "insurrection" or as "ineffectual revolution", criticisms
which provided fuel for the nationalist belief that they themselves
were the revolutionaries, even though they had fought against the
people behind the barricades. In historical retrospect, national-
revolution can be seen as a historical strategy arising out of its
original role of counter-revolution. The putschist mentality which
Moeller attributed to the Freikorps, and which he condemned so
vigourously, now itself becomes justified as an embryonic form of
revolutionary action against the democratic republic. Salomon, who
admitted the political naivety of the Preikorps, could nevertheless
condemn the leftists of 1918 as "a grey rabble without instinct for
36blood or barricades." Schauwecker makes the homecoming officer-
narrator of The Fiery Way say of the revolutionary scenes confronting
his decimated company, "I've nothing against the revolution. We saw
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it coming inevitably, but when I see this shuffling without trace
of genius, this thrusting of utter incompetence into the offices
of the state, the contents of my gorge shoot up,"^7
The ineffectually and the inevitability of the revolution had,
in reality, not been foregone conclusions. The homecoming nationalists
from the front were both startled and enraged by the widespread civil
disorders. They saw them as the initial manifestation of the stab-in-
the-back and the betrayal of Germany, later given an official seal of
approval by the Treaty of Versailles, The role of the Freikorps
was crucial in quelling the leftist revolt and setting up the republic.
In retrospect, however, the work of Moeller and Spengler could be
adduced as theoretical •evidence* of the historical necessity of the
failure of the Left, The Left had been discredited, according to
the elder statesmen, because it operated with a false and bastardised
form of socialism. The specific terms of its nihilation lay, as we
have seen, in uncovering the * true1 yet dormant forms of German
socialism which lay waiting in the wings upon the failure of the Left.
Spengler and Moeller were the first to say "I told you so", about
an issue which had hung in the historical balance.
The new nationalists celebrated their graduation from the status
of counter-revolutionaries to national-revolutionaries with smatterings
of the nationalist socialism offered to them by the elder statesmen.
Kern, for example, talking vaguely of a socialistic and nationalistic
Germany, echoes Spengler's demand for a socialisation and equalisation
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of wealth and a return to the intellectual unity of the Second Reich.*'0
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Salomon himself, in his sociological essay, repeats Spongier*s
assertion that Marxism was a political ideology which established
itself in the context of a purely nineteenth century capitalist
society.39 its class doctrine, therefore, could be seen as little more
than part of the ideological superstructure of the subordinate class
of capitalist society, which would dissolve and crumble in the new
nationalist and socialist Germany. Here, according to Salomon, the
true socialist emerges, dispensing with all the intellectual trappings
of "ideologies, dogmas and programmes", for programmes, as Spengler
had said, belonged to the previous century. If nationalism was a
metaphysical compulsion, socialism was a "wordless consciousness".
It was a matter of feeling, not of rational intellect. The new
nationalists clearly saw themselves in the notion of Gemeinschaft.
which Spengler called socialism of the blood, and which he explicitly
stated originated from the war-experience.
Nationalism was the impulse to destroy, socialism the feeling
of social solidarity which suffused the bands of nationalist destroyers.
Both erected an externalised doctrinal metaphysic. Both were a
species of psychological reductionism. In both their metaphysical
aui their reductionist phases they complemented one another.
Nationalism and socialism farmed an emotive yet metaphysical unity.
Kern, while talking in terms of the egalitarian and socialistic
unity of the nation, can say, almost in the same breath, that he is
not interested in the nation's hunger, but in its fate. To these
obsessions, the conservatism of Moeller van der Bruck seemed almost
peripheral. It was true that in the freikorps movement historical
symbols of Germany gained a new importance. In the Baltic, the Hamburg
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Freikorps flew the ancient Hansa flag and sang old songs.
In Organisation Consul the medieval practice of Femegericht
(Folk Justice), originally used by vigilante bands to dispense
home-made justice, with its gruesome single sentence of death for
any offence, was revived with a conscious and symbolic recognition of
its historical origins. More important than Germany's past, however,
was Moeller's futuristic vision of Germany as a great empire.
When Salomon asked Kern the ultimate goal of the actions impelled
by his enslavement to the nation, he replied "In the conquest of the
world by Germany".^-0 Revolutionary nationalism in a state already
possessing national sovereignty invariably gravitated towards
imperial domination. The goals of revolutionary nationalism,
already confronted with the actual existence of the nation-state,
were ultimately bound by their own logic to affirm the pursuit of
imperial conquest. Moeller had staked his claim to posterity by
proclaiming the future Utopian vision of empire when the majority
of the right-wing revels were still narrowly nationalistic and
nihilistic. In this way, it provided a political foundation
for the direction of revolutionary nationalism simultaneously with
the projection of its grandiose Utopian design of the future Germany.
It was no exaggeration to say that Moeller's prime contribution to
the ideology of revolutionary-nationalism was to legitimise the
ambivalent and contradictory conception of Germany as both empire
and nation.
Apart from taking the notions of socialism and revolution out
of the hands of the unsuccessful revolutionaries, Spengler and Moeller
also found evidence in Russia of the successful development of the
struggle against that other main enemy of the radical right -
Western liberalism. They both looked, in different ways, to Russia
as the major post-war source of resistance to the Westernising trends
in Europe and the hegemony of political democracy. Their claim to
have detected in the new Soviet Republics a great upsurge of
nationalist feeling, both during and after the revolution, was not
lost on the new nationalists. According to Salomon, the greatest
political error of the Freikorps, after having allowed themselves
to be used for the defence of the German bourgeoisie against the
red terror, was to become the instrument of Allied foreign policy
against the Red Army in the Baltic. ^ Kern, in Salomon* s novel,
speaks of the Bolshevik seizure of power as part of a process of
national awakening that ought to be emulated in Germany without all
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the superficial trappings of Marxism. Schauwecker claimed that
Lenin was a "great leader" who died before he was able to prevent the
nationalist impetus of bolshevism from being submerged in the
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Trotskyist ideology of international communism. Dwinger compared
the conflict between Kerenski*s liberalism and Bolshevism with the
parallel antipathy between German Wilhelmianism and the ethos of the Front,
He asserted that German national.ism, inspired by the nationalist
upsurge of the Bolshevists, would not submit itself in the docile
manner of the German communist party to the Soviet world-revolutionary
claims, but set up instead a parallel and rival nationalism with similar
revolutionary foundations. "The destiny of Germany", he wrote, "is not
East or West, but an autonomous centre where the German world-revolution
will assert itself against the Russian world-revolution." ^
Russian bolshevism, distinguished from the international and
purely class-connotations of Marxism, was seized upon as a historical
precedent for the fusion of nationalism and socialism advocated by
the revolutionary-nationalists. Towards the end of the Republic,
it led to the emergence of the National-Bolshevik movement of Ernst
Niekisch which became one of the main national-revolutionary factions.
What is notable about Salomon's writings is that they convey
much of the general emotive character of Freikorps nationalism.
The "nation" is erected into a metaphysic without substance. Yet all
forms of integral nationalism thrive on such a diffuse emotional
support. Hitler exploited it to the full in his constant railing
against the 'Diktat' of Versailles. In the German situation, his
success was in no way dependent purely on people's concrete ideas of
what Germany was or ou^ht to be. But for nationalist intellectuals,
such could not be the case. They had to state what the nation was
and to chart its destiry, In doing so, most of them displayed utter
contempt for the liberal nineteenth century conception of nationality
and the nation-state. Bismarck's legacy was obvious. He had not
created a nation but a Reich, an empire by military and e3q>ansionist
means. Yet even this was not enough. Bismarck had co-existed
with the liberal nations of the West and consequently never made
full use of Germany's dynamic expansionist potential, While many
writers, including Hitler himself, saw this expansion in terms of
racial mastery, the lesson of the Great ar had been very much
different for Juenger. He saw the key to military-imperial expansion
in technology. The war of material made few concessions to recognised
territorial boundaries. The re-drawing of the map of central Europe
by the victorious ..Hied Powers had made this very clear. The idea
of the German nation with a fixed territorial area pillaged by the
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Treaty of Versailles was a predominant factor in the resentment of
the more conservative nationalists, hut for most revolutionszy-
nationalists this was a thing of the past. Juenger's idea of
technology provided a cogent rationale far a new imperialism in
which the nation was to he constrained no more by the formula of
the nation-state or the idea of nationality. Juenger came to
envisage his new Germany as a technological world-empire.
The impact of technology on warfare is crucial to Juenger's
mythology of the front-fighter. In a repressive technological
world the latter serves as an alternative hero and victim to that
of Marx's industrial proletarian. In the face of imminent
destruction he is the most exploited and the most courageous of men.
The front-intellectual provided for Germany's nationalist storm-
troopers and freebooters an alternative mythology to that of Marxism.
The mythology was in many ways however even more limited and
unconvincing. For the fighter was ephemeral. The industrial
worker was a permanent feature of the modem worldj the fighter in
a mass army at best a temporary one. The problem then for Juenger
was to make the fighter the prototype of the new man in a world
which in peacetime renounced his existence. There was only one
solution. In order for the front-fighter to gain the universal
status of the worker, war would have to become permanent. If war
was permanent the enslavement of the iron cage, to use eber's
metaphor, would have to be accepted as necessary and desirable.
The universal nature of the fighter, consequently to become the
fighter-worker, could only be sought in that universal process
of rationalisation which weber had seen as intrinsic to all societies
whether socialist or capitalist. But where ft'eber resisted his own
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prophecy, even to the extent of opting for the limited freedom
of 'private capitalist expansion* against * governmental direction'
based on German civil service officialdom, Juenger acclaimed this
process. For Weber it held out the prospect of a universal
bureaucracy based upon uniform conditions of organisational rationality.
For Juenger on the other hand, under the conditions of permanent and
total war, organisational rationality was militaristic rather than
bureaucratic. It was oriented towards planned methodical destruction.
As such, it held out within the iron cage the perpetual thrust of
danger and adventure which bureaucracy in the (.eberian formula could
never possess. Whereas Weber saw the bureauoratisation of the
modern mass army as a feature of a modern growth of organisational
rationality, Juenger saw the mass army as the core model of all
other organisations. For Weber the modern army was potentially
bureaucratic; for Juenger the modern organisation was potentially
militaristic, Juenger*s perversion of Weber* s formula of
rationalisation finally enabled him in Per Arbeiter to present an
alternative prototypical worker to that of Marx. But he achieved it,
by the denial, typical of both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks under Stalin,
of the role of the worker in the emancipation of humanity. Like
Marx's proletarian, Juenger*s fighter is the product of a total
environment. Unlike Marx, however, Juenger conceives of no
change in the fighter thereafter, whatever the changes in environment.
Socialised into war, he is not pacified by peace. His fighting
attributes, his stoicism, his capacity to receive and inflict pain, are
permanently enduring come what may. There is no question of emancipating
himself (or humanity) from bondage, for that bondage is inevitable.
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The great war and the civil war were two historical events
which provided the focal point for changes at all levels of German
society. One of these changes might be termed a change in generational
ideologies in some sections of the German saiddie-class. Many middle-
class Germans of the generation of recruiting age for the war came to
commit themselves to extremist political doctrines after the collapse
of Imperial Germany. On the political right, a developmental process
occurred whereby a highly revolutionary nationalism came to challenge
the previous dominant ideology of conservative nationalism which had
acquired widespread legitimacy in pre-war German society. The
social basis of this extremism lay in the disaffected junior officer
stratum, whioh was both unable and unwilling to secure military
positions for itself in the drastically reduced officer corps of the
post-war German army. The "war-experience" of this group of officers,
and sometimes K.C.O.s as well, was a necessary condition for this
disaffection with Wilhelminian Germany and the type of nationalism which
f
had prevailed in it. The "war-experience" became totalised by many
new nationalist writers who emerged from this stratum, to epitomise
man's experience of war as such, and, in so doing, elevated the
"war-experience" to the status of an authentic myth. The process
of alternation conveyed by Juenger and Schauwecker found its social
basis of continuity in the post-war campaigns of the Freikorps.
The legitimacy of the new ideological conception of war and of
nationalism was reinforced by the post-war activity of the socio-
military stratum to whom it referred.
Sue! a change in generational ideologies rested also upon the
de-institutionaiisation of this group. Their ability to carry out
military practices within the context of volunteer formations and outside
of the legitimate institutional context of violence - the armed forces -
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provided the social basi3 for the nihilistic conceptions which
beoame prevalent in the radicalisation of nationalist ideologies among
the new nationalist writers of the younger generation. Thi3 whole
historical syndrome comes under the heading of what Mannheim was to
L3
call "the generational stratification of experience. Differential
age accessibility to major historical events within 3uch an institutional
context suggests that given generational units have differential
responses, in many cases, to questions of socio-political legitimacy.
ithin the sociology of radical politics, one of the most distinctive
forms of generational discontinuity has arisen out of mass participation
in collective violence, whether in the form of rebellion, revolution
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or war. In the present case, the differential access to a specific
type of violence became the necessary condition far the process of
activistie radicalisation, which was only, six or so years later, to
become fully politicised, with the growth of national-revolutionary
circles and of the mass political movement of national-socialism.
Within this generational context, the social solidarity
underlying ideological change was also a function of differential age
accessibility and the front-line conditions which resulted from them,
accentuated the favourability of this formation of solidarity. The
adulation of the comradely Gemeinschaft of the trenches implicitly
referred to the highly intensified form under which solidarity
experiences are, as Eisenstadt has suggested, ^ developed within
the context of secondary socialisation. At the same time, the
authentic myth of the young nationalists specified a further source
of disenchantment with the superficial and patriotic glorification
of war by the politicians, the professors and the pamphleteers of
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1914. The war, for the younger nationalist generation, was a living
reality which falsified and discredited the "ideas of 1914". The
actual letters of German student war victims do give some evidence
of the disenchantment with idealistic patriotism. It is only in the
post-war writings of Juenger, Schauwecker and their followers, however,
that this disenchantment is turned into a sociocultural critique of the
whole political background to the war, and further into a projection
of the alternation process of war. These three thematic nuclei,
Gemeinschaft. disenchantment and alternation constitute the basis
of the generational change in nationalist ideology.
Initially, the new nationalist ideology of the post-war
generation possessed only the first of the two doctrinal indices of
nihilation. It had rejected idealistic patriotism and the social
strata which propogated this notion without explaining the development
of the phenomenon of conservative nationalism as a dominant ideology,
within the framework of its own substituted doctrines of nationalism.
This did not, in fact, occur until the intellectual activity of a
relatively small group of thinkers bore fruit at the turn of the
decade. The work of Spengler aim Moeller van der Bruck had certainly
tended in this direction, but their immediate criticisms tended, for
the most part, to revolve around the nihilation and incorporation of
left-wing socialism into the aegis of neo-conservative ideology.
Vhile Moeller deplored the restorationist tendencies of the German
Nationalist Party as being reactionary, he did not attempt to explain
the phenomenon of pre-war nationalism from the standpoint of his own
theory. It was not until Carl Sehmitt's Der Begrlff Pes Politischen
and Juenger»s symposium on war that the full nihilation of conservative
nationalism in this sense occurred.
115*
It s occurrence is inseparable, also, from the actual fate of
conservative nationalism after the collapse of Imperial Germany.
The attachment of the orthodox academic intelligentsia to the state,
referred to earlier, became under the condition of the Weimar
Constitution, where the conservative nationalists became a minority
political party, much less plausible. The collapse of the cultural
values which underpinned the "ideas of 1914" in fact made the
professorial class intellectually bankrupt. The intellectual
bankruptcy, apart from being a contributory factor to the more
radical notions of nationalism which circulated after the war, also led
to a debate about the nature of knowledge in general. The debacle of
German collapse had lent su; stance to Nietzsche's prophecy of the
disintegration of values and to the credibility of ^pengler grandiose
historical scheme of self-closed relativistic cultures. These
Nietzschean and dpenglerian components are also present m Che debate
centring around the sociology of knowledge. And the sociology of
knowledge in turn led to the circulation of makeshift ideas in German
social theory which lent support to the growth of revolutionary-
nationalism. In the work of Hans Preyer and the Tat-circle of Hans
Zehrer it came to possess a distinctly political and polemical aspect.
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The Sociology of Knowledge and the Dethronement o£ the Ideocracy
The destruction of the German monarchy and Second Reich heralded
a orisis in German politics. The final and sudden collapse of the
German war-effort had utterly discredited the professorial euphoria
of the "ideas of 1914." In its place there prevailed a universal
war-weariness and disintegration of national morale which gradually
undermined the confidence and privilege of the pre-war defenders of
Eultur. The war was the point of fatal acceleration in what
frits Ringer has recently called "The decline of the German Mandarins",
In many ways the same high standards of learning in German universities
which were the envy of Europe remained. But the status and political
role of the orthodox mandarinate was severely undermined. The threat
of a volatile political democracy and a philistine mass-culture reared
its ugly head. Ernst Troeltsch wrote in his Spektator Briefe:
"The academic class has become more and more
conservative oonarchistic and nationalistic....
Patriotic indignation at the fate of Germany is one
reason. The other is the class war against the
proletarianisation of society, against the tlireat of
educational reforms which would destroy higher .
cultivation, and eliminate the academic status-groups."
The success of Spengler's Decline seemed to symbolise its
dilemma. A work of immense historical scholarship had readied a huge
reading public. But it was written by an outsider, a dilletante whose
understanding of history was judged faulty by the orthodox, and whose
appeal was not due to scholarly achievement but to its appearance of
lending historical weight to a widespread popular feeling of cultural
despair.
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The sovereignty of Rultur and the realm of absolute ideas seemed
to have been challenged less by subversive iconoclasts than by a series
of historical events which seemed to defy description. Even the cry of
revolution itself seemed submerged in an irreversible state of
Heraclitean flux. The history of Germany's debacle seemed to defy
interpretation. In leterature Hermann Broch, Franz Kafka and
Robert Musil all prophesied the growing helplessness of the intellect on
the stage of European culture. Musil in his novel The Man without
Qualities (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften) written in 1930 about a
"collateral campaign" of aristocrats and intellectuals in pre-war
Vienna, looks forward at one point to the historical fate which awaited
all his well-intentioned but ineffective characters. It was a fate
they would never have believed possible:
"In the cinema and at the theatre, on the dance floor
and at concerts, in cars and aeroplanes, sun and rain,
tailor's workshops and commercial offices a tremendous
surface of impressions and expressions, gestures, attitudes
and experiences was constantly coming into existence,...
nd if Arhheira had been able to see several years into the
future, he would have witnessed there and then that
nineteen hundred and twenty years of Christian morality,
an appalling war with its millions of dead and a whole
forest of German poetry that had cast its shade over the
f > male sense of modesty, were unable to deter for a single
hour the day when women's skirts and hair began to get shorter
and the girls of Europe, after countless centuries of taboos,
slipped out of their coverings for a while, naked like
peeled bananas. There were other changes too, wi ich,
had he seen them, he would scarcely have believed possible.
And it does not matter how much of it will last and how
much of it will disappear again. What must be realised is
the great and probably fruitless exertions necessary to
bring about such revolutions in life-style along the road
of intellectual development.... through philosophers, painters,
and poets instead of through tailors, fashion and chance.
From this it is possible to speculate how much creative energy
is generated from the surface of things, and how sterile, in
contrast, are the active qualities of the brain.
"This is the dethronement of the ideocracy, of the brain,
and of the shifting of the mind to the periphery.,.." 2
In academic circles one topic of discussion symptomatic of the
dethronement of the ideocracy was the problem of historicism. A debate
which had been sparked off several decades earlier by Wilhelm Dilthey
now seemed to have reached an impasse in the relativistic atmosphere
of the Weimar Republic. Ernst Troeltsch who pondered the problems of
historicism as seriously as anyone, took the idea of history to its
most extreme possible point. If, a3 he claimed, every historical epoch
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was unique and developed according to its own organic laws, it seemed
impossible not only to have general theories of history, but also any
valid objective criteria for comprehending individual historical
totalities. The cul-de-sac of historicism seemed to lie in its
degeneration into a radical solipsism and a radical relativism. It
seemed to consciously present itself as a symptom of a general disease
of intellectual powerlessness. Nothing could be grasped in terms of its
intrinsic historical meaning. Nothing could be linked to anything else.
Historicism symbolised not only the dethronement of the ideocracy but the
dethronement of absolute ideas. For many young G-erman intellectuals and
artists, modern reality had evaded the intellect, and traditional and
archaic conceptions of knowledge persisted in a vacuum of sterility and
self-delusion. The extreme subjectivist spirit of German expressionism
had thrived on the disintegration of absolutes. In the Germany of the
early twenties, both inside and outside the Youth Movement, mystic, occult
and irrationalist sects began to flourish.'* Historicism for its part
captured the 3ense and feeling of historical flux and uncertainty without
being able to explain it. It had revealed the shortcomings of orthodox
scholarship but put nothing in its place.
The crisis of historicism in turn produced its own intellectual
response - the sociology of knowledge. Although the term was first used
by the vitalist Catholic philosopher and sociologist Max Scheler, it is
most closely associated with the name of a young Hungarian sociologist
Karl Mannheim, who came to Germany after the defeat of the Hungarian
revolution, Mannheim regarded the sociology of knowledge as an attempt
to go beyond historioism by using some method of radical scepticism in
order to reinstate the active comprehension of reality which seemed to
5
elude it. His own writings must be placed in perspective however by
a third and relatively obscure figure whom he knew briefly in the early
twenties at Heidelberg - a young student of psychology and sooiology by
the name of Alfred Seidel. Seidel, a member of Hans Bleuher's
Freideutsche Jugendbewegung during the war, and subsequently a student
of Max Weber and Alfred Weber, is of limited importance as an intellectual
influence. On this account, his slim posthumous collection of writings
was of negligible consequence. He was important however as an intellectual
who on the one hand felt himself part of the malaise stemming from the
dethronement of the ideocraoy and who, on the other attempted a radical
and. ultimately nihilistic solution. A supporter of the 1918 revolution
and a disciple of Nietzsche and Freud as well, Seidel produced among his
random reflections a neo-Freudian theory of revolutionary class-struggle
as a form of parricide. Revolution, he claimed, was a manifestation
of the oedipus complex involving the hatred of the bourgeois communist
son for his capitalist father. This synthesising eclecticism was typical
of Seidel's approach. In the course of his book, Consciousness as doom ^
(Bewusstsein als Verhaengnis), he boldly triad - and failed - to synthesise
the Marxian, Freudian, Rietzschean and Weberian critiques of bourgeois
society. Seidel wanted to show that the class contradictions of bourgeois
society manifested themselves in the growth of cultural decadence, the
hypertrophy of the will-to-power, as according to Neitzsche, and also in
the growing rationalisation and bureaucratisation of the scientific and
organisational world as according to Max Weber, Freud's concept of
neurosis he saw complementing Nietzsche's attack on the decadence-sickness
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of Christianity, The growing rationalistic and technical discussion
of modern social reality which Weber despairingly alluded to, he saw
as a Freudian "sublimation" of reality through the artificial and
inadequate concepts of science and objectivity. All contributed to
what Seidel considered to be the fundamental ill of the bourgeois
society of his day • the avoidance of subjective reality through the
resort to scientistic notions of truth,
Seidel' s affirmation of an extreme Nietzschean subjectivism was
part of his revolt against the fossilisation of absolute ideas. He
wa3 in revolt, however, against two contradictory processes - against
the chaos of cultural fragmentation and the purely technical order of
an excessive intellectualism. Weber's doctrine of rationalisation and
the warning of "the radical disenchantment of the world" were the danger
signals for the irreversible trend towards greater intellectual
uniformity. The "analytical character" of science, moreover, and its
concern with the purely technical dissection of reality, was a form of
"sublimated suicide". For illusion, according to Seidel, was closer
to reality than truth. 'Reality' may have been an illusion but truth
wa3 a sadistic lie;
"The fact that those capable of life can only possess
illusory images of the world, means that whoever destroys
these illusions is a sadist of truth, himself incapable of
life, a suicidal type, instinctiveless, a psyohopath in the
most evil sense," 7
Seidel saw the scientist as "a sublimating pervert" whose life
was characterised by his "anti-sooial" sublimated intellectual activity.
His revolt against rationalisation was based on a perceived incongruence
between the claims of science and fee nature of life. It was a revolt
against a technicised and positivistic image of order. But that same
revolt was itself a factor in the disintegration of culture. Its direct
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affirmation of life brought to an end the reign of absolute ideas in
the realm of European culture;
"The dethronement of absolute ideas through the
affirmation of reality - whether it is called life,
power or sexuality on the one hand or nation and class
on the other - is indicative of the disintegration of
culture." 8
Seidel's revolt against order was equally a revolt against
chaos. Following Nietzsche, he regarded the twentieth centuiy as
the century of nihilism, the era of the denial of life. His attack on
rationalisation-as-order and rationalisation-as-disintegration was in
his own words an attempt at "the nihilation of nihilism". In
particular he attacked the Reflexionscomplex of the modern thinker,
the tendency to analytically dissect ideas for purposes of criticism
and comparison. This form of reflexive consciousness is suicidal
precisely because it leads to fragmentation. Ideology which relies on
contrast between conceptual opposites is, according to Seidel, a form
of self-denial. Rationalisat on and reflexive consciousness embody
both order and contrast as nihilistic principles and foment the
"destructive intellectuality" of "consciousness as doom". Seidel thus
reaches the point where his own nihilation of nihilism itself becomes
nihilistic. "One can only drive this type of practical nihilist to
despair, if one is prepared to be nihilistic oneself."^ His attack on
truth and the severance of truth from subjective reality involves the
abolition of thought itself. His writing pulsates with the dynamic
vitalism of Nietzsche but at the end of it he uses his discovery of
psychology to replace Nietzsche by Freud. The ultimate value of life
is not the ascendant will-to-power, but "harmonious, unconscious life'.'
The Freudian unconscious is invoked to salvage man from the disaster of
human thought in general. Rescuing himself from nihilism, Seidel
drives himself into oblivion.
Seidel saw the tragic consequences of his own thought. At the end
of his book he followed Dostoevsky and claimed that he wa3 on the side of
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Christ against truth. But he openly advocated using Beelezebub
to cast out the devil. Though he might crave the abolition of thought,
through "unconscious life" he could not abolish his conscious despair.
His final contribution to the nihilation of nihilism was to take his
own life. Continually beset by severe depression, he wrote
immediately prior to his death in 192k:
"I have to perish horribly. Death is the only form
of expiation. But I must do it. I do not regret it.
Not I, but the world-spirit, destiny, is realising itself
through me. I know what a hideous task I have to fulfill.
But all these things will have been stated in an age which
marks the commencement of the great despair of western culture,
as stipulated by Schopenhauer and Max Weber. They alone have
pointed out its direction,
"Is it traitorous of me to leave ay own work? Anyone
who has read it, would themselves say that no man could
possibly live with it any more..,.
"Ultimately the only thing left to me is to nihilate
myself" 10
Whatever the psychological symptoms of his illness, Seidel had clung
effectively to the logic of philosophical suicide. Fighting against
truth he embraced illusion, fighting against rational order, he had
embraced chaos. But he also saw the prospect of illusion and chaos
as sounding the death-knell of western culture and this left him with
an uncoi 3olable despair. In a similar yet scarcely as extreme
situation of being seized by the unrest of post-war despair, Ernst
Juenger outlined in a letter to his brother a less grim but equally
drastic solution. During a time "in which every handshake, every
breath is a burden" he wrote, I recommend the categorical
imperative as the means by which the atheistic worker, seized by
vertigo on the dizzy heights of the Babylonian tower, can strengthen
hi3 own heart."11 For Seidel there was no possibility of self-
discipline at all. He died of despair.
In one sense however Seidel did see ideology as a positive
breakthrough into the future. If the rationalisation of the world
threatened the end of ideology, it was for the ideologues themselves
to fight back and re-establish a direct relationship with reality.
To do so they would have to radically forego the scientific problem of
veracity. Seidel's position had led to an acceptance which he never
truly made explicit - the acceptance of reality as illusion. Karl
Mannheim, who knew and criticised Seidel*s work, could not have failed
to notice the extreme relativism of Seidel's approach and the
difficulties that lay within it. He shared Seidel's radical
scepticism but his approach was almost the reverse of Seidel's
indiscriminate assault on objective truth. While he saw an age
of crisis being created by the dethronement of absolute ideas and
the growth of ideological pluralism, he sought to provide guiding
principles which would overcome their fragmentary and dissipatory
consequences. For Mannheim brought with him another source of
influence from Budapest - the work of Georg Lukacs, former member
of Max Weber's pre-war Heidelberg circle and later Marxist Minister
of Culture in Bela Kun's short-lived revolutionary regime. Like
Lukacs, he believed there was an immanent dialectic in history.
He believed, as he put it, in "the rational intelligibility of the
historical process". This belief remained the fundamental basis of
his own utopianism - an optimistic belief, which Seidel for example
could never share, that history could continually resolve in practice
the incongruence in life between knowledge and reality.
The sociology of knowledge lies, in fact, in the shadow of
both Marx and Nietzsche in two important ways. The first is in the
idea of the knowledge of r eality being rooted in man's being.
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Mannheim1 s phrase Seinsverbundenheit des '.'/issens - literally the
"being-rootedne3s of knowledge" - was wide enough to absorb Marx's
claim that social being was the foundation of human consciousness
and Nietzsche's bio-social claim of knowledge being based on the
instinctual drive of the human will-to-power. Thus Mannheim
absorbed both the Marxian class critique of consciousness and the
Nietzschean bio-social critique of reality. It was an act of
synthesis however which enlarged and made more vacuous his own
inconsistent usage of the being-rootedness of knowledge. The second
fundamental imitation of Marx and Nietzsche lies in Mannheim's
Entlarvung des Ideen - the unmasking of ideas. Nietzsche's massive
critique of Christianity in The Genealogy of Morals as a morality of
reassentiment is intended as an exposure of the concealment of its own
will-to-power beneath the humanitarian apparatus of altruism,
selflessness and pity. Nietzsche regarded his attack as an
unmasking of the otherwise enigmatic triumph of the weak over the
naturally strong. In the veiy act of revelation lay a diminution
of the enen?y's strength. Unmasking presented itself as a fonn of
domination. In Marxism it is expressly so. Mannheim's distinction
between "the particular conception of ideology" and "the total
conception of ideology""^ revealed clearly his preference for the
Marxist mode of criticism as the more effective. Marxism's total
conception of ideology meant that criticism would nihilate its
opponents not only by calling into question its epistemological or
psychological basis but thesocial and historical situation in which
it flourished. Thus Marx and Lukacs attacked the nineteenth centuxy
doctrine of political economy as an attempt by bourgeois ideologists
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to construct universal laws of human production out of economic
processes peculiar to a particular historical stage in the growth
of capitalist society. They stipulated the limiting conditions
under which it emerged and during which it flourished as being the
constraints upon thought which made bourgeois ideology a partial
and distorting doctrine of capitalist society, Lukacs in
History and Class-Consciousness went even further than Marx in
suggesting that proletarian class-consciousness, which is to all
extent and purposes identical with own dialectical theory of history,
was responsible for unmasking the limitations of bourgeois ideology
and thus accelerating its revolutionary destruction,
"hat became clear to Mannheim was that the Marxist total
conception radically enlarged the nihilating element in modern
political doctrine. Theorists would consequently not only reject
their opponent's arguments but explain as a consequence of their own
doctrine wl\y for social and historical reasons they could not possibly
be right. The intellectual uncertainties of an age of dissolution
and relativism were intensified by the proliferation of this
ideological politics of nihilation and distrust. Thus Mannheim
claimed that the sociology of knowledge "must become a systematization
of the doubt which is to be found everywhere as a form of insecurity
and uncertainty in modern life", ^ Radical scepticism was a historically
dynamic form which had to unmask the bias, partisanship and distortion
of thought-forms in modern society. It also, however, had to rise
above the malaise of mistrust of which it was an undeniable symptom.
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At one extreme it embraced the decisive and devastating 3ense of an
iconclasm which tore through to the roots of the worlds pathology.
At the other it marked time as a tactical device in the contestation
of ideologically opposed groups demoralised by their own stalemate.
In Nietzsche's terms it could be interpreted either as an authentic
expression of the will-to-power or a symptom of decadence. In
Lukacs' terms it could be seen us part of a total theory of bourgeois
society or a symptom of false consciousness. '.Vhatever it was,
Mannheim's instinct led him to realise that it was crucial to the
war of words in the political ideologies of the twentieth century.
Hermann Hesse in Steppenwolf provides an uncanny literary
correlative to Seidel's faltering tirade against absolute ideas.
Near the beginning of the novel, the Steppenwolf, middle-aged hero
in passive revolt against bourgeois society, expresses in the mere
look which flickers for a moment on his face, a whole damning
indictment of an orthodox cultivated knowledge:
■".hen the lecturer ascended the platform and began
his address, many of his listeners had expected a sort of
prophet and were disappointed by his rather spruce and
conceited air. And when he proceeded by way of
introduction to say a few flattering things to his
audience, thanking them for their attendance in such
numbers, the Steppenwolf threw me a quick look, a look
which criticised the words and the entire personality
of the speaker - an unforgettable and frightful look
that spoke volumesJ.... it not only unmasked the
conceited lecturer and dismissed with irony the subject
at hand, the expectant attitude of the public, the
somewhat presumptuous title under which the lecture was
announced - no Steppenwolf's look pierced our whole epoch,
its whole surge and strife, the whole vanity, the whole
play of a shallow opinionated intellectuality.15
Hesse presents us in no uncertain way with an extended image of
the ecstatic conceit of unmasking. Proceeding from a particular
incident at a particular moment in time it suddenly transcends its
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spatio-temporal limitations to culminate in a grand crescendo of
universal condemnation.
Hesse's extended image of dismissive revelation represents
the operation of unmasking at its extreme Utopian point, where
critical criticism suddenly triumphs through its will-to-power.
But Mannheim was more cautious and at times more gloomy. The example
of Marxism was totally salutary. Starting out as the most devastating
critique of modern society yet envisaged, it had itself become the
subject oficonoclastic and critical attacks similar to those for which
it was Itself responsible. It had to suffer the slings and barbs
it once considered as its own exclusive weapons. /a far as the
sociology of knowledge was concerned, Scheler had already taken
up Lukacs* exhortation to autocriticism at the end of History and
C1ass-Consoiousnesa as a convenient invitation to test the
ideological assumptions of Marxism. From both a vitalist and an
idealist standpoint, he quite predictably found than wanting.
He regarded Marxism as a distorting interest-ideology, which had
arisen, as Marx claimed political econony had arisen, out of the
industrial capitalist system of the nineteenth century. He turned
the Marxist critique against itself by claiming that it shared the
same symptoms as those of its proclaimed enemies:
Scientific rationalism and intellectualism and
equally the proletarian pragmatism of the labour theory
of value are false - they can both be represented as
interest-ideologies; one that of the bourgeoisie,the
other that of the proletariat.16
According to Soheler, therefore, Marxist ideology, which he
interprets in a very mechanistic and materialistic manner, was the
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mirror-image of the scientific and ascetic rationalism of the
capitalist class. Both were hybrids of a Comtean scientific
positivism which had produced an ascetic and utilitarian system
of values in modern society. But Marxism, according to Scheler,
legimated industrialism specifically from the standpoint of the
lower classes. To this extent it was a historical continuation of
a perceptual world-view of subject classes which had operated
throughout western history.
Sensing the ideological vulnerability of Marxism when
confronted by its own weapons, Mannheim no longer considered it
possible to believe in the Marxist prophecy of olass revolution.
Marxism had not dissolved but rather intensified the dilemma of
ideological pluralism and the stalemate of ideological conflict.
At a later date Mannheim was to put very precisely the fear to which
this prospect had given rise. iindless and proliferating iconoclasm
meant that all doctrines, traditional or innovatory, radical or
conservative, ended up on a general epistemological rubbish dump:
"We live in an age in which the weapon of reciprocal
unmasking and laying bare of the unconscious sources of
intellectual existence has become the property not of one
group among mary but of all of them..,. In the measure that
the various groups have sought to destrqy the confidence of
their adversaries by their most modern weapon of unmasking,
they have also destroyed.#., man's confidence in human
thought in general." 17
This process of "reciprocal unmasking" represented for Mannheim
a levelling of ideological statuses. The idea of Scheler or Lukac,3
that dominant and subjeot classes had models of social perceptions
specifically related to class functions of dominance and subjection
is bypassed in Mannheim's critique of ideology by the implicit
equalisation created by the anomic conditions of ideological conflict
itself. While the social background of ideologies remained an
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important yardstick for their evaluation, this social background is
never analysed by Mannheim in terms of relative privilege or
deprivation. It remained purely and simply a referent for
partisanship. The whole of Mannheim's approach to ideology,
with its emphasis upon the equality of Ideological extremism, seemed
to be a massive rationalisation of the 3orry state of the Weimar
Republic. Total parties with total conceptions of ideology battled
with each other In uncertainty and confusion. Any form of political
compromise constituted a potential loss of face.
In a way Mannheim had perhaps drawn excessive attention to the
problem of ideological conflict by viewing it in such a pessimistic
way. He presented the problem he thought necessary to be resolved
in its worst possible light. Thus the solution itself would have to
be equally radical. And it was. Although he distanced himself
from the Marxist doctrine of class-struggle, lannheim remained,
probably through Lukacs' influence, a trenchant left-Hegelian, He
clung to a radical and optimistic historicism after it was bereft of
its specifically Marxian content. Thus he was never in danger of
the suicidal subjectivist position adopted by Seidel, He did not
attempt to sever the link between objective truth and social reality
but to reaffirm it. Lukacs1 "Bourgeois ideology" and "proletarian
class-consciousness" re-emerge in Mannheim as the more general concepts
of ideology and utopia. Mannheim thought it possible in any age to
distinguish between doctrines which were legitimating elements of an
existing order and those doctrines possessing revolutionary futuristic
conceptions of a new social order. His criterion for distinguishing
between them, however, was retroactive, "Ideas which later turn out to
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be a distorted representation of past or potential social order are
ideological. Those which successfully realising themselves in the
18
suceeding social order are, relatively speaking, Utopias."
Under such a definition, a case could be made out for regarding
Stalin's classless socialist society and Hitler's peoples' community
as Utopian - a claim historically made by the partisan supporters of
Hitler or Stalin. The claim to utopianism is still controversial,
and itself becomes sucked into the vicious circle of ideological
conflict. Mannheim's Utopian formalism thus ends up contributing to
the ideological morass from which it seeks to extricate itself. The
purpose of all political ideologies, whether radical or conservative,
is to present their opponents, in Mannheim's sense, as ideological
and themselves as Utopian. In seeking to overcome Ideological conflict,
Mannheim merely formalises its most sophisticated tactical devices.
He possessed, however, another solution. As a response to
possible condemnations of an excessive historical formalism, Mannheim
turned to ^lfred 7/eber's notion of a freischwebende Intelli,~enz -
literally a free-floating intelligentsia. Mannheim regarded modem
education as having the levelling effect of supressing social
differences and thus eliminating the basis of partisanship which lay
in social differentiation. The potential objectivity of a value-free
intelligentsia lay in its social distancing, but this distancing brought
forth the prospect not of influence but of powerlessness. Deprived
of partisan social commitment in the interest of knowledge Mannheim's
intelligentsia was consequently deprived of revolutionary utopian
inspiration. As we shall see, Hanz Zehrer of the Tat circle used
Mannheim's idea to formulate the notion of a "revolutionary intelligentsia"
but in doing so took the decisive step which Mannheim himself had been
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loathe to make. /s it was, no Mannheim but Scheler asserted the
innovatory power of the intelligentsia in a more direct and immediate
wqy. For Scheler, intellectualism was a form of elitism.
Intellectuals -were innovatory and pathbreaking because as a group
they possessed special and exclusive features. The formulation of
new ideas and new forms of culture was the work of a dedicated minority,
not concerned in the first instance about their popular support:
"The positive factor responsible for the realisation
(in society) of a purely cultural phenomenon is invariably
the free activity and free will of a small number of persons,
in the first instance of leaders, prophets and pioneers, who,
by virtue of the well-known laws of contagion, effectively
ensure the voluntary and involuntary imitation of the greatest
number - the majority." 19
In a lecture at the Deutsche Ilochschule fuer Politik in 1927
just prior to his death, Scheler made his position more concrete.
Previously he had stated that social factors, what he called
Realfaktoren, were only secondary factors opening and closing the
20
"sluice gates of the spirit". Unlike Mannheim, he saw ideas as being
independent of social or historical origin. Now he advocated a
vitalistic and elitist solution to wh, t he considered was the
intensification in the Weimar Republic of the classic German
opposition between ;.acht and Geist. Scheler claimed:
"I am firmly convinced that a growing German elite
can.... slowly penetrate and unobtrusively direct our
political leadership in all areas.,.. Specifically,
political elites hardly ever grow out of the political
sphere, but are born in movements which are spiritually
new, and at the 3ame time impelled by a new feeling of
vitality. Only then do they slowly enter the political
domain." 21
Yshile accepting the framework of democratic politics in "eimar,
and himself supporting the Catholic Centre party, Scheler could only
conceive of legitimacy in such a system emerging out of some form
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of elitist and vitalist intellectual guidance. He was thus in a
paradoxical situation of proposing as a solution to the ills of an
unpopular and unstable democracy, an intellectual elitism which was
clearly incongruent with it. The historical example which he chose
to illustrate his belief was also unfortunate. He saw a similar
vitality in the Fascist "movement of national rebirth in Italy".
His sociology of knowledge, whose immediate purpose was to free
knowledge from the charge of historical determinism while affirming
the relevance of social factors to its social diffusion, never
escaped from the Nietzschean heritage of his earlier Lebensphilosophie.
Soheler was finally led therefore to advocate the disaffections of
irrationalist vitalism as a means of legitimating the politics of
compromise.
With respect to his Hegelian heritage, Mannheim was in something
of a similar predicament. As a confirmed social democrat, he
supported the ""oiaar Republic. His foraalistic revolutionary
utopianism commited him to historicist conjecture about radical and
imminent change from the Weimar-type stalemate of total ideological
politics. But Mannheim could give no suggestion as to what
political doctrine was Utopian enough to accomplish it. Rejecting
Marxism because of its class-bound nature, he rejected anarchism
because of its refusal to accept any elements in the existing order
as dialectically indispensable to a future Utopia and he rejected
fascism because of its ahistorical and irrationalist approach to
22
the seizure of power. Mannheim never gave a*y substantive
grounds for what he might want a revolution. The spectre of
cultural relativism and endless unmasking plus a dogged Utopian belief
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in the reason of history propelled his doctrine forward in a direction
which politically he seemed to have already rejected. Positively
glowing with the thought of revolutiontry Utopia, Mannheim could give
no contemporary examples of it at all. His formalistic utopianism
did however convey the desperation necessary to provide a solution
to problems once they were stated, as Mannheim stated them, in such
a totally relativistic way. Utopia was necessary at axy price to
transcend the spectre of powerlessness and intellectual vertigo which
Mannheim had conjured up, and which in ary possible formulation was
intellectually intolerable. Honest and ruthless with himself to
a perverse and tragic degree, Alfred Seidel had taken relativism at
its lowest point - the point where nihilism existed in unison with
its attempted nihilation as the nadir of total negation. Where the
solution to nihilism was itself nihilistic, all that remained was
philosophical suicide. The desperation of the illusion of ecstacy,
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CHAPTER VI
Rightist Interpretations of Utopia: Hans Freyer
After its publication in 1929, Mannheim's book Ideologie Und
Utoole was one of the most discussed works in intellectual circles
at the turn of the decade.1 Extensive reviews and discussions of
his thesis of "the existential determination of knowledge" as he
2
called it, proliferated. As well as acclaim his book came in for
extensive criticism. Young marxist intellectuals at the newly formed
Institut fuer Sozialforschung at the University of Franfurt with whom
Mannheim had close contacts, and who were then not widely known -
Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer, criticised
3
Mannheim for having abandoned any tenable Marxist position. On the
other hand among the more conservative intellectual circles his work
war regarded, by virtue of its emphasis on the social origins of
thought, as having made Marxism salonfaehig and undermined the whole
German classical tradition. While some focussed almost exclusively
on Mannheim's postulate of the existential determination of thought,
others were clearly more excited by his analysis of Utopias.
It was both features however which characterised the attack on
Mannheim by the well-known philosopher and cultural critic Ernst
Robert Curtius in his book written in 1932 German Spirit in Danger.^"
Curtius clearly identified the tone and meaning of Mannheim's work
with a more general wave of intellectual and political disaffection
which had begun to sweep through Geraary in the dying years of the
Republic. In a general tone of foreboding his own book was a guide
intended for a fairly respectable and orthodox reading public,
largely of the older generation, to the subversive subterranean currents
of thought he saw circulating in the more politically extreme groups
of the younger generation. In this context he considered Mannheim's
work a danger to German youth and one which was most especially
fertile in extreme right-wing rather than left-wing circles.
Ideology and Utopia "is a work which is now of a distinct and symptomatic
significance, which can no longer be dismissed in contemporary politioal
discussion and which has been duly studied and made use of in the
5
right-wing revolution ry circles of the young." Among the areas
where Mannheim's work was being discussed and disseminated, Curtius
mentions two major exponents of what he called his "sociologism" -
the Leipzig professor of sociology, dans Freyer and a circle of young
intellectuals in Berlin grouped around the magazine Tat.
The way in which both Freyer and the Tat circle had interrupted
Mannheim according to Curtius, lead than to a sociologistic approach
to knowledge and in particular to German classical learning and to an
alarming tendency to give unqualified approval to the politicisation of
social life which was taking place so rapidly in the party politics
of that time. Squally important to both was something about which
Curtius in his concern to demonstrate the total nihilism of Mannheim's
influence was less forthcoming, namely the creation of Utopias which
could not be projected onto a future social order.
Iian3 Freyer
Hans Freyer as well as being considered along with Mannheim
as one of the avant-garde sociologists of the time, was also active
in the Youth movement. He -was one of the predominant figures in
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drnst Buske's Freishar. which at the turn of the decade was probably
the largest group within the Youth movement, which could broadly
specking be regarded as part of the radical right. Hence his
writings while exhibiting many features of what one might call a
mainstream sociological orientation based on Freyer's acquaintance
with American as well as German sociology, also contain elements
of voelkisch and bundisch exhortation which sometimes seem curiously
anomalous. Ill in all his writings are too esoteric and hybrid to
be placed firmly in either the Voelkisch, neo-conservative or national-
revolutionary categories of the German right. As we shall see,
however, his tendency to emphasise the sociological dimensions of
revolution and. the dynamic processes of modern society as opposed to
categories of cultural or racial authenticity, place him nearer to
revolutionary nationalism within the continuum of the conservative
£
revolution, In addition his later essay of 1933 Domination and
Planning entailed the rejection of some of his earlier voelkl3Ch
assumptions and showed the clear influence of Juenger and n tional-
bolshevi?m.^
The influence of Mannheim on Freyer is at its strongest in his
major sociological work published soon after Ideology and Utopia
8
which he entitled Sociology as a "cience of reality. His intention
here is not only to provide a history of German sociological thought
but an original contribution to contemporary sociology itself. Thus
he attempts to link the two by means of a rudimentary Hegelian scheme
whereby the history of sociological controversies is seen as a history
of one school "superceding" in the Hegelian sense, its predecessor,
until the "'Yirklichkeitwissenschaft" school of which Freyer sees
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himself as the main proponent emerges as being most in alignment
with the future developmental tendencies of German society. This
rather crude Hegelian conceit enables Freyer in particular to regard
both Marxism as doctrine of class-structured society and the formal
9
Sociology of Georg Simmel and Leopold von 7*'iese as aufgehoben.
There was nonetheless a certain consistency and sophistication
with which Freyer set up his methodological premises ;ind a convincing
appeal in the way in which he attempted to create a historical
sociology. His work was influential for example upon politioal
theorists such as Hermann Heller who were seeking ways out of the
problems created by the ultra-idealism of Dilthey's Geisteswi3senschaften.
Freyer's Hegelianism manifests itself not only in his definition of
sociology but in his conception of its ta3k. Sociology is "the
objective knowledge of the factual developmental tendencies of
11
the present". As a critical discipline it must attempt to uncover
in the present social world the principles upon which the future
social order is based. This, claims Freyer, is the essence of
Mannheim's distinction between what is Utopian and what is purely
ideological. Sociology must plaoe itself in the service of the future
utopia by formulating in scientific terms the conditions of its
12
possibility. Yet sociological knowledge, the study of social
reality, is not in itself a sufficient condition for the transition
to utopia. It must be accompanied by action on the basis of this
knowledge and knowledge itself is an offshoot not a precondition of
a much wider human voluntarism which provides the motivation for
social action.
This voluntaristic component of ireyer's thinking manifests
itself more clearly in an earlier essay on utopia where he emphasises
13
the primacy of the will as the basis for all future-oriented action.
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It ia through the absolute nature of the will that man escapes
from the mechanical causality of the material world. "My will,"
he writes, "has the power to tear apart the whole network of purely
material motives within me."^*" In his sociological work this
emphasis on the "strength of will" as the source of a categorical
imperative by which man can step outside of his material world
manifests itself in Freyer's discussion of Mannheim, For Freyer
the problem Mannheim had raised was that of"plural Utopias", of a
situation of dootrinal pluralism where ell future-oriented doctrines
attempt to destroy each other by imputing ideological distortion on
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the basis of social partisanship or prejudice. Such a situation
invariably leads to cultural chaos, and out of such chaos it is only
the knowledge of social reality aligned with the strength of the will
which provide a formula for the transition to the authentic utopia
of future society. But the predominant element is the will itself.
The dialectic of historical change can be reduced to a collective
voluntarism of futuristic goals which remain to be achieved:
"The hiatus between the present and future will not
be bridged by material developments but through
the will.... The system of structural concepts in
sociology conceptualizes what is not yet social
reality, but still the intentionality of social
willing*"15
Ultimately knowledge itself becomes the mere concretization of
the dynamism of the collective will, "True willing", Freyer
concludes, "is the foundation of true knowledge."^
Mannheim's obsession, the Utopian transcendence of the
ideologised world becomes in Freyer's formulation "the intentionality
of social willing". The guarantor of utopia is the pure efficacy
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of collective action. The ideologists are those who cannot align
themselves with history, are the purveyors of false Utopias whose
distortions are revealed by authentic utopianisra. Unlike Mannheim,
however, Freyer goes further and gives a substantive historical
context to his general statement of revolutionary utopiani3a.
'.Vhile Mannheim clearly saw some Utopian transformation as being
imminent in German society he never specified its exact nature:
Freyer, on the other hand, saw it in terms of what he called a
18
"revolution from the right". In the polemical tract of 1951 which
he gave this name to, he embarked upon what can only be called a
•right-Hegelian* critique of modern industrial society. Freyer's
object was primarily as Spongier*s and Moeller's had been before him,
to take revolution out of the hands of trie political left by branding
than as politically, and, in his own case sociologically, defunct.
His politicisation of Mannheim's substanceless dichotomy of
ideology and utopia starts with an analysis of nineteenth century
capitalist society similar in many ways to that of Spengler and Scheler,
but with a Hegelian orientation which is clearly his own. The nineteenth
century he says, is "the classic age of the revolution from the
19
left." In a class—divided capitalist society the growth of the
working class and its political organisation constituted a challenge
to the hegemony of capitalist society. But the challenge was short¬
lived. The growth of citizenship and political parties meant the
institutionalization of working-class activity as a political form of
collective egoism within capitalist society which did nothing to preveht
the growth of monopolies and the accumulation of capital. There
occurred instead of revolution a convergence of interests of both
Itv6.
classes, as ipengler had claimed, and also a convergence of ideologies.
Freyer saw the social-democrats in Germary as being ever—increasingly
committed to a programme of reform through which the left became
converted to liberalism. Hence he reiterates Spongier*s assertion
that both liberalism and socialism were part of the ideological
superstructure of capitalism. In addition because no revolution had
occurred, history had not been made. Instead Freyer proclaimed,
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"the nineteenth century had liquidated itself." The modern
socialist and communist parties had long settled for limited sectarian
goals and r/ere totally incapable of the emancipation of society itself.
Freyer's model of class-convergence leads him to contend that
nineteenth centuxy class society has been transformed into twentieth
century industrial society where the industrial middle class and the
industrial working class have a basic identity of intex-ests end the
same basic commitment to democracy as a political system. To search
for revolutionary forces within modern society means going outside
the system. Dutifully addressing himself, like the national-
revolutionaries, to German youth he exhorted them to try and disseminate
a historical consciousness of their own role within contemporary
German society. As a leader of one of the largest groups in the
youth movement, he clearly saw age-clifferentietion as an important
factor in ary modern revolution. Thus in the ranks of the Youth
movement and the private armies of the political right, the Stahlhelm
and the S.A. he savr a tremendous potential of revolutionary energy
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for coming revolution. In addition, however, his Hegelian scheme
necessitated some conception of the class or stratum in opposition to
industrial society which in the twentieth century would take over the
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role of the working-class in the nineteenth without proving similarly
defective.
for Freyer, this stratum is the amorphous undifferentiated Yolk.
The Yolk are the German people outside of industrial society. At one
point he calls them "the whole class, the whole estate, the whole
22
people" and later claims that historically speaking, "after the
fourth estate has fallen, the fifth estate takes over the heritage
23
of revolution." This romantic anti-capitalism common among
Voelkisch theorists and present so strongly in the Youth movement
presents the task of revolution as being the reinstatement of the
unity of the Yolk and the state on the new basis of a twentieth century
society. But Freyer'3 Utopia, in common with national-revolutionary
thinking is not a 'society1 as such. 'Society' itself is an artificial
construct of nineteenth century thought, the abstract conceptualisation
par excellence which arises from the historical situation of class
division. It is "the abstraction of life from itself; the harnessing
pi
of the human race in the service of anonymous capital". The
twentieth century has made it redundant. Just as social classes are
replaced by the Yolk, so society is replaced by the state.
Freyer*s revolutionary utopianism thus leads him not to a classless
society, which he regarded as a nineteenth century utopia but to a
Voelkisch state, and as such the role of sociology itself becomes
redundant with this revolution from the right. /ccording to Freyer,
sociology is powerless to ascertain the nature of this emergent
25
phenomenon of the Yolk since it represents "the decree of the absolute"
Thus sociology itself declines with the world of industrial society
of which it is a p- rt. The new state restores the land in
unspecified ways to its rightful heritage in a re-agrarianised
paradise where, unlike industrial society, technology "is no
longer a magical power medium in the hands of its owner hut a wide
stratum of nature, a network of arteries of mind and will, which
the land brings together and by which it forges the unity of the
26
human world." By virtue of this nystical fusion of technology
and nature, technology simulates the conditions of nature itself.
Such an idea is, as we 3hall see, almost diametrically opposed
to Carl Schmitt end Ernst Juenger's idea of technology as a force
27
which conquers nature and Freyer himself went on to modify his own
ideas. In llerr3chaft und Planting (Domination and Planning) written
in 1933, he accepts the validity of the wholescale planning of modern
society. He does so specifically from a fascist viewpoint. Very
much in accordance with his volunteristic concept of social willing
as the basis of social knowledge, he claims that planning is not
based upon expertise alone but on the will to rule. "It is the
23
rulers who plan", he writes, "not the planners who rule."
Freyer's preference for a decisionistic as opposed to a technocratic
model of planning also served as rationale for his conversion to
national-socialism. It also signalled the end of his opposition
to industrial society as such. The purely Nietzschean will-to-power
which stands behind his analysis of revolutionary politics i3 modified
to accept planning as a form of political domination. But his ideas
never attained the force or complexity of those of Schmitt and Juenger
by whom he was clearly influenced. In the meantime his very cogent
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and influential idea of a *revolution from the right* which seemed
to many to capture the true nature of Nazism celebrated the triumph
of the will over the social conditions which constrained it, A
»
rightist revolution heralded the triumph of the people over society
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pluralism. Freyer's commitment to planning signifies his final
rejection of Mannheim's utopi&nism.
CHAPTER VII
"Away from the Absolute - into Reality I" ; Kana Zehrer'a
national-revolutionary utopianlsm.
The Tat circle were a small group of young national-revolutionaries
in Berlin, who in 1929 assumed the responsibility for producing and
editing a journal for the well-known right-wing publisher Eugen
Diederichs called Die Tat. The leader of the group and the editor
of the magazine was a young journalist liana Zehrer, The growth and
success of the magazine in Zehrer's hands and its role in political
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intrigue in the crisis years of the republic has been well documented.
Zehrer's own journalistic experience on the Berlin newspaper of the
famous Ullstein press Vossischen Zeitung clearly helped him in his
attempt to popularise the journal among a young and educated middle-
class audience. From the Vossischen Zeitung Zehrer brought with him
a young economics specialist Ferdinand Fried and through his acquaintance
with Zugen Diederich's son, Peter, was able to recruit two teaching
assistants from Heidelburg university, Ernst '.Vilhelm Sschmann and
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Giselher irsing. Both of them had been well-grounded in the social
sciences and Eschmann had been taught by Alfred eber and Karl
Mannheim.^ Zehrer had earlier worked under '"erner Saabart in Berlin
but had to give up his studies through lack of financial support.
A fifth editorial associate by the name of Horst G-runeberg, a secondary
school-teacher, also joined the editorial board. As a strictly
intellectual endeavour, replacing the voelkisch mysticism of its
previous editors, the success of the magazine over a period of
five years was remarkable. When Zehrer took over in 1929, 800 copies
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were sold. By 1931, over twenty thousand were produced and in 1932
this had gone up to over thirty thousand.^"
That was the secret of this success? Curtius, writing in 1932
claimed that the Tat circle had taken over from the Jugendbewegung
the privilege of being the main focus of intellectual activity for
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nationalists of the younger generation, "This magazine", he went
on to write, "has become in the last two years the assembly point
of the young nationalists. In it there predominates, in contrast
to the parties of Hitler and Hugeriberg, an outspoken intellectualism
of academic and sociological significance," ^ Die Tat became the
focal point of informed polemic against the Yeimar system. More
closely-knit than the factions of the Youth movement and more outgoing
than the "new nationalists", it rapidly became a political influenoe
of the first order among young intellectuals. But what is more
remarkable was its capacity for journalistic self-stifficiency. The
vast majority of its major articles came from the pens of its original
editorial board of five, three of whom resorted to pseudor?ym3 to
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conceal the profuseness of their own output. The use of pseudonyms
was fashionable. In the Berlin Nazi journal of the Strasser brothers
Kationalsozialisti3che Briefe. its young contributors used as their
noma de plumes the names of the heroes of the 1525 Peasants Revolt,
But for the Tat circle it was an attempt to disperse impressions of
the undoubted cliquia liness of its editors. Self-confident, iconclastic
and utterly contemptuous of the 'system1, they produced a highly
inventive and journalistic brand of social and political theorising
which surpassed the efforts of all their rivals on both extreme left
and extreme right to popularise themselves. Above all they milked
the impotence of parliamentary politics from 1930 onwards in such a way
lft-.
as to exaggerate their own political position out of all importance.
They skilfully rode the crest of the wave which washed over the
drowning corpse of democracy in such a way as to suggest that they
were an intrinsic and necessary part of its momentum. Plunging
into the unpredictable dynamics of political crisis, they created
the temporary illusion of themselves as a revolutionary intelligentsia
assured of a fundamental impact of the course of history. In 1933
they were to find out that history was to betray them.
Curtius' alarm signals about the 'critical nihilism' of Die Tat
bespoke a fairly traditional though perceptive concern for the classic
German ideals of Kultur and Bildung. He saw the sociologistic
mentality of the younger generation as indicative of a modernist
contempt for the benefits of classical learning. He claimed that
it aggravated among German youth a craviiqg for "a now and total
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doctrine of life and culture". Mannheim's sociology of knowledge
which attempted to account for knowledge and culture in terms of the
social conditions under which it was produced was a potential -weapon
upon which a new and barbaric anti-intellectualism could sharpen its
teeth. The significance of Mannheim's doctrine for the Tat circle
was sli^itly different from that claimed by Curtius. It seemed to
have evaded the pitfalls of .Marxist materialism on the one hand and
effectively sabotaged the belief in absolute ideas on the other.
Its dynamic utopianism steered a middle course between complete
materialism and absolute idealism. Moreover by reaffirming the
relevance of intellectuals to the transformation of ideas into social
reality, Mannheim had reinstated intellectual activity within the
sphere of the political. In so doing, he had provided a route out
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of the politics of cultural despair.
The significance of this feat becomes clear in the favourable
reception acoorded to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia on its publication
in 1929. It was reviewed and acclaimed in the magazine by Korst
Grueneberg.° In a doublr review of Mannheim's book and Seidel's
Consciousness as Doom, Grueneberg saw clearly the different options
offered by the two writers to the problem of scepticism and relativism.
Both pointed to the post-war crisis of learning in Germany. Both
heralded the destruction of all notions of absolute truth. According
to Grueneberg the result was "a perceptible incongruence between life
and form". The Weberian "rationalisation of the intellect" had
resulted in the teohnicisation of thought and the growth of sterile
academic specialisation. How was ^ie Tat to react? Despite his
own suicidal tendencies, Grueneberg claimed, Seidel had given the
magazine a new slogan - "Away from the absolute - into reality'." ^
He had claimed that only the ideologues could rescue science from
its doom by a radical breakthrough into a new reality. Defeated by
total relativism, it was a breakthrough which he personally had not been
able to accomplish, Mannheim however had provided a way forward out
of the crisis of learning. His distinction between ideology and
Utopia was the first attempt at a reformulation of science and a
departure from abstract, idealist thinking. The distinction was
similar to Seidel's distinction between "ideologies of self-affirmation"
and "ideologies of self-denial". But it was more than this. It was
"a positive scientific theory" which demanded the immediate destruction
of the incongruence between life and form and the radical breakthrough
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into social reality. Mannheim thu3 became the harbinger of the Tat
circle's revolutionary utopianism. With Sorel, Pareto, Othmar
Spann and the politioal theorist Rudolf Smend, he joined a select
school admired by the Tat circle of what Ernst Wilhelm Kschmann
called "post-materialist soliology,"^-1
According to Eschmann, the new school of sociology, itself not
internally homogeneous, had nonetheless overcome the intellectual
hegemony of Marxism and liberated sociology from its mechanistic
and materialistic conception of history and society. It is quite
clear here that the Marxism of which Ksciimann i3 speaking is the
Marxism of the pre-war German Social-Democrats. This was the doctrine
of historical materialism 'inherited' from Marx through hngels and
formulated systematically by Karl Kautsky, responsible for the
"Erfurt programme" of 1891. Kautsky was in the decades before the
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war the one important Marxist theoretician of the S.P.D. rfter
the war, with the revolutions in Russia and Hungary as well as
Germany, his doctrines became an object of ridicule among the
Spartacists and the Bolsheviks. He was generally regarded by the
radical left in post-war Germany as a figure of fun. Yet for the
Tat circle his intellectual eclipse was an indication that the
doctrine of Marxism as such had outrun its course. Unacquainted
with the earlier writings of Marx which were only finally published
in 1932, and blatantly ignoring the Marxian formulations of Lukacs,
Karl Korsch or Rosa Luxembourg, they identified Marxism as both
party and doctrine with the S.P.D. which at that time was the
majority party in the ruling coalition of the Republic.
While their attacks on the fatalism and passivism of
Kautsky's historical materialism mirrored in many ways the attacks
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of the revolutionary left"*"^ their attitude essentially differed
over the role of Marxism in a democratic republic. For many
socialists Marxist doctrine was the only basis of revolutionary
activity. Out of the defeat of 1918 there eventually emerged the
doctrinaire German Communist party. Zehrer on the other hand claimed
that Marxism had already suffered its revolutionary swansong by
establishing an intellectual hegemony (as historical materialism)
within the ruling S, P.D. He applies at the level of ideology the
notion propounded by Robert Michels about the organisation of socialist
movements - namely that socialism perishes in its hour of triumph.
For Zehrer then, historical materialism was part of the ^eimar
establishment."1^ Accordingly a genuine debate on revolution within
a Marxist context was totally impossible. Zehrer turned istead to
the revolutionary transformation of German nationalism. In its
urgent ooncern to avoid Marxism like the plague and yet remain
revolutionary, the Tat-circle bozxowed wildly and eclectically from
"post-materialist" sociology. Having acquired a revolutionary
utopianism from Mannheim, they reinforced it with an authoritarian
model of the modern state culled from Othmar Gpann and Rudolf Smend.
Borrowings from Sorel and Pax*eto set the seal of a 'mythical1 elitism
upon this statist utopia. Like Hans Freyer they used sociology to
formulate a blueprint for the creation not of a new society but a new
authoritarian state.
The ever-ingenious Zehrer was quick to give a substantial content
to Mannheim's vacuous notion of a "classless intelligentsia". Only
months after Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia was published, he wrote
an essay in Die Tat professing to have discovered an immediate role
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for a new revolutionary intelligentsia in v7eimar Germany. But it
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was scarcely a revolution of which Mannheim would have approved.
They synthesised him with the irrationalist enemies he had already
rejected - Sorel and Pareto and used his ideas to proclaim the
immediate necessity of a "revolution from above" supported by the
German middle classes. The very instrument of intellectual endeavour
which Mannheim considers so crucial - the ability of intellectuals to
distance themselves from all forms of social partisanship is soon lost
in the work of Zehrer. The responsibility of the intellectual is not
towards society or to scientific objectivity but primarily towards
himself. His political coaitment must be seen not as the fruition of
a rational social consciousness! it must be seen as an attempt at
political revenge against a ruling establishment which has excluded him
from power. It is not a demandfor social justice but a personal
rebellion founded on resentment:
"Revolutions are primarily speaking intellectual in
origin and only in a secondary sense political and economic#...
The intellectual must put on masks, enter into disguises. He
must transform himself into a real power ao that he can incite
rebellion against the powers which hinder and constrain him."16
The cynical and at the same time enthusiastic evocation of
revolutionary activity as a rationalisation of personal revenge is
unthinkable without the cumulative impact of Nietzsche's will-to-power,
Pareto's elitism and Sorel's description of political doctrine as
'svyth'# Pareto in particular had provided the Historical scenario
for the brazen adulation of an elitist seizure of power that was
periodically inevitable and undeterred by the materialist constraints
17which the German Marxists had thrust in the face of histoiy. The
intelligentsia was its own will to revolution. At the same time
Zehrer realised like Pareto that social factors were relevant to the
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circulation of elites. ''/here he differed from the Marxists was
in the question as to which social classes provided fertile revolutionary
soil. Like Freyer he believed that the so-called proletarian
revolution of the left was a nineteenth century phenomenon beset by
political entropy. While Zehrer believed that the analysis of the
class-structure of modern society was relevant to revolutionary
strategy, he refused to accept the Marxist premise that revolution was
the sole and exclusive property of the working-class. But if he
realised that revolution had to have a social basis, where did he look
for it?
Zehrer adjudged the working-class to be defunct as a self-contained
revolutionary force. His attitude towards it was conditioned by his
attitude towards the S.P.D. which he saw as part of the ruling class,
the political bosses in fact of the Weimar Republic. Capitalising
on Michel's classic pre-war study of the party and Weber's analysis
of bureaucracy, he saw the party as an oligarchic and bureaucratic
apparatus unresponsive to social change. Its political
institutionalisation of working-class radicalism meant that to all
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extents and purposes socialism was defunct within the movement.
Moreover Zehrer treated as derisory the suggestion by Kautsky that
there was always room within the S.P.D. for an autonomous critical
intelligentsia. The S.P.D. had excluded the intellectuals from
power and turned those intellectuals who supported the Republic into
"an intellectual ruling stratum without battalions and without real
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power." Where then should a revolutionary intelligentsia look for
a real source of socialism? The opportunities for socialism which
Zehrer regarded as credible were those suggested by Spengler in
Prusslonism and Socialism and Hendrik de Man in his book
The Psychology of Socialism (Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus).
De Man in his book, first published in 1927, attacked the materialistic
animus of orthodox socialism in a similar vein to Zehrer, He prescribed
a massive renewal of faith of an religious and chiliastic nature as the
means of its purification. "bocialisra is a passion not a cognition" he
stated,",...I firmly believe there will be a swing of the pendulum and
that the masses will return from the materialist cynicism which now prevails
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to the religious fervour which animated socialism in its earlier days."
Zehrer used de Man's critique of the mechanistic and materialistic nature
of party-regimented socialism as the basis for a wider onslaught on the
rationalist Marxist critique of class-consciousness in general. Marxist
dialectics, he claimed had overlooked the basic motivational impulses of
socialism. "Class-consciousness" he consequently stated "in the sense
of the rational knowledge of economic class-interests is the outcome of
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common sentiments, not its point of departure,"
De Man's call for the injection of quasi-religious faith into
socialism, perhaps prophetic of the rise of national-socialism, seemed
incompatible with the austere duty-bound Prussian socialism of Spengler.
Nonetheless it had a point of confluence in the front-experience. Here,
as Cpengler had suggested, a sense of duty ana a sense of social solidarity
existed side by side. Moreover the front was a new arena of human
exploitation. Zehrer said of the war-generation;
"This generation returned home as socialists not
because they had read and understood Karl Marx but because
they had experienced in the community of life and death social
injustice in the deepest sense of the word and had formulated
a justification of its social resentments which previously-
thrived only in the working-class," 22
The front-generation, however, was neither elite nor mass.
It straddled both of them, yet formed no more than a segment of either.
In looking at the composition of the potential revolutionary mass Zehrer went
further than "new-nationalism" and looked at the contemporary structure
of German society in the post-war period. Here he attempted to align
the resentment of the war-generation with that of those social strata
who had suffered most from the rule of social-democracy in the republic.
Regarding the cult of the front-experience as valid but exhausted by the
i;.mediate out-pourings of Juenger and his circle, he sought theoretical
originality elsewhere.
He turned instead to an analysis of the German miadie-classes
(Kittelschichten) who had suffered so heavily in the German inflation
of 1923 and were to suffer again during the Great Depression. The debate
about the role of these occupational strata within the social structure
of a capitalist society had been revived in academic circles by Lederer
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and Karsehak in their discussion of the possible "proletarianisation"
of both the new and old middle-classes - of employees and officials as
well as artisans, shopkeepers and small businessmen. The fear of
proletianisation" was itself strong among many sections of the German
middle class after the experience of 1923 and constituted one of the
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central themes of the German cinema of the t?/enties, especially in the
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so-called street films. Applying Marxist analysis to the position of
the new mit.dle classes, Lederer and Marschak contended that in conditions
of severe economic crisis these strata would sink into the proletariat.
What was new was their analysis of the white-collar employee in terms
similar to the Marxist conception of the classic petty bourgeoisi#.
They predicted that the bourgeois aspirations of the white-collar worker
in modern society would be drastically undermined by adverse economic
conditions. Superimposed upon this dimension was the question of the
rationalisation of organisations in the interests of bureaucratic
efficiency. In 1930 Siegfried Kracauer had written a remarkable series
162
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of articles in the "Frankfurter Zeitung" articulating through depth
interviews and the like, the cultural self-image of the employee
(Die Angestellte) in his work-setting. The sense of purposelessneas
and cultural despair, the ever-recurrent uncertainty about job-prospects,
the loss of identity before ever-increasingly rationalised procedures
of work are the basic images which Kraoauer presents. The dimension
of cultural exploitation is added to that of economic exploitation.
The 'employee* is anonymous atomised man who takes re luge in the new
forms of urban mass-culture to offset the affliction of his "spiritual
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homelessness".
Kacauer's description of the employee gave rise to Hans Fallada*s
famous "Kleiner Mann". follada inspired by Kracauer's description of
the anomie and rootlessness of the employee in urban life used it as
a starting-point for his best-selling autobiographical novel,
What now, little man? Kracauer's cultural critique of the white-collar
worker which approximated in some aspects to the postulates of later
mass-society theorists about urban life, was nonetheless criticised and
rejected in Die Tat for reiterating the Marxist "fallacy" of proletariani-
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jsation. Esehmann, in his review of the book quite clearly stated
the view of the Tat circle when he said that the mechanistic notion of
the automatic proletarianisation of the employee was a false assumption
of bourgeois Marxism. According to Eschmann the unique forms of
exploitation experienced by the nev/ middle classes would lead them to
search for autonomous, that is non-Marxist, foim3 of political expression,
and thus transcend their proletarianisation. Thus it was no coincidence
that the largest trade union mentioned by Kracauer, as organising
white-collar employees, the Deutschnationale Handlungsverband. was not
Marxist in its orientation, but nationalistic and anti-semitic.
According to Eschmann it was precisely under conditions where proletarianisa¬
tion became a real possibility that the middle classes strove for new
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and revolutionary forms.
For Zehrer this struggle was the basis of the potentially
revolutionary nature of the middle classes. "This economically
proletarianised stratum," he wrote, "struggles desperately to assert
its own individual position precisely because it distinguishes itself
pQ
both spiritually and culturally from the proletariat." In addition
the growing rationalisation and bureaucratisation increased rather than
reduced the ranks of the employees and the self-employed in modern
capitalist society and the Marxist hope of class polarisation therefore
bore no correlation with the economic deprivation of the middle classes
as such.2^ The middle classes were fertile material for what Zehrer
called the "revolution from above" conducted by the elitist intelligentsia.
But what are to be the connections between the intellectual elite and the
revolutionary mass? While Zehrer claims that the elite should be able
to mobilise the middle-classes on the basis of objective social
conditions, i.e. their class exploitation, he clearly feels that stronger
bonds of attachment are needed to cement their relationship. He
therefore takes a step which is superfluous for the consistency of his
argument but consequently undermines it quite drastically. He claims
that the revolutionary intelligentsia will want to support the middle
classes because that is precisely where their own social origins lie;
"The majority of the intelligentsia has its origins in
this social stratum which can be ehar;icterise& as middle-class,
and so it is, sociologically speaking, bound to this class."30
Starting from Mannheim1s position of the autonomy of the
intellectuals, Sehrer in an astonishingly jejeune manner, reverts baok to
the premise of social partisanship which Mannheim had wished at all costs
to avoid. His conclusions are thus diametrically opposed to he premisesS
Havings stated that intellectuals can instigate revolution regardless of
their social background, he now claims their social background is vital to
1&,.
the whole process of revolutionary mobilisation. The educational
deprivation of young German students and intellectuals from the
middle-classes corresponds to the economic deprivation suffered by their
families. They are made revolutionary therefore by their own social
experience of hardship. Zehrer totally contradicts himself by
confusing two arguments about the radicalisation of intellectuals which
are arrived at separately and independently. On the one hand the
intellectual in his desire for power cynically exploits any form of
social disaffection; on the other the middle-class intellectual in
contemporary Germany is radicalised by the stifferings of his own class
in which he himself shares. The contradiction is superficially a
symptom of the intellectual naivity of Zehrer*s argument. In reality
it is a contradiction embedded in fascism itself. Fascism was a
middle-class revolt against modern society. It was also a doctrine
diametrically opposed in its nature to the humanistic components of the
ideas which emerged from the French Revolution of 1789, and which in the
nineteenth century had been associated with the ascendancy of the
middle-classes. Zehrer was torn between the idea that revolution was
necessary because the middle-classes had been betrayed by humanist ideas
traditionally associated with them but no longer relevant to their
condition, and the notion that because such humanist ideas were no
longer relevant, no ideological justification based on social
disaffection was necessary for the elitist revolutionary seizure of
power. Socially fascism supported the interests of the impoverished
middle-classes. Ideologically it advocated revolutionary elitism, in
which the masses were of no real significance.
Even prior to the great depression, the Tat circle had attacked
middle-class impoverishment and unemployment. Forseeing a problem
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which in recent decades has afflicted all advanced industrial societies,
Zehrer spoke of the growth in higher education of "an academic
proletariat" of middle-class origins.^ During the twenties in Germany
the problem of graduate employment was certainly a pressing one.
Roughly a half of graduating students were able to find jobs for which
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their academic qualifications were necessary. After the Wall Street
crash the situation was aggravated and university entrance numbers
surged upwards because of general unemployment.^ For Sehrer in
particular this represented a further threat to middle-class life-styles.
The middle-classes were culturally exploited by increasing academic special¬
isation and rationalisation of academic life. University education
was a compromising solution for those sections of the middle-class
sandwiched between big business and labour and finding themselves
economically helpless. The humiliations of academic exploitation was
the price paid by the middle-classes for lack of political organisation
and political awareness which characterised their working-class
antagonists of the S.P.D,
At the same time Zehrer claimed this very lack of awareness was
the necessary precondition for revolutionary mobilisation of the
middle class. The political agitation of an intellectual elite would
transform the Mittelstand into a class-for-itself, which would
subsequently revolt against both organised labour and organised capital.
The "revolution from the right" against industrial society envisaged by
Freyer is replaced here by the idea of a Revolution der Mitte, a
35revolution of the centre. The intellectuals are equipped to lead
because they share in the deprivation of their own class. The
"socialist" example they follow is that of the front-soldier, not the
proletarian, Sehrer had given here something which hereafter he became
reluctant to admit - a remarkably accurate sociological description of
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the rise of Nazism. He provided some three or four years before the
Nazi seizure of power the thesis circulating among modern political
sociologists of "the fascism of the centre". lie had in fact scooped
academic social scientists in giving a very precise account, from a
partisan standpoint, of the potential of Nazism,
From 1929 to 1933 the possibilities of a "revolution of the centre"
were substantiated. The Nazis transformed themselves into a mass
political party by successfully appealing to the peasants, to small
traders and businessmen, and to white-collar workers. They took over
almost completely the voters of the traditionally liberal small centre
parties, and in the 1930 elections they also took a substantial proportion
of votes from the conservative D.N.V.P., especially from less prosperous
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middle-class voters in rural and regional areas. The success of the
national-socialists did not lie however in a self-conscious ideological
formulation of their class position. In their emphasis on the
Volksgemeinschaft they were anxious to avoid class sectarianism. But
their political instinct for exploiting middle-class rassentiment was a
crucial weapon. And for this theoretical sophistication was not really
necessary. Furthermore it was shown to all extents and purposes to be
dispensable. Nazism provided one of the few historical examples of a
revolutionary elite which was not predominantly Jacobinist and
intellectualist. Not only were few of the Nazi leaders intellectuals in
any real sense of the word, their strategy involved the creation of a
mass party following by legal and parliamentary means which completely
alienated the Tat circle. At the same time it made Zehrer change his
attitude towards revolution itself. He saw the growing success of the
communists and the Nazis not as evidence of the electoral and
parliamentary effectiveness of the extreme parties but as growing
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evidence of the unpopularity of the parliamentary system as a whole.
He also saw that the working-clas3 it3elf could not be ruled out of the
reckoning. With the increase in unemployment and the decline of the
influence of Social-Democratic trade unions, many workers had turned to
the communists with the expectation of militant action including possible
revolt. Other unemployed workers were recruited into the ranks of the
S.A, The two parties had monopolized the extreme forms of radical
disaffection against the Republic and to some extent the Tat circle*s
contempt for the sterile dogmatism of the K.P.D. and the intellectual
inadequacies of the national-socialist leaders was tinged with envy and
frustration.
Their own model of revolutionary struggle was that of Italian fascism.
It was the violence and the ruthlessness of the movement - its total
co: tempt for legality which appealed to them. In fascism not only did
Eschmann and Zehrer find the mobilization of the middle-classes and the
front-veterans but also the incarnation of the sociology of Sorel and
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Pareto in a utopian and particularly unique form. They regarded the
fascist "utopia" as the cornerstone of modern nationalism. It had shown
once and for all that the doctrine of the revolutionary centre could not
be a class doctrine since all class doctrines, according to Eschmann, were
essentially counter-productive, merely mobilizing the class opponent into
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action. It had to be a myth beyond class - a niyth of the nation.
Hence the middle classes were not mobilized to struggle exclusively for
themselves but for the nation. Tue "distinct sociological efficacy" of
the fascist utopia is that it aligned theory to reality and brought into
revolutionary nationalism the possibility of a mass social base extending
far beyond the limited groups of front-fighters and their adherents. But
if did this by stressing an ideal beyond reality which was in effect myth.
168,.
The middle classes had no structural unity and they had to be bound
together by the nyth of the nation;
"These strata can manifest their unity only in a
great community, in the Yolk or the nation, not in a
trade union, an association, a class or any suchlike organisation
- it can only be through an ideal, a myth". 1*0
Zehrer regarded parliamentary politics as a form of unforgivable
compromise which negated revolutionary nationalism in its essentially
mythic form. From the outset he had given a clear warning to his
nationalist readers to stay clear of party politics and spurn the
approaches of the national-socialists.^" But for those who took
Die Tat's ideological standpoint to heart, the only politically decisive
choice was the Nazis. There seemed no alternative. In fact the more
educated and middle-class members of the younger nationalist generation,
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many of them either joined, or voted for the party in large numbers.
Yfithoufc a doubt the Nazis represented the most politically effective
movement which was both nationalist and revolutionary. From the
fragile minority in the Youth movement, the national-revolutionary sects
and the free Trade Unions who managed not to succumb to Nazi enticements,
Zehrer attempted to mould the basis for a "third front" which was
independent of party regimentation and bureaucratic constraints.^
This idea in fact was to form the basis of his political intrigues in
1932 with General Kurt von Schleicher who envisaged a Bonapartist coup
as the solution to the political power-vacuum of the Republic.
Zehrer's independent but militant nationalists with the possible support
of the trade unions and the Northern wing of the Nazi party under
Gregor Strasser were ideally to provide the power base far Schleicher's
initiative - the short-lived and unsuccessful initiative which wa3 to
become the new pragmatic version of Zehrer's 'revolution from above*. ^
But Zehrer's own subterfuges were dogged by the constant feeling that
the Nazis had captured the hearts and minds of the revolutionary masses
and consequently could never afford to be ignored. His personal
oscillation between revolutionary elitism and the urge to establish
links with the new social reality of the Nazi-controlled masses made
his attitude tow. rds Nazism, despite its enti-intellectualism and its
use of parliamentary methods, favourable to the end.
If the astonishing Nazi success in mobilising the middle-classes
was one reason for Zehrer's disillusionment with an elite-controlled
revolution of the centre, the social and economic effects of the
depression was another. Ferdinand Fried the Tat economist achieved
h-5
fame overnight with his book The End of Capitalism in which he set out
a model of autarchy and reagrarianisation as the solution to Germany's
domination by western industrial capitalism. Fried's in many ways
absurd and retrogressive arguments were nonetheless coloured by an
awareness that economic catastrophe had affected the lives of all
ordinary Germans. He realised that it was impossible to regard either
the middle-classes or the working-classes as the exclusive or even
predominant victims of what had happened. He consequently made out a
case for looking at German society in economic terms which vastly
extended the non-privileged sector beyond orthodox class dimensions.
He placed people in three socio- conomic c ^egories - a class of owners
of capital (Besitz), a middle-class (Mittelstand), and a class of
i c
non-owners (Nicht-Besitz). In terns of numbers, he places a hundred
thousand of the population in the first category, four million in the
second end sixty million in the third. Given these distinctions, the
first or upper-class is composed of rich capitalists, the middle-class
of the successful professions and businessmen end the third is a
residual category of non-ownership expanded by the economic crisis of
the depression. It Includes peasants, businessmen, employees and
manual workers. Fried in fact amalgamates the old-middle, new-middle
and 'working class into a stratum he calls "the lower non-privileged
class" .^"7
However dubious a framework for social stratification, this idea
of a lower non-privileged class provided the Tat circle with an essential
distinction between capital and the masses. Since economic
deprivation cut across traditional class lines in times of extreme crisis,
all economically deprived social strata formed, according to "ehrer, a
unified coalition against capital. The publication of Ortega y Gasset's
The Revolt of the Masses in 1931 thus came as a sudden revelation to
him, for it shows the potentially rebellious nature of the "masses" as
a whole. The breakdown of class barriers in modern society and the
formation of masses have interlocking political and economic dimensions.
In the same way as the masses are excluded from capitalism, they are
alienated from the democratic party system, Zehrer's consequent
rejection of the exclusive revolutionary role of the middle classes was
due without a doubt to the widespread and catastrophic effects of the
economic crisis in Germany. Ke saw the masses as being politically
organised by the Nazis and the Communists, but for the same reason
being politically divided because of what he considered to be the
traditional class and political attitudes of the two parties. While
/
both contained within their ranks the sources of immense revolutionary
energy, while both were filled with the ranks of the post-war younger
generation, they dissipated their strength by fitting against each
other instead of joining forces to attack the pari lamentary and
capitalist system from a position of strength. Zehrer concluded that
their unrelenting hostility towards one another was a result of a
special type of false consciousness which was the product of liberal
thinking - namely to perceive political divisions in terms of left and
right, the traditional distinction, which had been the heritage of
• O
"the religion of 1789". The new role of the national-revolutionary
17L.
intelligentsia was to liquidate the premises of this ideological
obscurantism and destroy the very conceptual language within which
it propagated itself. In this way, freed from the remnants of liberal
ideology, both parties could pool their differences, and as a unified
revolutionary movement find common cause.
The Struggle for Language
Zehrer,s perception of the crisis in democracy which he end his
circle had welcomed with open orra3 was guided all the time by the
feeling that a new reality had presented itself with which the
existing conceptual apparatus of political thought was inadequate to
deal. Reality, in advance of thought had made the whole liberal
vocabulary of parliamentary language completely obsolete. But
language was that aspect of social reality which changed more slowly
then re lity itself,4"^ Language embodied tradition and legitimated
the tendency of traditional power-interests to prevent social change.
In revolutionary periods there was a widespread experience of radical
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disjunction between thought and feeling. In the resultant
conceptual chaos Zehrer sees a situation similar to Mannheim's internecine
conflict of ideologies - a total scepticism and despair in the face of
mistrust and ideologicical distortion which can only lead to desperate
forms of activism, "Out of the inadequacy of linguistic materials grows
an activism which can only fulfill itself ultimately in a physical
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manner." Thus the street fights and the para-military formations of
the political parties are seen as a response to the inadequacy of
political concepts to render themselves Utopian - to transcend the
stalemate of an ideological conflict carried out in a traditional
vocabulary. The role of the national-revolutionary intelligentsia is
to create a new language consonant with the social forces of the new
reality of Oermary. It would achieve a revolutionary breakthrough and
17<n.
liberate the parties of the revolutionary mosses from their slavery to
traditional political terms of reference by liquidating the distinction
between left and right and destroying the legitimacy of the
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"conservative-liberal-socialist Gemeinschaft". that is, what Schmitt
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called the "common vocabulary of modern parliamentarianism".
The new Utopian language congruent with the new reality is the
language of national-revolutionary sociology. Its understanding of the
dynamic revolutionary forces of modern society enables it to recognise
that the distinction between left and right is false. The crucial
5L
distinction is bet een revolution, ry and conservative. While
conservative policies can be either reactionary or reformist, Zehrer sees
"conservatism" as a generic ccucept referring to a definite stake in
existing economic and political power. Ideological programmes are no
guarantee of either revolutionary or conserv tive steadfastness.
Conservative parties can under certain conditions be radicalised and
revolutionary parties become conservative. This follows very much
Mannheim's conception of utopicnism, whereby it is no longer possible
to judge revolutionary movements on the basis of their ideological
pronouncements but upon their results. It is the theorist not the
politician who decides in principle what is revolutionary, but as the
Tat circle was to le rn much to its chagrin, it is the politician who
decides in practice. Whatever his shortcomings on this issue, Zehrer was
still perceptive enough to see that the politics of the Weimar Republic
had made the traditional distinction between "left-wing" and "right-wing"
parties totally inadequate. In a Germaiy dominated by a western
political system and reeling before the crisis of the western economy,
le:; extremes se touchent. Whatever their political labels, the owners
and the rulers are conservative and the propertyle33 and the ruled are
revolutionary. The radicalisation of the "ri$vt" by the Nazis and the
"left" by the communists can only be understood as the consequence of
the movements of the Social Democrats and the centre parties into
conservative positions of power.
This change in political meanings however, has its own historical
dimension. It does not provide the basis for a purely cyclical view
of history but rather a conceptual model far what Zehrer called
"unfinished revolutions". The February revolution of 1917 in Russia
anu the 1918 uprising in Germany are two historical examples which
Zehrer uses to show how revolution occurs in two stages - in the first
instance a change in values and in the second a change in social and
economic conditions which is more radical and dynamic than the first.
Thus Germany awaited its October revolution and until then operated
in the vacuum of a "Kerenski epoch", of ideological confusion and
political chaos, where everyone awaited the second revolutioncxy seizure
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of power. It is in the unfinished revolution that the linear
conception of politics changes first into a broken line (from 1918 to 1923)
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and finally into an elipsis.
The new Utopian language by which Zehrer claimed the masses could be
mobilised into a united revolutionary movement incorporating all the
radical parties was the language of national-revolutionary sociology.
The •democratisation' of the concepts of political myths, the
circulation of elites, and the path from ideology to Utopia, were the
essential components of the breakthrough into the new revolutionary order
and the final liquidation of the traditional political models of the
Wilhelmian era. One of the more gadfly fantasies in Zehrer's
revolution from above was that of teaching the masses the concepts of a
post-materialist sociology! Drawing strength from the magazine's growing
influence, the Tat oirde fantasised about what could be achieved whan
their Utopian dreams of power were realised. But the fantasy was
nurtured on the power-vacuum in Germany which followed Bruning's
emergency decrees, and the illusions were brief. Like the other
nation?1-revolutionaries, Zehrer and his associates had been totally out-
:flanked by the quasi-legality of national-socialism and equally surprised
by the degree to rhich the plebians on its flank maintained a contemptuous
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theoretical silence on their ova sociological and historical role.
Zehr r's misinterpretation of the national-socialists* assessment of mass
party politics, which Hitler and other Nazi leaders saw as having a
purely tactical value, meant that he drastically underestimated the
revolutionary nature of a. movement which was in many ways following the
course he had charted with some of his own ideological sophistication
or political 3elf-consciousness.
The Utopian State
Zehrer's Utopia was neither a classless society in the Marxian sense,
nor some anarchist utopia of collective-self-government. Despite his
attachment to sociology as a radically new and relevant doctrine of social
reality, his political aims remained within the doctrinal paradigm of
German nationalism - the creation of a strong authoritarian state, ".here
he differed from conservative nationalists was in the essentially dynamic
model of sooiol change which he used as a framework for the discussion of
the new 3tate, The dynamics of modern society could not be ignored but
must be pursued relentlessly whatever the result, Mannheim had
suggested this categorically, but there were also others. Two of the
most influential political theorists in national-revolutionary circles,
both of whom took account in their own way of the dynamic nature of
modern society were Carl Schmitt and Rudolf Ssaertd. In his essay
published in 1923 on parliamentary rule, Schmitt had provided a classic
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refutation of modern democracy as a mass-democracy. It had clearly
influenced Mannheim's rejection of liberal utopianism as a superficial
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quest to seek out truth through the principles of debate, and Zehrer*a
image of parliamentary democracy as a nineteenth century institution
unable to cope through its pluralistic mechanisms with the chaotic
consequences of mass-democracy in the twentieth century.^0 The more
important influence of the two however was Rudolf Smend, one of the
writers discussed by the magazine in their abortive series on modern
sociologists. One of the reasons that the Tat circle tended to look on
Smend as being more sociologically than politically oriented was his
concern to construct a model of the state in which all social forces
found relevant and appropriate modes of political expression. This he
called "integration theory".
Smend had argued that the state must functionally integrate the
collectivity, that is society, by direct and dynamic means. The
vitality of the state arose when it was firmly rooted in an external
social reality. Thus it must, according to Smend, become a plebiscite
which repeated itself daily in order to ensure that no barriers existed
between the political apparatus of the state and the life of its
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subjects. Its continual integration of social forces into the
polity transformed it into a dynamic totality. "Its totality",
Smend claimed, "is that of a historically fluid and realistic whole,
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not of a permanent, comprehensive and systematic whole". The labile
integration of all social and cultural life into the state would break
down the abstract formalism and remoteness of political rule. For
Bio Tat the implications were clear. Smend had presented the problem
of grounding the state in social reality in a way analogous to
Mannheim's attempt to ground utopian thought in social reality. The
176
state was potentially as dynamic and Utopian as thought itself. Given
the right formula for integration not only social life but human culture
Q.
as a whole could find a full and unhindered expression.
Although Smend did not specify the exact type of political system
which could perform the function of social integration, he thought that
parliamentary government was totally incapable of doing so. Within
the Tat circle, however, his ov/n model vras compared with existing
political regimes. Grueneberg claimed that Smend's notion of the
comprehensive integration of society by the state had been put into
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practice by Italian fascism. He conceived of Smend's model in terms
which Smend did not specifically use, as that of a fascist authoritarian
state. The Tat-utopia then became an authoritarian utopia in its
fullest sense. Social integration was an euphemism for a new "type of
organic unity guaranteed by the domination of the state over society.
The age of critical criticism was to be superceded by the age of
certainty where the less of autonomy suffered by the intelligentsia
would be atoned for by its incorporation into a new dynamic political
elite.
The theoretical legacy of Smend becomes all the more significant
when it becomes clear how much it is embedded in the course of Zehrer's
pragmatic political intrigues with General Kurt von Schleicher, Defence
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Minister in von Papen's cabinet in 1932. In return for financial
support for a daily Berlin newspaper, the Taegliche Rundschau, which the
Tat circle first started to publish in 1932, Schleicher tried to gain
support of a Zehrer-organised "third front" for his own bid for political
power within the D.N.V.P. against von Paperw... But the national-
revolutionary groups which Zehrer tried to recruit, along with some
independently right-wing trade unions and groups in the Youth Movement
were not responsive to his overtures.
Schleicher end Zehrcr saw in each other the instruments of their
respective ambitions. While Schleicher saw Zehrer as a pawn by which
he could gain support from the fascist intellectuals for a sort of
Prussian Bonapartism, Zehrer saw in Schleicher the man most fitted to
carry out the revolution from above. Since neither possessed access to
mass support both eventually fell victims of the power-vacuum of Weimar
democracy. Despite his elitist prejudices however Zehrer saw the main
enemy to Schleicher in the middle of 1932 as being Franz von P; pen the
head of the bourgeois German Nationalist party, r ther than Molf Hitler.
Hitler possessed mass revolution .ry support whereas the reaction ry
Papen had none. If Zehrer had to make a choice between national-socialism
or reactionary conservatism it was clear that his choice lay with the
former rather than the latter.
In the summer of 1932, Papon*s position seemed superficially at
6?
least to be stable and secure. fie had just formed a so-called
"c binet of barons", made up of a reaction ry Prussian nobility from
which the Nazis as coalition partners had been effectively excluded.
Papen in fact was attempting a tactic which later proved his downfall
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but which was commonplace among many conservatives. He thought an
alliance with Nazism in which the Nazis were effectively excluded from
positions of power was the only means of controlling the politically
irrational masses in periods of crisis. Hitler and Strasser however
protested that this was tantamount to a denial of the will of the
people, since the majority party in the coalition, the Nazis, had no
effective political control. While Papen's 'c binet of barons*
ironically provided an important anti-deaocr tie precedent for the
Nazi seizure of power, they themselves used pseudo-democratic firguments
to contest its validity. It was these very arguments which Zehrer
himself took up. For they paralleled the theoretical argument he had
derived from Smend about the integration of state and society. In
the political situation of 1932, the exclusion of the Nazis as the
major partner in the Harzburg Front, from positions of ministerial
power, was a denial of political expression to the masses. It
entailed the exclusion of a dynamic social reality from the state.
According to Sehrer, a viable authoritarian regime had to be
constructed not only from, to use Carl Schmitt's terms, auctoritas
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potestas. It also had to possess as its most dynamic element,
the will of the people (Volkswille).70 But in the coalition ministry
a split had taken place between the bourgeois Nationalists who possessed
governmental authority ("uctoritas) and the state's resources of
physical force, the police and the Reichswehr (Fotestas) while the will
of the people was contained largely in the national-socialist movement.
Die Tat's own connection with the northern wing of the Nasi party was
enhanced by the appearance of Helmut Ellbrachter, dose and
influential friend of Gregor Strasser, on its editorial board. JSehrer" s
idea of the will of the people followed, despite his elitist sentiments,
the political strategy of Strasser in trying to widen support for Nazism.
Strasser's attempt to gain Nazi support both in middle-class and social
democratic trade unions gained polemical support from Sehrer as a
revolutionary endeavour which cut across class barriers. Given the
revolutionary situation in Germany Sehrer in fact realised that if a
revolution of the centre was on the cards, a purely middle-class revolution
was impossible. The will of the people was a convenient catch-all for
all forms of radical support among the economically underprivileged.
Outside of the Nazi party, however, it had no meaning. When the Nazis
withdrew from Papen's ministry and allowed Schleicher the opportunity of
setting up his own ministry, his significant failure to gain Nazi
support through Strasser, meant in fact that his own short-lived rule was
179.
more vacuous than any of those tf ich had preceded it.^ In Schleicher's
failure to gain any mass support from any source and his success in
alienating conservative opinion, Zehrer could see the fruits of his own
contradictory revolutionary elitism. Possessing no respect for
traditional notions of legitimacy and authority, revolutionary-nationalism
remained isolated from the masses which it saw hot as revolutionary and
contemptible,
Zehrer's contradictory attitude towards Nazism remained to the end.
They provided the exclusive key for his desire for a dynamic state which
would satisfy "the people's will to revolution",^ Yet the price of
a national-socialist Germany was not one he was prepared to pay for the
fulfillment of such a desire. If the state had to break out of its
fossilized political shell into social reality, the masses equally had
to break the cast-iron grip of party politics and organisation.
Zehrer claimed that the Nazi party had gone the way of the S.P.D. and
K.P.D. and become a brutal and stultifying political machine which
constrained the undoubtedly revolutionary social forces within the
movement. The Nazi movement was the most advanced social revolutionary
movement in Germany at that time, 'but its methods drastically hindered
its revolutionary potential. "National-socialism,... what that phenomenon
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which had advanced furtherest towards the comprehension of the new reality,'
But as a party it had accepted "the old reality of elections and
parliament". In what aspect of the movement did Zehrer see the most
advanced expression of a new social reality? He saw it in "the armies
of the . arid the . S" Provisionally thought of as fighting and
defence organisations to protect the party's liberal parliamentary
methods, according to Zehrer, the private armies which future generations
were to look on with fear and hatred "contain within themselves the
possibilities of creating a new reality, should the methods of the old
reality be rejected or come to no purpose". Prophetic in a way which
he would have regarded as utterly misfortunate, Zehrer nonetheless
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managed to reveal his simultaneous attraction and repulsion far mass
behaviour. In either its mechanical obedience to party hierarchies or
in its undisciplined anarchy it was unacceptable. When transformed
into quasi-independent organisations which practised a disciplined
violence it had its revolutionary fascinations. What Zehrer was not
to see was that the very same private armies he admired were
instrumental in executing the totalitarian policy of Gleichschaltung
which destroyed for ever his idea of an authoritarian state based on a
coalition of like-minded Utopians under the leadership of a Prussian
general,
Under the Nazi regime it soon became clear to Zehrer that there
was no room for Die Tat as an independent and critical voice. While
the other members of the editorial board compromised with the party,
Zehrer felt unable to follow them. Ferdinand Fried abandoning the
idea of autarchy, became an 8.S. officer in his capacity as an
assistant to Walther Darre, the Reich Minister of Agriculture.
Eschmann and Wirsing continued editing the magazine for four years
before it finally lapsed into silence as an independent supporter of
the party, whose non-party nature had made it superfluous. Zehrer went
into internal exile on the island of Sylt in the North Sea. The
revolutionary intelligentsias hour of glory was over. The illusion of
making history, provided by courtesy of the Weimar Republic, exploded in
its face. The choice now was to Join or not to join. Either choice
in effect meant silence.
Knowledge and Power
The utopianism of Die Tat was not merely an intellectual aspiration
betrayed by the course of historical events. It was from the outset a
value-attitude flawed by its attachment to the ideal of an authoritarian
state. The utopianism of the sociology of knowledge was similarly suspect.
As Hans Barth has pointed out, its inspiration lies not only with Marx's
critique of ideology but also with Nietzsche's bio-social
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critique of power and Spongier's historical morphology. Beneath
Spengler's assertion that knowledge could no longer "be considered
true or false but merely deep or shallow (tief oder flach)^ emerged
the new irrationalist Impulses of a widespread cultural despair.
The sociology of knowledge suffered both from the rationalist excesses
of the Marxist view espoused by Lukacs that Utopian thinking was the
exclusive property of a rationally cognitive class-conscious
proletariat. It also suffered from the Nietsschean vitalism through
which Scheler, Seidel and Freyer indiscriminately attempted to cast aside
the rationalistic and materialistic constraints of the modern technological
world. Mannheim's insistence on the being-rootedness of knowledge was
an attempt to pitch the problem of cognition at such a general level thrt
the alternatives of irrationalist or super-r: ticnalist excess were no
longer problematic. His option for a v lue-free intelligentsia was oast
within a rationalist and humanist tradition. The communication of
genuine forms of human understanding to men, could he thought, generate a
universal ecstase. a going outside of oneself, a form of cultivated
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self-realisation in the fullest sense. This in fact was what lay
behind his idea of the democratization of culture. It was based on
what Ernst Bloch had called "the principle of hope".
The T t circle however belonged to a new Intellectual tradition in
European social thought which had abdicated the principle of hope.
The cynicism, the disillusionment and the impatience with all democratic
processes which pervade the work of Par©to and Sorel axe synthetically
blended with a utopianism cut adrift from it3 humanist suppositions.
It becomes a travesty of the .hole idea of historic 1 progress, and its
attitude towards the masses betrays an amoral instrumentalisn
characteristic of the phenomenon Julien Benda was to call the "Trahison
das clercs." In socialist parties this had also happened. - through
the growth towards oligarchy in social democratic parties and in
communist parties with the conscious statement of principle by Lenin
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that the party must be an elitist vanguard of the proletariat.
Eehrer's demand for a revolution of the centre was in many ways a
re-active imitation of the control gained by the communist party over
the working-classes. It was also one of the most explicit statements
of middle-class partisanship to be found in the intellectual history
of fascism. While bourgeois Marxists attempted to retain their
humanist aspirations by * supporting' the working-class, bourgeois
fascists succeeded in renouncing theirs by supporting the impoverished
middle-classes. Two diametrically opposed means had been found to
destroy that tradition of bourgeois humanism which both extremes regarded
as an anachronism of the nineteenth century.
The element of humanism in the division between extreme left and
extreme right is perhaps one of the few decisive factors, in persuading
us to retain this conceptual axis in the discussion of modern politics.
In fact Zehrer while consciously producing a formula of middle-class
revolution admitted what Hitler and Mussolini instinctively knew, that
its sociological efficacy depended on a more general appeal to the nation.
The dissimulations which resulted arouse out of a fundamental fascist
contempt for the masses, even those who could become revolutionary, and
a belief that men generally were too fickle to act in their own interest
when confronted with a strictly realistic account of their historical
situation. They only responded to political myth. To tell the
middle-class they were carrying out a revolution of the centre was
politically useless. To tell them they were acting on behalf of their
nation was absolutely fundamental. For the Tat circle and their post-
materialist sociology this raised some fundamental questions about their
attitude to the acquisition of knowledge. They acquired the contemporary
vocabulary of the social sciences and its analytical claims to scientific
validity. But in political life, especially during periods of political
crisis, sociological knowledge merely served as a strategic consideration in tb
process of revolutionary mobilisation. Outside of its oythical efficacy,
its importance was nil. Knowledge merely had an instrumental political
function, and its autonomy or validity was a matter of indifference,
Hans Freyer saw sociology too as a science of the pre-revolutionary
world. It contributed to the structux 1 analysis of industrial society
and the prospects of revolutionary transition. But the agent of that
revolutionary transition, the people is unamenable to sociological
analysis. Net only docs it abolish industrial society but also the
ncientism which conceives of life as 'social'* Before the vital and
dynamic onrush of the Yolk, 'Society* the abstraction of a decaying
bourgeois world is dissolved* The practical consequences of Freyer's
attitude bee me apparent hen he joined the Nasi party, and became one
of the leading &e demic .intellectuals to give his support to the seizure
of power. His official party standing also enabled him to liquidate the
Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Sosiologic against the wishes of Inopold von
TCiese and so wipe out the institution. 1 status of sociology as r critical
intellectual discipline,^
Mannheim's TTiasensoziologie had consequences which, as an intellectual
casualty of Nazism, he could only hsve despised. Yet despite his own
explicit condemnation of fascism, his utopionism became used by fascist
social thinkers, His attempt to combine Nietzschean vitalism and
Marxian epistemology was a failure. Out of that failure an esoteric
attraction to fascism was Lorn, The humanitarian and cosmopolitanism of
Germany's left-wing intellectuals, the stalwarts of T"eltbuehne and
Tagebueh. Kurt Hiller, Leopold Schwarschild, Kurt Tuchholsky and Carl von
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Ossietssky was regarded with contempt. The Tat circle looked upon it
as a form of effete intellectualism whose negative and internationalist
orientation had removed it from the concrete problems of Germ ny. The
peculiar and eclectic utopicnism of Mannheim's in which voluntaristic
elitisn seemed to thrive side "by side with the dynamics of revolutionary
social change, jmd hich lent it to the more cynical speculations of
Sorel and Pareto, also helped to nurture the notion that humanity wca
dispensable to the concern of real power. The Tat circle combined a
fashionable concern for the tradition cf the new with an utter contempt
for universal ide-Is. In their work as in fascist social theory
generally the humanist belief in enlightenment and reason were dead.
The p: redox was that their short-lived intellectual success was
due to genuinely inventive and original ideas. They lacked nothing in
self-confidence or ingenuity. The journalistic experience of Fried
and Zehrer put their polemics on a par with those of Weltbuehne. Their
capacity for ad hoc iiinovntion made them superior to the letter's largely
negative and destructive criticism. They may have lacked the intellectual
sophistic tion of the ne . Frankfurt School of Sociology with its Freudian
versions of M irxism. But they also avoided its convoluted obscurity.
Thile the fault of the left during this period was that it had the right
values but few new or clear ideas, the fascist intellectuals thrived on
new ide.- s precisely because of the feeling of elation which followed its
abdication of humanitarian values. For that elation came from the
illusion of a definite break with the past. In their partisan support
for German n tionalism the Tat circle were constrained by a fundamentally
conservative commitment. The polemical use of the social science
language however offered them a whole conceptual apparatus of futurism
and modernity. They m y not have escaped from a whole web of assumptions
involved in the traditional Germanic servility to the authoritarian state.
In their iconoclastic and ideological use of language, their powers of




1. See the essays of Kurt Sontheimer: "Der Tat-Kreis" in Gotthard
Jasper ed. Von Weimcr zu Hitler 1930-1935 pp 197-229 and
Walter Struve: "Hans Zehrer as a neo-conservative elite theorist"
American Historic: 1 Review vol. 70 1964--65 pp 1035-1057
2. Sontheimer p.199
3. Struve op.cit. footnote p. 104-5
4., Sontheimer op.cit. p. 200
5. Curtiua. op.cit. p.36
6. ibid. p.36
7. Zehrer often signed his articles with the name "Hans Thomas" while
Eschaann used the "Leopold Dingraeva". Ferdinand Fried seldom if
ever wrote under his real name, Leopold Zimmerman, and many articles
were simply anonymous•
8. Curtius op.cit. p.4-3
9. "Das Ende der Wissenschaft. Krisis....Krisisi" Tat XXII 1930 p.596ff.
10. ibid, p.602
11. "Moderne Soziologen: Vilfredo Pareto" ibid. p.771ff. The series
also contained essays on George Sorel and Rudolf Smend, Eschmann
intended a German translation of Trattoria di sociologia. but it
apparently never materialised.
12. For a discussion of K utsky's role in the development of the S.PJ).
see George Lichtheio Marxism p.259ff.
13. Kautsky's final work Die Materialistische Geslchtsauffassung. a long
and leaden account of economic determinism was published in 1927 and
criticised by Korsch in 1929, the year that Zehrer started to edit
Die Tat: cf. Karl Korsch Die Materialistisohe Geschichtsauffassung.
Eine Auseinandersetaung mlt Karl Kautsky.
14- "Rechts oder Links" Tat Vol. XXIII 1931 p.536.
15. "Die Revolution der Intelligenz" Tat Vol. XXII 1929-30 p.488ff.
16. Zehrer op.cit. p.4-93-4-94-.
17. See Eschmann "Pareto" op.cit. p.779. Eschmann's excessively
voluntaristic account of Pareto's theory underestimates the




20. The Psychology of Socialism, pp.497,508 (trans, from 2nd German
edition Jena 1927).
21. Zehrer, op.cit., p.497.
22. "Rechts Oder Links", p.555.
23. Erail Lederer and Jakob Marschak Per Neue Mittelstand" in
Griindriss der. Sozialoekonomik, vol. IX. Tubingen 1926.
24. Siegfried Kracauer From Galigari to Hitler. p.l^Sff.
25. Published in 1930 in book farm as Eie Angestellte
26. ibid. p.83. Kracauer' s approach to the subject was in many ways
the forerunner of C. right Kills1 classic study of the early
fifties White Collar.
27. Die Tat, vol. XXII 1930-31, pp.460-463
28. Zehrer, op.cit., p.502.
29. ibid, p.503. Zehrer cites figures showing a 1QJ' decline in manual
occupations in German society between 1895 and 1925, while at
the same time there was a substantial growth in the ransk of the
self-employed. Within the "employee stratum" there was an
increase from 1.5 million in 1907 to 3.32 million in 1928. See
also David Sohoenbaum Hitler's social revolution, Chap.I.
30. "Revolution der Intelligent" pp.498-499. Zehrer bases this
dubious assumption on statistical evidence showing that 62J0 (sic)
of students attending institutions of higher education in Prussia
in 1926-27 were from the middle-classes as he had previously
defined them.
31. "Akademisches Proletariatj 137000 Menschen wollen •Doktor1 werden".
Die Tat. 1930 pp.816-823.
32. Karl Mannheim Man and Society in an Age of Crisis, p.14
33. R. Samuel and 1. Thomas Education and Society in modern Germany.p.82
The number of students in German universities increased from 60,458
in 1925 to 95,807 in 1931. Under the Nazi regime it declined
fairly rapidly to 48,458 by 1936.
34. "Revolution der Intelligens", p.502,
35. See the review of Freyer* s Revolution von Reohts by Hor3t Grueneberg.
Tat, vol. XXII 1930-31, p.240f. Grueneberg welcomes Freyer as a
"fellow-fighter for revolution" but criticises his inability to see
the forthcoming German revolution as a revolution of the centre.
36. The sociological locus classicus of the theory of the "fascism of the
centre" is Theodor Geiger's book Die Sozial Schichtung des deutschen,
Volkes. published three years later than Zehrer's essay in 1932. see
Dahrendorf op.cit,p,113f. For the most cogent restatement of the thesis
in modem political sociology see S.M. Lipset Political Kan. p,127ff.
37. See Heberle op.cit.j also the case study of political changes in a
small town in Hanover by "illiam Sheridan Allen The Nazi Seizure of
Power. For a general stwaary see K. D. Eracher"The German Dictatorship
187.
(trrna. by Jean Steinberg) p,152ff.
38. "Rechts Oder Links" p. 531.
39. "Moderne Soziologen: 2. Georges Sorel" Vol. XXII 1931.
40. "Reohts Oder Links" p.532
41. "Achtung, junge Front! DrausseribleibenJ" Vol. XXI 1929 p. 26f.
42. See the analysis of party membership by Lerner, Pool and Schueller
"The Nazi Elite" in H. Lasswell and D. Lerner ed World Revolutionary
Elites pp 194-315. For student attitudes generally see Bracher
op.cit. p.148 and Bleuel and Klinnert op.cit. p.l62ff.
43. "Die Dritte Front" Vol. XXIII Mfy 1932. p.97ff.
44. For the relation between Die Tat and Gregor Stressor see below
chapter 12,
45. For a detailed discussion of Fried*s doctrine of autarchy see
Wolfgang Hoch Deutscher Anticapitalisaas Franfurt I960 and
Hermann Lebovies Social Conservatism and the Gem-n Middle Glasses
Princeton 1969 chapter 6.
46. "Capital una Masses" Vol. XXII 1930-31. p.768ff.
47. ibid, p.772
48. "Rechts oder Links" p. 552
49. Hans Thomas (pseud.) "Politik ohne ' 'orte; der Kampf mit der Sprache".
Vol. XXIII 1932-33 P.241
50. ibid. p.242
51. ibid, p.246
52. "Rechts oder Links" p.519
53. Carl Schmitt Der Geistigen Lage des heutigen Parliamentarisaus p.45f.
54. "Politik ohne Worte" p.251
55. ibid. p.253
56. ibid p. 254. Zehrer's diagrammatic characterisation of the elipsia
indicating that revolution is again imminent is in terms of the


















57. For Zehrer's retrospective assessment of national-socialism as the
"silent guest" in the frenzied salon of national-revolutionary politics
during the final years of the republic, cf. Ernst, von Salomon
The Answers p.94ff.
58. Cf. Schaitt op.cit. p.45 For a discussion of Schxaitt as an
anti-democratic theorist in the purely political sense, cf Karl Sontheimer
.Anti-demokratisches Denken in der Weiaarer Republik p,195f.
59. Mannheim op.cit. p.110
60. "Rechts Oder Links" p.531ff.
61. cf. "Verfassung und Verfassungsi^echt" (first published in 1928) in
Staatsrechtllche Abhandlung Berlin 1955 p.l20ff.
62. ibid, pp 136-138 cf. also Schluchter op.cit. 52-90 for an excellent
account of Smend's integration theory.
63. ibid. p.167
189.
64. Schluchter op.cit. p.89. It is interesting to note that one of
amend's most important adversaries, Herman Heller, was equally
concerned with the problem of grounding the state in social reality,
but unlike Smend saw parliamentary democracy as beir^ capable of
achieving this very object, see Schluchter pp.250-278.
65. Horst Grueneberg. "Zur Theorie des ntiparliamentarismus"
Die Tat vol. XXII 1930-31, p.115.
66. For a fuller account of Zehrer's intrigue with Schleicher cf,
Struve op.cit,, p,1045ff Sontheimer op.cit., p.214f.
67. For a discussion of Papon's ministry see K. D. Bracher Die Aufloesung
der 'eimarer Republlk, p.601ff.
68. According to Hermann Rauschnung, this was the main reason for many
conservatives, himself inoluded, joining the Nazi Party, cf.
Make or Break with the Nazis: Notes on a Conservative Revolution.p ,45ff.
69. The distinction is made by Bohmitt in Hueter der Verfassung (1932)
p,135ff. """ ~™~™
70. "Revolution oder Restauration" Tat August 1932 p.354f.
71. Bracher op.cit. p./07ff.
72. Zehrer, op.cit., p.3^5.
73. "Revolution oder Restauration", p.386,
7t. Wahrheit und Ideologie. p.272
75. The Decline of the West, vol. I, p.415
76. "The Deomocratisation of culture" in Essays on the Sociology of
Culture. p.239f.
77. R. Dahrendorf "Soziologie und Nationalsozialismus" in Andreas
Flitiner Ed, Deutsches Geistesleben und Nationalsozialismus. p.79.
78. For an account of Germany's socialist intellectuals during this
period see Kurt Hiller's autobiography Leben gegen die Zeit and
Istvan Deak Weimar Germany's left-wing intellectuals Berke3$r 1968.
190.
CHAPTER VIII
The Helmet and the Sickle
The problem which faced revolutionary-nationalism after tfte
Friekorps era had drawn to a close was how to make front and
Freikorps violence the nythical foundation of a new political doctrine.
Their own predicament was similar to that encountered by Alfred Seidel
at the level of epistemology, - the irrevocable feeling that nihilism
could only be countered by nihilism. For bourgeois democracy with its
instability, its lack of legitimacy and order, its decadence, was to
their way of thinking nihilistic. The "nihilati n of nihilism" was
to use Seidel's phrase involved action which was even more drastically
nihilistic than the alleged disease it was attempting to cure. The
three main doctrinal strands of revolutionary-nationalism to be discussed
in the following chapters - national-bolshevism, international
nationalism, and total mobilisation are in this sense all nihilistic
forms of the nihiliation of nihilism. Seidel, who had no connections
with nationalist ciroles nonetheless provided an uncannily accurate
statement of its philosophical predicament. Unlike the Tat-circle
who had embraced some form of authoritarian utopianisra as a way out
of the nihilist predicament, Carl Schmitt and Ernst Juenger, the
most complex and sophisticated of the revolutionary-nationalist thinkers
accepted without reservation the nihilistic predicament. As a consequence
they transformed fascist doctrine into a vehicle of nihilistic totalitarianism
which many of the most committed ISuropean fascist intellectuals would have
found too extreme. The means by which this was done was also unacceptable -
to invoke the Bolshevik experience in Russia as one of the crowning
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examples of statist domination in the twentieth century.
This certainly was the premise of German national-bolshevism.
But national-bolshevism went throu^ two distinct phases in the Germany
of the twenties. It is only in the second phase that revolutionary-
nationalism, throu^i the person of Ernst Niekisch, became centrally
involved. The first phase emerged during the initial years of the
Weimar Republic, when some political thinkers came to see in the
violence of the Spartacists and the consequent counter-violence of
the Freikorps the basis for all alliance, between extremes of the left
and right, rather than as a symptom of a life-and-death struggle between
socialism and nationalism. Two Hamburg 'national-communists' Keinrich
Laufenberg and Frits Wollheim argued that Freikorps nationalism could
possess revolutionary potential if it was aligned to the class-struggle
of its socialist enemies. They contacted Karl Radek, a Polish member
of the Comintern who had played an important part in the Spartacist
uprising and succeeded in convincing him that an alliance between
nationalism and communism was possible.1 In 1920 Radek returned to
Moscow and put forward the idea that for the immediate future at least,
the struggle of the German nation against the imperialist <v'est should
take priority over the international class struggle against capitalism.
Lenin however rejected this national-bolshevism or what he called "left-
wing communism" as a political absurdity. He claimed that Germany
would have to accept the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty just
as the Bolshevists had accepted the terms of Brest-Litovsk. Liberation
from the constraints of Versailles, he claimed, could only come
2
internally through social revolution.
Nonetheless Radek continued with his efforts to gain support
among the German nationalists. There were some hopeful signs that
192
the union of political extremes he proposed could be partially
realised. The Freikorps who fought against the Red army in the
Baltic tended to accord the Bolsheviks a reluctant respect and
Manfred Killinger, a Freikorps leader who became a leading member
of Ehrhardt's terrorist Organisation Consul before going on to join
3
the Nasis, often referred to his own men as "right-wing" bolsheviks.
The real opportunity for dialogue came however in 1923 when the sudden
entry of the Frenoh into the Ruhr gave the Freikorps and the local
armed communist organisations the opportunity of a military liason
against the invading 'imperialist* army. The Rhhr campaign provided
the rationale of Radek* s famous speeoh to the executive committee of
the Comintern in June 1923. Here he identified the class-struggle
in Germany almost completely with the German national struggle against
Western Imperialism. The iaartyr of the struggle against the French,
he claimed was not a communist but a Freikorps man, Leo Sehl&geter
who was killed in action against the French. cchlageter epitomised
the fate of the fighter uprooted from his moorings in post-war German
society. He was, said Radek, using the title of a Freikorps novel of
the time, "the wanderer into the void". The Radek line of stressing
the revolutionary potential of the Freikorps was given approval by
Zinoviev and officially endorsed by the partyA
Yet Radek's endeavours were short-lived. The theoretical debate
on national-bolshevism between the communists and the nationalists
showed quite clearly that the hiatus between them was unbridgeable,
Radek took part in a discussion with Moeller van der Bruck and Count
Ernst von Reventlow whioh occupied the pages of Moeller's magazine
Per Gewissen. Moeller however effectively spurned Radek's overtures
in a series of short articles in w.ich he attacked the materialism of
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Marxist doctrine, the unacceptable identification of the proletariat
with the nation, and the inflexible commitment of the communists
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to the ideology of class-struggle. Moeller, adhering to the statist
tradition of Herman political thought, found the ideological vocabulary
of Marxism alien and unacceptable. This theoretical impasse was
reinforced in the realms of practical politics by the communist
uprisings of the same year in Hamburg and Saxony, where local
communist leaders declared their open hostility to the parties of
the right and to "bourgeois nationalism". From that time onwards
although the Herman communist party maintained a substantial national
appeal in its party programmes, especially in opposition to the Dawes
plan of 1929, the dialogue with the extreme right was dead. With the
growth of national-socialism, opposition to the dialogue was intensified.
Peripheral leaders suoh as Heinz Neumann were prepared to make overtures
to the radical northern wing of the Nazi party but these came to nothing.
By the turn of the decade the formal doctrinaire concessions to
nationalism in the party had been drowned in the overwhelming
nationalist hysteria fomented by Nazi demagogues.
The second phase of national-bolshevism, starting just before
the turn of the decade, and continuing until 193k when it vjas belatedly
subjected to Nazi persecution, emerged as a purely theoretical debate
when the political omemtum wjich encouraged it within Hermany had finally
died out. It was the doctrine of a small minority sect within
revolutionary-nationalism whose political appeal was strictly
limited. Its leader, Lrnst Niekisch had, like Mussolini in Italy
before him, turned towards nationalism from revolutionary socialism.
Unlike Mussolini however, Niekisch retained many of his leftist
1%
sentiments, notably his liking for bolshevisra, but did so in
ideological terms, which the Marxist left found both obtuse end
untenable. Niekisch*s strange volte-face was indirectly due to hi*
own participation in the revolution of 1918. As a member of the
U.S.P.D, the Independent German Socialist Party, Niekisch had played
a leading role in the creation of the Bavarian Soviet Republic,
in which he had been a minister, but was disillusioned by the
anarchy, the improvisation end the disorganisation of the Soviets.
The final fiasco of its disintegration and defeat at the hands of
the Freikorps prompted him to direct himself to increasingly
authoritarian forms of socialism. Disillusioned with the
revisionist S.P.D. as well, he broke may from it in 1926 with a
g
group of young socialists to found the /lte Sozlalitische Partei.
He started to edit a magazine '"iderstand (Resistance) and in 1928
was joined by August ""innig, another ex-socialist revolutionary
who had switched his allegiance to the nationalists at -the time of
the Kapp Putsch. It was through Niekisch that nrtional-bolshevism
became transformed from a code-word for the alliance of political
extremes to a doctrine which Juenger was later to use in the creation
of his model of a totalitarian state.
In his most important work published in 1930 Entscheidung
Niekisch shows quite clearly that his likinr for Soviet Russia
comes not from his adherence to Marxism or revolutionary socialism
but from the tendency to see the key differences in European society
in terms of an Kast/AVest geopolitical axis. The reasons for the
impasse betv/een east and west were religious raci .l and geopolitical.
According to Niekisch the "slavic-germanic racial mixture" of Eastern
Europe provided the foundation for the Prussian political struggle
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against Western urban civilisation on the one hand and the struggle
of a North European Protestantism against the Holy Roman -impire
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on the other. The core conflict of modern European history was
the struggle of the rural Protestant east against the urban
Catholic est, of "creative primitive life" against "economically
intoxicated civilisation" and "rural revolutionary conservatism"
against "urban liberalism".
In this context the front-experience had been significant in
two important respects. Defeat by the Allies had brought into Germany
the corrupt urban-democratic life-styles of the West; but it had also
intensified the German national awareness of its Prussian heritage.
It was the former, however, which in the Germary of the twenties
appeared to have won a temporary victory. Under the onslaught
of urban mass oulture and western capitalism German/ had become prey
"to the values of the city". With the disintegration of the
supraindividual norma associated with the authoritarian Prussian
value-system, the desire for material self-aggrandisement and the
acquisition of property reigned supreme. "Individualism and
materialism", Niekisch commented, "are like Siamese twins. They
were born at the same time and continue side by side on their
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indestructible path." "Urban-bourgeois man" is the non-hero,
"the trader" and "his value-system is a price list". Niekisch
regarded urbanisation in Germany after 1918 as a concrete manifestation
of Western imperialism and the Weimar parliamentary system as one
of the most "brutal forms of dictatorship by the 'Western nations".
The German city was a corrupt and colonised world of wishdreams in
which the German seeks refuge from the heroic and sacrificial tasks of
Prussianism.
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.Against this temporary victory of Testern colonialism and
decadent urban culture, the front-experience had provided the
true Prussian with a source of experience and hope. It had proved
to him that "he invariably had to be ready for sacrifice, if he was
not to be totally destroyed". The demands of the front, the
readiness for service and sacrifice were a form of "moral achievement".
They provided the ethical basis of both Prussianism and protestantism
which expressed in political and theological terms respectively
the binding nature of this ethic, Bismarck, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky
are Niekisch,s heroic resistance fighters against "estern capitalist
and Roman Catholic domination. He took up Dostoevsky's clarion
call to Germany to assert its "eternal Protestantism, its eternal
protest against Rome" which had originated in the rebellion of
9
/rminius against the Roman legions. The political domination
of the est and the development of estern capitalism is presented
as a historically transformed and secularised continuation of
two thousand years of Catholic theocratic rule in Europe. Against
the liberal-catholic "est the Prussian protestant resists through
a life-style characterised by "drill". "Drilling is the way in
which a whole nation, in order to attain its life-needs, cultivates
asceticism.The militaristic features of the Prussian life¬
style are transformed into the moral virtues of German protestantism.
Apart from the fbont-experience, the other great event contributing
to the possible renaissance of Prussia was the Russian Revolution and
the rise of Bolshevism. Niekisch, having decisively broken with his
leftist revolutionary past, does not see Bolshevism as the fruition of
the Marxist doctrine of revolutionary class-struggle. For him Marx
is cf no importance. The author of Das Kapital is described as a
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"revenge-seeking Jewish emigre". His sociological creation, the
proletarian is castigated as a typical product of the west without
inwardness, heroism ©r respect for authority. Russian bolshevism
meant for Niekisch the destruction of Jewish-Marxist socialism
of the est. It had rendered obsolete the westernised concepts
of "socialism"^'paoifism" and "the dictatorship of the proletariat",
Finally it had asserted its truly Russian nature when it rid itself
of the most despicable Jewish- estern epigone in Moscow, Leon Trotsky.
Kiekisch's anti-Marxist interpretation of bolshevism illuminated quite
clearly the significance of communism for the national-bolsheviks.
Communism was counter-revolutionary. It had secularised the "eternal
protestantism" of Last against est outlined by Dostoevsky as the
major task of a new Germany. It was not a socialist creed of
egalitarianism and happiness but a moral creed of service and
sacrifice. Its revolutionary origins made it in advance of western
capitalism: at the same time it signified a revolt against the
whole estern idea of progress. Marxism possessed a purely
instrumental function ; s a propaganda weapon, "Communism is the
counter-movement against the bourgeois world.... It does not use
Marxist theory as an inviolable sacred doctrine, but in some cases
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as a mask, in others as a weapon." Through Marxism, the communist
movement had effectively concealed its conservative and authoritarian
values behind a mask of revolutionary egalitarianism. As a doctrine
of revolution, the protagonists of Marxism always had a ready-made
opportunity for denouncing the west as reactionary, despite the fact
that most of the features in Western societies they were opposed to
were basically dynamic and progressive ones. By this ideological
inversion the authentically conservative nature of bolshevisa could be
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immune from attack by Western liberalism as itself reactionary.
Bolshevism had proved for Niekisch that a potential conservative
lurked behind every revolutionary mask.
The implication for Germany was quite clear. A political
movement adapting the bolshevik achievement to its own purposes
could defend Prussian authoritarianism from a revolutionary standpoint.
The attack on the urban-industrial west from a conservative standpoint
could masquerade as revolutionary. Before he fully realised the
full extent of industrialisation implied by the first Soviet five-
year plan, Niekisch in fact provided a rural-feudalist rationale
of the Drang nach Osten. Prom this traditionalist perspective,
he stressed "morality, tradition and honour" as being the fundamental
values of a Prussian feudal Germany. He went further and called for
a rescusitation of the type of Prussian domination known as
Gutsherrschaft which flourished under the Junker aristocracy. Clearly
different from the Grundherrschaft of western Germany, where noble
landlords rented out land to the peasantry, the Junker landlord not only
kept the peasants economically subordinate to himself, but was
responsible for political and military control of the area in which
his manorial domain resided. According to Niekisch this was the only
appropriate legitimate form of domination for Prussianism:
Only in the period when the Junker landlord
was both an administrator and a warrior, could the agrarian
state effectively maintain itself. The Junker landlord
(Gutsherr) was at the same time an overlord, (Gefolgsherr),
His staunch loyalty to his subjeots, rooted in the German
character, became a formative political force. His Germanic
domination became, to use i,*ax ./eber's phrase "a social
institution". Prussia*s social spirit revealed itself by
virtue of the fact that the overlord wa3 socially responsible
for his subjects." 13
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Niekisch eventually abandoned his Prussian rural-feudalism
when the Soviet Union entered into a stage of massive industrial¬
isation. Yet the model of Gutsherrschaft remained the key to
his interpretation of Soviet industrialism. The party bosses
and the managerial technocrats were the new overlords of the
industrial world, incorporating the same principle of domination
and the same 'social spirit'. Juenger's contention that "service"
was the appropriate mode of action for both ruler and ruled is
derived from this Prussian standpoint. Both he and Niekisch am
Russia as a technological Junkerdom where the spirit of a traditional
form of domination could accompany modern technological invention
in the fight against the West, Technology, in this conservative-
revolutionary context, could be turned against its original inventors
and their flaccid ideology of progress. Bolshevism was not Marxist,
but Prussian. Their acclaim for the five year plans was inseparable
from a nostalgia for feudalism. What Niekisch had done was to claim
that the basis of German nationality resided in the most traditional,
reactionary and agrarian sentiments mustered by the Prussian state.
East Prussia the land of rural backwardness and of a patriarchal world
which prevailed under the Prussian Junkers right into the period when
Germany became an industrial nation is extolled as the model for
German revolutionary-nationalism. Distant from the industrial Ruhr
and Rhineland, and from the catholic south, religious values, political
traditions and reactionary forms of feudal benevolence and reciprocity
form a rural-protestant-prussian syndrome which looks eastward in the
opposite direction ftrom the historical expansion of the German nation
to the west and south in the nineteenth century. For this expansion
had brought the civilisational conniption, the penetration of a more
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dynamic and changing universe, which during the war and immediately
afterwards had shaken the old Prussian traditions to the oore.
Ostensibly nationalistic, Niekisoh1s national-bol3hevism with
its vision of a Russian-German condominium extending from the Rhine
to Vladivostock entailed a destruction of nineteenth century
conceptions of nationality and the nation-state. It puved the
way instead for Juenger's vision in per Arbeiter of global
technological domination. Revolutionary nationalism thus provided
a Prussian mandate for a dynamic conservative imperialism, which
Juenger in his work used as a springboard for the destruction of
all forms of tradition.
The conservative outlook of Niekisch also reflected the paradox
which many writers claimed to detect in the growth of German
nationality. It was Prussia which had by and large been historically
responsible for German unification. According to Max ,eber
Prussian Junkerdom had been the breeding ground of the military
discipline necessary for the creation of a German-nation state.
Yet with the establishment of the Second F.eich and the growth of
industrialization, the East becomes the servant of the South and West
with "their overpowering capital". The commercialisation of the
landed estates in the East and the development of capitalist
rationality in industrial Germany had eroded both the Prussian values
and the social strata so crucial to the founding of the German Reich.
For Weber the process of capitalist rationalization was irreversible.
Labour migration to the West, he thought, would destroy the structure
and spirit of Prussian agrarianism for good. Niekisch however wished
to restore that same vanishing patriachal and martial spirit to German
life w .ich Weber saw in the throes of inevitable dissolut on. The key
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to the process for the national-bolsheviks cane in the construction
of an industrial system which Weber, arguably, never really envisaged -
a rational-technological system which was the complete antithesis
of western capitalism. Soviet Russia provided a totalitarian
system of industrialisation which was unaccountable for both in terms
of eber's analysis of capitalist rationality in the economic sense
and his analysis of its complement in the political sphere legal-
rational domination. Juenger's own vision,an industrial technological
state was to join both martial and Prussian-authoritarian values
with modern organisational rationality, while at the same time mounting
a total and unconditional offensive both against Western capitalism
and legal-rational domin.tion. The point of difference was unequivocably
clear. While Weber had regarded protestantism and Calvinism in particular
as the incubator of values necessary to the development of a systematic
and rational capitalism and therefore clearly distinct from Prussianism,
for hiekisch Prussiani3in and protestantism were almost identical.
Protestant asceticism and pietism complemented the martial values
of the Prussian state. It was the kernel of resistance to the west
and of the Drang naoh Osten. The bolschevist posture was the
geopolitical consummation of this resistance. G-erman nationalism
through its Prussian adherents had been totally severed from the
factual and historical reality of German nationhood. The Soviet
Union had been called on to save Prussia from its own creation.
The political impact of Kiekisch's doctrine" was marginal. His
own following scarcely numbered more than four thousand and his
major political conversion betrayed a minor sort of historical irony.
In 1929 a large section of the Bund Oberland, a civilian re-organisation
of the Oberland Freikorp went over to nstional-bolshevism, Historically
this was a symbolic catch for Niekisch for this group played a role
in Hitler*s Munich Putsch of 1923 as well as earlier part in the
destruction of the 1918 revolution. Niekisch had joined hands with
his former enemies and enticed them away from the Bavarian and
"Romish" national-socialist movement. He had done so however
at a time when the Freikorps had long been dead and the violent
putschist tactics with which they had been associated, no longer
played an important part in German politics. From Hitler's point
of view, with the growing electoral successes and the appearance
of more and more young post-war stormtroopers on the streets and the
defection of old allies was politically harmless. Nieksch's circle
was in political terms reduced to competing for pride of place among
the national-revolutionary sects placed in the shadow of the communists
and the Nazis.
International Nationalism.
While Niekisch had been the front-fighter as the embodiment of
the heroic ascetcism of the Prussian-protestant spirit who gave
renewed impetus to the attack on western civilisation with the aid
of bolshevism, the group of nationalists with whom Juenger was closely
connected between 1926 and 1929 saw the front-fighter in more universal
terms. Niekisch's work could have aptly been retitled "The xrotestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Bolshevism"} the work of the leading
international nationalists, Frederic Hielscher and Franz Schauwecker
was distinctly anti-bolshevist in tone. Their own preference was
for an even more speculative and phantasmogorical alliance than that of
Niekisch - a vision of the metaphysical unity of Germany and the
under-developed colonial nations of the world. What was astonishing
about this position was the clear acceptance of a racial cosmopolitanism
which it inplied. ,<hile the Nazis were infuriated by Niekisch's
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pro-bolshevist stand, Hielscher's identification with the coloured
colonialists of the world and his acclaim of oriental culture was
even more unacceptable. liven in national-bolshevism there were
certain implicit racial assumptions in its geopolitical outlook.
biekisoh's Russo-German empire was all-white. It deliberately
15excluded coloured populations. While the west would be left
to deal with its insuperable problems of extinguishing colonial
black insurgency, the nutional-bolshevist empire by having no colour
problem would willingly shed one of the main bugbears of permanent
imperial domination. Hielscher's vision of a new German Reich
was one in which Germany itself was the spiritual and political
head of the revolt of the Third world against its western colonial
masters. In this context his interpretation of the front-experience
was widely different f rom that of Niekisch, '.'.hereas Niekisch saw
it as creating the basis for new self-awareness by the German nation
of its Prussian heritage, Hielscher saw it as providing a new form
of spiritual experience in fighting that would be universal to all
fighting against the west in the mouern world. The front-experience
was the beginning and embodiment of liberation from colonialism
which possessed global dimensions.
How was it possible that on the soil of German nationalism with
its strongly racial and chauvinist overtones, that such a political
metaphysic could ever thrive? To some extent the answer lies
in Hielscher's own favourable position within the national-revolutionary
minority in the late twenties. As a member of the post-war generation,
a student r'reikorp volunteer who had graduated in law from Jena
University, he had established contact with nationalist circles
in Berlin through membership of Niekiseh's Alte Sosiulistische Partei
204.
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and his earlier acquaintanceship of August "innig.. The growth
of the New Nationalists as the revolutionaxy-riationalists were first
called in 1926, came about through its uneasy and hostile relations
with the Stahlhelm. the para-military front-fighters organisation
which had strong links with the D.N.V.P. the German nationalist party.
Under the leadership of Franz Seldte, the Stahlhelm. the first official
league of ex-front filters had been quick to establish itself during
the stabilization period of the republic, as violent opponents of
the left-wing parties. In 1926 its membership was well over a
million and on May Dey, 1927» over 130,000 members participated in a
massive para-military demonstration in Berlin. It was on the fringes
of the Stahlhelm that the front-literati the Juenger brothers and
Franz Schauwecker joined forces with the remnants of Ehrhardt•s
terrorist organisation Organisation Consul. With Ehrhardt's
financial backing they set up an opposition magazine -within the
I
Stahlhelm called Die Standarte which was banned when it published
an article praising the ass as ins of Rathenau and Erzberger and outraged
local social-democrat politicians in Magdeburg where it was published.
Juenger and his circle then broke with the Stahlhelm.
Ehrhardt whose ex-terrorists were now organised into the quasi-respectable
Viking Bund agreed in 1927 to put up money for a new magazine Vonaarach
(, dvance) under the editorship of Juenger and Werner Lass, In Berlin
Hielscher, hit by graduate unemployment on leaving university and
experiencing the deprivations of the academic proletariat, gratefully
accepted the chance of editing the magazine in June 1928. In its new
format the magazine under Hielscher's editorship came to identify its
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own "advance" with the advance of the insurgent colonial peoples
of the world. An important precedent for HieIscher's position
was set a year previously in 1927 at the first congress of the League
against Imperialism and for National Independence at Brussels. The
formation of the League was the brainchild of Willi Muenzeriberger,
the most ideologically flexible and politically adept leader of the
German Communist Party, who possessed a remarkable flair for the
stage-management of campaigns cxf left-wing protest in Germary and
Europe during the twenties."^ Members of the League included
European socialists and communists and representatives of anti-
imperialist movements in the Third-World. Unfortunately the links
between European communism and Third World nationalism which
Muenzenberger wanted to intensify were undermined and outstripped by
political events. The breakdown of relations between the Kuomintang
and the communists in^ Chin; , regarded at the time as the most
militantly aggressive anti-imperialist nation in the Third World,
brought about a split between international communists and revolutionary-
nationalists. At a second meeting of the League in Berlin, the
Kuomintang was declared counter-revolutionary and expelled from further
participation in the League's affairs. Hielscher, who attended both
conferences, at once took the side of the Chinese nationalists against
the communists. He met and befriended a number of Chinese students
who shared his intensely nationalist hatred of communism and pacifism
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alike. The doctrine of national liberation through violence was
completely to his liking and further encounters with Arab and Indian
nationalists in Berlin as well as with the Chinese prompted him to see
in the predicament of these countries a fate similar to thatof Germaiy -
that of a violent nationalism fighting imperialism and being undermined
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in its struggle by the tactical manoeuvuring and the materialist
ideology of the communists. He also saw in these embryonic
nationalist movements a form of conservative revolution in which
the fight for independence meant a return to a traditional indigenous
culture destroyed by western colonial powers.
His book Das Reich published in 1931» proceeded to set out
what can only be called the historical-metaphysical and geopolitical-
metaphysical antecedents of a German world-empire based superficially
at least on the idea of an international nationalism. Hielscher's
closest supporter for this idea, to which incidentally Juenger himself
was largely non-comittal, was Franz Schauwecker. Gchuuwecker had
spoken in his book hp ist der Friede of a "world-revolution of
nationalism" in the twentieth century inaugurated by the first
19world war. ' Thus the fascist para-military organisations of post¬
war Europe - the Freikorps, the Italian squadriati, and the t ustrian
Heimwehr are identified with the insurgent anti-colonial armies of
Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) in Turkey and Chiang Kai-Shek in China.
Schauwecker identified the future anti-colonial armies of the
Third World as being similar both in organisation and life-style to
those of European fascism. Hielscher took this affinity one step
further by suggesting it exemplified the global significance of the
specifically German front-experience. For the first time the spiritual
qualities which had recurrently manifested themselves in the historical
growth of the German nation could spread like an unquenchable fire
across the face of the earth.
Of all the revolutionary-nationalists, Hielscher is without
doubt in his thought as well as his style the nearest to the German
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ideal of the Kulturmenach. He speaks almost alone for the virtues
of German Innerlichkeit. Yet inwardness according to Hielscher only
blossoms under the external conditions of a strong and powerful martial
state. In German history it is the Prussian statist tradition which
is the sole guarantor of the superiority of German culture. The
alliance of inwardness and power is a unity of opposites. The
development of the protestant iqysticism and inwardness of .chhurt
and Luther goes hand-in glove with the military slaughters of Gustav
Adolphus in the Thirty Years War. The Age of Goethe is also the age
of the supreme Prussian Frederick the Great. Nietzsche's philosophical
greatness is shadowed by the ruthless Prussian Realuolitik of the
founder of the Second Reich, Like Moeller van der Bruck, Hielscher's
insistsnce on the recurrent resurgence of German greatness is
governed by the Nietzschean conception of the eternal recurrence.
For Hielscher the alliance of inwardness and power continually repeats
itself throughout the course of German history. The significance
of the front-experience is that the same eternal recurrence which had
shaped the growth of the German Reich can take place on the plait of
world-histoiy. To make, his argument convincing he has to radically
devalue the status of Germany as a sovereign western European
industrial nation, Kielscher presents Weimar Germany as a defeated
power, whose status is that of a colonial nation. Germany's defeat
in the war, albeit the defeat of a sovereign industrial nation in
a war of materiel. he claims affirms German's colonial status.
Despite its industrial political development and its official
political sovereignity "Germany is the miracle of the west. It
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repays what the "est invests# It xs subsiduary territory."
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After the military weapons of the war come the .Vest* 8 economic
weapons of peacetime, "Not only tanks, gasbombs and subraaries
belong to the west's arsenal of weapons but just as important,
commodities, banks and business deals." Capitalist materialism
had overrun the Prussian sovereignty of Germany and destroyed the
classic legacy of German culture in the same way as it had destroyed
and enslaved the nations of the Third World,
Germany was joined to the Third World not by political
alliance or by virtue of similar social organisat ion but by the common
fate of exploitation by the west. That Germany had its own history
of military expansion, imperial designs and indigenous industrialisation
were facts which Hielscher either had to contend firecely or ignore.
In no sense could Germany of the .eimar republic be regarded as in
a similar social or political situation to French or British colonies.
The nearest analogy Ilielseher could find was agrarian China, which
he claimed was threatened by the great world-powers of the East-Russia
and Japan, in the same way that Germany was threatened by the three
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Western world-powers Prance, the United States and Britain.
Chinese nationalism had an analogous role in Asian politics as German
nationalism in European politics. The successful uprising in Jhangai
in 1927 organised by the Kuomintang and their subsequent decimation of
their former communist allies, led Hielscher to believe that a new
militaristic nationalism in the East could complement that of the West.
But in practical terms, there was little basis far historical affinity,
Hielscher therefore hinged his argument on suggesting a metaphysical
affinity. The German front-fighter had undergone a unique experience,
similar according to Hielscher to the proeess of artistic creation,
which could "become the basis of a new soul-brotherhood (seelische
Gemeinsamkeit) of warriors fighting imperialism throughout the
world. What the front-experience had exclusively produced in the
modern world was the feeling of "we"# It was a new form of "wordless
experience" which "had not yet acquired it real language"# It was
a "knowledge which was ashamed of itself when it sought out words
and spoke of "destiny" comradeship and duty. But it was there.
That was enough. Whoever stood in its secret brotherhood,
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invariably pursued the slaughter of war. The notion that the
future colonial wars of the Third World not only would embody but
also would be dependent on the German front-experience was little
more than wishful thinking. It represented a political roaantioism
permeated by unsupportable fantasy. What also became unsupportable
was the contention that the Pirst world war with its trench warfare
and large set-piece military encounters would have much in common
with the flexible and ubiquitous tactics of rural guerilla warfare.
As it turned out the static slaughter of the Western front and the
rural base strategies of the Asian guerilla movements such as the
Chinese Communists and the Vietminh came to represent the antithetical
poles of warfare in the twentieth century.
The geopolitical universalisation of the front-experience, did
represent, however, a kind of solution to the problem of front-
nihilism and the claustrophobia of world-isolation in German
nationalism. The very desperation of Hielscher's solution is shown
by its political unreality. It is almost as if he wished to attribute
the cause of the embryonic revolt against Western colonialism in the
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Third orId to the est's defeat of Germary. Colonial insurgency
is regarded as the form of revenue that Germany iaetaph.ysic.- lly wills
upon its estem humiliators. Opposition to the West is the convenient
yardstick of negative affinity linking nationalist Germany to the
Third World. Yet the very fascistic qualities which ilielscher
admired most in the Third Yorld were the ones which, like those
in Europe, ultimately met with disaster. The Kuomintrng with its
authoritarian and militaristic regime failed to achieve the alliance
of the helmet and the sickle necessary to ensure support from the
Chinese peasantry. It was ultimately destroyed by a communist
movement with a peasant army. Hielscher's indiscriminate
cultivation of practically all Asian nations also le a him into
political contradictions. He came to extol the virtues of Gandhi's
"passive resistance" in India side by side with the militarism of
the Kuomintang. And in the pages of Vormarsch and later Das deich
the magazine he started to edit in 1930* he placed almost side by side
articles by Chinese nationalists and Japanese professors supporting
the emperor Hirohito, at a time when relations between China and
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Japan had reached boiling point.
Hielscher's historical analysis of Asian and /rabic cultures,
compared with Spengler's morphology of world-cultures by which he
was undoubtedly influenced, was in max\y ways superficial and depthless.
Hielscher took such modern nationalist leaders and spokesmen as
Sun-Yat-Sen, Gandhi and Ib'n Saud as the political embodiment of
the classic cultures of their nation. He saw the renaissance of
classical culture emerging with the resurgent national consciousness
of the anti-colonialist leaders. Spengler himself however was much
more sceptical and went to the opposite extreme. When on a visit
to the elder man in the sunnier of 1926, Hielscher demanded to know
his opinion in the matter, Spengler said of Sun-Yat-3en, Gandhi
and I'bn Saud "They are nothing but Fellaheen, jumped up, artistically
speaking by the newspapers and historically speaking of no significance."
Hielscher pressed on regardless. Much more than a world-wide awakening
of national cultures, national liberation was merely a prelude to the
intermingling of these cultures. The epicentre of the vast global
intermingling of these cultural forms would be the German Reich. It
would become the vast repository of vital cultures of the world which
remained uncorrupted by western decadence.
Within Germany, the centre of the metaphysical Reich lies in
the heart of foreign territory - in the colonial decadent world-
city of Berlin. Anonymous and corrupt, anomic and atomising, the
new urban habitat of the revolutionary-nationalists was a "witches
cauldron". "Berlin", said Hielscher, "is merely the continuation
of the war by other means." Yet within the precincts of this
westernized city lies the invisible protestant kingdom of the Reich.
Here the uncontaminated non-westernized world is represented in
microcosm and all the struggles of the world are contained within it.
"There are no possibilities which elude Berlin. Here countries
from all over the world mix and collide. Here things which will have
taken years in forming, will be won and lost in a moment. Here the
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great transformation take place." The alienated warriors of the
front, no longer nihilistic have the power to transform Berlin into
the new Jerusalem of the world. The imperialist mechinations of
all the great world-powers will founder on the rock of Germany.
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All the colonial people of the world will crave its aid and
benediction and follow its destiny. Germany becomes in Hielscher's
eyes a geopolitical wishdream, a global panacea to allay the
sufferings of the world.
"The decision upon which everyone waits lies in the
domain of Germany. French foreign policy is unable to
deal with North frica. In order to remain on equal terms
with Britain and America it needs ascendenoy over Europe
and therefore over Germany..., Great Britain must besiege
Russia to contain its power. As a hinterland from which
to advance against Russia it needs - Germany. The United
States must create new markets if it is not to stagnate.
Russia is closed for that purpose. In spite of its ties
with London it needs a European base convenient for its
purposes, America must have - Germany. Japan can only
survive in the long run against Great Britain and America
if the great Eurasian hinterland protects it in the rear.
In this hinterland it needs.... Germany.
"The colonial peoples of the world can have no
satisfactoiy alliance with Russia because in all their
joint activities the spectre of communist doctrine is
dragged in; there is only one country whose stormtroops
have shown as uninterrupted effort to attain freedom -
Germany.... An encircled Russia has only one real outlet
where it can escape the ring around its territories.
On this outlet the future of Moscow and its policies
depends: Germany. At present the question of our
internal and external destiny have become linked.
We have to hold out our hands to all the cultures of
the world. We have to let them drink our blocd. gg
In us they encounter each other. The decision is ours."
Hielscher's geopolitical delusions are intended to lead
the successors of the German front-fighter along the metaphysical
road to world-domination. There is no question of the new Reich
being an equal consortium of oppressed nations. Germany was an
industrial nation whioh in that very war in which had been defeated
had already laid its claim to being a world-power. As an
authoritarian state it exercised oppressive forms of domination
over its own people similar to those exercised by the democratic
nations over their colonies. Hielscher's Germany could only overcome
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the double-standards of the western colonists by universalising the
standards they possessed abroad rather than the standards they
possessed at home. The paternalistic authoritarian Prussian spirit,
historically deprived of its colonial opportunities yet steeped in
the adulation of repressive violence so necessary to colonialism,
was steered by Hielseher along metaphysical paths to achieve that
type of "world-domination" (Srdherrschaft) which it had been unable
to achieve by historical or political means. The grandiose
alternative to western materialist colonialism was German
metaphysical colonialism. History however was to provide more
alternatives. The anti-cosmopolitan and racial master of the
Third Reich thought differently. Deprived of the opportunity of
setting up a colonial empire among the coloured peoples of the world,
Hitler had already decided to colonise Europeans. Likewise Japan
the only sian industrial nation, decided to colonise "sirns. Stalin
had already taken the process one step further by deciding to leave
the world alone -nd colonise his own country. Compared with such
abominations Hielscher*s metaphysical colonialism was a romantic
and despairing cri de coeur. It was a last hopeless and insane
plea for a lost Germany to obtain through metaphysics what it had
been unable to gain through conquest. It was a paradoxical demand
for an international soul brotherhood of fascist warriors ruled
by Germany. ""hat from a humanist standpoint was a false and synthetic
unity of incompatible opposites - of classic culture and m rtial
power, of mas3 slaughter and artistic experience, of spiritual
inwardness and the authoritarian state - became the groundwork for a
strange p rable of hopeless redemption never to be consummated.
The Peasant's Movement
National-bolshevism and international nationalism both held out
the promise an alliance between the peasant and the front-fighter,
between the helmet and the sickle. Niekisch saw this coming into
being with the turn towards the rural-revolutionaxy East, Hielscher
with the turn towards the colonial nations of the underdeveloped
world. In terms of practical politics, both notions were excessively
Utopian, The real alliance of the helmet and the sickle occurred
much closer at home in a different and more unpredictable way -
through the campaign and agitation of the revolutionary-nationalists
in the Peasant's Movement in Schleswig-Holstein. The initial
involvement in Schleswig-Holstein came fVom a handful of revolutionary-
nationalists but soon became the cause of the movement as a whole.
It was Bruno von Salomon, the brother of Ernst, and Friedrich Wilhelm
Hems, formerly of Ehrhardt's 0. C. and in 1928 as S.A. leader in
Hamburg who first took up the peasant's cause. The movement had
originated as a protest against adverse economic conditions for
small farmers in the area and lack of government financial support.
Poor prices for produce, depletion of capital, large-scale indebtedness
because of the difficulty of obtaining favourable interest rates on
loans, acted as a stimulus for the small peasants to demand nationalisation
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of banks and credit organisations. Both Salomon and Heins became
critical of the Nazi party which they thought was dragging its heels
on the question of radical agitation and they made an independent
bid for the leadership of the loosely arrayed protest movement.
Bruno von Salomon became editor of the main newspaper in Itzehoe
Das Landvolk on the west c??Et of 1116 province and quickly gained
support from the revolutionary-nationalists in Berlin, In supporting
and publicising the Peasant's grievances the newspaper was banned by
the authorities and kept re-appearing under different names to avoid
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the ban. The paper soon attracted the attention of Claus Heim,
a farmer whose personal charm enabled him to become the popular
figurehead of the movement. Joined by Ernst von Salomon, Bruno
and Claus Heim fanned the flames of growing protest which took
a number of different forms. The technique of passive resistance
was used in the form of the peasant*s refusal to buy up land which
had fallen into disuse, and later in a total trade boyoott with
Neuminster, the main town in the area, after police had violently
broken up a farmer's demonstration there. More violent methods,
very probably instigated by the Salomon brothers, manifested
themselves in terrorist bombings on tax offices and other government
buildings - acts of terror which were officially "disowned" by
Salomon's newspaper.
The peasants adopted a black banner as their standard and the
Peasants War of 1525 became their historical nyth. Further movements
sprang up in Saxony, Thuringia, Pomerania, East Prussia and Silesia.
The coalition S.P.D. Centre government soon came to regard the movement
as a threat to national security. This being the case the revolutionary-
nationalists in Berlin emerged out of relative anonymity to enjoy some
degree of political notoriety. The cause of the peasants in
Schleswig-Holstein provided a focal point of unity for a number of
dissident extremist groups. The Vormarsch circle was at the centre
of this new spell of activism and controversy. Ernst von Salomon,
in his memoirs, remembers the exclusive "Hans-Dieter Salinger salon",
named rfter the business manager of Vormarsch. which used to hold
regular and exclusive meetings in Halensee and Berlin, It provided
an intellectual centre for the more intellectually and politically
distinguished right-wing extremists of the period. Thus at a typical
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meeting in Hielscfaer's apartment in the lcwer Friedrichstrasse in
Berlin in 1929, they assembled to listen to the expressionist play-
wright Arnolt Bronnen speak of lis latest novel 0.S. Salomon recalls
seeing among others the Juenger brothers, Hielscher, Hans Zehrer,
and Otto Strasser and Herbert KLanck from the Nazi party. Ernst
Juenger, the warrior with a firmly established literary reputation,
was something of a central attraction especially for the younger
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nationalists like Salomon, During the brief period at the turn
of the decade he became something of an esoteric cult figure, a minor
Stefan George. In 1929 Leopold Sohwarzsohild, left-wing editor of
the political journal Tagebuch. described Juenger as "the
undisputed intellectual leader of German nationalism among the younger
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generattion." Hen like Hielscher, von Salomon, Arnolt Bronnen,
Werner Best, Hans Ebeling, erner Lass and Karl Paetel fell briefly
under the spell of a man who remained an intellectually dominant
salon figure in a world of violent political activists.
Salomon's contention however, that Juenger's circle represented
"the jeunesse doree" of the period is exaggerated. "These young
people", he claims, "had already achieved positions in society to
which their talents entitled them".^1 To the revolutionary-nationalists
however, their own achievements were accomplished in spite of the
system. Most of them had some record of privation and frustration
of their aspirations which provided fuel to their political extremism.
Salomon had spent several years in jail for his part in Rati enau* s
murder. Both Juenger and Zehrer lad to give up university studies
which they started in the early twenties, Hielscher after graduating,
walked the streets of Berlin unemployed. Otto Strasser and his
associates in the Berlin Nazi party were looked upon prior to 1929
as guttersnipe politicos. Goebbels, who for a while was an associate
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editor of Vonaarsch. testifies in his diary to the utterly squalid
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conditions under which the Berlin branch initially operated,
Ferdinand Fried of the Tat circle pointed out that academic success
under the conditions of wholesale graduate unemployment, merely offered
the prospect of ekinc out a threadbare bourgeois existence, repaying
debts accrued by six years of university study, and finally gaining
an income commensurate with respectable bourgeois status in late
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middle-age. Frustration, anoiaie, resentment all furnished the
contempt felt for the democratic "eimar system which was seen as
the tool and lackey of social-democrat bosses, monopoly capitalists,
Jewish financiers and a decadent cosmopolitan left-wing literati.
The success" achieved by the leading revolutionary-nationalists
lay entirely in the high intellectual and political reputation
gained in the role of extremist opposition. It was the sort of
success which is always possible in an open democratic society but
which, often for that very reason, does not lead to a greater
acceptance of the system but rather a hardening of attitudes against it»
In Weimar the conditions leading to a hardening of extremist
attitudes were conditions which the pre-war generation of nationalists
never had to contend with. Despite growing tension within G-ermany
during the Wilhelmian era the image of a self-cOnfident and ordered
authoritarian society prevailed. There was no general bourgeois
revolt against authority, despite the growth of the Youth movement
and the type of political bohemianism associated with expressionism.
The bourgeois revolt in the Weimar Republic was to a large extent
a revolt against the lack of authority. The "Kerenski epoch" of
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Weimar, as !'ans Zehrer called it, represented for younger post-war
nationalists a rule of parliamentary incompetents in an age of
prolonged social and economic crisis. For this reason their revolt
was authoritarian and presented in conscious authoritarian terms.
At the same time their methods and polemics were modern and radical.
Perched precariously between tradition and modernity they fused the
conservative end the revolutionary condemnations of bourgeois society.
Together with the attack on the lack of authority went the attack
on social and economic deprivation on American imperialism, on the
excessive rationalisation of modern institutions and on the unwanted
expertise of the educationally qualified which have been prominent
in the recent revolt of middle-class youth in western societies.
The crucial difference between contemporary rebellion and the
resentment of the revolutionary-nationalists would seem to be over
the question of values. Contemporary revolt is concerned, by and
large, with the Call for greater and more democratic political
participation and greater social justice. It is generally chaotio,
disorganised, spontaneous and anarchistic. Revolutionary-n ticnalism
however radical its contempt for the alleged hypocriey of bourgeois
democracies owed its final allegiance to the model of an authoritarian
state and to authoritarian values. Its revolutionary imagery remained
yoked to a fixation with the omnipotent German state.
The unyielding commitment to the state revealed itself even in
the support for the Peasants 'ovement which was, par excellence,
a regional protest movement against the policies of the centralized
state. Instead of developing political notions of state exploitation,
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however, the revolution ry-n.tionr lists regarded the failure of
Y/eimar government over the peasant's problem as being due to its
inability to execute authentic statist functions. Ernst von Salomon
wrote in Das Landvolk:
"Precisely because he is conservative, (the peas nt) must
become revolutionary. Out of the massed assemblies of
fighting peasants emerges the idea, not only that the
peasant should express his belief in the necessity of the
state but should himself contribute to its development.
It is precisely for this reason that he must defend himself
against the endeavours of the present system whose claim
to be statist is basically a fiction." 3k
Salomon went on to proclaim the need, (despite the bombings!) for
a "centralised" or "federative"' form of self-government to be achieved
through Gandhi's method of passive resistance. This was less a
plan for decentralisation than for the creation of "a state within
a state". It was an attempt to introduce a regional politics on
the model of an authoritarian state.
At the same time contradictions also existed between the grass¬
roots populist nature of the movement and the elitist attitudes of
the revolutionary-nationalists. The revolutionary elitism of the
Tat circle has already been discussed. In Zehrer's idea of a
"revolution of the centre", the link between revolutionary
intelligentsia and revolutionary mass was conceived of not as an
equal ana reciprocal partnership but as in terms of an elitist
revolutionary movement. Similar attitudes characterised other
revolutionary-nationalist groups. Part of the rationale for
Otto Stressor's exit from the Nazi party in 1930 was couched in
very precise elitist terns. Unable to get the support he wanted
from the S.A. and from other northern radicals who remained loyal to
his brother still in the party, Strasser nonetheless regarded his own
splinter group, the Kampfgemeinschaft fucr Revolutionaerer
Wationalsozialisten. later known as the Black Front, as the future
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"jacobins of the German revolution". He rationalised his own
withdrawal from the movement in terms of the tactical political
superiority of jacobin elitism over the complex and dysfunctional
mass party machine.
"Adolf Hitler's national-socialism, (he wrote), has gone
the my of all movements which are initially revolutionary.
Attracted by the real force of a new idea, too many people
flock out of turn to a movement which tends accordingly to
become too diffuse. In this way they weaken the power,
trivialise the purpose and break the absolute integrity of
the new will - This is invariably the case.
Girondist or Jacobin, Menschevik or Bolshevik, S.P.D. or
K.P.D." 35.
The jacobinist sentiments of the Black Front, which tried to play
its own part in the Peasants revolt by calling for a worker-peasant
alliance, were equally to be found in the leaders of the movement.
In his documentary novel based quite centrally on his own experiences,
in Schleswig-Holstein, Ernst von Salomon puts into the mouth of
his national-revolutionary hero Hans K. Ivinger, a fictional
portrait of his brother Bruno, fiarly conclusive elitist sentiments
about the nature of revolution. Towards the end of the novel after
the break-up of the peasants movement and the establishment of a mass
following in the area by the Nazi party, Ivinger still tenaciously
proclaims the sacredness and superiority of the revolutionary
elite and a profound terrorist contempt for the masses.
"We are not making a revolution. e are the revolution.
Is there, therefore, never to be ary law and order in our
beloved fatherland? No, by God, there shall be no law and
order in our beloved fatherland. Must we expect, therefore,
brute force,...? Exactly, and those who do not use it must
capitulate before it. So is this terror, is this chaos?
Precisely. Is this what the nation wants? Nobody knows
what the nation wants, now or in the future, but we want the
nation. And who are we? We are those who want nothing more
and nothing less than the nation.,,. We constitute our own
striving towards the Reich..,, Is this what the people want?
No one knows what the people want, they themselves don't know
what they want. But it is what we want," 36
The fate of the national-revolutionaries in Schleswig-I olstein
illustrated quite clearly the fate of jacobinism when confronted by
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extremist mass party organisation clearly intent on exploiting
agrarian disaffection. Although at first some general unity existed
between the revolutionary-n- ti nalists and the Nazis, this soon
disappeared when the Nazis, anxious to maintain the credibility of
their legality policy, disowned terrorist violence. On one occasion
when the Nazi party was mistakenly held responsible for bombings in
the area, its response was to announce that it was offering a reward
for information leading to the discovering of the culprits. In maqy
ways the chleswig-Holstein affair was a test case of a twofold
reorientation of Nazi policy - the substitution of rural and nationalist
ideological appeals for socialist ones and the decision to introduce
in the interests of greater organisational effectiveness, more stringent
controls over district party branches by central directives. The
attempt of party rudicala such {is Heinz and Bodo Uhse, another
ex-Freikorps man, to promote an idealogical dialogue with the national-
revolutionaries was frowned upon just as much as the policy of arbitrary
terror, wuich the Nazis correctly surmised would alienate the majority
of small farmer opinion. The political tactics of the Nazis in faot
exposed the vulnerability of the loose and open-ended protest
movement under Claus Ileim. Heim was arrested and put on trial in
Altona on bombing charges. His national-revolutionary supporters in
Berlin were arrested by the political police after an article in the
Vossische heitun# by the left-wing journalist, Heinz Pol, alleging
that they were prime conspirators in the movement. As a result
the movement possessed no adequate organisational structure which could
function in the absence of it3 leaders and Nazis accordingly moved in.
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Not only did they recruit Wilhelm Hamkens who was Reims second-in-
command to the party, but more important, as Rudolfe Heberle has
shown, they offered official positions in the party to local young
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activists who played an important role in the Peasant's Movement.
The success of their grass roots recruitment policy and their
electoral successes in the area contrasted strongly -.with the terrorist
jacobinism of the national-revolutionaries and the more doctrinaire
efforts of the Communist to create a worker-pecsant alliance.
The role of the national-revolutionaries in the Peasants
Movements illustrates maz\y of the dilemmas of the intellectual
activist in radical politics. Much hinges on the question of how
far his superior political knowledge and information and organising
ability can coalesce with the grounds of local discontent. ryen
though he identifies with the grounds for discontent, he remains
open to the charge of being an outsider or a sectarian political
adventurer. The ideological prejudices of the n tioncl-revolutionaries
and the perverse honesty of their elitism, merely added substance to
the charges. Freedom from the shackles of party control meant great
ideological latitude and independent terrorist initiatives. But the
absence of the organisational norms of the mass party also entailed
no permanent and binding relationships with the discontented populace,
in addition whereas the Nazis realised the electoral system could be
used to gain important positions of local power and establish cleai*-cut
long-term political goals to motivate their followers, the n: tional-
revolutionary rejection of party organisation as "liberalistic" placed
than, once the impetus of boycotts and bombings h:d died down,
firmly out in the cold. The epitaph to their involvement with the
peasants is expressed no more succinctly than in the words of Salomon's
hero, Ivinger when he concludes that national-socialism, by leading
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democracy ad absurdam had exhausted its historical mission and was
no longer justified. History had repeated itself# Once more the
G-irondins would make the breach for the Jacobins to swarm through.
"The task", he concludes, "lies in the hands of the revolutionaries
and no one else. It lies in the hands of those who have already
10
perfected the revolution in themselves."
Lingering attachments to the movement after 1930 remained.
But the focal point of unity which it had provided for revolutionary-
nationalism evaporated. The police detention of Juenger's circle
in Berlin effectively resulted in the rundown of Vormarsch. Juengsr
himself gravitated towards the national-bolshevists. Hielscher's
new magazine Das Reich exhibited an even more esoteric cosmopolitanism.
Zehrer went on to edit Die Tat, the most successful of all the
magazines. But the Tat circle ploughed its own furrow and ignored
the nati nal-bolshevists. The addition to national-revolutionary
circles of Stressor's Black Front, which itself underwent an internal
split in 1931, added to the complications. And other even smaller
splinter groups sprang up to confuse the picture in those halycon
days of disintegration before Nazism was victorious and silence was
all. 2ven in their continued support for Claus Heim, their martyred
leader still in prison, the national-revolutionaries were outflanked
by the Nazis and the K.P.D. Certain that his movement had finally
disintegrated, both parties bent over backwards to obtain his release
and gain the favour of the peasants for having done so. An attempt
to put up Heim as a presidential candidate was foiled by ex-comrade
Beppo Roehmer who in his new role as a communist party functionary
was successful in persuading Heim to stand down in favour of the
communist candidate, Hrnst Thaelmann. Practice having been
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distinctly abortive the leading intellectual fascists in Germany
went back to theory end prophecy. But in this scheme there was
no role for the peasantry. The most complex and most enduring
legacy of German intellectual fascism was the model of a totalitarian
state which made the most ruthless use of warfare and technology
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Juenger's indisputable position of intellectual leadership
within the Voranrsch circle was due to the esoteric nystique of his
role as a fighter-intellectual which he assiduously cultivated, but
it was outside the immediate circle of nation-list activity that
Juenger came to acquire the most marked intellectual impact upon the
development of his vork. This was to be found in his association with
the legal and constitutional political theorist Carl Schmitt, who had
taught at Bonn univex-sity and moved to take up a professorship at the
University of Berlin, Schmitt provided for the revolutionary-
:nationalists a link with the academic intellectual world from which
by and large they were fairly dist nt. Like Karl Mannheim he
possessed widespread influence both within end outside academic circles
and was strictly speaking a new type of radical intellectual whom it
would have been impossible to fit in aiy sense into the traditional
pre-war pattern of the academic mandarinate. He was forthright,
lucid, direct, and above all polemical in orientation. His attack on
the theory and practice of parliamentary democracy1 perhaps put him in
the forefront of the new intellectuals nurtured by the Republic. That
same attack, however, was a direct assault on the legitimacy and
foundation of the Republic itself.
In some of his earlier writing Schmitt had directly taken up some
of the problems posed by Spengler and Moeller van der Brock on the
nature of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary tendencies in modern
society# He emphasised the thin dividing line between the activistic
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violence of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary extremists. The
obvious example was the respective roles of the communists and the
Freikorps in post-war Germany. That excited him about the nature of
counter-revolutionary activity was the absolute decisiveness necessitated
in its action in order for it to be effective. He derived this
sentiment not only from the counter-revolutionary writings of
Louis de Bonald and Joseph de Maistre during the period of French
restoration but even more so from the Spaniard Donoso Cortes who had
declared his implacable opposition to the French revolution of 1848 in
radical counter-revolutionary terms. Schmitt's doctrine of
2
decisionism stemmed from these "supreme* philosophers of the state"
as he called them:
"The actual significance of these counter-revolutionary
theorists lies in the consistency with which they make their
decisions. They thrust forward the moment of decision in
such a radical manner that it conclusively transcends the
notions of legitimacy from which it has arisen."3
In the place of a system which is already crumbling before the
pressures of revolutionary agitation, they advance an immediate and
effective dictatorship which is no longer constrained by the
constitutional procedures it uses under normal circumstances.
".Already...,in the utterances of De Maistre there
lay a reduction of the state to the moment of decision,
that is to a pure and absolute decision, inaccessible
to reason or discussion, which did not justify itself
and in addition was created out of nothing".^-
"The decision created out of nothing" is the leitmotif of Schmitt's
work during the twenties, the absolute affirmation of the raiaon d'etat
by which the state in defending itself negates and rids itself of the
encumbering constitutional constraints which make its action
justifiable. This emancipation of the st:te from itself is in Schmitt's
terms sufficiently radical to be comparable only with those revolutionaiy
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acts which are intended to destroy the state in toto. He therefore
sees a remarkable affinity in the 1848 revolution between the main
theoretical protagonists Cortes and Pierre-Joseph rroudhon. Both were
opponents who understood the real nature of revolution and gave no
5
quarter to the dilutions or compromise of parliamentary constitutionalism.
Neither was interested in the liberal ideal of free discussion. While
Proudhon saw Cortes as a fanatical grand inquisitor, the Spaniard looked
upon the French socialist leader as a demon masquerading under the guise
of anarchy. But both welcomed the slaughter which made their unyielding
opposition to each other inevitable. For Schmitt tl is mutual contempt
for all political rules in the face of revolutionary struggle set an
important precedent for a new twentieth century development in which
the ideas of state and revolution were no longer anithetical. As
early as 1923 Schmitt had seen the importance of the fascist application
in Italy of the ^orelian idea of political myth.^ The nation as a
political myth was for Schmitt the binding link between the state
and revolution which effectively made the distinction between
revolution and counter-revolution meaningless. Both Mussolini's
March on Rome and the Dublin Laster Uprising of 1916 gave him hope that
twentieth century revolutions would henceforth be accomplished by those
interested in restoring the power of the state rather than those
interested in destroying it. The friendship of "Padriac Pearse and
James Connolly, nationalist and anarchist" (sic) in the Irish rebellion
was seen by Schmitt as a symbolic expression of a new alliance which
would lead to a general renaissance of the state,^
Like Spongier's idea of the declaration of war as revolutionary,
Schmitt envisaged a nationalist coup as a revolutionary act. Lven if it
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is generated in response to the fear of revolution, the instantaneous
j
decision to seize power in order to create a new state is a form of
emancipation from constitutional constraint. By seeking emancipation
in the act itself rather than it its moral justification Sohmitt shows
himself indifferent to the theological and essentially Catholic
8
premises of the nineteenth century counter-revolutionary theorists.
Schmitt had derived the rationale for the decision not from theological
premises, hut from within the boundaries of the decision itself. In
his famous essay Per Begriff des Politisohen first published in its
9full form of 1929, decision becomes a function in human relations of
the essential permanence of the fight (Per Kaapf). The centrality
of the fight in addition however points to the centrality of politics in
human existence. All conflict is ultimately governed by politics and
conducted on the basis of a fundamental distinction at the level of
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the political - the distinction between friend and foe. This
distinction overrides all other distinctions at different levels of
human existence such as that of good or evil in the sphere of morality,
beauty or ugliness in aesthetics, profitability or unprofitability in
economics and so on. While all of these provide a dichtomy analogous
to that of friend and foe the alikeness is purely one of analogy.
The domination of the political over all spheres of life is oontained
within this fundamental distinction.
The criteria for the identification of foes, which in turn makes
them potential victims of decisions that might be taken against them
cannot be constrained by normative preconceptions and the decision to
fight cannot be subject to impartial norms of procedure. The
identification of the foe and the decision to fight are existential.
"The political foe need not be morally evil, he need not
be aesthetically obnoxious. He should not appear as an
economic competitor and it should even be possible to do
business with him. He is just the other, the stranger
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and it is enough that his nature, in a particularly
intensive and existential sense is something other
and strange for confliot to be possible with him
in extreme cases. Such a confliot would not be
determined either by a general set of rules decided
in advance or by a non-participant and therefore
"impartial" third party." 11
The existential criterion of the foe aa the "other" legimates the
essential open-endedness of the selection of the foe and the
impersonal nature of the emnity towards him. The decision to
fight cannot be based on personal psychological hatred but solely
and entirely on a political decision. In many ways Schmitt* s
analysis mirrors at a political level Juenger* s insist into the
nature of the Great war - that the intensity of the slaughter wa3 in
no way directly proportional to the national hatred or idealistic
motivation of the different sides, but rather something which because
of decisive political and military factors seemed to possess its own
momentum. Consequently Ichmitt's own analysis in a very real sense
politicises the nyth of the front-experience. The essence of the
political is that it gives ri3e to the continual possibility of the
type of war which is a legacy of the Great War. The political
decision in a fundamental sense is a decision to declare war,
"The eventuality of struggle in the real world is
part of the concept of the foe.... The essential thing
about the concept of physical farce is that it is a
question of the physical murder of human beirgs. The
word fight just as much as the word foe is to be
understood in a primorial existential sense (seinsmaessigen
Ursprunglichkeit;. It does not mean competition, or the
"purely spiritual" conflict of discussion nor the symbolic
"struggle" in which man somehow fulfills himself, because as
things stand, the whole of human life is a "fight" and every
man a'Tighter". The concepts friend, foe and fight are
meaningful in the sense that they have reference in particular
to the real possibility of physical murder. War ensues from
enmity since emnity, existentially speaking, denies it ary
other possible attributes. War is merely the outward realisation
of enmity." 12
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War is essentially for Schmitt a fight "between "organised
political units". As an existential rather than a normative
phenomenon, the appropriateness of the alleged ideals for which it
can be fought are invariably called into question. In Schmitt's
formulation of the problem the "ideas of 1914" through which the
German professors attempted to interpret the Great War as a war of
Kultur against liberal civilisation, could only have a propagandist
content. Conservative nationalism in Germany could not provide
any politically viable form of justification for the war, since all
ideals merely contradicted the essential nature of war as the purely
political decision to fight the foe:
"War.,., has no normative but only an existential
meaning specifically in the real situation of a real struggle
against a real foe, not in some kind of ideal or programme
or norm. There is no rational purpose, no norm however
justifiable, no programme however exemplary, no social
ideal however marvellous, no legitimacy or legality which
could justify men killing each other on its behalf..,. No war
can be founded on ethical or legal norms." 13
The nihilism of the front-fighter and the Freikorps terrorist to
whom beside the oall to fight, all the goals for whioh one fights pale
insignificance is raised by Schmitt to the level of the state itself.
The role of the intellectual is significant only if his role had
been construed as that of a fighter. The war of the pen waged by
an academic literati is superfluous. It is within the realm of the
political alone that all important decisions are made and to which
knowledge or information, in any scholarly or scientific sense, has
no purpose, and to which doctrines in any moral or ideological sense
are irrelevant. The pointlessness of defining goals, the futility
of possessing ideals, leads, as Karl Loewith has noted, to a
"radical indifference to every political content of the purely
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formal decision." Schmitt's conception of war is that of the
essential arbitrariness of the war of each against all in the
Hobbesian state of nature raised to the level of the war between
states as organised political units. The political state possesses
in Schmitt's doctrine of fighting the same existential qualities
as Hobbes* state of nature. Its predominant feature is random
and arbitrary fighting. But fighting between orga rased states is
intended as the antithesis to Hobbesian anarchy. The war of all
against all is not the core problem of human order but its solution.
In the place of the atomised disorganised distrust which characterises
Hobbesian man in the state of nature where he is stripped down to
his bare psycho-physiological credentials, in Sohmitt's scheme of things
these same credentials find expression in the organisation of the state.
The political therefore is not the alternative to the state of nature.
It is its institutionalised expression.
hile Schmitt wishes to denigrate all yalues and ideals as
empty normativistic formulae, it is clear in his own work that he
possesses a very singular type of value-commitment to a specific fora
of politics. Indeed he himself declares that "all political concepts
15
ideas ^nd words have a polemical meaning." His own particular
polemical option as it were is for the organised political unit in which
modern warfare can be carried out most intensively and most effectively.
For this reason, he denigrates the idea of internal war and in
particular the Marxist notion of the class-struggle. The latter
he admits has affinities with his own idea of fighting, particularly
as it is a victim of the moderating effects of pluralism in liberal
societies. Nonetheless since its avowed aim is to destrpy the state,
2 ■%.
it is ultimately incompatible with the true idea of the political.
But what type of state doe3 exist which is favourable to Scmaitt'a
doctrine of fighting? He sets out to find the authentic state
by discarding those political arrangements which have contributed to
the state's downfall. The liberal age in Europe, he claims, is
characterised by the increasing "neutralisation" of the state,
by virtue of the ever-increasing emancipation of different spheres
16
of human life from their specifically political obligetions."1"0
The political theory of pluralism is the bourgeois ideology which
legitimates this process by conceiving of it as the 'natural'
development of 'society' and 'humanity'.
Schmitt's own polemical attack on what he regards as the
nineteenth century conceptual distinction between stt te and society
is directed in particular at the British socialists &. D. H. Cole
and Harold Laski, both of whom he holds responsible for stressing
polemically the importance of the ties of the individual to
institutions and voluntary associations which were independent of
state rule. The "society" of the pluralists is in effect a
polemical concept used in the attack on the absolutist state, and
its doctrinal statement reaches full fruition in the development
within politics of socialism and within academic scholarship of
sociology. Sociology, as what Carl Brinkmann, the national-
economist had called an "oppositional science", was a bourgeois
ideology in the sense that it defended the implacable dualism of
state and society,1^ The polemical counterattack upon the
development of society both as theory and practice is developed by
Schmitt through the integration-theory of iudolf Smend. In the
same way that ->mend had derived from Joseph Schumpeter's essay on
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imperialism his notion of the essential aimlessness of the political
10
fight, Schmitt gained from 3mend the insight that it was possible
to create a new form of organisation of the state in which it would
be possible to re-integrate society into the polity with a view to
perfecting this aimlessness. Such a state would be truly modern in
the sense that it could effectively come to utilise within it all
the resources it possessed for the pursuit of war. Schmitt called
19
it, following Mussolini's phrase 'stato totalitario* a total state.
The function of the total state was to integrate all extant forms
of 'social' life into the polity and to make them all equally subject
to the sovereignity of the political decision. The influence of
Smend's integration theory on Schraitt differs at this point from
the consequences it had for the theoretical orientation of the Tat
circle. while both took the example of Italian fascism as being
a model for the new type of state they envisaged, and while,
in addition, the possibilities of a dorelian myth of the nation
as a means for the revolutionary seizure of power so important for
20
the Tat~circle, had been seen by dchmitt as early as 1923, there was
quite clearly a distinction between the authoritarian state envisaged
by the Tat-circle and the total state of Schmitt himself. The
difference lies mainly in their differing attitudes to 'society*.
,,hile Zehrer and Fried for example had a strong theoretical orientation
towards an understanding of the class-structure of modern society, an
essentially socialogical orientation, in Schmitt's terms the question
of social stratification becomes one of secondary importance since
all human life is to be governed by the political. While for the Tat-
circle the problem is one of establishing new modalities in the relationship
between state and society, providing of course these are essentially
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authoritarian ones, Schmitt wishes to liquidate entirely the
distinction between state and society. The total state then demands
a process of historical transition from the age of neutralization
characterised by liberal society to the age of struggle characterised
by the total state. By the same token it would equally be a process
in which the class-structure of society, what Marx had called the
infrastructure would come to assume increasingly less importance.
In Schmitt's terms therefore, Lehrer's notion of a "revolution of
the centre" of a particular section of society against its exploited
position could have no more meaning, whatever its sociological
exactness, than the classic Marxism notion of the struggle of the
proletariat. In any case social protest in a mass-democracy
merely leads to the sterility of parliamentary discussion. The
historical transition is therefore one which is by implication not
itself revolutionary in social terms but in political terms - that is
to say, in terms of its ability to engender the unhindered operation
of the friend-foe distinction at the level of the 3tate.
The attempt to abolish all 'normative' preconceptions about
the nature of the state is admitted by Schmitt to be itself a
polemical argument with its own partisan presuppositions. His own
favourable attitude towards Hobbes, Machievelli and the nineteenth
centuiy theorists of counter-revolution is due to their own pessimistic
assessments of the nature of man. "All the narrowly political
21
theories of man", Schmitt claims, "presuppose him to be evil."
This is true equally of Schmitt himself. Like Spengler, his outlook
is radically pessimistic. But unlike Spengler, whose gloom is
derived from a vast morphology of world-cultures, Schmitt narrows
the focus of his pessimism to a minimal existential definition of
human nature. That man is invariably engaged throughout histozy
237.
in murderous hostilities, is due to the fact that he is capable
existentially speaking of nothing else. In Humanitarian terms,
it would be because he was capable morally speaking of nothing better.
But Schmitt challenges all the humanitarian doctrines of pacifism,
security, social harmony and progress, which he claims arise from
a fundamentally erroneous assumption about the goodness of man.
Such doctrines, he claims can only perform a propagandist function
of masking the essential hostile nature of men to each other.
The polemical argument of the /llied powers in World Tar 1
that they were fighting German barbarism on behalf of humanity,
could only be looked upon as an instrument of Imperialist expansion.
"It characterises the eneny as being outside of humanity", Schmitt
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claims, "and can therefore justify any action against him." In
his own terms however, the just war is not merely impossible: it is
meaningless. Moral judgements have no place in the realm of the
political decision.
Schmitt's premise of the evil nature of man leads him, as it
does Pareto, to a radically confined view of the possibilities of
human action. /ccording to his existentialist viewpoint, the
wherewithal of fighting calls forth endless possibilities. To
this degree men*s actions can be random and arbitrary. There are
no possibilities on the other hand, of not fighting. Human
freedom lies within the boundaries of necessary and permanent
hostility. There are no other options. Just as Nietzsche saw
no alternative to the will-to-power, or Pareto to the circulation of
elites, Schmitt in his own "brutal definition of the political could see
no alternative to the substanceless decision to fight. bcistential
freedom existed only in the choice of foes. Out of the state of
fallen nature came the collective war of each against all. Pchmitt's
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preconoeption of man's evil nature, even though he remains indifferent
to the psychological premises on which his preoonception rests,
does hinge upon a moral judgment. 'Vhile Schmitt denies the
relevance of morality, he himself admits that he proceeds with
a notion of man's evil nature. Polemically he is comiai ted to the
idea of man's incapacity to do good. It is the deliberate
exclusion of the sphere of goodness which provides the rationale
i
for the alleged necessity of fighting. It is only n: tural therefore
that only one side of the friend/foe dichotomy is significant to
Schmitt. The nature of the political remains not a search for
friends but a search for foes. Friendship has a secondary tactical
significance which springs out of the decision to fight.
The idea of the total state does not altogether accord with the
definition of the political. The occasional or even exceptional
nature of the political decision Schmitt presents us ith gives little
basis for considering the permanent norms which circumscribe the
activity of the state. Nonetheless the idea that fighting was
facilitated by the ere tion of a total state had an immediate impact
on Ernst Juenger. For it posed the question, what re the
institutional processes necessary to the creation of such an
arrangement? Thanks to Schmitt Juenger*s self-styled
'Prussian anarchy* was able to set up its nihilist blueprint
under the aegis of the political. The outcome of the idea of a total
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Heroic Realism uod. Total Mobilization
Schmitt's existential doctrine of fighting was a product of
the trauma of violence which had seized Germany from 1914- onwards.
The analytical distinction between friend and foe was like a mandarin
mirror-image of a far deeper and more emotionally disturbed attachment
to violence which the legacy of war, defeat and revolution had given
to the military outlaws of German society, Schmitt's lucid, self-
confident and almost restrained prose hid beneath it a disintegration
of values, a simmering rage for brutality, and a fundamental contempt
for the rule-governed conflicts of a democratic society. chmitt,
like Mannheim, had propounded a solution of sorts to the problem
of relativism. Unlike Mannheim, however he had not sought out
the salvation of a historical dialectic which could ensure that some
values at least were indestructible. On the contrary, he blandly
asserted that values were no longer important at all, lighting
had replaced values at the centre of political life, and values
h d been relegated to an ideological superstructure where they
possessed purely propagandist functions. The academic whizz-kid
of the eimar Republic had provided the cruoial ammunition for the
warriors of the salon, Juenger and his circle saw in chmitt's
doctrine a specifically political application of their unpolitical
sentiments. The friend/foe distinction appealed to the diffuse
nature of their hatred and resentment. It had in effect shelved
the problem of friends and concentrated on the more acceptable problem
of foes.
In a symposium edited by Juenger in 1930 celled "ar ,nd Warriors
(Krieg und Krieger) the indebtedness of the revolution ry-n tionaliats
to Schmitt clearly reveals itself. Despite the uneven nature of the
contributions to the volume, two essays, one by Juenger nd nother
by erner Best, develop along lines suggested by chmitt. hkin to
Schmitt's doctrine of fighting was Best's concept of heroic realism.
Complementing Schmitt's conception of a total state was Juenger's
idea of total mobilisation. Both provided a rationalisation and
ideologisation of the nihilism of the f ront-experience and its
historical legacy. Like Niekisch's nation&l-bolshevism and
Hielscher's metaphysical colonialism, they were nihilistic solutions
to the problem of nihilism. For them Nietzsche's prophecy had
already come true. Prior to Nazism Nurope had already witnessed the
spectre 01' nihilism. The corain- century of nihilism had Ire ady
arrived; instead of the fire next time, the fire this time. Thus
judging themselves at the centre of the prophesied reality of
nihilism, they fall into the same trap as the prophet himself did
in The ill to Power and make nihilistic prescriptions to end the
nihilism which for Nietzsche was yet to come, but for them hud already
occurred. The age of destruction had already been reached. Only
its incipient chaos was subversive. The best answer to chaotic
destruction was organised destruction. Out of the clear distillation
of opaque destructive sentiments a new totalitarian philosophy was born.
The solution of nihilism by nihilism became the most flagrant double
negation based on false premises which the twentieth century had
witness to. Total mobilization, gruesomely prophetic of the second
global conflagration of the century a decade, wa3 the fascist doctrine
of those who saw the only form of atonement for human imperfection in
the absolute reign of total destruction.
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In Juenger's symposium a clear expression of contempt is to
"be found for Germany's pre-war conservative intelligentsia. Albrecht
Guenther, the Hamburg revolution?ry-n?11ionalist who contributed a
piece on " ar and the Intellectuals" speaks derisively of the
"society of gentlemen" (lionoratoriengesellschaft) who occupied
professorial chairs under the humanist educational system of the
nineteenth century.* According to G-uenther the emphasis on
cultivation (Bildung) in German education had led to the starvation
of the natural sciences. It also led to an excessive academic
servility to the "feduol-military caste" which ruled Germany.
"The title of Poktor." he claimed"signified at most, enrolment into
2
a particul rly badly paid class of intellectual lackeys (Intelligenzkulis)'
The failure of the growth of the natural sciences became evident, he
went on, in the first world war when conservative intellectuals were
highly regarded for their publicist and propaganda roles than for
their scientific or technocratic capabilities. Adopting Max -Veber's
critique of the "ideas of 1914" to his own purposes, Guenther claims
that war-propaganda was characterised by the superficial optimism
of "Journalists and literati who possessed no integral relation to
the state or the n tion."^ 7diere technical performance was the
decisive contribution that the intelligentsia could have m. de to the
war-effort especially in the development of sophisticated armaments,
its only achievement was to parrot a "war-blind" and "school-masterly"
form of Kultur propaganda which was totally ineffectual, Guenther's
condemnatIon of Germany's pre-war intelligentsia in in fact one
specific aspect of Juenger's attack on Wilhelmian Germany. HJhile
Guenther criticises the German intellectuals for their lack of
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technocratic capability, and their idealistic preference for Kultur
as against military performance, Juenger extends the criticism of
conservative nationalism to incorporate a condemnation of a whole
era of industrial-feudal society. To him, it was inadequate to cope
with the type of modem technological war it had undertaken.
As a staendische societ ruled by political and military castes
and status-groups it had been first surprised and finally destroyed
by the new social phenomena which mass warfare had brought into being.
The process was irreversible. The restoration of the monarchy and
the recreation of an absolutist state on eighteenth century lines was
an obselete conservative illusion. n an extended passage Juenger
attempts to chart the unalterable end dynamic tr nsformation which
had taken place in central-European society, as a result of the
Great ,7art
"The times are long; since past when it was sufficient to
dispatch a hundred thousand recruited subjects onto the
battlefields, as in Voltaire's Candide. and when, if 'His Majesty'
lost the battle, peace could be dem;mded as a civic duty. But
in the second half or the nineteenth century conserv tive war-
cabinets could still plan, execute and win ars which the
people's representatives were either indifferent to, or rejected.
This, to be sure, presupposed a completely unique relationship
between Crown and rm , a relationship which only underwent a
superficial transformation through the more dynamic forms of
life originating in universal military service and which in
essense, still belonged to the patriarchal world. It presupposed,
moreover, a certain calculability in the extent of costs and
armaments, which made the war appear as an extraordinary but in
no way limitless outlay of existing energy and resources.
In this sense mobilization was identified as a partial measure.
"It only remains to be seen now the growing transformation
of life into energy (vfachsende Umsetzung des Lebens in Energie)
which more and more demanded transient types of social ties
favourable to mobility, bestowed upon the concept of mobilisation
- which at the outbreak of the war was enacted in many countries
by the monarchy independently of countersignature - an increasingly
incisive character. There were a multiplicity of factors
which determined this. 7/ith the obliteration of status-groups
(..taende) and the curtailment of the privileges of the nobility,
the concept of the warrior-caste automatically disappeared.
The military service of the nation is no longer ti e duty and
privilege of the professional soldier but instead becomes the
task of all those who are capable of fighting. In addition
as the chaotic multiplication of costs makes it impossible to base
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the war on a fixed budget, it is much more necessary for
the extension of credit and the utilization of the last spare
penny to get war-machinery into motion. The image of war as
an armed encounter merges even more into an ever-expanding
image of a giant process of work. Adjacent to the armies
which meet each other on the battlefield arise the newly-
formed industries of communications, of supplies, of armaments
- above all the srmy of work. In the last significant phase
of the war when it was already ne;.ring its end there was no
activity, not even a housewife at her sewing machine, which did
not have an indirect bearing on the course of the war. In the
absolute utilisation of potential energy which changed the
leading warring nations into volcanic forges, the beginnings
of the fourth estate were perhaps indicated at its most
significant - they made the world war an historical phenomenon
of at least equal importance to the French Revolution. To
generate energy of such proportions it is no longer necessary
just to mobilize a force of ;-.rms - a mobilization of the inmost
strength, of the very nerve-centre of life (Lebensnerv) is ,
necessary. To realise this is the task of total mobilization."
Juenger's interpretation of the demise of the autocratic
and monarchical Staendestaat is as crucial to the doctrine of
revolutionary-nationalism as the interpretation of the self-destructive
nature of capitalism is to the doctrine of Marxism. The militaristic
ethos of Prussia in the modern industrial world was not, as Sombart
once saw it, an indication of the coming triumph of the warlike
industrial society over its peaceful Anglo-Saxon Spencerian counterpart,
but of the persistance of an archaic ruling class whose tendency to
militarism and in addition, whose quest for world-power, represented
the mens of its own destruction. For Juenger it was, politically
and historically speaking, capable of nothing more than partial
mobilization. The drawing of this crucial distinction between
partial and total mobilisation should be seen quite clearly as a
debate with the liberal Anglo-Saxon ghost of Herbert Spencer.
The Great "ar had clearly made nonsense of Spencer's claim that
modern industrial societies were peacelike. In stating that they are
permanently warlike, however, Juenger borrows a distinction which
Spencer himself had applied to traditional militant societies.
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Here the criterion of "the survival of the fittest" is according to
Spencer to he found in those societies which subordinate the total
population to the necessities of waging war. The victorious social
type emerges from those societies who operate on this principle.
Vanquished societies are those who allow their workers to retain
5
the produce of their own labour. Juenger applies Spencer's
critique of the survival of the fittest in militant societies to
industrial societies, thus sabotaging the fundamental distinction
which Spencer attempted to make between the two types. Total
mobilisation in Juenger's essay is the key (in the modern world) to
the survival of the fittest. Partial mdbilisatlon is a sure sign
of ruin and disintegration. In Per Arbeiter the concept of total
mobilisation retains the Spencerian, or perhaps one should say Social
Darwinist, aura of fitness and survival. Juenger plots the failure
of European absolutism as the failure of Spencerian adaptation to
the den-nds of a very un-Speneerian warlike industrial world.
Partial mobilization meant not only defeat but the destruction
of a way of life and the falling of the curtain on a whole epoch
of European history. The Russian, Au3tro-Hungarian and Turkish
empires all went the -way of the Second Reich for almost identical
reasons. The more intense the absolutism of the monarcly, as in the
case of the Czarist regime in Russia, the greater the intensity of the
upheaval which accompanied its destruction. The European monarchies,
in unleashing the forces of the fourth estate, had unleashed the forces
of their own destruction. All the trappings of milit xy regalia and
milit,-;ry honour and all the cultural airs of belligerence which had
characterised the "'ilhelmian era, the apparent source of its political
and military self-confidence, had in the long run, according to Juenger
made no difference at all. The sterility of a status-bound military
culture was fully illuminated by the fact that the United State#, a
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country with a democratic constitution and an isolationist foreign
policy, could mobilize for war using measures of a harshness impossible
in a land which combined its militarism with the inequality of the
three-class suffrage.^
The indisputable fact that the "est, through its democratic
governments, had been in a better position to mobilise the population
and retain their political confidence is not an indication however
of Juenger's conversion to democracy, but rather of the stiffening
of his resolve to create a German nationalism which has liberated
itself from the vestiges of the absolutist and patriarchal world.
It is an attempt to revitalise the Prussian spirit while at the
same time eradicating the sources of its historical failure.
Juenger's sense of mission in denigrating the political rulers involved
in the German war effort results in his historical underestimation
of the technological foresight of Rathenau and ichard von ioellendorf
in trying to develop a planned mixed econon^r in which it would be
possible to ensure the most technologically efficient co-ordination
of all sectors of industrial production for the war-effort. Their
efforts to create a Planwirt3chaft both during and after the war had
in fact shown no uncertain perspicacity in recognizing the need
for co-ordinating conservative political rule with socialistic
g
economic measures. The planned econoay of the Sovieb Union which
was so crucial to the adulation of Russia by the national-bolschevists
was in fact indebted to German ideas and experiments. Lenin's
economic advisers Milyutin and Lavin drew explicitly on the notions
of Rathenau and Moellendorf in their creation of industrial trusts
by which they tried in the twenties to restore the shattered Russian
9
economy. Nonetheless it was essential for revolutionary-nationalism
to totally disassociate itself from the previous failureof the Prussian
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state. lathenau, the victim of assasins who held his work in high
esteem, was once more relegated to a position of ignominy for
bein: on the 'wrong' side of history.
The significant feature of Juenger's new concept of total
mobilization is thrt it presupposed the exceptional aspect of the
war-measures to be the permanent basis for the organisation of
society in the twentieth century. The notion of war-preparedness
which Spengler had eulogised as the truly revolutionary feature of
modern life could no longer be simply manifested in the transient
adulation of 1914, but must be the subject of permanent regeneration.
The western idea of progress, which Juenger sees s the ideological
basis of the onward march of estern civilisation could no longer
be challenged by an ideology which merely asserted ideals in the new
urban-industrial age. ny ideal of iultur. no matter liow it asserted
itself, was predestined to failure:
" ho can deny that 'civilisation' is more inwardly
related to progress than 'culture', that it finds in the
big cities the possibility of speaking its natural language
and knows of ways and means of manipulating it, to which
culture itself either has no relevance or remains hostile.
Culture has no currency as propaganda...." ^
Democracy, urban-industrial society, so-called mass culture, gave to
the est the natural advantages of political domination in the
twentieth century which they successfully exploited through the
ideology of progress. While larxism characterised imperialism
in terms of economic exploitation, and Oppenheimer and Schumpeter
11
envisaged it primarily in terns of military conquest, both Juenger
and Schmitt, bearing foremost in their minds the example of the
idea of progress, saw 'imperialism* as the domination of one nation
over {mother by an alien ideological language. Like ilielscher,
they saw Berlin, the centre of Germany as an outpost of alien Western
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civilisation, which in Juenger's case, was the historical outcome
of the defeat of staendische society by liberal-democratic society.
The imposition of an alien civilisation, one more congruous with
a modern industrial Germany than the Wilhelmian era had ever been,
was treated as a form of 'cold war* domination. Not only did the
revolutionary-nationalists see the Versailles Treaty in terms of this
type of imperialism but also the more recent Kellogg Pact of .-.ugust
1927 which had been signed in Paris by a number of Western and European
powers and was as a general indictment of war. According to ochmitt,
the pact which condemned war except as "an instrument of national
policy", was a fona of political doublespeak which enabled the
imperialist powers of the West to carry out wars in the name of
peace and to conceive of their wars on behalf of humanity as a fbrm
of 'global pacification'. The essence of this type of western
imperialism was Caesar dominus et supra grammaticum;
"Imperialism creates far itself its 0wn concepts, and
a false normativism and formalism only lead3 to a situation
in which finally no-one knows what peace and war are....
It is an expression of real political power if a great
people determines for its own part the way of speaking and
even the way of thinking of other peoples, their vocabulary,
terminology and concepts. As Germans we are truly in a state
of dismal political powerlessness, not only in the world but
within Europe, and as a German I can only have the feeling
that, through this accomplishment of merican imperialism,
I am speaking like a beggar in rags about the kingdoms and
treasures of strangers." 12
Although the west could generate periodic total mobilization
in time of war, it relied also, Schmitt claimed, upon the dominance
of an ideology of progress also in times of peace. The idea of
progress, however, was such that by its appeal to "humanity" it
could achieve imperial domination through language as well as through
active military mobilization. As opposed to the west, Germany had
possessed culture the masses ignored nd a patriarchal ruling class
capable of only partial mobilization. Nonetheless the future
appropriation of total mobilization by Germary was a possible means
of emancip tion both from the Wilhelmian era which had failed Germary
and from the post-war era of defeat and cultural subservience to the
idea of progress. For Schmitt, Juenger's idea of tot 1 mobilization
came to have an important historical significance. It marked the
end of the age of neutralization which characterised nineteenth
and twentieth century European societies after the demise of eighteenth
13
century abso'utism. It was the means by which the total state could
be brought into existence.
There remained however a basic historical contradiction in the
rel;tion of total state to total mobilisation. Juenger saw total
mobilisation as a brainchild of the state. Schmitt, on the other
hnd, saw it as the means to the rescuscitation of the state. Neither
was ble to state unequivocally how it was possible for total
mobilization to arise in Cermaiy in the absence of an uthentic form
of statist domination. The specific historical reference for total
mobilisation, the calling of the nation to war, is a specifically
statist enterprise. 7/hether it could be achieved prior to or
independently of this, Schmitt and Juenger never clearly say. The
contradiction however is one which arises directly as a result of
their counter—revolutionary position and illuminates even more clearly
their inability to conceive of revolution as an insurrection against
the state. 'Yhile Schmitt had seen in the counter-revolutionary
decis on the initial impetus for the counter—attack of the state against
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modern society, Juenger's own idea of total mobilisation as a
revolutionary phenomenon was based on post-revolutionary circumstances.
After war-preparedness, it was Soviet planning in the Stalin era which
he saw as approximating most closely to his concept. Total
mobilization was here dependent on a prior revolutionary seizure of
power about which Juenger has little or nothing to say. Total
mobilization is therefore a conjunction of counter-revolutionaiy and
post-revolutionary processes. It is a historically dynamic process
which enlarges rather than diminishes the powers of the state, and
which by implication, can only be brought about by revolutionary
anti-statist movements if such movements betray their own ideals.
The easier alternative is the one offered by Schmitt. It can be
better brought about by counter-revolutionary movements who stick
to their own goals.
Total mobilisation remained definitively a "revolution from
above". Juenger's claim that in the future technological warfare
would produce universal amies of work was clearly a suggestion
that whole populations can only be made authentically revolutionary
by a process inaugurated by the state itself. This being the case
however, he has no conception of the revolutionary means by which
such a totalitarian state can be brought into being. When in
The worker he falls back on total mobilisation to explain the
transition from bourgeois society to the worker's state, he relies
upon an effect to explain the cause which produces it. The counter¬
revolutionary masquerading as revolutionary finds he cannot have his
cake and eat it. The central paradox of the conservative revolution
all at once becomes transparent. How is it possible to have a revolution
against what is considered to be a non-statist state? Ho?/ is it
possible to revolt against the absence of authority? The Nazi
answer was simple. Use the democratic system in order to destroy it.
The revolutionary-nationalists * desire to avoid contamination by
the system meant that they were left without a genuine strategy for*
revolution at all. The other alternative was war. But without
a strong state they could not declare war, and without a war they
could not envisage the means of creating the state. To go back
to the counter-revolutionary situation meant being waiting for the
next left-wing revolution, and this would have been less a credible
ploy for theorists than for agents provacateurs. They at least
might have the technical and political esqpertise which Juneger*s circle
clearly lacked to ensure a self-fulfilling prophecy. The Nazi solution
was essentially a practical and pragmatic one - propagate the fear
of left-wing revolution by invoking the spectre of 1918, even though
this testified to its failure, and get involved in the parliamentary
system, even thougl this meant forgoing statist principles. 1 n any
case for the Nazis the state of the future was not to be an impersonal
and objective apparatus however authoritarian. It was to be a party
state, to be controlled by those who had seized power.
Juengor's argument then lead him away from strategies for the
seizure of power. He remained obsessed with the key to mobilising
the masses, not in the party-political sense, but in the military-statist
sense. Convinced like Schmitt of the effectiveness of Allied
propaganda in the First World war, of the seemingly irresistable
nature of appeals to humanity and progress in the age of popular
sovereignity, he wished to dream up a specifically Germanic counter-
response . What was needed, he thought, was a new life-style and a new
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set of attitudes condusive to accepting the necessity of war not
for the future of pence or humanity but for the future of Germany.
A new German ideology would have to be created equal to this task.^1"
This was the onus of heroic realism.
Heroic Realism
The necessity of maintaining psychological morale in modern
armies has invariably been a crucial factor in their military
performance but the immense difficulties experienced by the .uropean
monarchies in fightin. total war3 had lead in Germany, Russia aid
Hungary to the disintegration of the power of the state and subsequent
revolution. Juenger, in fact, regarded revolution s an almost
15mechanical outcome of the failure of partial mobilization. ' The
taslc of total mobilization was therefore primarily an ideological
one. The success of the war-effort in total war depended on people
continuing to believe in the war whatever circumstances and privations
they would have to face. Juenger's conception of a universal army,
however, conflicts with his e rlier notion of struggle as essentially
a form of immediate physical violence called forth by the rage for
blood."'"0 Heroic realism in essence is a creed not of theuniversal
arny but of the fighter, whose specific role is concerned with physical
murder in a direct sense. Although Juenger quite clearly wishes to
oppose it to the V/estefn ideology of progre s, "the great peoples
17
religion of the nineteenth centuiy", there is a clear contradiction,
which remained unresolved until er Arbeiter. between the objective
process of total mobilization, as demanding the universal co-ordination
of work, end the specific role of the heroic realist fighter directly
concerned with physical violence.
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The term "heroic realism" was used initially in the symposium
by w'erner Best in his essay "The ar and the Law". Best, a young
lawyer and an associate editor of Vormarsch, attempted to show the
formal limitations of natural right conceptions of law in attempting
to constrain human conflict in the modern world. Heavily influenced
by Nietzsche1 s critique of lav; in the G-enealo/.y of Morals, Best saw
all struggle as a feature of the endless will-to-power which characterises
man's existence, and constitutional law as a merely Utopian ax befact
which ineffectively attempts to stabilise and regulate it. But it
is helpless before what Nietzsche called "an eternally self-creating
and self-destroying world". Law and change are therefore polar
opposites:
"Law in its most complete form is also a form of
regul tion, the ordering of situations, which no longer
recognizes struggle, force or tension.... Change is the
antithesis of law; it overcomes law which invariably
returns to the ordering of situations." 17
The fighter on the other hand, recognises no form of the
regulation of situations, of legal uniformity, but merely the notion of
destiny from which all explanations in any casual sense are absent. The
denial by Best here of what we mi$it regard as any form of V/eberian
legal-rational domination, is due to his perception of the legal
uniformity of natural rights as an Utopian attempt to regulate man's
- by implication, essentially evil - nature. hat Best terms the
"utopian-rational" and "moral-idealist" conceptions of law in liberal
society are therefore travesties of what he considers to be the
essential nature of human reality:
"The utopian-rationalist and moral-idealist doctrines
deny the empirical reality of life, which we have identified
simultaneously as being struggle, tension, change and catastrophe.
For these doctrines find their synthesis above all in either an
anticipated or intended transcendence of this reality. (On the
other hand) what we can here call nationalism accepts the
conflictual reality of our environment.... From a realistic acceptance
of truth will thus emerge a heroic doctrine;
consequently as terminological parallels to the
"utopian-rational" and "moral-idealist" conceptions we
can characterise the attitude of nationalism as one of
heroic realism." 18
Natio alism therefore is not merely a partisan commitment
to the cause of one's nation. It specifies more generally the
need for heroic resistance on the part of the fighter to all forms
of philosophical transcendence. Precisely by virtue of its refusal
to recognise utopianism of any sort, it differs both from the racial
utopianism of the Nazi ideologists and the historicist utopianism
of the Tot circle. Neither race nor history are viable criteria of
the necessity for fighting, which recognises no future goals to which
it can be purely instrumentally oriented. Best in fact presents an
even more radical statement of the meaniiiglessness of goals than
Schmitt:
"The new doctrine ca..not lay down "what" because it
recognises no such thing. It is not directed towards a goal
and does not fulfill some purpose of completion or fulfillment,
very moment calls into question the moment which h-.s preceded
it. Ko values for which we may have at one time fought can
make any claim to being positive or permanent. The criterion
of morality is not "what" but "how", not its content but rather
its form. "Not what we fight for, but how we fight is the
essential thing". (Juenger). The fight is necess ry and ,g
permanent, the goals of the fight are temporary and oh?ngeabls".
Pheras the Utopian rationalist claims that some overall meaning is
present in the nature of any conflict which renders it explicable,
the heroic realist affirms both his heroism and realism by recognising
that fighting has no rationally explicable meaning at all. It is not
a matter of circumst. nces but a m tter of destiny. The heroic act
consists in the acceptance of a cruel and inexplicable reality. It
accepts th-t there is no alternative to continuous fighting and the
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livelihood of men dying by fighting as well as living by it.
The acceptance of empirical reality also involves the acceptance
of the possibility of defeat. The expectation of total victory
is a Utopian illusion:
"There can be no que tion of success in our fight. The
most immediate object of fighting lies in winning, but victory
is not the decisive thing in the ethos of the fighter. The
hope of victory is not always the governing factor for those
who are fighting. Those who do believe in an ultimate purpose
which makes fighting tolerable for them, usually can fight in
the expectation that they themselves will win or that one dqy
the "good cause" will triumph. The criterion of the new
doctrine on the other hand is the acceptance of the fight
in a lost position for a lost cause. It is a question of
fighting a good fight, not of the "good cause" or of possible
victory." 20
The existential fight in which victory is of secondary
significance vindicates the supremacy of means over ends, of
performance over values, and of violence over its moral or historical
meaning. Juenger claimed that heroic realism resolved successfully
the antithesis between materialism and idealism in the explanation
of human behaviour. But what he really expressed was his fundamental
aversion to causality as a form of rational explanation. Since no
victory was ever certain heroic realism declared all fighting to be
indefinite. It demanded the preparedness to fight, without rational
explanation, in real circumstances which offered total destruction and
hopelessness. Fighting as an indefinite confrontation with a destructive
reality could not be ejqolcined in terms of an historical causality which
rested on premises of a distinction between either violent and non¬
violent epochs of human history on the one hand, or violent or non¬
violent states of human behaviour on the other. For fighting itself
was the essential and continuous reality of all human behaviour.
In audition the fi.hter's relat ion to reality was immediate, specific
and of itself produced no new or enlarged spatio-temporal unities.
The existential core of the fighter's being was related to the immediate
action in which he was involved. Thus Juenger states in a letter to
one of his national-revolutionary associates in 1930:
"I am suspicious of formulas such as that of "future"
reality. Either I h..ve a rel tion to reality, and in that
case I have always had it and would not be able to lose it,
or else I do not have it at all. In the very moment when
I storm a row of filthy trenches, this moment is real for me
and what do I care for all the hundreds of constellations
further out in space. Out of the succession of suci moments
is produced the route of my journey. It is the character of
reality in a special dimension." 21
The heroic invincibility of the existential fighter is thus
conjured out of his unflinching acceptance of the destructive here
and now. On the surface Best and Juenger have presented the ethos
of the no-win fighter striving on against relentless opposition and
impossible odds. The heroic realist is pictured as the victim of
an overwhelming exploitation and oppression whose power is
unalterable. Yet the crucial point about heroic realism is that
it is not a doctrine of the oppressed but a doctrine of the oppressors.
It is the doctrine that under the endless conflict and play of the
will-to-power, the rulers as well as the slaves or chandalas, to use
Nietzsche's term, face the prospect of periodic defeat. In the continual
war of the proto-Nietzschean rulers against their inferiors no ultimate
victory is possible. Best makes this clear when he affirms the
principle of class-stru gle. This does not merely mean "class-struggle
from below" but also "class-struggle from above", the struggle of rulers
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against the insur ent mob. What Juenger saw as constraining the
possible supremacy of the Nietzschean masters in the twentieth century
was the equalization of military prowess created by the development
of modern technology. The task of establishing supremacy, of the
rulers asserting their will-to-power had become immensely mare complex
and difficult than Nietzsche had ever envisaged.
For Nietzsche domination of the strong over the weak was a
fundamental form of liberation. The will-to-power expressed itself
through a brutality and cruelty inseparable from its own sense of
primordial innocence. The pseudo-liberation of the superman freed
from all moral and legal constraints of civil society was the source
of the sense of liberation which pervades Spengler's elation at war-
mobilization and Schmitt's elation at the effective counter-revolutionary
decision. In the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche writes:
"Here they enjoy liberation from all social constraints.
They recover in the wilderness from the tension produced by their
long imprisonment and containment within civil society. They
step back into the innocent consciousness of the beast of prey
as exultant monsters which perhaps walk away from a horrific
sequence of mcrder, arson, rape and torture, with such wantonness
and equanimity as if they were merely c rrying out some student
prank, with the conviction that now and for a long time to coae
the poets will have something to sing about and celebrate.
At the center of all these splendid races the beast of prey,
the roving lustful blond beast is not to be mistaken." 23
The blond beast roving cruelly in the wilderness is freed from the
moral constraints of the Judao-christian world. He breaks out of
the "resentment-morality" of history's slaves. Nietzsche's etymological
derivation of 'good' from 'strong' and his contempt for the weak is
pervaded by a delirious nostalgia for a pre-civilisational world
in which there was no obstacle to the might of physically superior
races. The growth of morality and legality in western civilisation
had destroyed his golden age of barbarism, and he den: nded revengt.
Heroic realism is to be seen essentially as en addendum to
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Nietzsche's doctrine of the barbaric supremacy of the master,
rationalising the position of the ruling race at the nadir of its
fortunes. Historically that period had, in the eyes of the
revolutionazy-natimnlists, already been reached. The decade of the
twenties was a decade of the humili tion of the Germans who should
have been the rulers of Hurope. Instead of being dominant, they
had subjected to the indignity of the Versialles Treaty anl the Kellogg
Pact, submerged by the western idea of progress and outmanoeuvred
by the pacifist ideal of humanity. The rulers were themselves
ruled by the imperialism of peace and progress with, as Schmitt put
it, its "alien language". The luxury of sudden conquest, the
leisure of arbitrary cruelty which Kietzsche had proclaimed -ith such
Utopian fervour was no longer possible. A different tactic was
suggested by heroic realism. In Juenger's eyes this -as the tactic
of invisibility. In The Adventurous Heart he had written of the
Prussian anarchist - now turned heroic realist - immersed in his
nihilism. "For a long time we have m rched towards a m . ic zero-point
(Nullpunkt) which can only be surpassed by having at our disposal
other invisible sources of power." " Hielscher*s protestant
theodicy, the invisible German Reich, was just such a source of power.
It w 3 who immune and invisible core of met physical resis ice residing
in Berlin, the ecological heart of Western dominance. For Juenger
this constituted a "secret Reich" and "Hternal Germany" into which
all the f lien fighters of the hunt had passed. They had pa sed
from "an imperfect into a perfect reality". They inhabited "a domain
of mythic proportions" and bequeathed a new certainty and a new basis
of legitimation for future German generations in their fight against
the west.
'ith this evocation of an "eternal Germaiy" Juenger seems, like
Kielscher to have sought refuge in a form of metaphysics which has
its roots in theology and German classical idealism. But on close
exenin tion his purpose appears more different. Trenchantly
atheistic, he never believed in txy theological sense in life-uftei>»
death. In addition the whole tenor of his ess&j is an attack on
the futility of German Kultur in the modern technological world.
His resort therefore is less to a notion of life-after-death than an
attempt to obliterate the distinction between life and death itself#
Here his writing bears en uncanny resemblance to Reiner .... ria Rilke's
explanation of his Duino Elegies. The comparison between Juenger
and Rilke is more than fortuitous. lartin Heidegger was to see in
Juenger's "worker" and Rilke's "angel" of the Duino Elegies, the two
most authentic modalities of Nietzsche's superman transposed into
the twentieth centur. world. In a letter to the Polish translator
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of the Elegies in 1926 Rilke touched on both these themes - the
importance of the unity of life and death and of the necessity of
invisibility. Death he claimed could no longer be seen as extinction
but s an intensification of being. It was the other unilluminated
side of life, an extension of life into the infinite. t the seme time
he claims to have gone beyond "Catholic conceptions of death, of the
hereafter and of eternity". For in the modern age where "the familiar
objects" of previous German generations had been submerged by American
"dummy-life", by the false and synthetic products of moaern civilisation,
this extension of life into the infinite is possible only through
invisibility. "Our de3tiry," writes Rilke "Is continually growing at
once more actual and invisible within us.... The Angel of the Elegies
is the being who vouches for the recognition of a higher degree of
reality in the invisible,"
xor Rilke, invisibility is a metaphysical poetic conceit; for
Juenger on the other hand, it is in the full military sense of the
word, a tactical manoeuvre or a tactical retreat. The invisible Reich
is the final resting home of all Germany's warriors, an atheistic
Valhall. from which they inspire future German generations to sacrifice.
The eich is a Sorelitn iiyth. Immune not only from attack and
criticism but also from visibility, it produces a magical form of
heroic death ancestry. If the dead have sacrificed themselves for
the living, the living must in turn sacrifice themselves for the dead.
The key to total mobilisation, to its historically endless recurrence,
is the worship of sacrifice in previous generations, which in turn
is the spur to sacrifice in the contemporary one. Total mobilisation
with all its totalit rian military and political ramific, tion3, is the
heroic attempt at tire completion of a circle which can never finally
be closed, a form of martyrdom in perpetuum mobile, where the already
de d, ..ith their impact upon living memory and the source of inspiration
they provide for current sacrifice, are as alive s those who are
currently engaged in the process of dying. The distinction between
life and de...th is thus dissolved. The death of the individual no
longer possesses aiy meaning. It merely represents a numerical
deficiency of the warring community of which he is a part. for many,
tl.e Gre t ar was the war to end all wars. The cry 'lio more ar!"
had echoed across the wasteland of durope. for Juenge., however,
it was merely a beginning.
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The fifthtin/-; organisation and the universal army
At this stage in Juenger's thought, there was an immense gulf
between heroic realism and total mobilisation which had not been bridged,
J
Total mobilisation involved the thrusting of whole populations
indefinitely in the jaws of the modem technological war machine.
Heroic realism was the precious creed of a Kietzsehean fitting elite.
Its hegemonic particularism is openly stated by Best in his inversion
of the Kantian Categorical Imperative. The code of the filter
triumphantly discards its claim to universality. "Act", he proclaimed,
"as though the maxims of your action ought, through your will, to become
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a law for those such as you." The contradiction not only pointed
out a problem in fascist doctrine but also in national-socialist
practice. The amoral and brutal fitting traditions of the military-
outlaws of the twenties which Bchmitt's doctrine of fighting and Best's
doctrine of heroic realism seemed to legitimate, contrasted clearly
with the professional code of the German army. From Juenger's point
of view total mobilisation could only occur through the universalization
of the amy. War was still a military phenomenon. The private armies
of Nazism, however, heir to the front-fighter myth and Freikorps
nihilism, challenged the very legitimacy of the arny itself. Ernst
Roehm threatened that the grey uniforms of the Reichswehr would perish
beneath the brown hordes of the S, A. In 1933, when Hitler had to
tread the delicate path of power by alienating neither, Nazi ideologues
were themselves worried by the seeming impasse this division created,
Alfred Baumler sought to get round it in typical propagandist fashion
by suggesting the unified lifestyle of the "political soldier,"
Both soldier and Nazi fighter he claimed should equally be members of
the mass movement as well as defenders of the state. The problem however
seemed impassable and was only resolved in the Ni^vt of the Long Knives
when the Fuehrer decimated his own arqy partly in order to appease
the professional .ray over which he had as yet no control.
Yet the very agent of this decimation was the one destined to
maintain the distinction between fighter and soldier in a more ruthless
rationalislie and methodical manner - the S.S, The transition from
the 5 .A. to the 3.3. was a passage fron sadistic to rationally organised
nihilism. hat Juenger and his accomplices had accomplished in 1930
at the level of doctrine was accomplished four years 1:ter at the
level of practice. And alone among the members of the Vormarsch
circle it was Werner Best who went on to act out his vision's of
domination and the will-to-po ver on the field of history. In 193k
Best was recruited into the S.D. the security service of the S.S.
by ileinhold Heydrich. It was perhaps the most elitist and intellectualist
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sector of aiy of the private armies of the Third ieich. Not only
did its young members have academic or legal training, they tended to
have little or no connection with the political masses, a fundamental
fact of life in nearly all the other Nazi organisations. Among them
Best was to become the closest working associate of his master Reinhold
Heydrich until the outbreak of the war. As Hans Buchheim has pointed
out, if it is possible to talk about an S.S. ideology, it approximates
most closely to the notions of heroic realism which Best brought with
him into the movement."'0 '.hat Best had emphasised for all ruling
fighters and he saw the S.S. as an organisation of ruling fighters par
excellence, was the plasticity of struggle. In its new institutionalised
form, however, it also suggested a well-defined link between administration
and violence. As one the chief ideological spokesmen of the S.S. Beit
applied an institutionalized version of heroic realism to the ruling
functions of the new political police in Germany. The Gestapo was the
apotheosis of the fighting bureaucracy where no permanent bureaucratic
rules for fighting existed.
"A legal standardisation of the chringing technique
of a political police is sotjrcely possible, just as it is
impossible to envisage in advance the means used to attack
enemies of the state and the types of danger which would
otherwise threaten the stte.... The concept of a political
police springs directly out of the reality of this situation.
As a special corps for the defence of the state it possesses
a new and unique form. in tne fulfillment of their
bureaucratic duty, its members feel themselves to be comrades
in a fighting organisation" 31
Best emphasises the limitless nature of fighting in the police
state. In a situation where it is no longer possible to say what
form of repression is possible, everything, as Hannah Arendt seys,
becomes possible. ho form of imprisonment, torture, murder or
genocide can be ruled out. Moreover the indefinite nature of
fighting results in that other central aspect of totalitarian rule,
the indefinite search for enemies. Enemies cannot finally be wiped
out. They always continue to exist. Thus fictitious enemies
are created after real ones have been eliminated and it is only when
enemies are fictitious that the real momentum of extermination
asserts itself'. In this light Nietzsche's delirious cruelty and
barbarism could only be seen as a nostalgia for a golden age of
momentary and carefree conquest.In the twentieth century, barbarism
had to be different. It must be rational organised and indefinite
however monumental the task. fast's master, heydrich, possessed
the necessary attributes to link domination and heroic realism in the
institutionalised context of the police state. As the first hand
portrait of his ex-lieutenant -Iter Schelleriberg shows, he was master
of intrigue as well as a predatory animal, ruthless calculating and
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methodical as well as instinctively cruel. One of the names by which
he was known was "the blond Beast". But another was "Mr. Suspicion".
Information as well as fear, or more precisely, .in collusion with it,
was the primary yardstick of his totalitarian power.
The common historical experience in the age of Ideology - the
monster of practice broken free from its theoretical moorings also
applied in the history of the German police state. Best presented
that peculiar dilemma of the intellectual who despite his monumental
contempt for intellect clung to the talents which it personally
offered him. Having evinced a totalitarian contempt for all
recognisable forms of legality in his essay for Juenger and having
gone on to put his contempt into practice by contributing to the
higher lawlessness of the S.S. state, he suddenly found that his own
intellect and legal training still constituted a hindrance to the
grand designs of his master. In 1939, as head of the legal and personnel
seotions of the political police, which were state rather than party
organs, Best still believed that legal training and intellectual talent
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w s necess ry for organisational efficiency. Heydrich, having built
up a complex and monumental machinery of repression out of legal and
intellectual talents such as Best, decided tin t such qualities were
dispensable. Predictably defeated in the power struggle with Heydrich,
Best left the Gestapo immediately prior to the period when, on the
basis of principles which he enunciated, the S.S. entered its purple
period of genocide and destruction. Having proclaimed that everything
was possible in the field of unilateral fighting, Best was still
horrified at what actually was possible. He ended the war as a kid-
glove administrator in occupied Denmark, using his technical expertise
to save a number of Danish Jews from the gas chambers. A man called
Adolf Hichmann, horrified at such a sell-out, recalled the time when
in 1939 he had heard Best give such stirring lectures on the functions
of the political police, and bemoaned the gall which witl such an
impressive ex-comrade could defy the dictates of the Pinal Solution.
Keydrich, bereft of Best's intellectual background and his ideological
flair, had no such qualms. In the decisive moment the man of action
proved his will-to-power, and thence to destruction, more ruthless
and thoroughgoing than his subordinate who had tried to link action
v/ith belief. That belief itself was however destined to failure.
For it was a belief in the purity of activism, and as such pronounced
itself superfluous. The process of the final solution and the
consummation of totalitarianism was set under way by the activists
and opportunists of power when the resistance of the ideology which
supported it had finally collapsed.
Y/hile Best's version of heroic realism was essentially a
doctrine of internal repression as function of the will-to-power,
Juenger's vision of total mobilization invoked the spectre of all
Europe as a permanent an J ravaged battleground of materiel. "o
feasible distinction was possible any longer between internal and
external violence, between revolution and counter-revolution on the
one hand and total war on the other. Juenge 's doctrine had in
effect dissolved the boundaries of the nation-state, and with the
concept of territorial limits and borders which is fundamental to
the Clausewitzian philosophy of war. Clausewitz's idea that war
was a series of distinct short term engagements to force the enemy
to negotiate favourable political settlements was perhaps relevant
to the absolutist state and the nation-state of the nineteenth century
35but not in Juenger's term to the technological wars of the twentieth.
Juenger's vision of total and permanent war was designed to swamp the
limitations sugg sted by Clausewitz and outline a gruesome prophecy
267
of this-wordly Armageddon. What distinguished him from the Trench
prophets of total war a decade earlier - poeple like Alphonse 3echs,
Georges Blanchon and Leon Daudet - was not merely the absence of
horror which pervades all his writings, but the metasocial conclusions which
he drew from it. He envisaged like 3c mitt the possibility of a
transition after the end of absolutism from a parvenu bourgeois society to
a totalitarian state which in Germany, at least could destroy bourgeois
society before it had really begun to assert its societal dominance.
The age of neutralization which ochmitt saw as having dominated the
west since the beginning of the nineteenth century could be reversed
in a Germany which had trenchantly though unsuccessfully resisted
erabourgeiosement until 1914, by a societal process which instead of
enlarging the po er of bourgeois society, had the- effect of destroying
it. It was this process involving society, and in particular the
fourth estate, which Juenger and subsequently Schmitt himself, saw as
reinstatin the sovereignity of the state. It was a form of sovereignity
totally different from previous absolutist regimes, since in order to
ensure its continued existence not only would it commit itself continually
to total war but would also find in total war the suitable formula for
the total state - namely the integratron through statist domination, of
state and society.
The concept of total mobilisation, w ieh Juenger himself claimed
was the most discussed and least understood aspect of all his work,
found its greatest following outside his own immediate circle in the
Reichswehr, It stimulated works by Lwald Banse and General Ludendorff
on strategies of total war and also had a hold on sane of the German
generals who worked under Hitler - most notably General Geoig Thomas,
who became head of the newly formed Vehrwirtschaft (defence economy)
Ministry created with a view to massive German rearmament. Thomas
in fact claimed that he saw his role as building up a war-geared economy
based on principles of total mobilisation within the context of the
national-socialist total state."'0 Kis intentions however foundered
in the interstices of the jungle of overlapping private empires operating
in the Third Reich. Not only did he find himself at loggerheads
with the other armed forces and with G-oering's Four-Year Plan, but
more fundamentally his plan for "armament in depth" completely
contradicted Fitle. 's own war-plans. s far as future European wars
were concerned, Hitler had taken the completely opposite view to
Juenger, and wished to avoid the slaughter and stalemate of trench
warfare at all costs. In addition he also cldmed, accord in to
Rauschning, not to see any change in the nature of warfare brought
about by technological development per se. His own Blitzkrieg
tactics of engineering lightening strikes when the enemy was
militarily or diplomatically offguard, which were so immensely successful
at the beginning of the war, flagrantly abused all notions of total
mobilisation. His policy of wanting both gun3 and butter which
operated until well into 1942, meant that Fritz Todt and later
Albert hpeer, his armament ministers, both found immense difficulties
in ensuring desired production quotas of armaments, a difficulty much
less apparent in the 'Hied countries end a distinction which seemed
to bear out Juenger's own remark about the first world war of the
ability of democratic society to create a total mobilization of resources.
When Speer as Minster of rmaments finally managed to switch the economy
over to total war, after the disaster of Stalingrad in 1943, G-ermaqy was
already a losing nation. The notion of total war, was in addition
only resuscitated for ideological reasons when doom was apparent and
when Goebbels recovered his role as a mass demagogue in the Berlin
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Sportspalast by preaching the total equality of' total destruction.
Of all the major nations, Germary, the most ideologically receptive
of ideas of total war among the great powers was politically
and economically the least capable of achieving it when it really
counted.
Schizophrenic Theory and Schizophrenic practice.
The practice of total war makes the dividing line between
responsible and non-responsible, between Justifiable and non-
Justifiable violence almost impossible to make, Mas3 bombings and
mass infantry bombardments on both sides to some extent bore Juenger's
prophecy and ravaged the cities and civilians of Europe. Yet despite
the ruthlessness both of the Allies and the Axis powers in the
military conduct of the war, it was Germany alone which oreated an
independent S.S. army of over half a million men in addition to its
mass professional ray. The growth of the S.S. empire and its
atrocities in Eastern Europe was the historical culmin tion of a legacy
of violence wnich began on the eatern Front and had its roots in
authoritarian nature of German society. The Freikorps, the S.A.
and finally the S.S. embodied the liberated brutality of two
generations of an authoritarian self-hating bourgeois society# The
end result was a schizophrenic division which has not been seen
anywhere in the history of modern warfare. Vhile the "ehrmacht
fought against opposing armies, the S.S. "fought" unarmed populations
and prisoners of war in territories already secured. The Komissarbefehl
and the Final Solution demanded not heroism but rapid wholesale and
efficient extermination of the already conquered.
In the service of Hitler's master-race hallucinations, the
3,3. exhibited both the heroic tendencies of fighting against
formidable enemies regardless of the cost to themselves, and also the
genocidal tendencies required for the elimination of "subhuman" Slavs
and Jews. On the Eastern Front especially, its main military
force, the Waffen 3.3. showed exceptional recklessness and courage
in withstanding the counter-attacks of the Russian armies end fought
on until its elite divisions had been practically decimated. As
a spearhead of the military campaign, regarded with jealousy and
hostility by the ..ehrmacht, it almost seemed to replicate the elite
storm battalions of the trenches in the first war. Nothing restrained
its willingness for fighting as a form of sacrifice. At the same
time nothing restrained its atrocities against prisoners and unarmed
civilian populations. Its brutality made little or no distinction
between armed enemies and the rest of humanity. At the most extreme
point, pushed to the limits of its nihilism, heroic realism conjoined
the heroic qualities of sacrifice with the anti-heroic qualities of
systematic liquidation. While the .ehrmacht looked on in horror,
the S. S. fighters committed atrocities which made its own courage
meaningless and finally forgotten. In devaluing their own lives,
they devalued the lives not only of their enemies but of mankind in
general. The Nietzschean vision of the slaughter of the innocents
had in historical reality reached gruesome proportions and fighting
had become a travesty of its own nature. It found its true metier
where it no longer had opponents but merely victims. In the secret
police and the concentration camps, Best's devaluation of the values
of fighting reached a logical extremity w ich entailed the end of
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fighting itself. Rational and systematic liquidation was no
longer daemonic, no longer threatened by the uncertainties of struggle.
It was one-sided,machine-like and as Arendt claims, banal.
The doctrine of fighting had come full circle. Originating
as a protest against the liberal and western repression of fighting,
it paved the way for the most horrifying barbarities ever to be
conceived of in fighting*s name. Heroic realism, originating as
the oppositional cry of repressed and exploited rulers, proclaimed
that rulers themselves possessed a carte blanche for all forms of
repression and exploitation within the bounds of possibility. And
as Himmler himself had said, the word •impossible' should never be
heard within the S.S. The result was that the most articulate
apostles of violence recoiled from the castrophe which they had
provided impeccable and original ideological sources. But while
they experienced revulsion at racial genocide the opportunists, the
indoctrinated faithful and the fighting bureaucr ts experienced none.
As a "ehrmacht officer in Paris during the occupation, Juenger owed
his life to his ex-disciple Werner Best who had sought to give rein
to his Nietzschean instincts in that very butcher's organisation which
Juenger had claimed to detest. After the disaster of Stalingrad,
plans had been mooted to eliminate intellectuals like Juenger and
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Hielscher who were considered a potential threat to national morale.
Best, then serving as a high-ranking S.S. officer in liason vdth the
Wehrmacht in France, had intervened to save the lives of his old-time
comrades by claiming that alive they were perfectly harmless and could
do nothing. The ex-disciple thus aided his master by denying the power
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of his influence. s a pure activist he felt contemptuous of
activism's armchair advocates. But they were activists and activists.
Three years earlier his own master had felt the same contempt towards
him. His own legalistic and intellectualist temperament had itself
constituted a brake on Heydrich's most ruthless plans of terror.
Juenger and Best, at different times and in different circumstances
had become Victims of their own intellect. For what they had
produced was a doctrine proclaiming all doctrine to be superfluous.
They had thus theorised themselves out of existence. They had
committed the ultimate intellectual auto-da-fe. Paving set out
confidently on the collective road to nihilism, they had suddenly
found -themselves flung by the wayside. Before the final genocidal
forms of Nazi fighting had become reality, the fascist doctrine of
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CHAPTER XI
The World of Work and the Technological Superman
The break-up of the Vormarsch circle and the disintegration of
the Peasant's movements produced a strong disillusionment with practical
politics among the revolutionary-nationalists. This was enhanced in
1931 by the formation of the so-called Harzburg Front. This coalition
between the Nazis and the bourgeois German nationalist party convinced
the revolutionary-nationalists more than ever that national-socialism was
a spent revolutionary force which had succumbed to the seductions of the
democratic system. In this period, when Die Tat took over as the
intellectual mouthpiece of the younger nationalist generation,
Juenger gradually moved closer to the minority cult of mtional-bolshevism.
A partial withdrawal from politics resulted in little decrease in literary
output. The impending doom that hung over the Republic stimulated
Juenger, as it did many other intellectuals, to greater heights of
polemical achievement. In October 1932 when the republic was on the
verge of collapse, his most complex and intellectually accomplished work
was published by the right-wing Hanseatische Verlag in Hamburg. This was
The Worker (Ber Arbeiter)"!" With some publicity build-up, it became one
of the most immediately controversial books of the year, running into
several editions. At this time Juaiger was at the height of his
literary prestige due to the popularity of his front-writings and he had
a potentially large audience for anything he published. In the long run,
however, the book because of its abstractness and its complexity, produced
disappointed reactions, and a mixed critical reception. Apart from the
hostility of the left-wing press, Juenger found hostility from those he
could consider to be on his own political flank. F<|r the national-
socialists the Voelkische Beobachter complained of "the endless
dialectical language" and while admitting that Juenger had produced a
viable alternative to the Marxist conception of work, castigated him as
a member of "an intellectual elite" who had little contact with the real
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German worker. There was, by implication, little in Juenger*s book
to further the political interests of the national-socialists. Hostility
however was also expressed among revolutionary-nationalist groups
themselves, notably Harro-Schulze Boysen's Per Gegner.^ Die Tat was
non-committal. Oswald Spengler, one of Juenger's greatest mentors
compl ined th t he had been unable to free himself from the Marxist fallacy
of regarding the worker solely as a manual worker while at the same time
completely ignoring the peasantry,^" Almost alone, Ernst Niekisch hailed
the work as a great event, but in terms of what he considered to be its
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absolute vindication of national-bolshevism,
What had Juenger in fact set out to achieve? Maiy commentators
followed Niekisch's own line and saw it as the crowning achievement
of national-bolshevism. In it they saw an esoteric, Prussian
justification of the process of the industrialisation and forced
collectivisation undertaken by the Soviets in the first four year plan.
But if this was so, it marked less the conversion of Juenger to
Stalinism, however, than his conviction that the Soviet experience was
a form of total mobilisation of equal stature and significance to the
fighting of total wars. He saw it as one important aspect of the more
universal impact of technology on the modem world. It was technology
which led Juenger to national-bolshevism rather than vice versa.
Whereas Niekisch had to change his vision of the "rural revolutionary
east" in accordance with Soviet developments to a pro-industrial stance,
this had always been Jueiif er's position and Stalin's Russia now fell
neatly into place. The reason for Juenger's change, in fact, came
about because of difficulties he felt to be Inherent in his notion of
total mobilisation. In his earlier writing he had seen the basis of
human praxis as fighting. In the wake of total war, hoover, there
hed emerged "universal armies of work". Bearing this in mind, Juenger
regarded the purely instrumental nature of fighting as a subordinate
aspect of the instrumental nature of work. Work as a whole in. the
modera world bore testament to what he called the "permanence of means"
(Konstanz der Mittel). But it was constrained in the west by the
decadence of bourgeois-capitalist society. Bourgeois capitalism did
not constitute for Juenger a basic framework of the iron cage of
bondage. Such a society could only be attained after the bourgeois
age of modern Europe had drawn to a close. Juenger saw its destruction
as imminent. But he still had to produce evidence of the forces which
would destroy it.
It is at this moment that Niekisch's conception of bolshevism as
"counter-movement to the West", takes on significance. '".'hereas
Kiekisch had originally conceived of the. European West/East axis as
being liberal-industrial/authoritarian-rural, Soviet industrialism
radically altered this polarity. Juenger saw the Soviets as having
revolted against the West by utilising the very basis of Western
industrialism - technology. It had thus turned against the west and
fought against it with its own weapons. It was not Niakisch, but
surprisingly enough Carl Schmitt, who despite ais reservations against
bolshevism, took up this aspect of Soviet technology which impressed
Juenger so much.^ Schmitt saw in Soviet Russia not a new type of
economy but a new type of polity. He welcomed it as producing not a
new type of society but a new type of state. Everyone knew of Lenin*3
statement that "socialism equals the Soviets plus electrification" toad
the favour he showed towards Taylorism, the cult of technological
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efficiency in .American capitalism, What was significant for Schmitt
was that the technological impetus in Russia was not capitalistic as it
was in the .rest, but statist in the truest sense of the word. He saw
statist technology, like total mobilisation, as a means of countering
the neutralisation of the state - in his eyes, the infamous disease
of all estern liberal societies. Irrespective of its specific
internal or external policies, claims Schmitt, one thing was unmistakable,
that "on Russian soil an antireligion of technology had been put into
practice and that here a state had emerged which was more intensely
statist than ary of the states of the absolute monarchs such as
Q
Philip II, Ludwig XIV or Frederick the Great".
In Schmitt's own scheme of things, technology played a crucial part
in his revision of Comte's Law of the Three Stages. After the initial
two stages of theology metaphysics, Schmitt claims that in place of
the transition to positivism, there were three further stages, each
constituting the central organising principle of thought in its own
century. In the eighteenth century it was the moral-humanitarian
principles of the Enlightenment. In the nineteenth century, it was
that of economism, the doctrine both of the English political economists
and of Karl Marx, described pejoratively by Schmitt as "a typical clerc
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of the nineteenth century". In the twentieth century the economic
class-struggle was superseded by technology. It is that point that
Schmitt applies his model of political decisionism to technology. It
is a feature of every age that it accepts as &n eternal truth, the
world-view which is dominant at that given historical moment. But
according to Schmitt, there is no eternal truth in this sense. All
concepts are polemical. At any given time they can be expropriated by
political groups engaged in fighting for political power. Since
political fighting is based on existential criteria, such expropriation
obeys no laws of historical determinism. It rests on the pure decision
of the fighting political elite to utilise thou^it for its own
purposes. In the first half of the twentieth century, technology was,
in this sense open to expropriation. «.nd it had been initially expropriated
by the Western powers ana put forward, ideologically speaking as
manifestation of the Western idea of progress. In the modern age therefore
through the polemical ascendancy of the Western powers it had not been
possible to distinguish technology-in-itself from technology-as progress.
dchmitt then goes on to claim that it was the basic tragedy of the
pre-war German intelligentsia that they had been unable in the matter
of technology to distinguish ideology and reality. Put crudely, they
had fallen victim to the Western polemics of "technology-as-progress".
the politics of cultural despair and the resort of vblkisch arcadian
mysticism were due to the inability of German intellectuals to see that
there were alternative forms of technology to that offered by west.^
Schmitt attacks ,eber, Ernst Troeltsch and Walter Rathenau as being the
great culprits of the German surrender to Western imperialist mythology.
Weber, despairing of the retention of human qualities in the age of the
rational machine and Rathenau, rambling on endlessly about the
mechanisation of the soul, had perpetrated a fundamental delusion for
a whole generation. According to Gchmitt, Germany could use technology.
The fashionable and to Schmitt's way of thinking, fatuous distinction
between the organic and mechanical world, was a form of romantic escapism.
There was a spirit of technology rich in future promise.
"The spirit of technology which has led to the mass
adulation of an anti-religious this-wordly activism is spirit,
perhaps a more evil and aatanic spirit, but not to be dismissed
as mechanistic and not to be attributed to technology. It is
perhaps somewhat terrifying, but is not itself technical or
machine-like. It is the belief in an activistic metaphysic,
the belief in the limitless power and domination of men over
nature, even over the human physis, in the unlimited
"recession of natural boundaries", in unlimited possibilities
for transforming the naturally constituted existences of men.
One can call this fantastic or satanic, but not simply dead,
spiritless or mechanised soullessness." 11
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Schmitt envisaged the new revolutionaiy technological rulers of
the twentieth century, those capable of mastering the demonic spirit of
technology, as the exact antithesis of those traditionally conseivvative
intellectuals whose fear at the spectre of nihilism was nothing more
than panic at the threat posed by disorder to the status quo. They
would emerge in the shadow of life, characterised by asceticism and
poverty, and mistakenly identified by historicans and sociologists, as
a visible manifestation of the nihilism which they were attempting to
surmount, in the same way that every revolutionary elite in Western
history is initially identified with the disorder which mar*ks its
ascendency to power. This demonic asceticism envisaged by Schmitt is
the key to Juenger's acceptance of technology. It was more than an
answer to Weber's sober pessimism about the growing disenchantment of
the world. If rationalization had destroyed bourgeois humanism, it
had also not destroyed the fascist demon. Within the limits imposed
by technology, man's capacity for adventure and destruction and for
the will-to-power were not diminished but enhanced.
In ft sense Schmitt and Juenger were not alone in this unqualified
irrational acceptance of the rational machine. The demonology of the
machine-world was a constant preoccupation of European culture in the
twenties. Even before the war Marinetti's Futurist manifesto had set
the tone with its acclaim of war and destruction, its worship of
"the nocturnal vibrations of the arsenals and the workshops before their
violent electric moons; the gluttonous railway stations devouring
smoking serpents factories suspended from clouds by the thread of their
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smoke...." j\nd later the German expressionists, playwrights like
Ernst Toller and Georg Kaiser, film-makers such as Fritz Lang enunciated
the promise-threat of the machine world. For Lan,* in particular the
overpowering dimensions and tyranny of the industrial metropolis had an
electrifying fascination. In Russia too the Constructivism of Tatlin and
Leonidov expressed in architecture and theatrical design a worship of
the sheer functionality of machine-mode and machine-like objects.
The philosophical source of Schmitt and Juenger's vision of the
domination of Bum over nature through technology lies in Henri Bergon'a
philosophy of the elan vital, the dynamic evolutionary process of motion
in the universe. In Creative Evolution Bergson sketches a vision of
all forms of life, plant, animal and human as being divergent biological
forms of the same vital impulse possessing an internal coherence which
enables it to triumph over matter:
"/.ll the living hold together, and all yield to the same
tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant,
man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity in space
and time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and
behind each of us in an overwhelming ch rge able to beat down
every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles,
perhaps even death."13
Bergson later goes on to compare the energy of machines with that of men.
He claimed that technological invention was the prime mode by which aiy
age of mankind was retrospectively char cterised, and reg rded it as
the highest form of human intelligence. At the same time the motor
energy of the machine, as a product of human invention, parallels the
motor energy of man and of nature. In a suggestion later taken up by
Sorel in The Illusions of Pro;-reaa. he sees technology as the human
retention of life-energies that would be otherwise dissipated in nature.
Technology was the highest human expression of the elan wital.
For Juenger too, technology was the highest human development of
energy in the universe, to which all forms of knowledge and learning were
to be ultimately directed. The milieu of technology is work. In the
technological age work not only becomes sovereign over the face of the world
but joins hands with other forms of natural and cosmic energy:
"Work is the tempo of the hand, of the head, of the heart,
of life by day and night, of science, art, belief, worship and
war. "fork is the vibration of atoms and energy set in motion
by the stars and the solar system."^
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Tork is that same "activistic metaphysic" which Schmitt had envisaged
in the unlimited possibilities of technological domination over nature.
Even for Schmitt, however, Juenger*s formulation was too extreme. On
the reading of the book he asked him: "Are you also characterising as
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work the circling of an angel in the firmament?". To Schmitt the
question was ironic, but to Juenger it was utterly profound. Work was
not merely a human aotivity. It was an expression of all forms of
terrestial and solar energy. Technology was a form of domination which
placed m.n on a footing with the forces of cosmic energy. It was
Nietzsche's will-to-power placed at the centre of the twentieth century
world. The worker is the twentieth century prototype of the Nietzschean
superman, and through technology human activity mirrors the forms of
motion and energy in the universe itself.
The legacy of Nietzsche cannot be underestim- ted. As well as
conceiving of the will-to-power as t chnology, Juenger is also heavily
indebted to Nietzsche's metaphysical critique of bourgeois society.
What is important here is not merely the superiority of Nietzsche over
Marx, as Juenger saw it, but the fact that these two thinkers alone had
fashioned the only alternatives to bourgeois society which possessed any
authentic nature.> Hugo Fischer, the absent-minded Leipzig philosophy
teacher and national-bolshevist associate of Ernst Niekisch, whose work
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Juenger held in high esteem, fashioned the distinction crucial to
Juenger's own thinking. It was the distinction between Marx's
economistic critique and Nietzsche's metaphysic 1 critique of bourgeois
society. Fischer claimed that Nietzsche was superior to Marx because he
recognized that the class struggles of bourgeois society were a symptom
of decadence and not its cause. Decadence, that ubiquitous offshot of
Christianity in Nietzsche's writing was more universal. It was a
category according to Fischer, which was "both metaphysical and
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sociological at the same time"# It characterised any social reality
which lacks the active driving force to establish a decisive domination
17
over its own epoch. It is the malaise of a society which lacks aivy
"real presence".
Fischer and Juenger applied this characteristic of decadence to
the German nation-state of the nineteenth century. Instead of looking
upon Bismarck as evidence of real domination, they saw him as fighting
a heroic rearguard action against s money-dominated parvenu bourgeois
class where ascendency through the economic system drastically diminishes
IS
the importance of politics and the role of the state. u hereas modern
critics see the Obrigkeitstaat as resulting in a crucial debilitation of
a democratic industrial Germany, the revolutionary-nationalists came to
see it as consigned to impotence before the pernicious designs of the
bourgeoisie. Germany's read to nationhood guided by the Prussian spirit,
in reality signified the ascendency of bourgeois society. Decadence as
a prime feature of such a society is its failure to achieve constant
domination. Juenger calls the age of the third estate "the age of
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pseudo-rule." Long before the war, Germany had become a colony of
Europe in which real political domination had ceased to exist# What
Schmitt had called the age of neutralisation is seen by Juenger as the
age of atrophy of the will-to-power.
The metaphysical critique of bourgeois decadence as well as
involving atrophy, also involves the process of levelling# Nietzsche's
vision of democratisation is more radical than any of the later theorists
of mass society .ho are ultimately indebted to him# Not only is the
mass of the populance sociologically undifferentiated, the whole of
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bourgeois society is reduced to the status of the human herd. The
growth of the educational process in Western civilisation merely hastens
the process of degeneration in which the intelligentsia and the decaying
ruling classes also share. Everything sinks into the decadence of
sameness and attains its lowest common denomin:: tor in the morality of
the herd. Juenger inherits this critique in his own vision of bourgeois
society as a society of the masses. Unlike modern mass society
theorists Juenger did not see individual and mass as irreconcilable
opposites. On the contrary he saw mass behaviour as resulting from the
very excesses of an atomic individualism. The bourgeois ideology of
"humanity" portrays mankind as a cosmos of atoms. But idea and reality
mutually contaminate each other. Bourgeois "society" is also composed
of individuals arbitrarily thrust into random formations of structureless
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masses. /II the public crowds and gatherings of bourgeois society are
seen by Juenger as mechanical collective formations. Crowds, riots,
political meetings, holiday festivals, mass jubilation at the outbreak
of cessation of war are all a series of random and meaningless variations
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of the formlessness of the masses.
Social protest, instead of being an attempt to overcome decadence,
and hypertrophy by seeking metaphysical domination over the present,
is a form of romantic escapism, according to Juenger, which takes flight
from the realities of everyday life. The real forms of conflict in
bourgeois society, war and crime, which expose protest as an ersatz
leisure occupation of the decadent, are ideologically concealed through
techniques of social pathology, and hence explained away. They continue
to exist, however, in the shadow of urban life and constantly threaten the
fragile security of bourgeois life. Bakunin's humpen-proletariat exerts
a fascination for Juenger since it presents the continual threat of a
pmntom-like and sinister force of evil ready to strike to the rotten core
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of a decadent society. In ghettos or side-streets, away from the masses
with their public an organised demonstrations, they carry disintegration
to its furthest point with their total absence of values. The criminal
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carries on at the centre of the metropolis the work of the fighter
at the front - the task of nihilistic destruction which finally brings
bourgeois society to a close. The extreme antithesis of this
underworld is the world of the bohemian salon where the Parisian heritage
of art, creativity and controversy eke out its slow poison. The
narcotic atmosphere of salon dandyism and fin-de-siecle decadence, which
Juenger himself was feebly to emulate in German military uniform in
occupied Paris a decade later, are the veritable death-throe3 of bourgeois
society. For Juenger "the cultural (Museal) pursuit represents nothing
p»
more than the last oasis of bourgeois security."'" The very conditions
which stimulate the flowering of culture in late-bourgeois society are
those which testify to its coming destruction.
Juenger's •metaphysical* critique of bourgeois society, i3 among
other things, en occasion for the familiar revolutionary-conservative
attempts to overlook such mundane sociological factors as class
antagonism, occupational differentiation and the dynamics of social
change inherent in modern society. According to Juenger, social class,
both as concept and reality, is a nineteenth century phenomenon. The
proletariat is a degenerate mass formation. Contradiction, where it
exists, is between the values of bourgeois society and the reality it
embodies. Decadence is the state in which the values of progress,
individualism and humanity no longer possess any metaphysical domination
of the reality of bourgeois society. The idea of progress is helpless
before the slaughter of the world-war, the idea of humanitarian reform
helpless before urban criminality. Pacifism exists side by side with
violence; the social discussion of salon literati coexists with
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political assassination in the streets. The contradictions of force
and legitimacy, blood and intellect, sex and love, state and society, the
mechanical and the organic dominate the bourgeois world. Contradiction
286,
in its multiple forms, prevents the creation of any authentic
relationship to totality.
Such a relationship, Juenger claims, is only possible through a
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recognition of "the total character of work". The totality of work
metaphysically conceived eradicates the contradictory elements of
bourgeois society. The citizen is to be replaced by the worker.
Individuals in their composite masses are replaced by the uniform type.
The romantic escapism of social protest is to be replaced by the heroic
strivings, by day and night, of the adventurous heart which seeks out
danger in the immense facticity of all it confronts. Salon culture long
the centre of western civilisation is suddenly made to appear very
provincial by the dynamic onslaught of technology. The theatres and
museums of the bourgeois age are to be replaced by the workshops of the
technological world. Upon the dissolution of bourgeois society, there
will emerge instea a worker's state. Work, the activistic metaphysie
of technology, provides a totalitarian solution to the atrophy, the
egalitarianism and the contradictions of bourgeois society which are all
interrelated aspects of the disintegration of political domination.
Work is human praxis. but contra Marx, precisely in its reified form.
It depicts human activity twenty-four hours a day in the context of the
organisational rationality of technological work. It is the
consummation of the total rationalization of man in the western world.
The liberalistic distinctions of bourgeois society between work end
leisure, career and family, public and private life are to be finally
swept away. The economistic division of labour is superseded by the
metaphysical totality of work. The distinction between instrumental and
symbolic action is superseded by a totalitarian model of a purposive
rationality which is itself symbolic. The permanence of means in the
technological world results in work being both the activity and the
life-style of the worker. The neutral spheres of bourgeois socle ry
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disintegrate. Culture, economics, morality, sexuality, no longer
possess any autonomous meaning.
This quest for the totality of work is both metaphysical and
sociological. It is less a question of creating a new reality than
creating the circumstances under which men will perceive it. In his
essay on total mobilisation Juenger had spoken of a new German ideology
needed to generate total mobilization. Here he goes one step further.
Total mobilization is to be generated by the perception of all praxis
as -work. It is to be achieved through what Juenger calls
"the Gestalt of the worker". The term Gestalt, a semantic borrowing
from the so-called Berlin Gestalt school of psychology at that time,
is divested by Juenger of its psychological connotations. It is a
tacticsl-metapbysic.l device arising out of his earlier preoccupation
in the essay Total Mobilization with invisibility. The worker's
Gestalt is the culmination of his attempt tc create a new German
ideology which to use Rilke's phrase was an attempt to find the truest
form of the actual in the invisible. Juenger writes:
"As Gestalt we refer to the highest meaningful reality.
Its appearances are meaningful as symbols, representations
and impressions of this reality. '^he Gestalt is a whole
which embraces more than the sum of its parts. This "more"
we call totality....Prom the moment in which one begins to
experience things in terms of a Gestalt, eveiything becomes
Gestalt."27
The Gestalt is an invisible meaning-endowing force which has an
exclusive monopoly of the appearances of phenomena in the real world.
Juenger's anti-causality lead.: him to reject the notion of historical
sequence. In the world of work there is no cause and effect, but rather
"impact and imprint" (Stempel und Praegung). Impact is the Gestalt
stamping its imprint on the world. The action of stamping involves
simultaneously meaning and power. It id the means by which Nietzsche's
matapbysical will-to-power impresses itself on the real world in a way
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specified by Nietzsche himself, but articul; ted even further by Juenger.
"Interpretation", Nietzsche stated, "is itself a means of becoming a
2S
master of something.... the will-to-power interprets". ° Juenger
characterised this interpretive mastery of the will-to-power as
legitimation.^
Juenger's Gestalt legitimates all activity as work. But as a
concept the G-estalt is itself a result of (its author's) "work",
Juenger's definition is deliberately circular. The concepts describing
work are the work of the author:
"All these concepts", Juenger writes in a footnote,
"Gestalt, type, organic construction, total - are
notabene there by virtue of being understood. They are
of no concern to us as such. They can be forgotten
or put aside without further ado after they h ve been
used as dimensions of work,(/rbeitsgroessen) for the
grasping of a substantial reality which exiats in spite
of and beyond every concept. The reader has to see
through the description as if looking through an
optical 3ystea." 30
While admitting the duality of subject and object, noumenon and
phenomenon, appearance and reality, embedded in the mind's perception
of its object, Juenger regarded the problematic philosophical aspects of
this dualism as, tactically speaking, dispensible. The reduction of all
forms of experience to a Gestalt is a tactical outmanoeuvring of the
philosophical dualism in decadent Western metaphysics. Language is as
purely instrumental as the technology mobilized by the Gestalt of the
worker, even though by semantic designation Gestalt, it is the medium
for conveying the nature of that reality. The Gestalt determining but
not determined, real but invisible, explaining but inexplicable, is
pure emptiness masquerading as the purity of form. Metaphysics is a
tactical device for putting out of reach the prime reality of human
experience and justifying Its impact on the real world as inexplicable.
here are the origins for Juenger's radical devaluation of
metaphysics and the subsequent perverted identification of this
devaluation with its essential value? The answer seems to lie in the
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most highly developed metaphysical arguments in Germany at that time.
In the biological vitalism of Hans Driesch for example, one finds a
metaphysical explanation of the formative power of living organisms
which rests on postulating a moving force without spatial character
lying behind all the physio-chemical forces in the organism. This
force Driesch first called a soul, then a psychoid and finally in
31
Aristotlian usage an "entelechy". The enteleohy, like the worker's
gestalt does not itself act in space but "works itself into space".
Lacking in spatial character, it is nonetheless the source of the active
power of the organism in the real world. In the same way, the worker's
Gestalt st imps it3 imprint on a world which it lies beyond and to which
it is inaccessible. An even greater similarity with Juenger's concept
is to be found in Oswald Spengler*: idea of destiny, outlined in the
first volume of The Decline of the est, where Spengler is mounting his
mammoth onslaught on the idea of causality. Here destny is:
"an organic logic, an instinctive dream-sure logic of all
existence &s opposed to the logic of understanding and of
things understood#...Causality is the reasonable, the law-bound,
the describable, the badge of our whole waking and reasonable
existence. But destiny is the 'word for an inner certainty that
is not describable....We begin with the idea of destiny and only
later when our waking consciousness looks fearfully for a spell
that will bind it in the sense-world and overcome the death that
cannot be evaded do .re conceive causality as anti-fate and make
it create another world to protect u.. from nd console us from
this."&
Spengler goes on:
"Everything of which we are conscious, whatever the form in
which it is fin lly apprehended..hn a deeper meaning still, a
final meaning. And the ne and only means of rendering this
incomprehensible comprehensible must be a kind of metaphysics
which regards everything whatsoever as having significance as a
symbol."53
Juenger's Gestalt fuses the dertiny-ide of Spengler with Nietzsche's
will-to-power. The power of i.he Gestalt to stamp itself on the world is
accompanied by an incomprehensibility which is only overcome by its symbolic
manifestation in the real world. This same symbolic manifestation however
can only take pi. ce in its most instrumentally rational fora.
Juenger regards work-performance or efficiency (Leistung), the supreme
criterion of organisational rationality as /an objective and factual
symbol of the worker*s frestalt", The same criterion applies to
3L
machine-technology. It is purely symbolic. The technological
symbols of the Gestalt provide the worker with the ritual forms of an
alien cult". Instrument and symbol, life and cult are thus identical.
i'nd behind them the Gestalt is imperturbably indescribable. "A Gestalt
cannot in the usual sense of the word be described....In so far as it is to
be sought beyond the will and beyond historical development, it is also to
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be sought beyond values. It possesses no quality," At this point
Juenger*s use of metaphysics outstrips that of Spengler and consigns it to
nihilism. Spengler had believed in the idea of destiny s unamenable to
oausal reasoning and indescribable but yet all-pervasive. Destiny embodied
a certain value and a certain truth. Juenger*s Gest-lt possesses none.
It can only be known through the language which announces it. But as
we have already seen the concepts of this language are dispensable, once
the "reality" of the G-estalt is "known" through them. Yet in the real
world this language is the key to technology*s domination. For the main
instrument of technology in the real world - the machine - is merely a
symbolic accessory like man himself to the domination of the technological
language of dominations
"Technology is the ways and means by which the Gestalt of
the worker mobilises the world....technology in this sense is the
domination of the language which is v. liu in the domains of work.
This language is no less aeningful, no less profound, than that
other sort which belongs not only to grammar but also to
metaphysics. Here the machine j-. -1 much as man himself plays
a secon ry role. It is only the organ through which this
language will be spoken."3o
Juenger has thus reduced the technological will-to-poaer to the
presence of the very language which announces it. In the beginning was
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the Word and the word was Gestalt, Juenger gloat3 over the spectre of
emptiness like a god surveying the disaster of his creation#
It is at this point that totalitarianism enters the stage. The
thoroughly determinate world of technology is at its core empty,
governed by an existential indeterminacy which accords to the invisible
Gestalt an unlimited and unquestionable domination. The elites of
Schmitt's decisionlstic world seem to linger invisible in the shadow,
waiting to use the nythology of the Goatalt to their own purposes.
The final proof of the domination of all totalitarian rulers rests on
widespread ideological premises which dery their very existence. All men
are asigned the status of workers. All fighting workers with their
universal uniforms, with their guns, gas-masks and helmets are outwardly
indistinguishable. The decadent functions of dress and costume so dear to the
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bourgeois "personality" are replaced. Yet visible uniformity, one of the
great symbolic devices of totalitarianism, concc Is the hierarchical nature
of the new order. For in the place of equality is to emerge a Nietzschean
order of rank. Uniformity is part of the totalitarian propaganda of
social equality: in truth it conceals a new hierachy of command and
obedience. For Juenger realised, from the Soviet experience, that
Nietzsche's heroic defiance of all forms of popular sovereignity and his
subjectivistic vision of the ne supermen, were unacceptable in the
twentieth century technological world. The Soviets had only been able to
destroy the principle of popular sovereignity with an ideology which in
actual fact affirmed it. Hen e we hve Tuenger's notion that the will-to-
jpower must be refracted through the Gestalt of the worker, and all men, whateve
their rani:, are to be called "workers".
The universal order of rank circumscribes Juenger's concept of freedom.
For him "freedom and obedience ere identical". Freedom is to be found in
the collective fulfillment of work obligations. Freedom is obeying.
The situation in which all workers dutifully gain their freedom by
absolute obedience is called "a democracy of work". Juenger's
calculated refinement of worthless definitions is like an aesthetic
exercise in the abuse and betrayal of political language. No doubt
he felt an intellectual satisfaction from carrying the ideological
disease of the twentieth century to its reductio ad absurdam.
Juenger's argument is not without philosophical precedence. The locus
classicus for identifying the forms of power waich subservience can
offer is in Hegel's disoussion of the master-slave relationship in work
in The Phenomenology of Kind. But his appropriation of it is a matter of
expediency rather than philosophical argument. For the philosophical
problems he himself is concerned with are largely those posed by
Nietzsche in the context of the will-to-power. The use of terms such
as freedom and democracy is an attempt to offset the impression that the
will-to-power is a form of unilateral domination. Zarathustra's advice
to his brother warriors itself hints at the means for doing this:
"Let your nobility show itself in obeying! Let even your commanding be
an obeying! To a good warrior 'thou ahalt* is more agreeable than
'I will'. And everything that is dear to you, you should first have
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commanded to you". Hie identification of willing and commanding made
by Nietzsche is the clue to Juenger's interpretation of the will-to-power as
a question of obedience. In The "ill-to-Po.er Nietzsche also claims
-\
that cormanding and obeying are forms of struggle. The hierachical order
of rank is "an unending process of the establishment of force in which the
different contenders grow unequally", Here "resistance is present even in
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obedience." Thus obedience for Juenger excluded neither domin tion
nor fighting. It was rather inseparable from both of them and to be
explained of the organisational necessities consequence of the development
of the will-to-powe.
The identity of domination and compliance in work is thus offered
by Juenger as an alternative model of human relations to that of the
social contract of bourgeois social philosophy:
"Each and everyone of us stands in a hierachical order
and the leader is recognised as the first servant, the first
soldier and the first .vorker. For this reason both freedom
and order refer not to society but to the state and the
model of its membership is that of an army, no* a social
contract. Hence our external power is at its strongest
when there is no trace of doubt about leaders and followers.
This much must be realised: that domination and
compliance are one and the same thing."W
'uenger envisages the fulfillment of work tasks in terms of a form
of fiefdom, in which the fief entails not only the necessity of
obedience but also the certainty of domination. A series of hierachical
orders ensue in which the orker is both active and passive, tyr nt and
victim in the service of technology. It is perhaps no coincidence that
the historical impetus to the myth of the front-experience emerged from
the junior officers of the German army. For here quite distinctly was
that area of a chain of command vhere men of action have to consider
unquestioningly the mandates for battle from their superior and carry them
out with a ruthless domination of those under their command at the front.
The experience of the middle organisational level where the premium of
command and obedience are together at their highest point. Deprived not
only of the power of political reasoning but also of that of conducting
strategy, the domination of the officer is the impact his men create on
the field of battle. Juenger obviously saw an analogy in the work-team
in the Soviet five-year plan and referred in passing to the construction
of whole townships by forced labour in Siberia as a similar form of
domination in the world of planning. What is quite clear from his use
both of military and economic examples is the rationalisation of the
life-experience of the middleman in the chain of political command.
The talk of domination is not the domination of elites; compliance is
not the compliance of the totally powerless. It is part of the
life-style of the worker that he experiences both. The orker is thus
in many ways a technocrat pieced in a position of control through
expertise. Yet he is partisan end activistic. Danger rather than
organisational predictability is the immediate experience confronting
his. He is both tyrant and victim - in terms of the Great War an
almost inevitable casualty of his on courage, in Soviet terms
technologically necessary and at the same time likely to be liquidated.
The universalisation of the worker is thus a universalisation of the
life-experience of what might literally be called a technological
"middle-class" - obedient to the dictates of the political which lie
outside its control and enabled by the existence of such dictates to
exercise domination through ruthless expertise on those made subordinate
to it by that same elite. One of the obvious fascinations of the Soviet
system for Juenger was the fact that the professional and technological
skills which made for the security of bourgeois citizenship and gentility
in the west were rendered invalid by the political demand for achievement
and. the constant fear of liquidation.
It was not Juenger however but Niekisch who directly paid gloving
tribute to the Soviet Union. In this of course he followed in the
footsteps of Western intellectuals with convictions more humanitarian
than his own. He did it for precisely the opposite reason. Juenger
and Niekisch were decidedly much nearer the truth in realising what was
going on, and that rather than any enchanted myopia the reason for their
praise, Niekisch after a visit to Moscow in 1933 used the exact
vocabulary of Per Arbelter in singing his new-found praises. Russia
was "a workers' state" characterised by asceticism and total poverty.
The Russian vorker was a "new type" who had found in the rhythm of the
machine the basis for the fusion of the mechanical world with the living
organism of the state. The liquidation of the Kulaks meant that
"the city controlled the land just as technology controlled nature."
The symbolic nature of technology in the Juengerian canon we3 not lost
on Niekisch either. "Russia1s production figures, achievement schedules
for factozy employees, the work-gang, the Kolkholz are the ikons, the
holy scriptures, the religious characteristics of the solemn exaltation
of this modern state.he rote. Yet his own weird pietistic brand
of protestantism became something of a dead letter in Juenger's
anti-Christian world of technology where churches were museum relics to be
razed to the ground and the sacraments of altars and candles had been
replaced by the sacraments of motorbikes and machineguns. As well as
the destruction of the last oases of bourgeois security, the domination
of technology also entailed for Juenger the destruction of the peasantry
and ith it the last arcadian Utopias of natural uncorrupted man. So much
for Juenger's support of the peasant's movement in Schlesig~HoIs tein.
Conservatism could have no more to do with the cystic rural east either.
It must accept technology or perishs
"To the extent that the peasant is in the service of
a machine one can no longer speak of a peasant class....(the peasant)
is a worker under special circumstances who collaborates in the
destruction of the str-ndische order like his forefathers who
departed more immediately into industry. The new formulation of
the problem to which he sees himself resigned is the same for him as
it is for the industrial worker, namely to act on behalf of the
Gestalt of the vorker or be annihilated,...The famous distinction
between town and country rem. ins today purely in the realm of the
romantic; it is as invalid as the distinction between the mechanical-
and the ox-ganic world,"42
Political liquidation had joined technological destruction as a
fundamental fe ture of Juenger's world and stood as a new test of courage
for his ruling slaves. "Mle his language never approximated to the
rhetorical cant of Soviet Marxism which he found tiresome and the tedious
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dialogues of party secretaries which he deplored and the message was very
similar. His own original death-language put him beyond the bourns of
orthodoxy, but official Stalinist pronouncements were to be found which
approximated to his own heresy. The universality of work as a sound
principle of totalitarian despotism was pronounced by the ch innan of
the Soviet state planning commission in the official foreword to the
second Five-year plan:
"Owing to the defeat of the parasitic classes, the
Soviet Union has become a country where everybody works,
where the possibility of parasitic existence has been
finally and completely eradicated." 43
ihere he differed most fundamentally was not from the convoluted
dialectics of the 'theory' of non-antagonistic contradictions or the
recurrent semantic hammer-blow of that magic word class-struggle but from
his distancing from the major political problem of the Soviet Union -
to ensure by coercive means that the party alone incorporated the true
historical legacy of creating a socialist society. For Juenger history
and party were of as little consequence as socialism. The power-struggles
of party elites had evaporated behind the nythical Gestalt of the worker,
and history in its turn was only a form of nythology which had no real
continuity no real causality, but only a tactical-metaphysical use as a
clarion call to death and sacrifice. History was to be part of the
timeless nyth of the Gestalt of the worker. No true knowledge of the
past was possible and no rationality contra Marxist historicism and
liberalistic progress could be attributed to its merging with the present.
A Gestalt is independent of all historical development (Entwicklung).
It 3imply exists. "A Gestalt 43 and no historical development augments
or diminishes it." This radical devaluation of history allows
oonservativism to absorb the dynamics of history without according to them
any intrinsic meaning. The transformations of the technological world
suggest upheaval and order, disintegration and homeostasis.
Conservativisn's greatest eneny, historical telos, whether in its
unilinear or dialectical form, has been finally severed from those very
processes which its advocates have relied on to validate it. Por
Juenger, technological destructiveness represents the key to the solution
of the problem of human order.
The organic world of destruction
In his war-writings there emerged from Juenger's pen a very precise
and calculated image of the technological battlefield as both metaphor
and model of a new human order. Total war above all else ensured the
absolute interdependence of the different functions of work. The
metaphor of the gigantic volcanic forge of the warring nation as a whole
extended even further Juenger's vision of a new organic world. To the
dimensions of total war, he now added the dimensions of total planning.
In his own totalitarian vision of the future, they became interdependent
and inseperoble. Despite the fact that total wars were to be fought by
nations with very different political and economic systems, despite the
fact that Stalin's "socialism in one country" was a policy of external
disengagement while collectivisation was under way on the home front, Juenger
claimed that "the war-front and the work-front were identical". The
war-plan and the work-plan were indispensable allies in the task of
"organic construction". Juenger's model of the organic world was not
the traditional conservative notion of a natural order. It possessed no
primordial forms of natural social harmony. The organic world had to be
constructed by mechanical and technological means. All forms of
tradition custom end honour normally associated with conservative visions
of the world were thus dispensable. Inherited wealth and privilege
traditional forms of status and honour were all in the interests of
organic construction to be swept away for good. What held the world
together was war. In his rage for total order, Juenger wished to
turn the world into a total and permanent battlefield. With uncanny
insight he uncovered one of the appalling truths of his century - the
unlimited possibilities of global destructiveness. ithin the arena
of fascist contempt, however, this was not a cause for* despair but one
for rejoicing. In the same way that Schmitt could speak calmly of
murder as if it were a necessary consequence of existential analysis,
Juenger derived his pleasure from implicating all mankind in the
misfortunes and cruelty of total war. fine combat zone could be
anywhere, violent death the fate of anyone irrespective of morality or
privilege:
"In these zones there is de facto no distinction any¬
more between combattants and non-coabattants....In total war,
every city, every factory is a fortified location, every
merchant vessel is a warship, all provisions are contraband,
all forms of behavious active or passive have a military
significance. It i3 of secondary importance whether the
type is a soldier or an isolated person - he will be
confronted in the attack on the particular area in which he
is located. This is the feature of a very intensive but
very abstract cruelty."44
This abstract cruelty which prophetically enough was to reach its
zenith in the civilian bombings of the second world war, is the absolute
guarantee that there is to be no escape for the innocent, and that the
random and arbitrary nature of violent death does not lack a supreme
technological rationale. The idea of fete has fallen into the hands
of the armchair sadist by courtesy of the destructive technological
capacity which rests at the fingertips of military planners. Al'though
Juenger claimed th t society would be liquidated in the worker's state,
it remains a repository for potential victims. Tire work-plan is its
perfect complement. Divested of all its humanitarian connotations, of
the pleas for social justice or economic improvement, and of the millenial
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historicist assumption of creating the final stage of mankind, the plan
is a pure experimental expression of the permanence of means, find through
it of the will-to-power. From the action of the worker subject to the
endless self-perpetuating tasks of the plan, language itself is abolished.
The discussion of goals is not heretical; it is meaningless. Total
involvement in the plan does not mean participation but merely factual
achievement. All relevant questions are questions of organisation not
of values. Hence the worker's achievement without try conceptual
attributes, so that in a very cogent sense, the type is a supporter of
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a revolution sans phrase." Work is a preparation for sacrifice and
death. In building his destructible fortresses, or constructing his own
prisons, the worker erects his own gallows and digs his own grave. At
the height of collectivisation in Russia Stalin had shown how the novelties
of planning could work in the interests of stirnul. ting loyalty and effort.
He had purged his technocrats, and found they were others clamouring to
take their place. Liquidation meant dynamic renewal and sacrifice.
But it pointed in no direction end instead gave the lie to the ratio of
history. Plus ca change plus e'est le meme chose; - the final hope of
revolutionary conservatism.
By this time the remnants of Juenger's nationalism which had been
the original rationale not only for his own but for European fascism s
a whole, had gone almost without trace. The bourgeois nation-state
including the Germany for which he had fought so fiercely in the Great ar,
was regarded as incapable of unleashing the dynamic totalitarian impetus
of technology. Nationalism, the slogan under which the front-generation
had been baptised was a dead letter. Germany was to be the centre of a
technological world-empire geared to permanent -war against the west;
"T. chnology as the means through which the Gestalt of the
worker is mobilised is world-revolutionary. The type who uses
this Gestalt to establish itself as the ruling race is world-
:revolutionary. The secret development of such means, of the
appropriate scientific and military resources, is directed
towards the domination of continents from pole to pole. The
altercation between different ways of life takes on the
character of a world war."46
Juenger had taken Nietzsche at his word and decided that in the
century of nihilism the new ruling race of technological supermen should
become "masters of the earth". Nietzsche in a classic sense was
interested only in victory. The wager he laid upon his ruling race in
The Will to Power was to survive in toto the millions of deaths in which
it had conspired. It was a wager which Hitler could be said to have
fought and lost disastrously - to have committed genocide and then to
be destroyed. for Juenger however technology prevented the vision from
being so absolute. He attempted to institutionalise the eschatological
madness of Nietzsche's final dream. There was no final flourish of
the will-to-power, I eroic realism meant the acceptance of defeat and
victory alike. The permanence of technological means subverted
eschatology. While whole nations were to be conquered and re-conquered,
populations enslaved and deported, and all human rights destroyed,
Juenger*s prophetic vision lacks Nietzsche's capacity for triumphant
delirium. "Whover wins or loses", he notes with an icy calculation,
"is of no consequence. Defeat and victory alike herald the domination
I ~7
of the worker."
Juenger's worker in fact, just like Spengler's Prussian socialist
but in a more exact sense, was a degenerate form of Nietzsche's superman.
The superman was the heroic man-God, the invincible ego-dream of the lone
prophet in defiance of all forms of human collectivism and the morality
of the herd. Nietzsche's resistance to the utopian promise of language
in religion and ideology was a form of personal defiance of everything
outside of himself. It was the triumph of subjectivism within which
his unbounded contempt for humanity had flourished. More than any
other modern philosopher he is closer to the solitary harshness and
suffering of the artistic creator. His demonic embrace of evil bespoke
a reverence for the purity of language no longer possible in an age of
total idological dishonesty. On all these counts Juenger betrayed his
master. He used technology to eliminate the subject from the centre of
the Nietzschean discourse and create his own depersonalised herd of
garrisons and armies. He replaced Nietzsche's philosophy of life with
a model of the state, "that cold monster", as Nietzsche had called it.
He did it too with the same lie which Nietzsche attacked. "Coldly it
lies too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: "I, the state, am the
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peoplel" He treated language with a cynicism of a satiated voyeur
gloating over the political and ideological betrayals of his age. The
meaning of words was of secondary importance to the effect they produced
and one of the liberating features of technology was that anyway
language would become superfluous. Juenger's faceless worker-type is
not a ruler in Nietzsche's sense but a technocratic vassal, whose task
and purpose is "revolutionary legitimation". It is as vassals that
Juenger's workers roam the industrial landscape as "sons, angels and
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archangels of godlessness", through temperatures of "fire and ice".
Domination is part of the military-technocratic transaction of the
fiefdom and the fighter remains in the bondage of his iron cage.
Caught in its vice-like grip, the superman succumbs to the organisational
mandates of a debased technological rationality.
In a landscape ravaged by war, the relentless task of organic
construction presses on. While whole cities are razed to the ground,
whole territories are transformed into planned technological landscapes.
War and planning, distruction and construction, feed off its other
virtues. If nothing is planned, there is nothing to destroy; if
nothing is destroyed there is nothing to plan. Organic solidarity
emerges at the height of global destructiveness. But what is the height
of global destruotiveness? In 1932 Juenger could do no more than hint
at, in a passing reference to atomic physics, the familiar and horrific
destructiveness which was later to emerge with the invention and
production of nuclear weapons. As a logical development of technology
in its global dimension, it made the second world war the last global
confrontation of its kind. It was America and Russia not Germany who
emerged as the two great technological world-empires. Their possession
of nuclear arms drastically altered the rules for feasible conflict and
so created the Cold War, The type of military conflict which Juenger
envisaged had been replaced by the ideological war of words he detested and
by the types of subterfuge and subversion at the territorial fringes of the
new empires which dispensed with the set-piece conventions of the war of
material. To compare his own vision against that of reality is to
realise that even in the process of destruction, the best or rather the
worst demonic aspirations can themselves be betrayed. In Germany itself
Juenger had been betrayed by racial and biological criteria of liquidation.
?he destruction of a single racial category of huunan beings contradicted
the universal cruelty of technology. In a less provincial sense nuclear
weapons were a betrayal since they lent themselves to the possibility of
final destruction, a state-of-affairs which would deprive the future
generations of the chance being born into a world of liquidation and
sacrifice. The radical nature of Juenger*s fascist contempt cannot be
underestimated. The permanence of technological means gave men's
capacity for self-betrayal and cruelty an indefinite opportunity to assert
itself. Nuclear destruction, though a possible manifestation of this,
would bring all such opportunities to an end.
A more radical notion emerges however than even this. It is the
possibility that permanent technological war and final nuclear war
both contain in different way the same possibility - namely the
abolition of man. In the closing section of The Will-to-Power Nietzsche
had endeavoured to present the basic stimulus of human life as almost
a mirror-image of the motion of energy in the universe. It was an
eternal recurrence or as Nietzsche called it "the nothing eternally".
For Juenger global technology is the highest expression of the eternal
recurrence. Endless wars, endless sacrifice, endless construction of
work-plans on a ravaged human landscape earmarked for destruction are
a transcription of Nietzsche's words "the sea of forces flowing and
rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back....
enclosed by nothingness as by a boundary". Here the world was
"a monster of energy without beginning without end....beyond good and
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evil". For Juenger total war with its almost abstract symmetry of
fire and movement, was not a conflict between men but an expression of a
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cosmio opposition between solar and terrestlal fire. Technology as
the highest form of human creation represented man's greatest emulation
of solar fire - of the explosiveness on earth parallelling the explosions
of natural energy in the solar system. It is only one step further to
see the possibility of nuclear war, the supremoform of technological
destructiveness, as the most advanced and the final human emulation of
solar fire. Nietzsche's vision of the world as a monster of energy
beyond good and evil had found its ultimate point of reference . Juenger's
astonishing definition of work as "the vibration of atoms and energy set
in motion by the stars and the solar system" finally achieves a horrifying
clarity, Man at last had finally managed to emulate the cosmos but only
in its destructiveness. Technology had achieved it3 highest potential
only at the expense of his probable extinction. Juenger's dubious
achievement had been, before the invention of atomic warfare, to start
thinking the unthinkable. The logic of his argument leads to the
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affirmation of nuclear extinction.
Yet there is an uncanny sense that the end result of nuclear war -
the final abolition of man - already exists in Juenger's work without
regard to the knov/ledge of atomic weapons he could not possibly have
possessed. The acceptance of technological rationality, the designation
of man as a mathematically predictable type governed by technological
metaphysics involved the renunciation of the subjective ego as the centre
of the Nietzschean will-to-power. The will-to-power was no longer
psychological, or rather no longer a metaphysic of the ego. In his
essay On Pain written in 1934, Juenger finally reduced his ruling-slave
of technology to a pure victim of the will-to-power. The subjective
correlative of the technological world was no longer psychological -
not heroic realism or the adventurous heart. It was physiological -
it was pain.-'2 Pain was the summit and totality of the collective human
experience of technology. It was the only effective guarantee of the
final abolition of values. The collectivistic depersonalised experience
of pain was in the province of the body alone. The body was the last
tactical outpost against the abstract cruelty of technology. Having
already attempted to abolish language, Juenger takes the next logical
step of attempting to abolish human experience.
Juaiger thus destroys the last human qualities of the worker and
transforms him into an object, a thing. Those last qualities were the
demonic and destructive ones which paradoxically had assured him of his
humanity. For Juenger, having attempted to abolish philosophical dualism
with all the subtle panache of a machine-gunner in a firing squad, is
forced back onto his own fundamental dualism - that of the demon in the
machine. As a mathematical cipher the worker is predictable and uniform.
His actions are those of an automaton - calculable and precise. As the
lackey and victim of technology*a abstract cruelty - of total war, forced
labour, deportations purges and liquidations, he is the satanic beast of
the twentieth century. As victim alone with pain as his only consolation,
however, his final demonic qualities are lost, Juenger's vision of that
of hordes of pack-marching phantoms treading the rubble of Europe,
disappearing and re-appearing in the final apocalypse he was not yet to
know, amidst the deadly bloom of radioactive dust. It was as if they
had achieved through dehamanisation the permanence of an abolition which
thirty years later in 1962, could well have been achieved in one decisive
death blow. Technology, the metaphysics of reality which had abolished
the metaphysics of philosophy, had finally fulfilled itself. It was, in
its quest to perfection, the elixir of living death. In 1932, man for
Juenger, had already died. Nuclear war could only be a posthumous
tribute to his extinction. And nothing, God or man, could be left in
the solar system to applaud the final achievement of attempting in a
self-abolition to rival the intensity of solar fire.
In one sense however, reality never lives up to chiliastic expectation.
The Cold ;ar stabilised imperial boundaries and instead unleashed a torrent
of words which had hoped once and for all would be silenced. For despite
Juenger's contempt for the secular millenialism of the revolutionary
left, Juenger was millenial with respite to his own obsessions. The
permanence of technological means while admitting of no historical finality
did at least mean liberation from language. But in the ideological war
of words which has characterised the second half of thetwentieth century,
language, the receptacle of lies, distortion, half-truth and doublespeak
returned with a vengeance. The Orwellian doublespeak, with Juenger
himself used quite brazenly he thought merely as a temporary device to spur
humanity along the road to nothingness. It was an incidental prelude
to the revolution sans phrase. Thus he became quite open about reversing
the meaning of words. In Germany in 1932, the two great emotional codewords
in politics were nationalism and socialism and the Tat circle took seriously
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the task of finding some common basis of unity between the two. For
Juenger however they were only important as the opposite of what they
meant. Hence he claims "socialism appears the precedent for a distinctly
authoritarian form of organisation, nationalism as the precedent for tasks
of an imperial nature". While Hans Zehrer regarded it as a worthwhile
and intrinsically fruitful intellectual exercise to destroy the linear
spectrum of politics with its left and right and show the points of
similarity between the extremes, such a task would have a purely
instrumental purpose in separating out those who could be creamed off
for a totalitarian movement unconcerned with political labels from the
equivocators who clung to the democratic system. Meanwhile his last
perverse allegiance to language reflects itself in the style of his work.
Calling it "a soldierly exercise" it is designed even more than
Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols to be an example of how to philosophise
with a hammer. Juenger's inventory of italicised concepts, resembling a
taxonomy of abstract species rather than a philosophical argument, is
hammered out with the monotonous repetition of commands barked out on the
parade ground. Unlike his war-memoirs where his language ebbs and flows
poetically with the movement and violence of the horror it depicts here it
moves with the facility of nails being hammered into a coffin. Inside
the coffin itself the language of controversy and inquiry, of man's ability
to question himself had been entombed.
Even in totalitarianism, above all in totalitarianism, language became
necessary. It sprouted during the cold war like a many-headed hydra.
In the modern world it seemed the tradition of fascist contempt was carried
on by military dictatorships either too lazy or ideologically illiterate
to join in the clamour of all other potential or actual oppressors to be
acting in the interests of goodness and humanity. It ?/as absurd far
Mussolini to deny his fascism. He had after all practically invented the
term himself. But who half a century later with similar aims, would in
their right political minds embrace a concept which had fallen into such
disrepute? The devaluation of words is a result of the persistence of
concepts, when the original reality they embodied has been forgotten.
In the modern world few have escaped the accusation of fascism and even
fewer have failed to vehemently deny it. The destruction of fascism in
1945 destroyed at least provisionally its basic reality but freed the
concept from its historical moorings. The inflation of its use as abusive
epithet has increased in proportion to the sensitivity of men in the present
age to its accusations. Prior to 1945 to have called a convinced fascist
a fascist would have been neither an accusation nor an insult but a
compliment. It only really worked as the German communist party
discovered early on when you called your non-fascist opponents fascist.
Thus the German social-democrats fighting an ineffectual rearguard action
against Hitler received for their pains the puerile epithet of
social-fascist from those who ought to have been fitting by their side.
The devaluation of fascism was inaugurated.
If language is still in use however as a free agent, if it has not
been reduced to an ideological staccato hollow and without resonance,
there is always hope for its authenticity. Too much language however
meaningless is better than no language at all - or rather than a purely
technical language which amounts to the same thing. For this was the final
consequence of Juenger's precious contempt. Gloating over the endless
betrayals of language, that ideological quicksand which drove humanists
like Mannheim to distraction, he toyed pleasurably with the idea of
getting rid of language altogether, by sealing it once ana for all into
the technicity of technology. He was able to live in happiness with the
thought which drove Alfred Seidel to his death - the thought of
consciousness as doom. With this the absolute vindication of nihilism,
the final demonic ellement disappears from Juenger's work. In the late
twenties in Berlin the cult novel of his circle had beai Dostoevky's
The Devils, l ow could the revolutionary-nationalists sated by their
obsessions with violence fail to identify with the metaphysical
revolutionary demons of Dostoevky*s mystic and chiliastic east? Who then,
did Juenger most resemble, or perhaps even identify with? Not Stavogrin,
not Verkhovensky, not Shatov, but Shigalev, pedantic prophet of a new age
of technological despotism and slavery, who forecast the Stalinist Russia
where nine-tenths of the populations were in slavery to their new
industrial masters. But Shigalev was no murderer, no revolutionary.
He was the agent not of the devil but of universal despair. Juenger drew
the necessary conclusions. Life was a lifelessness where even the devil
was excluded. Nietzsche's nihilistic utopia of the world as "a monster
of energy beyond good and evil" was a world where the will-to-power was
deprived of all telos human or divine. It was cosmic energy which man
could rival through technology for a brief moment before his own extinction,
but which had no need of either man or God, Nietzsche's desire to replace
man and God by his own man-God itself becomes in terms of Juenger's
dehumanised worker an ultimate heroic defiance by metaphysics of it3 own
destruction. Beyond good and evil, there is something over which
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CHAPTER XII
The Salon and the Swastika
Revolutionary-nutionalism could never have been considered at
any time an important political force in Germany, Its brief hour
of political glory came during the short-lived terrorist phase of
the Peasants1 movement. Born out of the Freikorps movement, its
ideological impetus developed when the Freikorps had ceased to be a
political force. Possessing a rather loose unity during the period
of the Vormarsch circle in the late twenties, its coherence and sense
of purpose disintegrated almost completely before the onrushing tide
of national-socialism sweeping Germany after the Great Depression.
Old Groups split and new groups arose. Sectarianism and
fissiparity went hand in hand. The popular success of national-
socialism and its policy of official legality alienated many
revolutionary -nationalists. There ensued a 3mall number of
ideological conversions of right-wing activists like Bruno von Salomon,
Lieutenant Scheringer, Beppo Roehmer and Bodo Uhse to the Communist Party.
In general with the growth of national-bolshevism cautiously encouraged
by the party for tactical reasons, relations with the Stalinist left
became more favourable. At the same time, as the work of Juenger
and Niekisch clearly shows there was no question of the revolutionary-
nationalists accepting Marxist doctrine in any shape or form. They
remained committed to some version of a counter-revolutionary Prussian
socialism. Their increasing favourability towards bolshevism was due
to the degree to which it too could be seen as statist and counter¬
revolutionary .
That reasons can be given to explain the reluctance of
German fascist intellectuals to support national-socialism in the
same numbers as their Italian counterparts had earlier supported
Mussolini? In the early twenties, Hitler's Munich Putsch had been
regarded by Freikorps terrorists as a valid, if tactically dubious,
nationalist offensive against the hated republic. The national-
socialists in turn regarded Fischer and Kern, the assasins of Rathenau,
as great national martyrs. Even by the mid-twenties both national-
socialists and Juenger's circle of "new nationalists" as it was then
called both felt themselves to be part of the same nationalist movement.
Both Hitler and Joseph Goebbels had read and acclaimed Juenger's war-
writings. Although Juenger and Hitler never met, they exchanged
copies of their books and Juenger referred to Hitler as "a great
national leader"."*' In 1927 Hitler's party offered Juenger a Reichstag
candidacy which he turned down. That started to sow the seeds of
discord between the party and the intellectuals? It seemed to lie
crucially in two main factors - the attitude ofthe intellectuals
towards political activism and Hitler's leadership role with the Nazi party.
Hitler established his central control and absolute leadership
of the Party at the Bomburg conference of 1926 when he not only
rejected the ideological programme of the Northern radicals of the
p^rty but managed to convince them in spite of this that his own
leadership was absolutely indispensable to the future political
2
success of the party. He established through his extraordinary
personal qualities a charismatic domination perhaps unparalleled in
twentieth century politics. Joseph Goebbels, at first appalled and
depressed at Hitler's support for the ideas of his bavarian ideologists
Gottfried Feder and lfred Rosenberg, let the last dregs of his socialist
sentiments evaporate before the charisma of his new leader. "Adolf
Hitler, I love you", he wrote. "Youare both great and simple.
A Genius".^ From this moment Goebbels encouraged and flattered by
his leader who made him district Gauleiter of Berlin, was no longer
distressed by Rosenberg's call for a radical alliance with Anglo-Saxon
Britain or by Feder's refttsal to denounce capitalism outright. The
proletarianised Heidelberg scholar found space beside his total
amorality and limitless contempt of humanity for unrestrained reverance
of his Feuhrer. For Otto and Gregar Strasser, the more serious of the
Northern ideologists, Hitler made it clear that there was room
for them to continue their own ideological pursuits if they accepted
unequivocably his own leadership and did not abuse this latitude to
create party disunity. The result was, as Joseph Nyomarkay has shown,
that ideological conflict in the party did not become a conflict over
party programmes but a series of intrigues by party leaders to gain
Hitler's support in their struggle against their enemies. Ideological
conflict scarcely touched upon the role of the leader which was virtually
unassailable. On the one major occasion after 1926 when it did, it
resulted in Otto Strasser's expulsion from the party.
Otto Strasser's am ideological position was little different from
that of his more powerful and influential brother. Both were in
favour of a Prussian socialism- involving large-scale anti-capitalist
measures of nationalisation and both, though trenchantly anti-semitic,
despised Rosenberg's mystic and virtually incomprehensible Nordic
Aryanism, Otto Strasser and his close associate Herbert Blanck
however went further and claimed in the Berlin party journal that conpared
with the idea of national-socialism, the leadership position was of
secondary importance. The influence of the revolutionary-nationalists
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was beginning to take its toll on Strasser's excessive preoccupation
with purely ideological matters. Hitler outraged by this subversive
personal attack called Strasser to Munich and tried to buy him off
with a prestigious propaganda post in the party. But as Strasser
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recalls in his memoirs, this private meeting with Hitler, merely
showed the difference between their political positions and the extreme
fanaticism of Hitler's racial world-view. It was too great even for
a confirmed anti-semite like Strasser to take. hat from Hitler's
point of view was a question of Strasser's personal disloyalty was
from Strasser's point of -view a profound ideological difference.
He saw Hitler not as a true German socialist but as a rampant racialist.
Thus he walked out on Hitler under the heading "The socialists leave the
party". But his departure had only minor repercussions. The majority
of northern Gauleiters whose socialism was basically no different from
his cwn remained behind with his brother. The crucial difference lay
in their acceptance of Hitler's leadership.
dtrasser's move, though it did little to affect the party's
popularity, was exactly the type of move welcomed by the revolutionary-
nationalists. The Tat circle nodded approvingly. Here, they
mistakenly thought, was a successful purificataon of the idea of
national-socialism which had been increasingly contaminated by the
excessively demagogic emphasis upon Hitler's leadership. Hans Zehrer
had called Hitler a "monomaniac without a political programme". Ernst
Niekisch claimed that Hitler's personal charismatic style was only
possible within the context of a populist and purely democratic
politics. "The demagogue", he asserted, "is in the nature of things
invariably a westerner".^ Although Hitler had initially managed to link
"his strongly demagogic instincts to German values", the deliberate
attempt to turn the streets and assembly halls into battlefields through
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frenzied exhortation to violence was a travesty of the Prussian
spirit. In addition demagoguery was positively Utopian. It
developed'h belief in miracles". "National-socialism", Niekisch
declared "is a form of national messianism. Its Messiah is Hitler." ^
The essence of Pruasdanism was its emphasis on duty and sacrifice.
And even Cpengler watching from the sidelines, felt moved to condemn
the messianic mass euphoria whioh pervaded the Nazi rise to power.
It was still unclear, however, whether the revolutionary nationalists
disapproved of Hitler's leadership in particular or of charismatic
dictatorship in general. The question of personal leaders was seldom
discussed. The most coherent theoretical statement on the nature
of leadership, which in effect leads to an indirect condemnation of
charisma, is to be found in Juenger's book The Worker. This was not
directly an attack on Hitler himself, like the sensational pamphlet
of Ernst Niekisch, Hitler . German Catastrophe published in 1932. It
was more an attack on the principle of dictatorship suggested by Carl
Q
Schmitt during his earlier political writings. While Juenger did not
attack Hitler directly, as Niekisch did, his rejection of dictatorship
obviously contained a fairly direct rejection of the Nazi leader.
The future leader of Juenger's fictional worker's state was described as
"the first servant, the first soldier, the first worker". Such a
description seems if anything to have its origins in the Prussian sense
of duty epressed by Frederick the Great in his Anti-Machievel Here
he stated "The ruler is far from being the arbitrary master of his
9
people; he is indeed nothing other than its first servant." Indeed
Juenger regarded dictatorship as nothing more than the temporary feature
of the revolutionary transition to a new order. "Dictatorship", he
claimed, "is a purely transitional phenomenon. The worker-type (Der
Typ) does not acknowledge a dictatorship, since for him freedom and
obedience are identical"."'"^ /anong the n:.tional-bolsheviks, the attachmait
to the Soviet system included a strong admiration for Lenin. Niekisch
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and Hugo Fischer, in his book Lenin, Machievelli of the Last. both
expressed open admiration for the Bolshevik leader. But Juenger
tended to look upon the Soviet five years plans as downgrading the
importance of leadership, and none of the national-bol3heviks seemed
able to realise the central role of Stalin's dictatorship in the
development of industrialisation and the five year plans.
Juenger» s Prussian orientation clearly was crucial in his distaste
for charisma. Max Weber had shown in his study of charismatic
domination that the "waning of charisma" was often due historically
12
to the growth of the barracks system of professional warriors.
It seems to have been a similar "warrior communism" which Juenger
had in mind when he spoke of the "democracy of work" being enacted
by "orders" after the style of the Teutonic orders of knights. In
the ascetic life-style of the barracks there was no room for the luxury
of charisma. "The mare cynical, Spartan, Bolshevik and Prussian life
in all its aspects, becomes", he wrote, "the better it will be." ^
Juenger's desire to model his worker-elites on the orders of the
Teutonic knights, the Jesuits and the Spartans, was one which struck
a chord among the Nazi leadership. The Jesuits were a model for
Himmler's idea on the formation of the S.S. Robert Ley, the leader of
the German labour Front mounted in 1937, the unsuccessful experiment
of the Ordensburgen, a group of elite worker-corps moulded on very
Juengerian lines.^" At one point in time the party as a whole was
brink of being transformed into a series of hierachical orders. For,
according to Hermann Rauschning, Hitler and Rosenberg seriously entertained
the idea in debating what form the party should take once its parliamentary
15
mission was complete. This romanticised medieval component of Juenger's
thought with its Darwinian overtones points to a crucial similarity
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between his thinking and that of the party leadership. Nonetheless
the supremacy of Hitler's position meant that whatever "orders" existed
in the Nazi regime were usually private armies whose bosses were
accountable to Hitler and Hitler alone. The Nazi leader's delegation
of authority was deliberately structureless. Hitler's party overlords
had no clearly defined area of authority and competence and certainly
no clearly defined authority-relations to each other. By comparison
with Nazism, Juenger*s idea of a state based on the command structure
of an army seemed quaint and inflexible. As Hitler's lackeys jostled
for position among themselves in a state at times approaching confusion,
the party leadership seemed more and more like the leadership of a
criminal gang. It was a situation crucial to the operation of
totalitarian leadership but one by which Juenger, with his Prussian
orthodoxy was clearly nauseated. Travail pour le roi de Prusse may
no longer have needed a monarchy, but neither did it need an Austrian
corporal.
Apart from revolutionary-nationalist objections to Hitler in
person, many of the ideological points of difference were vague and
diffuse. Hostility towards the party's policy of legality was wide¬
spread. The Tat circle's accusation of "liberal parliamentarianism"
was the most recurrent. Niekisch also criticised their parliamentary
methods by stating "there is no legal revolution nor revolutionary
X6
legality; where legality begins, revolution ends." Juenger,
expressing a general disillusionment with the equivocal role of the
Nazi party in Schleswig-H6lstein lamented that the "most feared
expression of the national will" should compromise itself by outrightly
condemning violence, and called for the use of "weapons of the purest
17
metal" in the fight against the Weimar system. Thus the major
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criticisms tended to be of political methods. On the question of the
general programs of the party, controversy tended to be less systematic.
Apart from Otto Strasser, who was forced to continually attack the
party from beyond the pale, there was very little genuine ideological
debate. One of the sore points for the national-revolutionaries
was Gottfried Feder's refusal to extend his attacks on capitalism
beyond that of the "interest slavery" of finance capitalism. But
antl-semitism was never really a bone of contention. It had been
common in the Freikorps and still existed in some degree among mary
of the national-revolutionaries. There were exceptions. Juenger
rejected all biological criteria as being unacceptable to his own
technological version of the ruling race, and Hielscher in typically
idealist fashion regarded anti-semitism as a farm of materialism, an
attempt to analyse people on the basis of ethnic criteria which was
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a reactionary throwback to the Wilhelraian era. But generally
speaking anti-semitism and its excesses in the party generally
encountered little or no active opposition. It was regarded by
Juenger and the others as irrelevant rather than repulsive and the
Tat circle scarcely mentioned it.
Other ideological criticism tended to border on the esoteric.
Niekisch*s paranoia about Catholicism led him to mistakenly identify
national-socialism with the "clerioal-particularist forces of Bavaria",
which were inundated with "Romish separatist and francophile
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tendencies". Despite Hitler*s opposition to Bavarian separatism,
his stated wish to create a Third Reich centred in Berlin, and higher
electoral support within the Prussian areas of Germany than in the west
and south, Niekisch persisted in seeing him trying to introduce the
strains of an alien romish virus into German life. Labellingthe S.A,
despite his admiration for the life-style of its members, as an
"imitation" of Mussolini's fascist and romish battalions, he was able
to indulge in a clumsy geopolitical casuistry and claim that his own
Prussianism was the opposite of (Italian) fascism. He came to see
fascism instead, to use the wards of Juenger, as "a brutal stenography
of the liberal political system". It possessed all the anti-Prussian
and anti-bolshevik vices of the West. In this way religion and
geopolitics finally enabled him to the position where he saw national-
socialism as being simultaneously"fascistic, bourgeois, civilisational,
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democratic, parliamentarian and legaln One result was that he
failed to account for its phenomenally high electoral success in rural
areas of Prussia and North Germany and its much lesser impact on Germany's
"decadent" westernized cities and its industrial Rhineland, Another was
that he could muster no real opposition to its anti-humanism, its
brutality or its desire for total power. Niekisch's attitude can
be summed up finally in his hatred of populism. The demagogic leader
was the crucial link between the people and political power. Not only
did populism entail mob rule, it meant that political leaders were popular
leaders in the western democratic sense. In expressing his dislike
of Nazi populism however he predictably reduces it to a religious polarity
which re-asserts the binding link between Prussian and Protestantism.
"The basic premise of national-socialism" he writes, "is, in accordance
with Catholic doctrine, the people as a natural reality. For German
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protestants however, it is the state as a moral achievement."
Individual Encounters with Nazism
The relations of the leading revolutionary-nationalists with the
Nazi party were much closer than they, in retrospect, would have liked.
No clear overall pattern emerges. Some like Carl Sohmitt, Werner Best,
Giselher Wirsing and Ferninand Fried joined the party. Others like
Juenger, Zehrer and Ernst von Salomon were clearly tempted at one time
or another to join. Most revolutionary-nationalists had their contacts
or followers in the party* But the dilemma of choosing between
political effectiveness and intellectual autonony again and again
repeated itself. The result was that most did not join. In any
case, Hitler almost always provided the crucial stumbling block.
The reason why Otto Strasser left the party in 1930 was the reason
why most revolutionary-nationalists never joined it. But a series
of encounters nonetheless took place and it is to these which we must
now turn.
One of the major converts was Carl Schmitt, who as a successful
academician was peripheral, both in terms of participation and. loyalty
to the revolutionary-nationalists. Schmitt's conversion to Nazism in
1933 was simultaneously a conversion to the leadership principle
of the party, the bugbear of nearly all the revolutionary-nationalists.
Because of his academic fame his joining of the party came to be something
of cause c'el'dbre. hat was perhaps more remarkable was the way in
which he was prepared to accommodate his own doctrine of political
existentialism to the national-socialist demand for complete acceptance
of the Fuehrer-prinzip. The political divergence of Schmitt and Juenger
during these year-s is all the more remarkable for their close personal
friendship in Berlin during the early thirties when Schmitt had become
a Professor of politics at Berlin university. Niekisch recalls that
they discussed the political situation quite closely well into 1934
when Schmitt and /molt Bronnen, another of Juenger's circle were both
confirmed Nazis. "?ith Schmitt's notorious justification of the
"Night of the Long Knives" in 1934, in spite of Juenger's personal
entreaties, their relations seemed to have cooled considerably. For
Schmitt this was a remarkable volte-face. It was accomplished nonetheless
with a casuistic ease. The first step that Schmitt took to.ards a
position favourable to the Nazis was in his dismantling of the notion
of a total state. He did this initially in an article in 1932
when he claimed that the Teimar Republic had been transformed into a
"quantitative total state" by the fact th t the five major political
parties operated no longer as liberal parties of opinion but as "total
parties" who recruited and indoctrinated their members from the cradle
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upwards. The "qualitative total state" on the other hand was equally
politicised but presupposed a unanimity in public life guaranteed by
one political movement alone. The next year with the Nazi seizure
of power, Schmitt became more explicit. Any authentic state could
only be guaranteed by a political movement which has the total confidence
people* State, movement and people represented a three-sided
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unity in the creation of a new Reich. The movement was the crucial
link between people and state. hile the state was static and formal
in nature, the movement was dynamic. It linked the political means of
administration to the unpolitical Volk. The idea of a total state had
now disappeared from sight. Schmitt also went on to argue that
national-socialism was a concrete political phenomenon which invalidated
the abstract and purely formal concept of a counter-revolutionaiy
decision. The idea of martial law, previously conceived as an
exceptional measure necessazy for a brief period to enforce that decision,
becomes accepted by Schmitt as a potentially permanent aspect of
political order. In addition fohmitt came to discard the notions of
norm and decision as empty legalistic abstractions. Decisionism was
doctrine without substance. But what in that case did possess substance?
The answer was the concrete political order of n tional-socialism.
The Nazi seizure of power was an existential political f ct, not an
attempt to fulfill the premises of an abstract theory. The exceptional
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counter-revolutionary decision is thus replaced by a permanent
principle of leadership "which springs directly from the concrete and
substantial thought of the national-socialist movement." 11 the
supra-legal features of counter-revolutionary dictatorship formerly
justified by 3chmitt as a necessary exception to the rule now become
the basis of the rule itself. The movement as the "authentic"
representative of the people*s will is free on a permanent basis
to dispense with the law as it wishes.
The essence of the permanent basis of this totalitarian power is
not vested in the movement as a whole but in its leader. In dchmitt's
justification of the purge of the S.A., it is the will of the leader
alone which emerges as the source and fount of all legality and
legitimacy. Schmitt supports Hitler's decision to liquidate his
own lawless henchmen in the crudest of terms. But this same crudity
was to point out quite clearly the guiding principle of legitimation
for the totalitarianism of the Third Reich:
The truth is that the act of the Fuehrer was real
jurisdiction. It is not subordinate to justice but is
itself real justice. It is not the action of the
republican dictator who creates a fait accompli in the
realm of lawlessness when the law has momentarily closed
its eyes, in order that the fiction of an unbroken legality
can re-establish itself on the basis of newly-created facts.
The judgement of the leader springs from the same source of
right as the rights of any people.... All right originates
in the right-to-life (Lebensrecht) of the people. 25
What is the link between leader and people? It is not ary
liberal-democratic notion of representativeness. There is no notion
of a political mandate. Unity of leader and led is ased not on
political equality (Gleichheit) but on "identity of species"
(.Artgleichheit). Here lies the supreme tautological casuistry
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of political existentialism. The leader commands the led because
he is like the led, and the affinity of leader and followers is based
on the existential (and by implication historically indisputable)
fact that he leads them, According to Schmitt "Only species
identity can prevent the leader's power from being tyrannical and
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arbitrary." It is clear however that with the conceptually
empty notion of identity of species it is already both. There is no
redress from the existential fact of leadership of the sort which
results in the Night of the Long Knives. In any case "the concrete
political thought of national-socialism" had already bypassed Schmitt
and devised substantive criteria for his identity of species as well
as his earlier friend/foe dichotomy. Species-identity entailed
biological identity. The division between friend and foe was narrowed
down to the distinction between Aryan and Jew. Schmitt, abandoning
the existential freedom of deciding on foes, swam with the tide and
acquiesed in the concrete racial notions of fighting and leadership.
But the impetus had come fron the outside. Schmitt was left with the
empty shell of an existentialist formalism and the sand of history
slipped through his fingers.
His point about leadership remained clear however. Any exercise
of the leader*8 will was intrinsically justifiable whatever the
consequences. Moreover it was concrete and permanent. The irony
of Schmitt's own position in the Third Reich was that despite his overt
and casusistic alignment with the new order other academic apologists
such as Otto Kollreuter and Hans J. volff who took up the concept of the
"will of the leader" not only left Schmitt in the lurch but tended
to stigmatise him for having produced the henceforth subversive notion
of the total state in which no reference to the Fuehrer existed. Despite
his pliability Schmitt's fall frcm grace came about from his erstwhile
originality. He had not a fraction of the influence in the Reich
he supported that he had in the Republic which he hated. Hven the
erratic freewheeling ideologues of the S.3. attacked him as potentially
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dangerous. Yet another irony also presented itself. The most
articulate justific tion of the Fueherprinzip in the Third Reich came
from the S.3. man whose notion of heroic realism itself owed in earlier
d^ys something to Schmitt's doctrine of fighting - Werner Best.
Using his talent from the safe perch high in the upper ranges of the
police state, Best presented the most extreme expression of support
for the leader's will. In doing so he shed the traces of his earlier
ideological leanings. Instead of fighting, it was the will of the
leader which was the destiny of the German people. Best claimed
prophetically that the Nazi leadership's will was not subject to law
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but only to historical destiny. History alone could punish its
wrongful use and lead Germany on the road to catastrophe. And history
did. Best recoiled before his own doctrine as he saw Gemany moving
along the road to Stalingrad.
The Boxheim Document
Werner Best w: s in fact another notable exception to revolutionary-
nationalist scepticism. His disillusionment with the intellectual
hauteur of Juenger circle and his obsession with the Nietzschean will-
to-power led him to look for more satisfying means of expression than
mere discussion. In 1929 he left the Vormarsch circle fter a
disagreement with Hielscher end Juenger and later joined the Nazi p rty.
From then on he became increasingly contemptuous of Juenger's salon
politics. At the same time his freewheeling approach to politics
and the Intellectual influence of Juenger remained in evidence for
some time. hile Juenger was obsessed by the nature of power, Best
like his new Fuehrer, was obsessed by the seizure of power. In 1931
with the help of some party associates he produced the amazing Boxheim
document which became the first publicly known Nazi plan for an illegal
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seizure of power. Best had become a legal adviser to the party
in the Gauleitung of Hesse and a Nazi deputy in the provincial
parliament. The documents were intended as secret contingency
plans in the event of a communist uprising. After the defection to
the S.P.E. of nilhelm Schafer Gauleiter of Offenbach, where the
rendevous of the oonspirators, Boxheim manor, was located, the documents
were seized by local government officials and made public. Best
claimed that the plans were to be used only in the event of a communist
uprising and while he was suspended from legal duties in Hesse no legal
prosecution was made against him. The exposure of the documents
caused embarrassment to the party leadership who knew of their
existence but not of their content. Hitler was prompted by the
incident to suspend the production of such contingency plans at a
local level in the party and to dery to the press that they had any
effect on the party's general policy of legality. Best, however
retained his membership and position in the party.
Although the incident testified to a degree of local initiative
in part,y aotivism, in Best's particular case, this indicated his new¬
found conviction that the Nazi party was the most suitable vehicle
for totalitarian revolution. The documents reveal quite clearly
a personal independent and cynical plan for the creation of
totalitarian power. Best was acting out the type of vision
theoretically formulated by Schmitt and Juenger, in the political
arena itself. The document bears the mark not only of a counter¬
revolutionary decisionism but also of Juenger's seminal interest
in total mobilization. In its fastidious legalistic jargon and its
quasi-military pronouncements, it in effect amounted to a mandate for
Nazi lawlessness. What it lacked quite significantly was any mention
of the role of the leader. Best had not yet swung round to the
acceptance of Hitler*s will as the prime moving force of national-
socialism. The role of terror and political repression is to be
monopolized here by the S.A. and other party militia. Immediately
"after the suppression of the previous state administration and the
destruction of the commune" - a reference to a communist uprising -
they are ordered to enact a series of emergency decrees and policies
to provide for "the relief of the people.... in the name of the German
nation". This ostensible "rescue operation" was in fact nothing less
than a springboard for the Nazi expropriation of total power. Those
who resisted the measures undertaken by the S.A. for "the restoration
of public security and the organisation of public consumption" would
be executed. The institution of a death penalty euphemistically
regarded as a necessity for the protection of the people was in fact
a carte blanche for S.A, intimidation and terror.
Best had thus followed along classic counter-revolutionary lines.
The example of the Freikorps was obviously at hand. He went further
than this however. The measures he envisaged were not merely emergency
measures but rather the precedent for a new type of permanent exercise
of power which utilised the same freedom of domination and terror
normally available in emergency situations. For Best then goes on
to outline measures for the freezing of production, exchange and the
circulation of money. The description of such economical measures
is never without its irony. They are presented as "guidelines for an
emergency decree to ensure the security of the present property-owning
classest" (sic). In such a situation "all food provisions stand at
the disposal of the S.A." All manufacturers and traders have to
submit an immediate account of all their goods, whether in warehouses
or their own possession. All selling of food provisions is forbidden.
The penalty for hindering or disobeying was in all cases to be
"confiscation of the entire wealth" of the person concerned, plus
anyadditional punishment deemed necessary, including the death penalty.
Furthermore "The S.A. leadership, in coming to the rescue of the
population is compelled to dispose of all available supplies of basic
necessities, that is to say, in practical terms, over the whole
productive output and wealth of each individual German comrade and of
the population as a whole. There i3 no more private income until
further notice." In addition to this, 3est mentions other measures
whose effect to complete this macabre scheme for the destruction of
the market economy in the name of the property-owning classes. The
flow of money is to be stopped by the forbidding of all monetary
payments, including payment of rent and repayment of loans or of the
interest on them.
The projected decision to curtail the whole economic basis
of the property-owning class in order to "protect" it, is all the
more remarkable for the fact that nowhere in the document is there
say specific mention of the communist threat which the justification
for the whole operation in the first place. Unlike Preikorps or
even official Nazi propaganda, there is no reference to the Red terror
nor to ways and means of rooting out communist conspirators in hiding.
The repressive measures outlined by Best seem directed more at the
population th^y are meant to protect. The legalistic decree for the
protection of property reads like a prolegomena to the abolition of
capitalism. Shorn of revolutionary rhetoric, it seeks to ensure
that the destruction of an imagined or even fictitious proletariat is
a signal for the S. . takeover of the means of production in Germany,
A totalitarian regime, in the interests of the middle class wouLd then
accomplish what its working-class enemies had failed to do. The
failure of Marxian class-consciousness signalled the ascendancy of
the Mietsschean will-to-power. What Best had earlier called "the
class-struggle from above" found its practical expression. It is tied
moreover to -the Prussian ethic of work. The propertied classes
effectively deprived of their livelihood, the population at the mercy
of the 8,A. , all victims of terror except for Jews are given the
opportunity of redeeming themselves through work-service. All Germans
of both sexes over the age of sixteen were eligible. The economic
rewards they received were to be wholly dependent on the satisfactory
fulfillment of this duty, or as Juenger might have said, their
factual achievment.
Best* s remarkable document is testament both to the relation betwwen
theory and practice and to its limitations. It is permeated by theoretical
assumptions which come directly from the influence of Juenger's circle.
At the same time it is a concrete plan for a seizure of power within
the Nazi movement. But the Nietzschean thirst for power had its own
pitfalls. Best could only enter the party at one of its more
remote provincial levels and personal plans for the seizure of power
330.
by provincial officials were seen as a threat to the party's drive
to centralisation. Successful promotion meant compromise. Hitler's
protective umbrella for Aryan big business meant that the Boxheim
documents could not be repeated. Best thus looked for compensation
in the more regimented forms of terror in the S.S. Here his
intellectual and legal background made him an articulate spokesman
and an important adviser. Compared with the doctrineless activists
and opportunists like Keydrich, his superior, and Walter Schellenberg,
his contemporary who outshined him, intellectual expertise proved
a hindrance rather than a guide in the real totalitarian struggle
for power. For the ruthless vision of power must have an even more
ruthless pragmatism. Compared with expertise of Heydrich, Best's
progress was only a quasi-triumph. In terms of the political
failure of the revolutionary-nationalists however, it represented
a strange sort of success. It was the major exception to the impasse
of theory and practice which had paralysed the fascist intelligentsia.
Goebbels and Juenger
In their life-style and political outlook, Joseph Goebbels and
hrnst Juenger were poles apart. Goebbel's crucial contribution to
the spectacular rise of Nazism lay in that area which Juenger most
despised - the area of mass propaganda. During the war and. immediately
afterwards there was bitter resentment in Germany about what was
considered to be the effective propaganda machine of the Allied Powers
through which they Justified their claim that they were fighting a war
on behalf of humanity against barbarism. We have already documented the
response of the revolutionary-nationalists. That of Goebbels was
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radically different. Like Hitler he saw the enormous potentialities
of the mass propaganda which had been so effectively used in the
Great War, and he determined to copy it and turn to his own advantage.
The electoral politics he despised offered tremendous opportunities
of building up a mass party through persistent ma3S propaganda, mass
meetings and mass demonstrations. Juenger had seen the permanence
of means in the sphere of technology, Goebbels saw it in the sphere
of propaganda. For here he regarded truth as immaterial. If
Juenger's technology entailed the abolition of values, Goebbel's
propaganda entailed the abolition of truth. ..ore than thi3 it meant
that theory was irrelevant to political practice. He once remarked
"there is no theoretical way of determining which kind of propaganda
is more effective and which kind is less effective". It was the
propagandists end not the philosophers who made history. bile Juenger
relied on the written word, Goebbels used the spoken word to better
advantage perhaps than any other political orator of the twentieth
century. Furthermore he rationalised his own achievement by looking upon
the great men of history in his own image - as propagandists.
".And wh: t else was Jesus Christ? Did he not make
propaganda? Did he write or did he preach? And what
about Mohemmad? Did he write sophisticated essays or
did he go out and tell the people what he wanted?....
Look at our own century. Was Mussolini a scribbler
or was he a great speaker? Vhen Lenin went to St.
Petersberg, did he rush from the station into his study
to write a book or did he speak to the multitude?" 30
Needless to ssy in the year of decision 1932 when Juenger was
in the process of completing Per Arbeiter. Goebbels was racing
indefatigably from one end of Germary to the other making speeches.
Having stated that propaganda was all, Goebbels confined his
intellect to the rostrum and the assemb3y-hall. While Juenger wanted
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to entomb language in the coffin of technology, Goebbels tried to
reduce it to the self-sustaining shriek. His diaries are almost
literally a row of exclamation marks. Theories of brutality may
have been influential but the shout and the exhortation was the nurk
of domination over the masses. Goebbels was a purely amoral
technician of the art of attaining political power. -fter 1933
Heydrich was the equally effective amoral technician who went about
preserving it. In fact both Heydrich and G-oebbels came closest
to Juenger's plea for a total absence of values in political leadership.
Both did so however in ways that were alien to him. And both were
ultimately subordinates to the Hitlerian vision of racial conquest
and extermination, which as technicians they were empowered to
facilitate. Both possessed the doctrineless dynamism necessary for
Hitler's sense of racial mission. Neither possessed the driving
force of that perverted idealism which had revealed itself in the
pages of Mein Kampf. It was a hallucinatory world-mission and
not amoral instrumentalisra which was finally responsible for the
destruction of Germany.
Although in practice Goebbels and Juenger lived in different
worlds, in 1932, those worlds happened to collide. Both had an
inveterate admirer in Arnolt Bronnen, a conoisseur of intellectual
hardness who had turned away from his earlier friendship with Bertolt
Brecht to the fascists of the day.^ Goebbels, never forgetting his
own days of scholarship at Heidelberg and his frustrated ambitions to
be a novelist, still harboured intellectual aspirations. rmed with
Hitler's permission, he sought out some of the Berlin revolutionary-
nationalists, including Juenger and Niekisch in an attempt to persuade
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them to join the party. Niekisch wtts immediately hostile to
him and they almost came to blows. Juenger on the other hand had
several meetings with Goebbels, and the thought of joining the party,
despite his reservations about it, must have crossed his mind. Yet
fully imprinted on his mind was a belief in the gulf between theory
and practice in German nationalism, which as a rule he wished to leave
standing. As early as 1927 he had written:
"There remains the distinction that national-socialism is,
in its role as a political organisation, directed towards
winning the material means of power. The task of nationalism
on the other hand is something different. On the one side
exists the wish to put the idea into practice, on the other
to understand it in its deepest and purest possible sense.
For that reason the masses quite rightly play a role in
national-sooialism, while for nationalism, number has no
significance." 33
As a Nasi seizure of power seemed more and more imminent, this gulf
seemed to widen, even among former comrades. In 1932 Salomon recalls
meeting his former Freikorp3 associate Ernst Roehm by chance on Munich
railway station surrounded by his impressive S.A. entourage. On the
train Roehm offered Salomon an administrative post in the party, claiming
it needed intelleotuals. When Salomon asked what he was to do, the
%
reply came back "Administrate and keep your mouth shut". Hielscher
recalls a similar encounter soon after 1933 in a Berlin restaurant
with his old comrade ferner Best. Best in S.S. uniform told him that
the door was open to him, but promised no opportunities for intellectual
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controversy or salon discussion. Hielscher refused. The same gulf
existed between Juenger and Goebbels. Invited to a select meeting of
intellectuals and dignitaries addressed by Goebbels in Berlin, Juenger
was finally alienated by the Nazi leader* s intellectual pretensions.
He walked out halway through his speech in protest and Goebbels was
33*f
furious. The latter wrote afterwards in his diary, exasperatedly
but also perceptively:
"(These intellectuals) seem utterly unable to grasp
that we really embody something essentially new, that we
will not and cannot be compared with any other party,
that we are aiming at a totalitarian state, and must
attain to absolute power in order to achieve our aims" %
This was something Juenger was unable to concede. How could an
upstart like G-oebbels put into effect the theories of a superior
man? And even though they were a blueprint for a totalitarian state
which had no need of theories anyway? The tenuous links which
Juenger possessed wiih Nazism were filially broken.
The Strange case of Martin Heidegger
This did not mean of course that Juenger,s work ceased to
influence others towards Nazism, It still seemed possible for
outsiders to mistakenly identify revolutionary-nationalists doctrine
with the ideology of national-socialism. In North G-ermany after all,
the ideas of the revolutionary-nationalists were very influential in
the party. In this context perhaps the most remarkable convert to
national-socialism during the seizure of power was the Freiburg
existentialist philosopher Martin Heidegger. As Jean-Michel Palmier
has shown very convincingly, Heidegger's attachment to national-sooialism
came not from ary direct interest in politics, for which prior to 1933
he had shown little inclination, but because he regarded Juenger's
Per Arbeiter as the true philosophy of national-aocialisu. Largely
for this reason he became rector of Freiburg in 1933 Joined the Nazi
party, and played a temporary role in the academic G-lelohschaltung
presided over in university circles by Ernst Krieck at Frankfurt and
Alfred Baumler at Berlin. Heidegger's inaugural rectoral address
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Die Selb3tbehauptung der deutschen Univer3itaeten and various articles
for the student newspaper during the course of the next ten months
in fact testify quite clearly the impact of .Tuenger • s work. Later in
1939 after his disillusionment with Nazism, he unsuccessfully attempted
to promote a seminar course on Der rbeiter which was soon terminated by
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the university authorities."'
The ideological basis of the Gleichschaltung of the university
did in fact give Heidegger some round for considering national-
socialism in this light. Ernst Krieck and Alfred Baumler, the
newly appointed Professor of Philosophy at Berlin and a friend of
Juenger in the late twenties both attempted to introduce into the
universities the fighting ethos of the front-experience. Denunciations
of the classic ideals of humanist learning introduced into German
universities at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Wilhelm
von Humboldt were accompanied by strident demands for a student
body with a new "soldierly spirit". For Baumler "the theoretical
man" of the campus was to be replaced by "the political soldier".^
For Krieck the university was to be the incubator for a new "intellectual
soldiery" whose symbol was to be Horst "essel.^ otudentdom was an
intellectual political construction. In a similar vein Baumler saw the
student's task as a continuation of the political revolution of 1933
by intellectual means parallel witii a "social revolution" of worker's
and peasants. The political soldier, Baumler stated, would approach
learning in a Nietzschean fashion as a heroic task. Opposed to
positivism on the one hand and irrationalism on the other would be a
"heroic rationalism" where the attraction of danger offset the security
of positivism and the armchair learning of nineteenth century
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humanism. The compulsory qualification for teachers and students
alike seemed to "be the soldierly life-style rampant in all the other
party organisations,not only the S. A. and the S.S. but also the Labour
Front and the Hitler Youth.
All this fits quite credibly with the cult of the front-experience.
Heidegger's own version of it, more subtle, and finally regarded as
subversive by the party experts, was to appropriate Juenger's idea of
fitting as a form of work. It i3 Juenger's theme of work as universal
praxis which informs Heidegger's own statements on the German
universities. Although he starts off in his rectoral address at
Freiburg by claiming that in the academic community of both teacher
and student bodies "must place itself at the disposal of fighting,"
he then goes on to conceptualise all activity under nit ional-socialism
as "service". There are three types of service - woik-service by which
students participate in the people's community; military-service by
which they contribute to the defence of the nation's honour and
destiny; and knowled^e-service which is concerned with "the spiritual
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mission of the German people". The idea of learning as service is,
according to Heidegger, totally incompatible with the idea of
"academic freedom" in the liberal sense which he rejects as "unreal
and negative". But what was to be the model for service to the state?
The academic community was to model itself on the discipline of
physical work. Heidegger claimed that "the fighting community of
teacher and student should remodel itself on the work-place". He
exhorted his stulents in his article for the Freiburg student Newspaper
to join the then voluntary work-camps being set up by the Nazis for
®erman youth. "In the work-camp a? new reality presents itself", he
wrote. "It stands as the symbol for the opening-out of our higher
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"441earning to the new educational power of work-service. The university
community could not only destroy once and for all its traditional
academic insularity but organise "their whole existence in a simpler,
harsher and more ascetic manner than any of their comrades" to prove
their own worth as workers.
Clearly unlike Krieck and Baumler, Heidegger did not merely
envisage a student emulation of the soldierly life-style, but an
active attempt by students to imitate rival and surpass the
disciplined methods of work in other spheres of life. The division
of labour between the head and the hand itself was to break through
the intellectual emulation of the life-style of work. Intellectuals
were to become workers - not merely intellectual workers, but woikers
as such. In one of his last articles on work-service in January 1934,
shortly before his resignation as rector, Heidegger states quite
openly his reversal of the meanings of work and intellect. All
genuine intellectual endeavour is but one aspect of work. Heidegger
sees the new national-socialist Germany as dominated by Juenger's
totalitarian metaphysic.
"Aithin the German university a new basis for scientific
work will slowly emerge. This will resuLt in the disappearance
of the concept of intellect and intellectual work within which
the "refined academic" (G-ebildete) has operated up to now and
which his emissaries still wish to rescue for an autonomous
concept of the "intellectually creative" .... do-called
intellectual work is not intellectual because it is related to
higher spiritual pursuits but because as work it reaches back
into the necessity of the historical existence of its people
and is directly - because scientifically - assailed by the
harshness of the dangers of human existence.
"There is only one single "living-class" (Lebenstand) in
Germaiy, That is the work-class (Arbeitstand) which is rooted
in the fertile soil of the German people and freely united
with the historical will of the state. Its character has
previously been moulded in the movement of the National-
socialist German worker's party." 43
What attracted Heidegger to Juenger's approach was his attempt
to subordinate all activity to the concept of work and all science
and knowledge to the concept of technology. The latter in particular
seemed to complement his firm conviction that modern science was
subordinate in importance to philosophy.^ For he traced his own
existentialism directly back to the Greek pre-socratie notion of
"being". The history of Western metaphysics he regarded as a process
of degeneration consequent upon the eclipse of pre-socratic philosophy.
Juenger* s confrontation with technology provided him with a means for
restoring the concern with "being" in modem thought. Even when his
brief flirtation with Nazism was over, the obsession with technology
remained. In 1935 he was still claiming that the "inner truth and
greatness" of the Nazi movement was its acceptance of "the encounter
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between global technology and modern man." The same theme continued
to haunt the rhetoric of his post-war writings.
The attraction to technology was made at no small cost, Heidegger
blithely overlooked the political cynicism of Juenger*s arguments, his
worship of Stalinist terror, and from a philosophical point of view,
the overtly Darwinian components of the conception of work. '11
conspired to undermine any analogy between the destructive nature of
;
modem technology and the Greek conception of tragic being. It also
perverted the understanding of Greek tragedy in modern philosophy.
Sixty years previously, Nietzsche had illuminated the birth of tragedy.
With Juenger and Heidegger* s turn to technology, this illumination was
at an end. Existentialism emerged cut of all this, less as a doctrine
of tragic being, than as a justification for murder and slavery, Heidegger
has rightly been exonerated, from the taint of Nazism and especially of
anti-semitism. Spied on by the Gestapo who reported to the anxious
Baumler and attacked by Krieck for his philosophical connections with
"decadent" Jewish philosophers like Georg Simmel and Edmund Husserl, he
was finally forced out of the party a disillusioned man. But
while his departure was partially honourable, his entry was less so.
He was led to Nazism by the philosophically complex but nonetheless
nihilistic creed of the abolition of values in the modern world.
It was a ludicrous commitment born out of political ignorance. For
he knew nothing of the political differences between Juenger and the
Nazis, and had never in fact met Juenger. But under the circumstances
of his own insularity ani the attraction of nihilism in German philosophy it
was totally feasible. Heidegger's plea for the abolition of "refined
intellect" was ironically enough a plea for the abolition of the very
circumstances by which he mistakenly joined the Nazi movement in the
first place. It was a plea made under the vexy conditions which he
was trying to terminate. Without them it would have scarcely been
possible. The result was that he was to cast a long and enduring
shadow over his intellectual reputation for a movement which had
little intrinsic interest for him. But to his chagrin, and because
of his naivity, he found that out too late. And there is always a
lingering suspicion that to more amenable forms of totalitarianism,
his particular brand of existentialism would always have been
susceptible.
Work: and the Dissolution of the Bourgeois >,orlu
One thing which Heidegger had taken seriously was the Nazi
claim to be a "German workers' party". The reality was more
contradictory and ambiguous. Its early composition was predominantly
lower-middle class. Although later an attempt was made to recruit
urban workers, especially in the North, after 1928 the majority of its
recruits came from small-town or rural backgrounds when it switched
to a predominantly nationalist and patriotic platform. The urban
worker was in fact the most resistant stratum of the population to
Nazism, despite Goebbels tendency to see a stout proletarian beneath
eveiy brown shirt. One of the obvious reasons for this was the strong
political organisation of the communists and the social-democratic
partisanship of the major trade unions. .Another was the Nazi party
ban on the formation of Nazi unions and Hitler's policy of courting
large industrialists for funds which led among other things to his
confrontation with Otto Stressor after the letter's defiance of a
p rty ban on strikes in Saxony. Deprived of the right to organise
unions and with only a small number of exceptions, the right to
support strikes, the Northern radicals encountered great difficulties
in their efforts to make the movement live up to its name as a German
worker's party. Efforts nonetheless were made. Gregor Strasser,
with the help of Berlin associates such as Reinhold Muchow started up
a factory cell organisation the Nationalsozialistische Betrlebsorganisation.
Alfred Krebs, the Gauleiter of Hamburg who was active in the organisation
recalls that though some young communists were converted the majority
of recruits were young white-collar workers from the Free (politically
unaligned) Trade Unions fearing unemployment during the uncertainty of
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the depression. The N.S.B.O. thus became a channel for the
political radioalisation of white collar-workers fearing proletarianisation.
It was one of the most concrete and militant expressions within the
party of what Zehrer had called "the revolution of the centre".
The revolution of the centre was accompanied however in this
context not only by an emphasis on the need to avoid proletarianisation
but by an ideological emphasis upon a revitalised conception of the German
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worker. One of the Tat circle's great white hopes in the resistance
to proletarianisation had been the nationalist white-collar Deutsche
Handlungsverband. It was this same union which Kerbs canvassed
unsuccessfully in Hamburg to give the Party full official support.
The large number of its members who did join the party on an individual
basis did show however that outside theinions the N.S.B.O. managed to
gain some limited sucoess.^' But in the depression situation, the
fear of unemployment which undoubtedly helped its cause was offset
by the widespread dimensions of unemployment itself. Here it
was the S.A. rather than the N.S.B.O. which was the beneficiary of
Germany's economic troubles. In terms of the general expansion of
party organisations and in comparison say with the Nasi success in
enlisting the farmer's Landbund to its cause, the N.S.B.O. fared
badly. Its strong ideological orientation came very much from the
commitment of its leaders to the most difficult and unrewarding tasks
of the Nazis.
The Nazi myth of the German worker as a stereotypical opposite
of the "degenerate proletarian" was one of its main ideological props.
In opposition to the notion of a proletariat or "a working-class"
(Arbeiterschaft) Strasser came to use a term first suggested by the
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national-bolshevik August Winnig, a "workerdom" (Arbeitertura) and
Winnig himself moved closer to national-social ism in the eo.r!y thirties
claiming that national-socialism was the only movement with a feasible
chance in the historical circumstances of creating a genuine German
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worker's movement. .Vhat in fact was the sociological and political
basis of this projected workerdom? It constituted by and large a
pre-emptive middle-class strike against the idea and the possibility
of proletarianisation. ork was to be both a life-style and a
reality for all Germans. By 1932 when the N. S,B»0. possessed
a membership of over two hundred thousand and over eight thousand factory
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cells, Gtrasser felt confident enough to qpeak of a embryonic German
worker's movement which included manual workers, clerical workers and
employers. He told a rally of the N. 3. B.O. in the Berlin Sportspalast
"I am convinced that the ultimate victory of the H.3.B.O. hinges on the
realisation that the problem of the German worker is a spiritual and
53
metaphysical problem". The materialist conception of the worker
inaugurated by the French revolution was dying with the disintegration of
the liberal world-view. Marxism and pacifism were merely offshoots
of a disintegrating liberalism and the workers' movement was estranged
from the state in Germany by "Bourgeois-Jewish loaders". For Strasser
the true concept of work meant an alliance of the third and fourth
estates to the exclusion of big business and international finance-
capitalism. Thus he spoke of a new unity between work-employee
(Arbeitnehmer) and entrepreneur (Untemehmer) on the basis of what he
described in a famous Reichstag speech as the "anti-capitalist yearning"
of ninety-five per cent of the German people, who were fighting against
54"the demons Gold, world-economy and materialism".
Strasser's conception of work owes much to Spengler. He saw
work as a Prussian life-style based on the example of officialdom, and
he spoke of it as embodying the "achievement principle of the Prussian
55officier and the German civil servant". Thus ownership, bureaucracy
and labour involved the same ethical conception of work, the same
disciplined obedience and effort to be found in a soldierly life-style.
By this means all class distinctions were to be finally overcome. The
attempt by Strasser and the N. S. B.C. to organise a movement of 'classless'
workers provided an important contemporary context for Juenger*s
own preoccupation with work. Yet Juenger despised the idea used by
both Spengler and Strasser, that work could be based upon some species
of officialdom. He atiacxed it as bureaucratic, one of the reasons
why he eventually dismissed Carl Schmitt's idea of a total state.
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The latter could only, he said, lead to "a total bureaucracy",-^
Moreover his acclaim of Stalinist industrialisation led him to a
point diametrically opposed to the Trotskyist critique of Stalinist
Russia as a degenerate worker* s state which had stultified through
bureaucracy. The Darwinian struggle for survival undermined all forms
of bureauoraey and made expertise the tool of danger and destruction.
Yet there were points of similarity between Straaaer and Juenger,
Strasser's contention that the problem of work was metaphysical was
the starting point, his idea of the unity of the third and fourth
estates a necessary presupposition of Juenger*s theory of technology.
The similarity also shows in his ambivalent attitude to private
property. Whereas someone like Riekisch regarded the abolition of
private property as a necessary principle, Juenger claimed that the
principle was a matter of indifference. What mattered was the
consequences of total mobilisation and not the premises of "an abstract
radicalism" which as often as not were incapable of being translated
into active policies. He demanded instead a "devaluation of ownership"
based on the destruction of the values associated with private ownership,
"Private initiative", he claimed, "will become unthinkable the moment
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it is assigned the status of a special attribute of work," Moreover
he went on to counter the Marxist preoccupation with private ownership
by suggesting that all that was really necessary was the destruction of
the feeling of private ownership. How was this to be done?
It was to be achieved by an idea, also preached by Strasser, of the
distribution of fiefs. Under total mobilisation "every form of
ownership will possess the more or less distinctive attributes of a
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fief". This romantic feudal notion enables Juenger to conceive
of his "orders" of fighter-workers as possessors of a fief, and of
technocrats as modern medieval knights. It also enabled him to conceal
his peculiar blindness to the problem of leadership. If the worker-
technocrat was a vassal, who was his master? For this there is no
answer.
The point of divergence between Juenger and otrasser, given initially
similarities, lies in Juenger*s totalitarian model of technology. For
Stressor's idea of work remained subordinate to his belief in an
authoritarian corporatlst state. While, ironically enough, his
position as Organisation leader of the party made him crucially
responsible for the party cell organisation which was to play such an
important pai-t in the G-lelchschaltung of 1933» his theory by contrast
was more modest in its claims. "We want an authoritarian state" he
proclaimed. "We recognise the higher authority of the state to demand
obedience and discipline from us if the state itself guarantees
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justice." There was little hint in Strasser®s speeches of the degree
of Nasi control to come after 1933. He advooated a planned economy
involving nationalisation of essential industries, but this was hardly
any different from the mixed economies of maiy modern West European
countries. His other main platform was the demand for the creation
of "vocational organisations" based upon occupational status, which,
in a very Durkheimian manner, would have the dual task of social
integration and political socialisation. They were to be relatively
autonomous organisations, and it was to be on the basis of this autonomy
that loyalty and. discipline could be promoted. This concession to
autonomy meant that Strasser's ideas were received very favourably in
1932 and 1933 in the columns of Die Tat.
More susceptible than Juenger and the national-bolsheviks to the
threat of totalitarianism, Zehrer and his editorial associates became
amenable to the seemingly anti-totalitarian yet sociologically conscious
position of Strasser in the period immediately before the seizure of
power. Ferninand Fried could be read calling for "corporatist
reconstruction" and "a planned eoonony" free from bolshevik influence,^
while Hans Zehrer made a last defiance stand against the Nazis on the
issue of institutional autonomy. In March 1933 he demanded that the
new German state should possess "Authority and respect for government;
distance between ruler and ruled; and autonony for communities, districts
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and professions." In fact he criticised the Nazis as both liberal
and totalitarian. On the one hand he resented their parliamentary
methods, on the other he criticised "the fascist experiment of a one-
p.rty dictatorship." He allowed Strasser and his associates an
ideological platform in Die Tat.even to the extent of publishing an
anonymous article by Strasser himself, wuich was used by Goebbels to help
discredit him in Hitler's eyes. But they overrated Strasser's role in the
party, predicting after his resignation from all posts of responsibility,
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that the Nazi party would collapse. It overcame the crisis however without
great difficulty, a task made easier by virtue of the fact that Strasser
proclaimed his continuing loyalty to the party and to Hitler.
Strasser's motives in negotiating with Schleicher have never
clearly been brought to light. Recently Dietrich Orlow has suggested
that after the setbacks of 1932 when the Nazi3 had failed to gain an
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electoral parliamentary majority, Strasser was convinced that power
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could only be gained initially through coalition and compromise.
It is quite possible that he was aiming for total power just as much
as Hitler or Goebbels. But his preparedness to relinquish this position
temporarily,for whatever motives, brought him support from Die Tat
which was attempting to break the Nasi monopoly on the kind of
social radicalism it favoured itself. Whether this would have
resolved the tension between the intellectuals and the party is
doubtful. From Strasser's point of view, the recruitment of
intellectual support was a way of enhancing the goals of the party,
not of ansiring its ideological correctness. While he was obviously
less mchievellian with respect to potential intellectual sympathisers
than Goebbels, the dilemma of prior ities remained. Having resigned
his leadership posts, he made no attempt to oppose Hitler at all.
This decision wa3 perhaps a more crucial key to his political role
and political thinking tiian any pronouncement on the nature of work
or the ideology of corporatism.
Under Robert Ley, the German Labour Front, which effectively
took over control of the industrial initiative of the N.S.B.O. after
the downfall of Strasser remained committed to its soldierly image.
Ley called the German worker "a soldier of work". In other ways
there was little continuity. The ideological discussions of a new
workerdom ceased. The Labour Front did atie up t an abolition of class
distinctions by joining employers and workers together in one
organisation. It did so however, by forgoing many of the
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characteristics of Prussian socialism. The Front attached itself
to the mass euphoria of the Nazi movement as a whole and adopted as its
slogan the phrase ".Strength through Joy". For Juenger the phrase
could only have been "Strength through Fein"• In the radical
tr nsform tion of identity that occurred during the convulsions of the
Nazi revolution, the imsge of bourgeois citizenship g ve way not so much to
an im ge of fighting-work as to one of ry: n purity in e new racial com. unity.
But work as an instrument of bourgeois self-destruction had done its task.
In anonymous writer in Die Tat pondered over Juenger's prophecy of the
decline of the bourgeois and the emergence of the new worker-type. But he
expressed a sense of elation rather than a sense of regret. After all that
destruction was not to be carried out by the working-clfss but by the
bourgeoisie themselves. "e ought to admit with glo ing pride", he
proclaimed, "that the bourgeoisie whose final role in the history of
capitalism is currently being enacted, pl»ys the .ec - sire role in its ov.n
destruction". ^
The idea of work was crucial among many German nationalists to the
bourgeois destruction of bourgeois existence. It was precisely through
the Prussian ideal of work that the young bourgeois gener tion could play
the decisive role in its own destruction. It wa. the same ideal of work
which tr; nscended the mutual repulsion of Nazism and Stalinism.
rnst Fischer the Marxist art critic recalled an altercation with a
Stalinist acquaintance about the sculptor Josef Thorak's Nazi "Monument to
L bour" on the Reich Autobahn. The st; linist had teen busy foaming about
bourgeois iecadence when Fischer showed him a photograph of it. "but what's
decadent about that?", came the reply. "Labour, the horny hand.... Vas that
by a Nazi too? A pity!"*^
ilem-nn Rauschning -nd the Role of Ide a in olltics
Of til the former Nazis ho turned against the movement find criticised
it in tne thirties, the most intellectually penetrating i3 Hera, nn Eauschning.
Rausdining, an East Prussian former and a Nazi party le der in the D-nzig
Sen; te, reproduced in his conversations with Hitler of 193? and 1933 an
astonishing document of Hitler's political attitudes and his outlook on life
gener; 13y. Despite this however, Rauschning w/ss to drastically
over-rate the influence of revolution ry-nationaliaa in the Nazi revolution.
It is revolutionary-nationalism which is the dominant ideological component
in his idea of Nazism a3 a "revolution of nihilism". hile Rausdining
admitted that the first jnd crucial phase of Nazism w: 3 the mobilisation of
the masses for purposes of attaining total power, he saw "the second phase
of the revolution" as being an almost direct transformation of Germany into
a totalitarian worker's state. Cruci 1 to this is Juenger's idea of a
new Gem n worker, v^ich according to Hauschning, wrs the growing idea among
the German younger gener tion:
"drnst Juenger' great vision of the Gesti It of the worker
is winning growing support, among national-socialist youth as
well as among the young who no longer support the national-
isocialists, in the amy and the young intelligentzia, in the
professions where the brainwork of tec nology is performed, even
in the S.S., right inside the narrowest circle of party fanatics
....His 'democracy of work* is whet national-aoci.-liam claims to
be, the genuine unity of evolutionary nationalism and socialism." 0
For this reason he went on to devalue the racial basis of n tional-
ssocialism, which he saw r.s mainly Austrian in origin, and elevate the
Prussian conception of work. Thus he speaks of the younger generation as
"the harder generation" an elite "which has voluntarily undertaken on
ascetic existence and is acoustomed to silence". Thi3 leads him to the
final misguided assertion that "national-soci lism was nations1-bolshevisa
plus noise and darkened counsel". Iiow is it, th«t although he saw the
nihilistic and self-destructive n, ture of national-socialism, he saw it
specifically in national-bolshevist terms? The answer is that he
generalises from what remains a segment of the movement but a limited segment
nonetheless. He himself knew of the ideological objections of Hitler to
"Prussian socialism" and "national-bo'lshevism". In his conversations of
1953 Hitler had told him, in what seemed a fairly direct reference to Juenger;
"These beliefs in the supranational worker's state with
production plans and production districts can only come out of
the misguided over-rationalised brains of a literary clique
that has lost its sound instincts." '
Despite this however, Rauschning had witnessed enough evidence of the
favourability of Juengerian conceptions among intellectuals, army officers,
party members and the like, to conclude that despite Hitler's own position,
the infrastructure! basis of the revolution would eventually undermine its
leader's own position. Among his accounts of enthusiasts of technology, he
mentions the extraordinary freelance fantasising of his close party colleague
Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, Koch had set up a planning institute
headed by a young professor of economics, at the University of Koenigsberg,
with party approval. Its task was to map out the possibilities of creating
planne landscapes over the whole of Eastern Europe, Its proponents
envisaged a European land-mass free from national boundaries, which could
become the basis of a technological empire. Here "planning chambers would
take the place of the parliaments of the p?st", technology would generate
totally calculable forms of human behaviour, and "human inadequacy was
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finally to be destroyed". It was the same Koch for whom Rsusohning was
acting as emissary when his conversations with Hitler took place. Hitler's
answers were therefore guarded for the tactical motive of keeping in favour
with the most distant of his Northern Gauleiters, Nonetheless his response
to Rauschning's suggestion of planned landscapes in the East was unequivocal,
"Only one can rule", he stated, "If we want to rule, we must first conquer
Russia, .After that Koch can go on carrying out his 'planned landscapes'.
Not before,Taile Rauschning fled to the west, Koch remained to play his
part in the Nazi version of the Drang nach Oaten, He became the Governor
of Ukraine and acted like the leader of a slave state. Though he was very
much his own master, resisting the encroachements of the S.S, on the one hand
and Rosenberg's ineffectual Ostministerium on the other, everything that
remained of his planned landscapes was submerged in mass slaughter and racial
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liquidation. In the execution of the Komiassrbefehl and the Final Solution,
no blackboard planning could match the crude imperialistic impetus of
gangsterish squabbles over extermination,
Rauschning in fact selected Juenger's work as the Leitmotif of Nazi
nihilism because in reality no guiding theme seeiaed to exist. Hitler made
no secret of his hatred of the Jews but he also made no mention of his plans
for a final solution. One reason why Rauschning had obviously such a great
interest in hearing the opinions of his leader was that few ideological
guidelines had been laid down by the movement at all in the years prior to
the seizure of power. The leadership principle created a vacuum into which
many strands of revolutionary-nationalist doctrine were sucked. For
national-socialism had no ideological core. Mle the communist party
presented revolutionary-nationalists with the alien language of Marxism,
Nazism presented them with no language at all. The official bible of
national-socialism was Alfred Rosenberg's The Myth of the Twentieth Century.
But its most nota le quality was its obscurity. At the Nuremberg trials
nearly all the party leaders testified to never having read it, Even Hitler
himself took no interest in it. He confessed to finding it "too abstract"
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and contented himself with flipping through the pages. Other ideologues
in the party like Gottfried Feder, its economic expert were politically
ineffectual and largely ignored. On the whole, it was only the Prussian wing
of the party which took ideological debate seriously and here the language of
revolutionaxy-n.tionalism w.-s most certainly an appealing one. But such a
debate played little role in gaining the support of the masses. Here it was
the simplified negativism of Goebbel's propaganda which ruled the dsy -
anti-bolshevism, anti-oapitalisa, anti-semitism.
There was also a further motive in R&uschning's mistaken identification of
nationalist theory and National-socialist practice. It lies in his ambivalent
feelings about conservatism and revolution. Like many others, he claims to
have joined the Nazi party from the conserv tive Right in order to gain control
over the irrational masses. He eventually repudiated its gangster methods
and its 1 ok of respect for authority and tradition. But he claimed
nonetheless to believe in the idea of a conservative revolution. from a
conservative standpoint he claims that a conservative revolution is the
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opposite of the revolution of nihilism. But if he used aueriger as the
archetype of Germ-m nihilism, he shirked a fundamental truth - namely that
nihilism was a logical consequence of the conservative revolution. Por
Nazism, despite its crude gangster tactics, did not go so fan as Juenger in
its contempt for all forms of tradition. Rauschning, like Albert Speer
in his recent memoirs, over-rated the Nazi subservience to technocracy.
The slogan of 'Blut und Boden" did possess a certain resonance. If any social
stratum was ideologically favoured by the Nazi leadership, it was the
peasantry. Walther Dance advocated colonisation of the east not through
technology, but with a peasant squireachy. Himraler was proud to recruit
into the S.S. men of peasant stock. Hitler himself told Rauschning that he
favoured the cunning of the peasant in preference to the urban proletarian.
Christophe Steding the sickly free-wheeling ideologue who wrote himself into
official favour with hi3 rambling treatise Das Reich und der Krankheit der
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Kurooaischen Kultur was from a peasant background. It was an intellectual
clique of conservatives rather then the Nazis who betrayed conservatism most
fundamentally. They did so however with a relentless logic which was
intended to shatter the whole idea of conservatism while maintaining its
reality in a concealed form. It was with this sentiment, found so strongly
in national-bolshevisra, with which Rauschning had first flirted and finally
rejected. But having reject©! it, he used it to defame Nazism, and to revert
once more to a traditional conservative position. From this position, it was
national-bolshevism rather than Nazism which was his greatest eneiqy. But as a
conservative insider in German nationalism, nothing was easier for him to
address his anti-Nazi audience by combining find confusing the two. It was for
this reason he claimed that Nazism after 1934 was undergoing its second
"revolutionary-nationalist" phase when revolutionary—n tionalisra had
already ceased to exist*
After 1934 in fact, Juenger's world of technology no longer mattered
to him, iiile Niekisch carried out until 1935 a heroic slid futile
Prussian resistance to the Nazis which resulted in his eventual arrest,
Juenger had already made his flight into a world of insects and flowers.
Refusing to join the German Academy of /:rts, writing to the Voelkische Beobachter
to request that they refrain from quoting him without permission or
acknowleigement, he retreated to the medieval town of Goslar in the Harz
Mountains where he could find refuge from the Third Reich. Technology's
advocate turned hack to naturalism. Politically he became once more
quiescent and traditionally conservative. ids fable of the rise of Nazism
On the Marble Cliffs'7"* was published in 1939 and secretly acclaimed by
opponents as an anti-Nazi tract. The authorities prevented it from further
printing but did little to stop the circulation of the thirty-five thousand
copies aire; dy published. Its message was ambiguous. 'hile it had the
courage to portray the violence of the Nazis, it did nothing to condemn it.
While Juenger* r> literary talent allowed him to achieve an exceptional clarity
of allegorical expression, its fictitious setting is that of a pastoral and
medieval world. At points it reads like one of Grimia's fairy tales.
Juenger' s fascination with violence thus reestablishes itself as age-old,
independent of modern war and modern life. It is written no longer with the
eye of the professional murderer but with that of the distant aetheste.
The compulsions of the storm-fighter are replaced by the compulsions of the
voyeur. The atrocities of the Mauretanians, the Nasi tribe are the subject
of lengthy fascination and elegant descriptions. As Juenger himself says he
watches "with the pleasure one finds in watching corrosions form as acid bites
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into dark mirrors of polished metal".' The result is that nothing emerges
from Juenger'3 allegorical bloodbath of violence that could remotely be called
revulsion, horror or outrage.
In the novel he and his brother ere threatened by the Mauret&nians (Nazis)
in their n turalist retreat in Marina. They have become the very aesthetes
and romantics whose impending liquidation Juenger hod triumphantly forecast
in Per Arbeiter through technology. But with one difference - persecution
was timeless, and. the persecutors s. murdering criminal gang. Yet even then,
when Juenger was emulating the Parisian aeatheticism, he had. previously so
roundly condemned, there is still on the brink of disaster the recompense
of that final feeling of inward metaphysical calm he had once experienced in
the great slaughters of 1918:
"With the Muretaniana absolute stillness reigned, as in
the heart of a cyclone. They say that id* one falls headlong
into an abyss one sees things in minutest detail through a
crystal clear lens. This - without the fear - was the vision
which one .acquired in the sir of if uretruiia, in an atmosphere
that was poisoned througn and through. At the very moment when
terror reigned, coolness of thought and spiritual detachment
increased. In the face of catastrophe good humour was everywhere
and they would jest at it like the keeper of a gaming table at
the loss of his clients."77
Juenger's horrifying detachment and insensitivity to violence was due to
his ability to conquer eiy other response to it. But the only other form
of response he considered authentic was th t of fe r. Detachment and its
perverted pleasures were the outcome of the total conquest of fear. But
once fear had gone, notkxng remained. Alone among the talented writers of
the twentieth century Juenger seemed to have pushed to its further limits the
p-redox of sensibility utterly devoid of feeling. In spite of his rejection
of Nazism all that finally separated the philosopher of violence from its
plebian practitioners was the fastidious scorn of the snob. He nostalgically
lamented the ritualism of fighting on which his o.vn doctrine had poured scorn
and which the Nazis had found dispensable. 'The core of rough honour which hed
tempered violence was destroyed", he wrote, "and mere crime remained". He
stayed on however to watch the violence of *mere crime* whether in occupied
Paris or on his tour of the Hussian Front with the precise mathematical eye
of a De Sade. For the front-fighter turned aesthete, the pornography of
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Auf die '.I.-irmorklippen Hamburg 1939. (-Jiglish translation
On Cliffs of .Marble 2nd ed. London 1970)• At least two of
the characters apart from Juenger nd his brother bear
affinities to members of Juenger's circle. The priest
Fathe Lampros is a fairly recognisable portrait of
lielscher. racqucnart, the(Nazi) Manretanian who challenges
his own leader and is killed with his hounds in a bloody
slaughter bear.) some resemblance to Werner Best. The
novel itself came out during the period when Best began to
have his disagreements with Heydrich. It seems quite
likely however that Bracquemart*s revolt against the Chief
Ranger (Hitler) was a fictional conceit or a piece of wishful
thinking, rather than the revelation of a master-plot.
Nonetheless the description of Bracquemart throws light not
only (possibly) on Best, but on Juenger himself, to whom
the following criticisms might equally apply:
"Bracquemart we knew from earlier days, but we h d seen
him only fleetingly for he was always on his travels....
Like all those who hunger after power and mastery, he was
led astray by his wild dreams into the realm of Utopias.
It was his opinion that from the beginning of history there
had been two races of men on garth - the masters and the
slaves - and they h: d been crossed.... It may seem
noteworthy that in this affair Bracquemart wanted to
confront the Ranger, although there was much in common in
their ways of thought and action. Yet there was a difference
to this degree, that the Ranger had in mind to people the
Marina with wild beasts, while Bracquemart looked on it as
land to besettled v.dth slaves and their overlords. At bottom
the question revolved round one of the internal conflicts
bet.een Mauretanians which it is not possible to resolve here....
Is far as Bracquemart is concerned, he bore the unmistakeable
stamp of nihilism in its later stages.... he conceived of life
as the mechanism of a clock, and therefore in force and in
terror ne saw trie gears which drive the timepiece of life....
Creation had died in his heart, and he had reconstructed it
like a mechanical toy. The flowers which blossomed on his
brow were blooms of ice....
In his thinking he took life for his model, find was insistent
that thoughts should be armed with tooth and claw. Yet his
theories were the product of distillation, and in the process
the true vital force was lost; they lacked a precious
ingredient - the rich abundance which alone imparts a saviour.
The dominant quality of his plans was aridness, although there
was no error to be found in his logic. Similarly the trueness
of a bell is lost through ah invisible fault in the casting.
The reason was that vdth him power was too much a matter of the
intellect, and found too little expression in grandezza, in native
d^sinvolture. In this respect the chief Ranger had the better of
him, for he wore his power like a good old hunting jacket that
fitted him the better the oftener it was steeped in mire and
blood. For this reason I had the impression that Bracquem rt
was about to embark upon an ill-fated venture, in such encounters
the theorist has always been worsted by the man of action."
On Cliffs of Marble, pp.8083.
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CHAPTER XIII
The Expiration and the Legacy,
After 1933# revolutionary-nationalism ceased to exist. Like
all the other political doctrines which it had so ferociously opposed
liberalism, Marxism, social democracy, traditional conservatism, it was
victim of the empty self-proclaimed National-Socialist World-view
which substituted for doctrine its beloved leader, its hatred of
Jewry, and the delusion of the German people as a master race.
Revolutionary-Nationalism thus expired with the expiration of its greatest
enemies. Otto Strasser left Germany but was hounded outside it by
the ' ,S. His brother was shot curing the purge of the S.A. in 1934.
H ns Zehrer left politics altogether as Lie Tat, shorn of its critical
voice limped on for several more years before disappe ring. The
heroic and futile opposition of Niekisch resulted in his eventual
imprisonment. He was saved from execution through the intervention
of Mussolini of all people. Juenger and Hielscher were left alone and
also saved from execution - this time by Best after the disaster of
Stalingrad. Hielscher was arrested by the Nazis after the assasination
attempt on Hitler in 1944. But Juenger although an officer in Paris
under the very Wehrmaeht Generals who were most in favour of the plot,
declined to participate. Practically all Juenger's circle had the
fortune - or misfortune - to outlive Hitler, and to protest as loudly
as possible the strength of their "hostility" to Nazism. Juenger became
a pan-European and a catholic; Niekisch temporarily tried the East
but suffered at the hands of the new Prussian bolshevists of the D.c.R,
who unsportingly toed the party line and started to censor his books.
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Stalin's Russia had finally become a technological world-empire and
made Juenger' s writing a prophecy half come true. Rut it was
inundated with the tedious and endless dialectical language of
Communist Party officialdom which he abhored. Having had little to
say while Nazism was triumphant, the remnants of revolutionary-nationalism
had even less to say now that it was finished. As their various
memoirs testify, they had little genuine criticism of the Nazis.
Some of the national-bolsheviks such as Niekisch and Harro Schulze-
Boysen, who joined the Rote Kapelle resistance movement, did show courage
and defiance. At the same time they had been converted to Marxism.
The majority of revolutionary-nationalists opted to stay west of the
Iron Curtain.
What then is the legacy of a doctrine which collapsed as a political
movement? It is that, while never politically influential it retained
a ring of prophecy about some of the developments in the post-war era.
Under the iron rule of the most authoritarian of all the last European
communist parties the German Democratic Republic represented a marriage
of sorts between Prussianism and Bolshevism. In the Cold War,
technology, as Juenger prophesied, was organised on a global basis for
the purposes of military defence and destruction. Moreover because
history seemed to have borne out some of its prophecies, it made
an impact, though not an altogether explicit one, upon the development
of German social thought. Though Friedrich Georg Juenger came to
express a severe disillusionment with technology after the war,"'"
Hiedegger credited his brother's theory with having produced a
restatement of the theory of the will-to-power appropriate to the
2
modern technological age. Moreover in other intellectual circles,
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Juenger and Schmitt*s work was taken as the central yardstick of
totalitarian irrationalism in the technological world. This is true
in particular of its treatment by the Frankfurt School of Sociology,
w ich has proceeded in its woik under the banner of "Critical Theory".
Early essays by Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse written in the years
immediately after the Nazi seizure of power attribute to revolutionaiy-
nationalism a central role in the development of the Nazi ideology
and the policy of the Third Reich. Marcuse for example describes
Nazism - and by implication fascism as a whole - in the following way:
"The establishment of the total-authoritarian state was
accompanied by the annunciation of a new political world-view;
heroic-voelkisch realism became the governing theory.... The new
world-view is a great reservoir for all the currents that have
been deluging "liberalist" political and social theory since
World War I." 3
They had in effect drawn the same mistaken conclusion of
Rauschning. They had inserted revolutionaiy-nati nalism into the
empty ideological core of the Nazi movement. But they had gone
further. They both viewed "heroic realism" not only as the ideology
of Nazism but as the culmination of philosophical irrationalism in
European thought.^" It was heir to the revolt against reason
inaugurated by Nietzsche and Bergson with their vitalist philosophy
of life. 7hile avoiding the disastrous assvanption of Lukacs* work
on the "destruction of reason" which ended up tracing the emergence
of Hitler back to Schelling, there nonetheless remained among the left-
Hegelians a firm conviction that European thought had ended in the
disaster of Nazism. In retrospect the figures of Thorns Mann and
Max Weber were to stand for Lukacs and Marcuse respectively as the
swansong of the bourgeois age. The German emigres from Frankfurt
felt themselves to be limbo after 1933 - perhaps a form of afterlife
in which it became impossible to countenance even in the est ar^y
continuance of classic bourgeois liberalism. Yet their feelings
towards the irrational ism which had destroyed it were ambivalent.
Horkheimer admitted that he shared some of the irrationalist hostility
towards the analytical rationalism and atomic individualism of
Western philosophy. But from a Hegelian standpoint, the irrationalist
abandonment of historical reason had been intolerable. Heroic realism
in particular had used its rejection of bourgeois individualism as
the pretext for the irrational call to violence and sacrifice.
Moreover it had modernised nineteenth century irrationalism by applying
it to technology. This according to Horkheimer was particularly
evident in the work of Spengler and Juenger. Here "reason and
technology unite above all under the concept of sacrifice. The ethos
of work, which incorporates this positive relation to rational powers
5is itself irrational,"^ Horkheimer accepted Juenger's contention
that "technology is of cultic origin which has unique symbols at its
disposal and behind whose operations a power-struggle between Gestalts
is concealed". ^
Juenger's technological slave-utopia in fact provided an important
conceptual pillar for Marcuse and Horkheimer's work on the nature of
¥/estern technology. For it gave an account, to them at least, of the
irrational nature of rational technology. But they arrived at this
position through an amazing process of distortion. Whereas Juenger's
vision was a dream of slavery he thought bourgeois society incapable
of creating, Marcuse ascribes it to the veiy basis of bourgeois society.
Whereas Juenger's vision of a technological "worker's state" has its
most recognizable model in Stalin's Russia, Marcuse identified it with
western capitalism. Moreover he identified it with what he regarded as
the most advanced form of monopoly capitalism in the west - Germany
under Hitler. It was an identification which could only be made by
3^4 •
regarding Juenger, like Rauschning had done, as a Nazi thinker.
The result of this is that Marcuse explains the development of Nazism
in purely Juengerian terms. It occurs when "merely partial
mobilisation" is no longer enough and "total mobilisation" is
required to subject the individual to "the discipline of the
authoritarian state". Concerning the Nazi destruction of culture
Kttrcuse also took his cue from Juenger. Total mobilisat ion was the
key to the destruction of those "progressive aspects of culture
centred around the idea of the personality".' The point here is
not merely that Marcuse was historically inaccurate in regarding
Germany in 1937 as a country of total mobilisation, (it did not
achieve total mobilisat on until 1943 when the war was already lost).
It is that Marcuse is guilty of extreme hypostatization. For no good
reason, Juenger*s national-bolshevik wish-dream re-emerges as the reality
of modern capitalism in its most advanced form. That form is
identified with fascism. The dye had already been cast forKarcuse*s
attack on western technology.
This attack comes three decades later in the book which ast
him into the political limelight after a lifetime of relative
anonymity - One-Dimensional Man. By this time Marcuse had revised
a number of earlier assumptions. The ascetic and sacrificial
dimensions of heroic realism were no longer appropriate to a mass
consumer society reared in the wake of the Keynesian revolution. The
domination of technology over man no longer took place in a situation
of scarcity but in a situation of abundance. Moreover another influence
had firmly shaped itself upon Marcuse's writings. It was that of Freud.
This time the influence was totally positive, Marcuse confronted the
reality principle of modern life with the pleasure principle based on
genital sexuality. He placed Eros against Thanatos. In the technological
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age however he regarded it necess ry to locate the destructive
nature of the aggressive instinct within the apparatus of technology
itself. In his book one sees an epic combat between two forms of
Bergsonian elan vital - libidinal energy and the concealed will-to-power
of totalitarian technology. The latter Marcuse claimed, in a tone of
resignation and cultural despair which he had taken from his enemies
of a bygone era, was almost invariably the winner. The domination of
technology is totally Juengerian in content and dimension:
"By virtue of the way in which it has organised its
technological base, contemporary society tends to be
totalitarian.... technological rationality reveals its
political character as it becomes the great vehicle of
better domination, creating a truly totalitarian
universe in which society and nature, mind and body are
kept in a state of permanent mobilisation for the defence
of this universe". 8
The import of this is made clearer in Marcuse's speech on
Max Weber at Heidelberg in 1965» where he misleadingly attributes to
Weber the components of a technological rationality outlined by Juenger
after Weber's death. It lies in the concept of technical reason.
Marcuse reads into it not only Juenger's concept of technology but also
Heidegger's interpretation of that concept. In Heidegger's existential
formulation technology was the mystical source of a tranquil Being,
whose active expression in the real world was restless, destructive
gand nihilistic. It is self-dosed, out of reach, exploiting
technological rationality, dominating man, but itself inaccessible to
reason. Marcuse places this Heideggerian notification of Being at
the basis of the modern Western World:
"The very concept of technical reason is itself perhaps
ideological. Not only the application of technology but
technology itself is domination (of nature and men) - methodical
scientific, calculated calculating control. Specific purposes
and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology
subsequently and from the outside; they enter the construction
of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-
social project; it is interested in what a society and its
ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a
purpose of domination is substantive and belongs to the very form
of technical reason." 10
3^6.
The link with Juenger at this point becomes clear. Technical reason
is part of the Sestalt of one-dimensional man, in the same way that
technology is the means by which the G-estalt of the worker mobilises
the world for destruction. The worker becomes one-dimensional man.
The relevance of Marcuse's critique to the Cold War and the
possibilities of global destruction cannot be underestimated. But
its originality can be questioned. Among Juenger's post-war
writings one can find some attempt to update his own vision. dpace-
travel is the adventure of the modem worker; the power-blocs
confronting each other with nuclear weapons^ Juenger gleefully
compares to children playing with matches in a burning bam. 11
Juenger's wish-dream is Mareuse*s nightmare. But the same nightmare
is identified with western reality. Democracy is merely a window-
dressing. Freedom is a function of "repressive tolerance". All
thought is subordinate to the demands of technology. Juenger's
seminal suggestion for the enslavement of knowledge and language are
developed by Marcuse into a frontal assault on Western philosophy.
Technology had been at the source of Juenger's'revolution sans phrase.'
It now stood at the source of "the closing of the universe of discourse".
Like Roland Barthes Marcuse claims that "the closed language does not
12
demonstrate and explain - it communicates decision dictum and conmand."
But this para-language of technical mason has a familiar context.
It is the same as the military analogy of "soldierly style" used by
Juenger thirty years previously. Much as he protests against it,
Marcuse can only do so with a convolu':eti dialectic which
seems to derive its momentum from its own aridity. Unlike Orwell, he
has not mastered the secret of doublespeak. Unlike Lukacs, Marcuse
is a Hegelian who does not understand modem literature. He reduces
poetry to a purely cognitive conceit. The verbosity of aros is scholastic
wind. Reading One-Dimensional Man as a plea for the conservation of
language in the face of silence, one is reminded how much the inflation
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of language is its other disease. In the global market place of the
twentieth century Zarathustra would probably cry out "Language is
dead!" But its destroyers would have already scooped him.
In his other main focus of attack - namely the instrumentalism
of modern science, Marcuse presents us less with an attack upon the
usage of science by military or governmental establishments, than
upon the epistemological basis of modern science itself. His attack
is different in kind both from that of C. Wright Mills and Noah
Chomsky and should not be viewed in the same light. For Marcuse
science is vulnerable to political control for epistemological reasons.
Its main defect in his eyes is what Arthur Koestler has called "the
vanishing act" ^ inherent in the discovery of the theories of relativity
and indeterminacy and in the failure of all traditional concepts of
nature matter, substance, particle, mass and even energy to withstand
the assault of mathematical physics. For this reason philosophers
like Russell had been stimulated to suggest that we could only know the
mathematical properties of the universe; scientists like Jeans claimed
that the cosmos approximated more to the structure of a universal mind
rather than a universal machine, The modern philosophy of science
dismissed at one blow the nineteenth oentury materialism which not only
underlay scientific thinking but also social thought. It was also
unamenable to the suggestion of an immanent dialectic in history,
especially since the assumption of a four dimensional continuum in
relativity theory had wrecked most orthodox philosophical concepts of
time and duration. To what type of modern philosophy does modern
science prove amenable? One possible answer was the existential concept
of Being. Carl von Weiszaecker stressed the greater relevance of
Heidegger's concept of Being to the discoveries of modern atomic
physics than the Cartesian dualism of Res cogitnns and Res hxtensa-
The indivisibility of Being in space or time iuid in fact been stressed
more by Parmenides, the pre-Socratic, than by Heidegger, his German
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follower, who is a philosopher of mind. But the abandonment by
modern science of rigid distinctions between mind and body and space
and time, which prompted Georgio di Santillana to call Einstein a
"true Eleatic" certainly reinstated the feasibility of regarding the
cosmos as unified indivisible Being.
The abandonment of the concept of determinism, the problematic
nature of time-sequences, the uncertainty relations of quantum theory
has destroyed science as the sole and unquestionable yardstick of
absolute truth. Even in 1932 the consequences of this had not been
lost on Jucnger. He used the idea that only the mathematical properties
of nature can be known as an analogy for his model of technological
domination. The relationship of the worker to his Gestalt. he claimed
wrs that "of the mathematical to the metaphysical". But this was not
a serious analogue. It was an act of political cynicism. It was an
attempt to exploit a principle of uncertainty. The Gest It was cythical,
not scientific and this accounted for its devaluation of history. For
Mircuse on the other hand, the refusal of scientific philosophers to
adopt some yardstick of absolute truth is a disaster, because it makes
them vulnerable to instrumentalism. If science has no ultimate
rationality, it can be put to apy political purposes. But what is his
alternative? It could only be that science immunises itself by
adopting a mythology of absolute certainty which in no way corresponds to
modem scientific discovery. In human history this is provided by-
dialectic reason. In nature there is no equivalent. M reuse's attack
3^9
is thus on the absence of scientific ominiscience, that same absence
which Juenger saw as a principle of totalitarian domination. But for
the latter its rationale was a debased act of freewill. It was
decisionistic. Viewing the modern age as the age in which man's
ideals were constantly betrayed by his failure to live up to them,
Juenger took this to its logical conclusion. He claimed that it
was possible to betray all ideals in advance by debasing them in one's
own mind.
"The best answer to the betrayal of the spirit by life
if the betrayal of the spirit by the spirit; and it is one
of the cruellest pleasures of our time to participate in the
work of destruction." 17
In his own account of technology Marcuse reifies this voluntary
act of devaluation into a totally determinate technical reason.
'hen he writes that "the technological a priori becomes a political
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a priori" he argues that the principle of uncertainty capitulates
before pure instrumentalism and the scientist becomes the slave of
politics. But politicians control scientific research for more
obvious and straightforward reasons than this, and. the epistemology of
modern science really makes very little difference. If arything
its vanishing act would make it potentially subversive to accepted
ideas ot order, Marcuse's objections therefore can only be understood
as part of a conflict en famille in German idealist philosoply. To cede
cryptically to German existentialism the doubtful privilege of being the
ideology of "western technology is a typical hypostatization in Marcuse's
own brand of Hegelian idealism. But, even if it does conjure up the
rather odd vision of Heidegger hiding somewhere in the hite House,
it explains very little.
In the battle between Left-hegelianism nd Right-existentialism
for the soul of modern technology, what to paraphrase Marcuse, are
"the chance of the Hegelian alternatives? li The awkward and rather
discordant feature of Marcuse's analysis is the attempt to fuse
totalitarian domination with a liberal ideology of technological
progress. He admits that technology can alleviate poverty and
disease and stimulate the condition for widespread prosperity. Yet
it demands totalitarian organisation. But since totalitarianism
resides in technology and not in the political regime and its forms of
control over social life, there is little political or historical
discussion to be found in Marcuse. But having criticised technology
so vehemently, he still remains Utopian about its prospects. This
above all testifies to his popularity at least for a short period of
time with a Hew Left temporarily disillusioned with the working-class
and disgusted by the entropic "end-of-ideology" thesis purveyed by many
liberal academics. Is he therefore something of a twentieth century
St-Simon? At first sight it might seem so. Closer investigation
reveals however that unlike St. Simon he does not reject metaphysics
in his search for a technological Utopia. In fact he seeks an alliance
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between science and metaphysics. That alliance cast in Hegelian
trappings a3 the /ufhebung of the totalitarian world, conforms almost
precisely to the demands made by Schmitt and Juenger for the inauguration
of the totalitarian world. There is an uncanny sense of d£ja vu. Marcuse,
like Schmitt before him, tries to rescue technology decisionistically from
the grasp of 'progress'. At the same time he claims to be moving away from
totalitarianism and not towards it. It is like seeing a familiar film
being played backwards with the sound track still running forwards.
In the 'film'Marcuse claims that "the scientific transformation of
the world" contains the basis for its "metaphysical transcendence". The
condition for this is "the completion of technological rationality". Once
this is achieved the w^y is open for the pure "quantification of values"
through technology:
371.
".... This (transcendence) does not mean the revival
of values, spiritu 1 or other, widen re to supplement the
scientific transformation of an and nature. On the
contrary the historic 1 ? c ieveaent of science and technology-
has rendered possible the translation of values into technical
tasks. Consequently wh< t is t stake is the redefinition of
values in technical terms, s elements in the technological
process.... From the quantification of secondary qualities,
science would proceed to the quantification of values.w 20
larcuse sees technology, therefore, as being beyond good and evil.
The quantification of values c n only signify the abolition of values
through a technological metaphysic. Technology is not the basis
of a better life. It is that better lire. .Art science raid eros
are all subordinated to it. They become part of the revalidation
of metaphysics" which accompanies technological transform ti n. In
other words, they are the handmaidens of f metaphysical technology,
darcuse's Utopia, therefore, is • i.uost Identical with Juenger's -
but with one crucial difference. It is bereft of the will-to-power.
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It is based instead on "the pacified existence" of hum nity. ' Therefore
it is no longer destructive m; nihilistic because it h. s conquered the
tendencies to domination inherent in technology.
But how is it possible for the will—to-power to disappe; r since
the whole point of Juenger's metaphysic ma the assertion of total
domination? 'Hie answer must be found in the other influence on
Marcuse - that of Freud. reuse identified in the destructives ss
of technology, the manifestation of the aggression instinct. Unlike
Freud who, in Civilisation and its Discontents, was sceptical about
the eliain tion of aggression from human behaviour, darcuse, like other
non-Freudians, claimed th t it could under the right social circumstances
be supplanted by the sex-instinct. But it seems unlikely th?-1 Freud
wauld have followed them. Thomas ann has suggested a direct link
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between Freud and Nietzsche and Schopenhauer and the theory of the
unconscious certainly owes something not only to the will-to-power
but to Schopenhauer's more metaphysical portrait of the restless will
asserting itself destructively in the real world in order to achieve
tranquility. Freud assumed aggression to be a constant and fundamental
feature of man, although as a rationalist he assumed that under many
circumstances it could be mastered. Marcuse's 'pacification of
existence' ig a Freudian quest for mastery over aggression and the
will-to-power. He speaks of "linking liberation and mastery". But
how is it possible to master aggression and power and at the same time
escape from their own shadow? M&rcuse's answer is cognitive mastery -
the power of rational cognition to eliminate the irrational, Freud had
already established the psychoanalytical cure. M .reuse wants to indulge
in the therapy of the social. He demands the "rational" application of
psychoanalysis to those who persist in vivid and morbid imaginings
and fail to recognise "the scientific rational character of imagination"
OX
(sic).'" In the same way he wants to eliminate all "irrational
resistance" to oentralised social planning. Marcuse's idea of
technology is the planned rational mastery of the irrational. But in s0
doing it relys entirely upon the fundamental nihilist premise
of that irrationalism - the abolition of values.
Marouse's work thus comes full circle. He dreams about creating the
technology he wishes to abolish. Technology is not finally transcended.
It recurs. In the language of that philosophical tradition of which
Marcuse is a part, Becoming attempts to supercede Being but is finally
supplanted by it. But what, one might ask, has happened to the
"Vill-to-Fower? Even if Marcuse wants to translate values into
technical tasks at least he wants to abolish the will-to-power as well?
In his correspondence with Freud, rnold Zweig, the novelist, claimed
that Analysis has accomplished all the feats reserved by Nietzsche for
the will-to-power. It "had reversed all values, conquered Christianity,
disclosed the true Antichrist". Freud had discovered the world that
Nietzsche had longed for - a world beyond Good and Evil. Zweig
continues "You have attained what Nietzsche would have gladly achieved
hiiaself; the scientific description and explanation of the human soul.
For Zweig this was to be the basis for a monumental study on the two
great men. Freud replied "I don't need to read it. You could write
it when I am no longer here and you are haunted by the memory of me."
Like one of his patients, Freud consciously resisted the truth of his
unconscious. For had he not broken down the will-to-power into its
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